

END Papers are published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation as part of the *European Nuclear Disarmament* project, which also produces the monthly *END Info* newsletter.

Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd.
5 Churchill Park
Nottingham
NG4 2HF

email: tomunterrainer@russfound.org

www.russfound.org
www.spokesmanbooks.com

EUR

END Info is a monthly newsletter produced by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation covering disarmament, nuclear threats and anti-nuclear campaigns from a European perspective . . .

END
INFO



For more information or to
subscribe, contact:
tomunterrainer@russfound.org

After the INF Treaty. *What next?*

Joachim Wernicke

Prepared for the International Meeting: Nuclear Security in Europe after Collapse of the INF Treaty Brussels, Belgium, September 14th, 2019.

Dr.-Ing. Joachim Wernicke lives in Berlin. He is a physicist interested in renewable energy and military technology. In opposition to the stationing of US nuclear weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany during the 1980s, he began critical research into Western military and economic policies. Dr. Wernicke prepared the German translation of Commander Robert Green's Security without Nuclear Deterrence, which is now available (see back).

Looking back: the NATO 'Double-Track Decision' of 1979

By 1976 the Soviet Union had developed and deployed a new type of land-based mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile called SS-20 in the West. Such missiles are called *ballistic*, from the ancient Greek word for *throw*, because after a short rocket-propelled launch phase they continue their flight without further propulsion on a curve-shaped flight path as if they had been thrown like a stone. The range of SS-20 was about 5,000 km, insufficient to reach mainland USA. SS-20 was a solid-fueled rocket based on the 2 main stages of a 3-stage intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) called SS-16, the first Soviet ICBM with solid propellant and deployment not in geographically fixed underground silos but mobile on road vehicles, increasing their survivability under attack. Thus the SS-20 was a byproduct of the modernization of Soviet ICBMs. It was a heavy device, heavier than the technically comparable US ICBM *Minuteman*. The standard payload of the SS-20 were 3 independently targeted thermonuclear warheads, each with about 150 kiloton yield, twelve times the explosive energy of the atom bomb which in 1945 had destroyed the Japanese city of Hiroshima. About 600 SS-20 missiles had been deployed.

In 1979 NATO argued: the SS-20 are unacceptably endangering Western Europe. Therefore in order to restore the balance NATO from 1983 on will deploy a similar number of new land-based US nuclear missiles, namely 108 ballistic *Pershing-2* missiles with 1850 km range and 464

Tomahawk cruise missiles with 2500 km range, each with one warhead. The Pershing-2 would be deployed in West Germany only, the Tomahawk in West Germany, Great Britain, Belgium and Italy. In the meantime NATO would negotiate with the Soviet Union to scrap the SS-20 in exchange for renouncing the deployment of Pershing-2 and Tomahawk. NATO called this the *Double-Track Decision*.

These negotiations occurred. But they failed, and the deployment of the new US missiles started in 1983, against widespread public resistance in Western Europe and the USA.

Why SS-20?

In the 1970s the Soviet Union had about 5.000 nuclear warheads on ICBMs which could reach the US mainland, but of course could just as well reach any point in Western Europe. It was a vast overkill capacity. So the question remains: why deploy SS-20 and about 1,800 additional warheads against Western Europe?

An official Soviet reasoning is not known. It has to be derived from what is known about Soviet war planning at that time. Immediately after the end of the Cold War, from 1991 to 1994, US Air Force General Lee Butler was the leader of the US Strategic Air Command (SAC), which from 1992 on combined with the US ballistic missile submarine forces to form the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which then was led by Butler. During that time he had met his Soviet military counterpart, General Igor Sergejev, and discussed military strategies with him. Retired from his military service, Lee Butler reported in 2015:

“How is it that we subscribed to a deterrence strategy that required near-perfect understanding of an enemy from whom we were deeply alienated and largely isolated? How could we pretend to understand the motivations and intentions of a Soviet leadership, absent any substantive personal association? Why did we imagine a nation that had survived successive invasions and mind-numbing losses would accede to a strategy premised on fear of nuclear war? Little wonder that intentions and motives were consistently misread. While we clung to the notion that nuclear war could reliably deterred, Soviet leaders became convinced that such a war might be thrust upon them and, if so, it must not be lost. Driven by fear, they took Herculeanean measures to fight and survive no matter the odds or the cost.”¹

In an interview in 2015 Butler had made clear what that meant in detail:

“This is one of the frailties of deterrence: the Soviets never bought into that sort of philosophy. For them, one warhead on the motherland, and that was it. If they should lose their leadership in an initial attack, they made provisions for the forces to be launched [by various lesser officials or military officers].”²

Thus the Soviets never believed in NATO’s *nuclear deterrence* or *flexible response* strategies. One US warhead on the Soviet motherland, and that would be the trigger for the full Soviet counterattack against the US territory.

This view is indeed confirmed by the information which historians after 1990 collected about the Soviet strategy. A fictional scenario from the 1960s and 70s had been verified by German military historians to be realistic.³

The NATO defense line goes through the middle of West Germany: In the North along the Weser river, in the South along the Lech river. The cities of Hamburg, Hannover and Munich remain undefended. It is not reported what the trigger for the following events would have been, but: a few dozen Soviet nuclear missiles are fired from Czechoslovakia and East Germany which destroy the military structure in West Germany, thus command centers, airfields, barracks and supply storages. Some 30 000 Warsaw Pact tanks and motor vehicles are on the move westward. The troops are forced through the contaminated area. Due to the shielding effect of the vehicles, radiation sickness effects start slowly and do not prevent activity of the soldiers in the first days. Parachute troops take bridges and the remains of military centers. Within 6 days West Germany is conquered. On the 9th day Soviet troops stand at the coast of the English channel.

France from 1966 on was *de facto* neutral as it had thrown US forces and NATO headquarters out of the country and had stepped out of NATO’s military integration. So West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands – all with US military installations – were the areas of interest for the Soviet invasion. How Great Britain would have been involved, has not been reported. This Soviet attack would have driven the US out of Western Europe, at the cost of at least the total destruction of West Germany. It is not reported if this would have been necessarily accompanied by a large Soviet attack on the US mainland.

Anyway, the SS-20 missiles deployed on Soviet territory fitted into this thinking of the mid 1970s. As the Soviets replaced their old liquid-propellant ICBMs by new ones with solid propellants which are more

easily manageable, by combining new propulsion modules they obtained SS-20 as a byproduct. In order to hit the relevant NATO targets in Western Europe the Soviets would no longer need to fire nuclear missiles from Warsaw Pact countries which were known as politically unreliable and would perhaps resist by a revolt of the population.

Back to the initial question: why instead of the SS-20s not use some of the immense number of Soviet ICBM warheads against targets in Western Europe? This is not officially known. One plausible looking reason is the following: respect for the US ICBM early warning system, in order to mark the SS-20 flight paths being obviously *different from ICBM flight paths and flight directions*, to give the clear and early de-alarming signature: these missiles are *not* targeted on the US mainland. Therefore it was essential for the Soviet military *not* to use any ICBMs against Western Europe.

However, the SS-20's warhead re-entry vehicles were targeted and released sequentially from the main missile during the mid-course flight phase at space altitude. The released warheads then went on ballistic flight paths towards their targets, without guidance maneuvers. Thus the hit accuracy was low, in the hundreds of meters, sufficient to destroy large areas by air blasts, but not sufficient to *reliably* destroy underground command bunkers. To destroy such a target with sufficient reliability multiple SS-20 hits would be needed, explaining the relatively large number of missiles and warheads.

Why Pershing-2 and Tomahawk?

The same argument as for the SS-20 is valid for the new NATO missiles: why didn't the US use their excessive amount of warheads on ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles for the purposes for which Pershing-2 and Tomahawk allegedly were intended, to balance the SS-20s? Technically this would have been possible.

This question becomes irrelevant, however, in view of the fact that Pershing-2 and Tomahawk gave the US military a *fundamentally new ability*: due to their precision target guidance both systems achieved hit accuracies in the order of tens of meters with earth-penetrating warheads, thus allowing them to target and *reliably* destroy deep underground command bunkers for the first time. Various proud press declarations by the NATO commander-in-chief, US General Rogers, in 1983 had confirmed this fact.

Pershing-2 was a two-stage ballistic rocket with automatic radar target

guidance. It worked by radar image comparison with a stored radar image of the target area. This equipment was relatively heavy weight and of a large size. But no other ballistic missile in the world had that hit accuracy at that time. The flight time over the maximum range was about 10 minutes. There was no defense against such an incoming maneuvering missile at about 12 times the speed of sound.

Tomahawk, still operational today in the sea-based version, is a winged cruise missile, in other words a jet-propelled drone traveling at the subsonic speed of a commercial airliner – about 800 km/h – and thus requiring about 3 hours to travel its maximum range. The missile flies at low altitude, typically some ten meters above ground, below radar detection. So it was in the 1980s – and still is – difficult to defend against such cruise missiles. The navigation and target guidance was obtained by radar measurement of the ground terrain elevation and permanently comparing this pattern along the flight path with a pre-stored three-dimensional terrain elevation model.

In the 1980s the term *decapitation strike* spread through western military publications: in case of war it is more important to destroy instantly the command structure of the enemy than his weapons and troops. In the case of the Soviet Union it was known that there were nearly 100 underground command bunker targets, all located in the greater Moscow region, some of them a few hundred meters deep. Using two missiles per target – in case one of the two should fail – you would be able to perform an efficient decapitation strike with about 200 missiles.

However you have to be fast, faster than the attacked party can react. Here Pershing-2 deployed in West Germany was an innovation too: the flight time of an ICBM from the US mainland to the Moscow region, by the laws of physics, is about 30 minutes, of a submarine-launched ballistic missile launched from the deepwater Atlantic about 20 minutes, of a Pershing-2 launched from West German soil about 10 minutes.

Within 30 minutes a certain assessment of the situation and an appropriate reaction might be possible by swiftly evaluating electronic sensor data on missile warning. At only 20 minutes missile flight time this becomes most difficult or even impossible. But at 10 minutes flight time, including the time needed for missile detection and flight path analysis, any prudent assessment and decision about an adequate reaction is illusory. This meant that *only* the Pershing-2 missiles were suitable for a decapitation strike. The Tomahawks were unsuitable, due to their long travel time and because of the risk that missiles might malfunction, crash *en route* and thus give an advance warning to the victim of the attack.

That the Soviets took the danger of a decapitation strike very serious can be seen from their preparation of an automated ICBM launch system called *Dead Hand*, also *Perimeter*. This system of Second Strike against the US would be activated by the first nuclear detonation on Moscow and the breakdown of the communications between the leadership and the military – a real *Doomsday Machine*.

Even assuming that the officially reported range of 1000 nautical miles (1850 km) for Pershing-2 is true data, the missile would be able to reach the greater Moscow area from West Germany. The Soviet side assumed a greater range of the missile. The NATO-official number of Pershing-2 missiles deployed was 108. However it was known that the procurement demand at the US Congress had been in excess of 300 missiles. Finally according to the INF treaty, 234 Pershing-2 missiles were waiting to be scrapped. So the officially given number of 108 was far from the truth. NATO had lied to the public.

The next surprise: the Pershing-2 were based in West Germany at three locations in the South-West of the country where the predecessors *Redstone* (1958-64) and *Pershing-1* and *Pershing-1a* respectively (1964-83) had been based. These missiles have therefore been based exclusively on West German territory. For the firing positions they were driven on special vehicles via public roads and motorways into open positions in West German woods. So they could have easily been attacked after the beginning of a war. The missiles lay on their wheeled erector-launchers without any side wall protection, so any such missile could have been blasted on the ground by a private sniper rifle from hundreds of meters distance, by the bullet impact igniting the explosive rocket propellant. Even spontaneous self-ignition of the rocket propellant could happen; this was experienced at an accident on the Pershing-2 base at Heilbronn in 1986, leaving 3 soldiers dead and 16 injured. So obviously these missiles were never suitable for a *reaction after* a Soviet attack. They were suitable only for a US First Strike: *use them or lose them*. The same applied for the Tomahawk firing units. The larger numbers of these missiles could be used after the Pershing-2 First Strike for destroying less time-critical targets in the Soviet Union.

So the conclusion: Pershing-2 and Tomahawk had nothing to do with the SS-20. They were a new category of First-Strike-only weapons to destroy the Soviet command structure. In return the Soviet Union never had and the Russians today don't have such a capability against the US, from geographic reasons alone: they lack military bases near the US mainland.

The Soviet Union criticized the decapitation strike potential of Pershing-2. For instance Valentin Falin, Soviet Ambassador to West Germany at that time, declared in 1983:

“Here are now the Pershing-2 and there are the SS-20. ... A computer error would be enough. The US computers from 1978 until 1980 within only 20 months had 170 errors. Also with our computers something can go wrong. With the Pershing-2 only six to ten minutes away – do you think there will be a meeting of the Polit Bureau or a session of the Central Committee? The only possibility remaining to the other side is: Launching as long as the command centers are not yet destroyed.”⁴

Was that an inadequate Soviet threat of a surprise nuclear attack against West Germany? Or was there a logic in Falin’s words? As a consequence of the Pershing-2 deployment in West Germany the Soviets deployed about 100 mobile nuclear SS-23 short-range missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

These missiles obviously were targeted at the Pershing-2 missiles and other nuclear weapon sites in West Germany, with about 5 minutes flight time. This acute duel situation with the full risk on the West German population could have been triggered by an alleged or real technical malfunction or human error. The West German government in tune with the main media kept this danger secret from its citizens but it was leaked by the non-government peace movement into parts of the public.

The INF Treaty and its End

In 1987 US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Michail Gorbachev agreed on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF treaty) which banned all US and Soviet land-based missiles with ranges from 500 to 5500 km – nuclear or conventional – including their launchers. Even the missile launchers themselves – without missiles – were banned. The missiles and their launchers were destroyed under mutual verification. Apparently as a gesture of goodwill Gorbachev included the SS-23 missiles into the dismantling plan of the treaty even though their range according to Soviet claims was less than 500 km.

The INF treaty brought security for Western Europe and for the Soviet Union. The security of the US remained unchanged by this process.

Why did Gorbachev take this step in 1987? A year earlier he had proposed to US President Reagan to commonly dismantle nuclear

weapons within 10 years'. Reagan refused. So to start nuclear disarmament with these land-based INF missiles might have been a motive for Gorbachev. But one of his priorities presumably was to remove the physical possibility of a US decapitation strike, which was achieved by the INF treaty for about three decades, until recently.

In 2016 the US opened for operation a ballistic missile defense system, *Aegis Ashore* in Romania, allegedly against missiles from Iran – which, although Iran has staged missile tests, are no threat to Europe. The US base in Romania is thought to be supplied with anti-aircraft/anti-missile rockets SM-3 (*Standard Missile 3*), 1.5 ton in weight and 7 meters long. However, Tomahawk cruise missiles can be also be launched from the vertical launchers type Mk-41, having about the same weight and dimensions as SM-3. The launcher system in Romania is the structurally original equipment of the *Aegis* destroyers and cruisers of the US Navy, in this special case installed at a position on land. Thereby it violates the INF treaty, even without missiles in its launch tubes. The Russians complained about that violation of the treaty. NATO and all its member state governments ignored this complaint.

Even before, in 2010/11, the US had tested intermediate-range missiles Minotaur IV, with 3000 kg payload over 5000 km downrange⁵, a violation of the INF treaty which remained widely unnoticed and unchallenged.

About at the same time the US government complained that Russia had developed and deployed a land-based cruise missile *SSC-8* (Russian designation *9M729*) with a range larger than 500 km. The Russians confirmed the existence of the missile but denied the claim of treaty violation: the range would be less than 500 km. But the Trump government stuck with its claim. So the situation called for a neutral investigation. In January 2019 in Moscow the Russians presented to the international press something which they claimed would be the missile system *SSC-8*. But the neutral range check of the hardware didn't happen, and the European governments failed to press for it.

Around 1990 cruise missiles with satellite-based precision guidance (instead of terrain map correlation) became state of the art. Since then the US military in their various wars fired more than 2000 Tomahawk missiles with a standard 500kg conventional high explosive warhead and a range of about 2000 km. This warhead is, in its destructive power, comparable to the *blockbuster* bombs dropped on German cities in the Second World War. Thus these missiles, fired from naval ships by the *Aegis* system, became one of the main weapon systems in the US wars. A Tomahawk is able to hit and destroy on its full range a certain individual building by its

pre-programmed geographic coordinates. One shot – one hit, regardless what distance, an entirely new long-range artillery capability. This fact has an important consequence: there is no longer any military role for nuclear weapons – with one exception: the destruction of deep underground bunkers for which the conventional 500 kg charge is far too weak.

Russia also has cruise missiles with ranges greater than 500 km, that can be fired from ships. This was not a violation of the INF treaty which only refers to land-based missiles. Such Russian missiles fired from the Caspian Sea were used in 2015 to hit targets in Syria, at a 1500 km distance.

The existence of these Russian sea-borne long-range cruise missile doesn't necessarily mean that the range of SSC-8 is greater than 500 km, as the US claim. The range of a missile depends on its military purpose. If the missile is supposed to be used as an army battlefield weapon to carry a certain large load of high explosive with pinpoint accuracy into a ground target in the war front area, for instance a bridge, then a 500 km range might be more than sufficient for any tactical and operational purposes. Generally the range of a missile depends on its payload. In the case of a cruise missile, by exchanging payload weight for fuel weight the range can be modified within technical limits.

NATO kept echoing the US claim that SSC-8 violates the INF treaty even though this claim was never checkable verified. The NATO member state governments failed to find out the truth about the range of the missile by national activities of their own. This is surprising because it was the key question about the future of the INF Treaty, which did not concern the security of the US but strongly concerns the security of Western Europe.

In February 2019 Trump unilaterally canceled the INF treaty. The Russians followed a few days later with their cancellation. Perhaps they feel free now to copy the performance of their large continental direct neighbors like China, India and Pakistan which were not inhibited by the INF treaty and *all* possess land-based intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles in their arsenals. And they are free now to produce land-based intermediate-range missiles with which, in a crisis, they can destroy the time-critical US installations in Germany within about five minutes flight time from their (in 1945) Soviet-annexed former German Eastern Prussia enclave (area Königsberg–Kaliningrad)

Why did Trump cancel the INF Treaty?

Land-based intermediate-range missiles in Europe are technically not able to reach the US mainland. Even though NATO leaders talk about an

allegedly necessary countermeasure against SSC-8, European governments have already made clear that they would not accept new land-based US missiles on their territory. So such missiles will not become a new business case for the US weapon industry as Pershing-2 and Tomahawk did in the 1983 period.

The question remains: what is Trump's intention with the canceling of the INF treaty? Official reasons are not known. Initial claims that it would be necessary to include threats by Chinese missiles not covered by the treaty have officially been denied by US military leaders⁶. So one has to make assumptions: does Trump want to launch a new nuclear arms race against Russia, delivering the payback for the corporations who have financed his election campaign? Does he want to trigger the Russians to deploy new nuclear missiles particularly against Western Europe, so he can claim a *Russian threat*, leading to prolonged US military presence in Europe and to additional government funds for US armament?

Present land-based Russian missiles *SS-26 Iskander-M*, with a range of less than 500 km, thus allowed under the INF treaty, would only reach from the Russian enclave Kaliningrad to the Berlin region, just into the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone of former East Germany where by the two-plus-four contract of 1990 no US military infrastructure is permitted. In order to reach the US command bunkers in West Germany the required range from the Kaliningrad enclave is in excess of 1000 km. This range could be covered by existing Russian cruise missiles launched from ships in the Baltic or North Sea or – after cancellation of the INF Treaty – also with such cruise missiles from ground positions at Kaliningrad.

However, the approximately two-hour flight time of these cruise missiles for an attack against US installations in Germany brings the risk of premature detection, for instance by a missile crash en route. The required promptness of attack is achievable only by ballistic missiles. It is not known what range the Iskander-M has with a light-weight *low yield* nuclear warhead instead of a heavy conventional high explosive warhead. However, 1000 kilometers doesn't appear impossible, at least by technical modifications on the Iskander-M missile or by a new kind of missile which the Russians doubtlessly are able to produce in short time, using existing propulsion and guidance modules.

Did Trump by canceling the INF Treaty want to open to Russia the *legal* possibility to attack the US command bunkers in Germany?

Trying to imagine the Viewpoint from the Russian Side

Due to the insufficient communication between the NATO states and Russia there are no publicly accessible sources about the thinking in the Russian military today. But there are a lot of hints about what such a point of view could look like, based upon proven historical facts. Here a fictional ‘thinking model’ of a Russian military man from the Moscow region:

“Our problem is the USA with its expansive economic system ruling the country. Its first attempt to bring my country under control of US corporations and banks happened in 1918/19, at the end of World War One. However, this military invasion failed due to the resistance of our forces.

I see US presidents as often being puppets of the American military-industrial complex. They get into their positions by billion dollar payments from corporations for their election campaign, to manipulate public opinion via corrupted media, and subsequently, when in presidential office they have to deliver to those corporations. Is that democracy?

Our dictatorial leader Stalin had remained the same inhumane tyrant from 1927 to his death in 1953. So my country understandably in the 1930ies was seen by the Western states as a terrifying enemy. After the attack by the Nazi Wehrmacht on us in 1941 the US government switched its position toward us from a terrifying enemy to a welcome and needed ally in the war against Hitler. The goal in that war for us was to defend our homeland. The goal of the US, with Britain in tow, was merely economic. Neither Germany nor Italy nor Japan would have been able to do serious damage to the US mainland by attacking. Instead of opening of a Western land front in continental Europe, as announced from 1942, US airmen sat on the British island and, together with the Royal Air Force, restricted themselves to an air war against Germany. They carpet-bombed civilians in the German cities, thus committing war crimes, with maximum consumption of flying material and ammunition, without military effect at the front. So they left the front fighting against the Hitler army to us and sent us some armaments and supplies. But they delayed their promised ground invasion from the West until mid 1944 when the German army was weakened and on the retreat and our victorious front was swiftly moving westward. So they feared that we would achieve a German capitulation on our own and they would not obtain occupation zones and war reparations from a defeated

Germany.

A similar thing happened in East Asia: Japan declared capitulation one week after our troops joined the war in August 1945 and made swift progress in Manchuria against the Japanese army. They had not surrendered because of the destruction of two more cities by nuclear bombs, after the US had carpet-bombed and fire-stormed more than 60 other Japanese cities, including Tokyo: all war crimes. But after the capitulation the US didn't allow us to join them as an occupation power of Japan. These two nuclear weapons were actually meant to be a signal against us, to teach us about the power of the new weapon on which the US had the worldwide monopoly for years to come.

When the war was over in 1945 we had to mourn the largest number of casualties of any war party, and our war-torn country was in a very weak state, with the infrastructure destroyed. But the US government switched immediately back to hostile propaganda against us, as an allegedly almighty and infinitely evil power eager to conquer the world for communism, and which could only be contained by nuclear weapons.

The US accused us of having evicted millions of Germans and occupied Eastern European countries, but they kept it a secret from their public that all these awful post-war arrangements had been agreed between Stalin and the British leader Churchill in 1944. Having seen the all-penetrating swarms of US heavy bombers against the German cities, Stalin thought he would need a safety strip of land in Eastern Europe for the potential defense against this danger.

So starting in 1945, the US initiated the Cold War against us in order to obtain permanent military bases in Europe and Asia by which they over the years encircled us. Had they been encouraged by the initial military progress of Hitler's army against us to follow on his path with stronger means?

At the Potsdam Conference in 1945 the common military administration of Germany by four occupation powers, including France, had been agreed. From 1947 on the US with their followers Britain and France sabotaged this agreement by separating their occupation zones of Germany and like a surprise attack introducing a new currency, 'D-Mark', there, printed secretly in the US. Thus they caused the political and economic division of Germany and secured their permanent military presence in continental Europe, mainly in Germany, until today.

In addition they didn't use their occupation forces for their original

task to hold down any revival of Nazi power. Instead they started to prepare war against us, including nuclear weapons. We had never thought about war against our former ally USA. We hadn't threatened them. With our human losses and the war devastation of our country we wouldn't even be able – even if we had wanted – to seriously threaten the economically healthy US mainland, spared of any war damage. The US armaments industry had been inflated from 1941 by the war deliveries to Britain and us and by a large build-up of US forces. But even after the end of the war they kept this mechanism running instead of downscaling to pre-war levels. Since the traditional enemies Germany and Japan had been defeated, this giant armament business needed a new enemy. They took us for this new enemy, taking advantage of mistakes by our tyrannical and cruel government which we never had a chance to elect or to remove. By their Marshall Plan and military aid the US bought willing governments in Western Europe.

In 1949 the US intensified their war preparations in Europe by founding their military alliance NATO. They encircled us with airbases all over Western Europe and Asia and prepared for a nuclear First Strike against us. At that time we neither had nuclear weapons nor long-range bombers able to pose any relevant military threat against the US mainland.

During the Cold War the US propaganda machine complained daily about the lack of freedom and justice for our people, which was in fact true. But at the same time they threatened our lives day and night with their bomber planes circling around our country. These planes were armed with large-yield nuclear bombs and operated in alarm status prepared to change their flight courses at any time toward our cities and kill and injure millions of our people. This danger was increased by new types of bomber planes and nuclear missiles that were targeted at us. How had our people harmed the American people to receive this fate?

It is true that my country reacted in kind from around 1960, with our own nuclear missiles able to threaten the US mainland. But we only followed the steps the US had taken before us. It is not right, actually a crime, that we threaten the innocent American people and the people of the US allies in Europe and Asia in the same way the US military is threatening our innocent people. But how else can we keep the US military-industrial power from attacking and murdering us?

It is documented that by 1961 the US had prepared a nuclear First Strike on the landmass of our country and our East European satellite states – plus China which at that time was not involved in the conflict.

But the Chinese had a communist government too. This was sufficient for US business to come up with a comprehensive death sentence, not only for us but for the clueless people of China too. The US government expected its victory from this attack, and they had calculated the price of a total of 600 million (six hundred million!) dead in Europe and Asia – a hundred times the Nazi Holocaust⁷. They didn't even calculate the fatalities by the radioactive fallout on neutral countries. Can you imagine the fear that at least three generations in my country grew up with?

This historically unprecedented war crime of mass killing of hostages was the official strategy of the US government and still is today, called 'nuclear deterrence'. It is motivated by economic reasons only, namely highly paid government contracts to private armaments corporations to develop, manufacture and service the US nuclear forces. This crime would be committed by a government that claims to be democratic and Christian. We wonder why the citizens apparently do not have the power to change this fundamentally criminal system.

After their nuclear 'victory' against us and our Chinese neighbor, what would the US do with that continent-sized devastated and contaminated area full of dead and dying people, animals and plants? They couldn't even enter this area with their troops for years or even decades because of high radiation dose rates and contamination even of the air filled with highly poisonous radioactive isotope particles. All this for "national defense" bills paid by the American people to armament corporations?

The large US-led wars in Korea (1950-53) and Vietnam (1964-75) were less about US victory than about consumption of US-manufactured weaponry and ammunition. Already at the beginning of these wars it was doubtless that the basically political conflicts in these countries could not be solved by military actions. But they were good sales for the armament industry: in the Vietnam war the US consumed more than twice the armament quantities used in the Second World War on all fronts taken together. The target areas for the US bombardments were mainly in South Vietnam which allegedly was to be defended but lost millions of its people by this 'defense'. The US lost this war.

In 1983 the US had for the first time organised their ability for a decapitation strike against our military command system, by its pinpoint-accuracy land-based nuclear Pershing-2 missiles deployed in West Germany and flying about 10 minutes to our command centers. This was absolutely unacceptable for us. So we had to deploy short-

range nuclear missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. These missiles with less than 5 minutes flight time were targeted on the US nuclear military structure in West Germany. In an acute crisis we would have been forced to fire these missiles before the US First Strike missiles could be launched against us. The victims of our pre-emptive attack would have been hundreds of thousands of West Germans. They were kept ignorant about this danger by their US puppet government – which had built for itself nuclear shelters in mountains near the West German capital of Bonn.

Fortunately in 1987 our leader Gorbachev succeeded with the INF Treaty to remove the danger of the US decapitation strike.

Already in 1986 Gorbachev had offered to US President Reagan to step out of the nuclear arms race by controlled removal of all nuclear weapons on both sides within 10 years. Reagan rejected the proposal because he intended – or was forced by the economic powers behind him – to start expensive projects on defense against our missiles, his ‘Star Wars’ program. This was a demonstration that the USA are not ruled by their citizens but by corporations, against the vital interests of the people. It is a sad situation.

In 1989 the Cold War ended because we unilaterally stepped out from the East-West conflict and the arms race. It had weakened our economy too much. From one day to the next both military alliances had become obsolete, both our Warsaw Pact and the US-led NATO. The geographically natural solution of the new situation would have been a cooperative all-European peace system, for instance in the framework of OSCE.

But in early 1990 the US government, with complicity by the West-German government tricked Gorbachev to accept the membership of the re-united Germany in NATO and of US military bases in Germany; in exchange he got hollow promises and West German money⁸. Gorbachev could have told the Americans: ‘We leave Germany when You leave’. Unfortunately for us and for the Germans he didn’t do that. He was stupid enough to trust these businessmen and thus allowed the present – 2019 – disaster situation to develop. This is why Gorbachev is not popular in my country today. The German government never apologized for this fraud.

So the all-European peace solution was sabotaged by the US and West German governments. The US didn’t see the end of the Cold War as the release from a nightmare but as a victory over us, the defeated

party which should obey to the winner. So from early 1990, in a confrontational manner, the US and Germany tailored a new Cold War in order to keep their military-industrial complexes going and growing. The US broke the promises made towards Gorbachev and from 1997 on expanded NATO eastward to our borders.

NATO today claims there were no promises given to Gorbachev. Fortunately historic research produced proof of the opposite and of Western coordinated cheating⁸. What does the US government intend with that? How would you feel if you were in our shoes?

In the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 it had been agreed that no permanent NATO military installations are permitted in former Warsaw Pact countries. But today the US both nationally and under the NATO flag operate permanent military bases in these countries, claiming this doesn't happen since the military personnel are 'rotating'. Isn't this simply cheating? An analogue: the Coca-Cola company opens a facility in country X, and from time to time it exchanges its personnel – is Coca-Cola permanently present in Country X or not?

What is the intent with the US Naval Base Ochakiv at the Ukrainian Black Sea coast since 2017, by bilateral contract between the Ukraine and the USA, bypassing NATO and EU? What is with the Aegis missile warships deployed in Europe outside NATO? Why is the US government eager to get our neighbour states Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, until present, however, resisted by Western European NATO governments who exceptionally in this case didn't obey US demands.

Caused by the hastened breakdown of the Soviet Union we are left with a handful of border conflicts. They all result from regional discrimination against Russian-speaking parts of the local population. The present-day Ukrainian government tries by law to prohibit the use of the Russian language as a second official language even though half of the country's population has Russian roots. Would you want to live as a Russian-speaking family under this Ukrainian government? The US and EU claim to be the guardians of democracy. So why don't they demand referendums in the regions concerned? Why don't they acknowledge existing referendum results, for instance from Crimea where the overwhelming majority is known to be Russian-rooted? Instead the US and EU claim that these conflicts are proof of our eagerness to re-expand Russia to its former Soviet imperial greatness. We Russians definitely have enough problems at home and don't need the neighboring countries' problems on top of our own.

In 1991, after the end of the Cold war, the US in their nuclear war

plan called SIOP had marked 12,000 targets in our country. 400 (four hundred!) thermonuclear bombs of 350 kilotons each were directed against my home region Moscow². Three of these bombs would be sufficient to cause a holocaust for millions of our people in this densely populated region. Did the people of USA know about this crime which had been prepared in their name?

The US trip-wire launch-on-warning system against our ICBMs is still active today, aiming high-yield nuclear warheads at 1500 targets in our country², like our reverse system against the US is, however. They and we are endangering every day and hour the existence of humanity. We urgently want to step out of this crazy system, but we can't allow the US government to steal our country. So we would need the help of the other European nations to get quickly out of this trap, by internationally banning nuclear weapons and worldwide nuclear disarmament – 9 nuclear-weapon-states claiming their right of crimes against the 184 non-nuclear-weapon-states of the world, and the US and us by far the leading causes the problem.

A particularly serious deterioration happened in 2001 under Cheney/Rumsfeld and their puppet President Bush junior: he cancelled the Anti-Ballistic-Missile treaty (ABM treaty); he U-turned from 'nuclear deterrence' to planning of real 'low-yield' nuclear weapon employment, even against non-nuclear-weapons-states which are members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under the pretext of "weapons of mass destruction" he declared the 'Bush doctrine' claiming the right of the US to pre-emptive wars, even to secure 'national interests', whatever that means. The Bush doctrine is a severe violation of the UN Charter. Since 2001 the US were the aggressors in a series of wars without UN Security Council mandate, thus illegally: Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), Libya (2011), Syria (2014). But they accuse us of being aggressors.

All this is proof for us that the US is preparing an attack on our country. This is a deadly threat against us.

We are alarmed by oddities: The American Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system officially contains 64 Ground-Based-Interceptor missiles in California and Alaska, intended as a defensive shield against our ICBMs. Our Second Strike capacity includes 1500 nuclear warheads, as in 2011 allowed by the NewSTART treaty with the US. But obviously the US leadership doesn't any more expect a relevant Second Strike from our side after their First Strike. Instead it is expecting that after the decapitation strike against our leadership there will be only very few of

our ICBMs suitable to be commanded and launched, and this small remainder is to be destroyed mid-course before impact by the 64 interceptors. Our few Second Strike ballistic missile submarines on sea patrol presumably are under permanent US Navy observation even today and would be sunk synchronously with the decapitation strike. We have no way to prevent that.

What is the US planning in detail? Officially this is not known, so we have to make assumptions from the visible facts. The main force in the US wars since 1990 is the Navy with its Aegis ships, firing in each initial attack on a country a few hundred conventionally armed Tomahawk cruise missiles. Regularly the US military achieves a successful decapitation strike against the victim state. This fate happened to Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. In Syria they didn't dare this because our military stands by our ally.

In 2017 a total of 33 Aegis ships were fully equipped, with altogether about 3000 launcher tubes for cruise missiles Tomahawk or air defense missiles SM-3 (96 tubes per destroyer ship, 64 tubes per cruiser ship). Officially 4 Aegis ships are deployed in the European seas – for what purpose? The command center for the Aegis system in Europe is located in underground bunkers in West Germany (official information: at Ramstein Airbase).

Since 2016 the US violated the INF Treaty, by the land-based Mk-41 missile launchers in Romania and – under construction – in Poland, because these launchers can fire Tomahawk intermediate-range cruise missiles. The US government refused a debate about this violation. Instead it claimed that we had violated the INF treaty by a cruise missile called 9M729, Western name SSC-8. The range of this missile according to our government is below 500 km.

Apparently – status 2019 – no Western European government will allow new land-based US intermediate-range missiles on its soil, in fear of public protests like in 1983. This is at least a little progress – if it will last. Presumably in anticipation of this hesitant attitude of the European NATO allies the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review Summary puts emphasis on the central role of the US Navy and on US independence from host nation support.

Technically it is easily possible to secretly manufacture and deploy on US Aegis ships a new type of pinpoint-precision intermediate range ballistic missiles, with a military performance at least comparable to the 'old' Pershing-2, for the decapitation strike against us, with flight times from the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea or the Barents Sea to the

Moscow region of less than 10 minutes. Such a recent US missile type officially is not known⁷. But certainly the US government would not advertise the existence of such a critical weapon type but rather would keep it hidden behind the highest security classification.

Ship-borne ballistic missiles appear to become 'fashionable', as the launch of such a missile by the Indian navy from a ship in 2018 demonstrated. Against land targets ship-borne ballistic missiles are uneconomic because subsonic cruise missiles do the same job at a fraction of weight, space consumption and cost. However, against warships and aircraft carriers due to the strong self-defense of these ships, cruise missiles have a chance to hit these targets only if they fly at supersonic speed. But over intermediate ranges the flight may still take about an hour, so the guidance toward the moving target becomes difficult. The solution to this problem is the ballistic missile with its even hypersonic speed and according flight time of minutes, and with target guidance for hit precisions and in order to outmaneuver any missile defense of the target ship. The guidance of the attacking missile may be supported by target data from real-time satellite reconnaissance.

And of course the US decapitation strike against our command structure requires the short flight time of ship-borne ballistic missiles.

Our leadership would act irresponsibly not to expect that the US will take advantage of its unique technical and geographical opportunity to operate freely from the European seas against us, using intermediate-range ballistic missiles on their war ships.

Couldn't the US use some of their 14 strategic ballistic missile submarines for the decapitation strike? By principle they could. The recent "Trident D5" missiles have pinpoint-accuracy. But these exotic missile submarines in the European seas would attract too much attention to enable a surprise attack. When firing from the open Atlantic, however, the greater distance leads to longer flight times of the missiles – about 20 minutes – which would perhaps allow us some warning time to launch a Second Strike against the US. So the Tridents are not suitable for a surprise attack.

Therefore the Aegis destroyers and cruisers remain as the technical solution for the decapitation strike. They are inconspicuous war ships as every navy in the world is using them in large numbers. From the European seas they offer unrivaled short flight time of ballistic missiles toward the Moscow region. So the Aegis ships in the European seas remain in the focus of our suspicion.

But would a missile with a performance similar to Pershing-2 fit into

the launcher system of the Aegis ships? This system consists of Mk-41 vertical missile launchers, grouped by modules with 8 launcher tubes each, for a 1.5 ton missile per tube. However, the 0.5 meters caliber of the launcher tubes on the Aegis ships is too narrow for an intermediate range ballistic missile. But by grouping every four Mk-41 tubes one modified tube of twice the caliber is obtained, 1.0 meter, indeed the caliber of the Pershing-2. This way a larger missile weighing at least 4 times 1.5 tons equaling 6 tons can be stored in and launched from a modified Mk-41 launcher. The data fit: Pershing-2 was 7 ton, state of the art 40 years ago, so 6 tons today looks promising.

Using up-to-date satellite navigation for target guidance (instead of the bulky radar system of Pershing-2) and using a light-weight 'low-yield' nuclear warhead to hit underground bunkers, the range of the new missile is expected to be beyond 2000 km, so the missile may fly faster than the 'historic' Pershing-2. The optical appearance of the Aegis ship's deck can remain unchanged so our aerial reconnaissance cannot find out what types of missiles are loaded on board. With 24 intermediate-range ballistic missiles per ship, only 8 Aegis destroyers would be sufficient to carry about 200 ballistic missiles for the decapitation strike against us. The flight time from the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea or the Barents Sea to the greater Moscow region would be about 7 minutes, by using a fast flat trajectory. The missile firing sequence of the Aegis ships is one shot every few seconds. So within about two minutes all 24 missiles of an Aegis destroyer would be launched. As all Aegis ships involved in the decapitation strike would fire at the same time, within about two minutes the fate of our command system could be sealed by the US, anytime, day and night, 365 days a year.

It might be understandable that such a permanent threat by the US is absolutely unacceptable for us. Other than in the case of the Pershing-2 in the relatively small West Germany in 1983 we have no chance to target pre-emptively in the vast European seas the many Aegis ships under suspicion to be prepared for the decapitation strike. We don't even know which ships are dangerous and which are not because to our reconnaissance they all look alike.

200 nuclear missiles – even with 'low-yield' nuclear warheads – would cause a holocaust in our population, particularly because the hits against underground bunkers have to be ground detonations, producing excessively strong radioactive fallout, including large quantities of neutron-activated soil material and of remaining plutonium with 24,000

years half-life. The Moscow area would never be habitable again.

If the US claims that they don't have such a sea-borne ballistic missile, I only hope that our government will not believe it, unless we are allowed to check all US naval ships in the waters in and around the European seas for their missile types. The US would presumably not welcome such inspections.

Obviously our government considers a US decapitation strike to be a real danger. It is reported that the military has installed an automatic system, 'Dead Hand', which would automatically launch our ICBMs towards the US mainland in case there has been a nuclear detonation in our capital and the communication is interrupted between the ICBM units and their military command^o. A real Doomsday Machine: the result of such a large nuclear exchange between us and the US would be the destruction of humanity. So the US intention will probably be to outsmart our 'Dead Hand'. Perhaps it is possible, perhaps it isn't. The system could never be tested, of course. Is all that the intelligent answer to our common existence problem, which the US and we have created by nuclear armaments?

But there are – fortunately for us – preventive countermeasures at hand because the US planning has a fundamental weakness. Due to the earth's curvature the decapitation strike from the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea requires a US command and control infrastructure for the Aegis ships on the ground in Europe. This infrastructure exists. It is located in Germany. No other NATO state government permits the US military such abuse of its national territory. Only the German government does, even though the Cold War ended three decades ago.

Most Germans apparently have no idea about this danger because no political party and no media bring it to public attention. It is a simple technical truth: Without the US Aegis command structure in Germany the decapitation strike against us cannot be performed.

So it must be our main priority in a phase of acute crisis to neutralize the US command infrastructure in Germany before that can ignite the decapitation strike against us. We know that such a pre-emptive attack would cost a large number of innocent Germans their health or life.

There is criticism about German performance in my country. The fraudulent way Gorbachev was treated in 1990 is not forgotten. He obviously wanted to do good to Germany but was cheated by US President Bush and West German Chancellor Kohl. Since 1990, the US has used their military infrastructure in Germany for their wars of

aggression which they fight without UN Security Council mandate, thus illegally. The US would hardly have been able to wage these wars without German complicity. It is reported in 2019 that the US are piling up ammunition in Germany, presumably preparing the logistics for a potential war against Iran. The German government looks away. And now a third time within a century German soldiers are standing at our borders in a hostile function. Do we have a 'German problem'?

Would our preventive attack against the US military structure in Germany be compatible with international law? If somebody carries a weapon but has not drawn it, and I shoot him, it is murder. But if somebody aims his a weapon on me, I have the right to shoot him in self-defense. I don't have to wait until he has shot me. This way an Aegis intermediate-range ballistic missile threat would be comparable to the weapon aimed at me, in view of the instant and permanent preparedness to shoot and the extremely short flight time of the missiles.

A different question: is it permitted to fire nuclear warheads of even low-yield on military targets in an inhabited area, with fatal consequences to the civilian population? There is not yet a worldwide ban on the use of nuclear weapons. If it wasn't so serious, it would be funny what the German government has done in this respect: in 1991 it ratified the Additional Protocol One of 1977 to the Red Cross Geneva Conventions of 1949. By its article 51 this protocol prohibits attacks which cannot discriminate between military and civilians. Nuclear attacks on targets in inhabited areas are the most indiscriminate attacks thinkable. So obviously this article includes attacks with nuclear weapons. But the German government – presumably under US pressure – added a written reservation declaring its view that this Protocol is valid only for conventional weapons. Thus, peculiar enough, a nuclear attack on the US military infrastructure in Germany – despite its awful consequences to the civilian population – in the view of the German government would not be illegal by the laws of war.

The locations of the US naval ships in and near European seas have to be monitored continually by our reconnaissance. But we have no chance to prevent these ships from firing. Therefore if our leadership has reliable information that a decapitation strike is an immediate threat it will have to destroy the US command structure in Germany as a preventive measure. Without this command structure the decapitation strike cannot happen. One minute of delay may be too late. In view of the extremely short time spans involved, an automatic warning system will be required on our side to assess the urgency of action. This

introduces the risk of a technical malfunction or a human error that could start a European war in which at least Germany will be destroyed.

In the optimum case it might be considered sufficient to destroy a single US command bunker in Germany, be it at Ramstein, Stuttgart, Grafenwöhr, Ansbach, Wiesbaden or Bitburg, perhaps even at the nuclear weapon storage at Büchel. Immediately after the hit our leadership may inform the US President about a most regrettable malfunction in our automatic warning system. The President will presumably loudly condemn the disaster. But knowing that our military is on high alert status he will do nothing.

So the US prepare the risky decapitation strike using Germany as their lightning rod, to be heavily damaged in case of the real lightning. The situation of self-defense forces us into a confrontation against Germany. We don't want that and have no reason for that, as far as the Germans themselves are concerned. But there are only two choices: either Germany sends the US targets out of its territory – or sooner or later we will have to destroy these targets by missile hits. We cannot take the risk which the German government has caused by its obedience toward US demands.

If we are too late with our preemptive strike against US targets in Germany, the decapitation strike against us would happen. Perhaps the US succeed in hacking our 'Dead Hand' system. This actually would be good for mankind. So our country has lost its leadership, a nuclear holocaust hits the Moscow area but not elsewhere, and our 'Second Strike' against the US does not happen: so no world-wide disaster. However, this wouldn't mean US control over our resources yet. Instead they would hve to fight a land war for the conquest of our country. This war would again cost millions of casualties, if not even worse.

However the US cannot even begin such a European land war with the slightest chance of success without unrestricted use of German territory. They need the German North Sea harbors and their military infrastructure in Germany, for the land war logistics alone, moving millions of tons weaponry and supplies from the USA. The now US-dependent countries of Poland and Romania are no replacement for Germany because their access through the narrow straits into the Baltic and the Black Sea can easily be blocked.

Even if Germany plays along according US demands, we are convinced that the US could not win a war against our country. We would be defending our homeland and have the harsh winters as our reliable ally. The US can bomb countries to pieces, they can create

chaos, murder millions of people and conquer oil fields. But with their mercenary type army without moral principles they can never win a land war against us. The price for Western Europe and for us would be awful, but the US cannot conquer Russia. The bad news is that the US armament corporations would draw billions of dollars even from a lost war.

However, the good news is that all such catastrophes can be prevented, by finding in European cooperation a peaceful way to defuse the danger. Apparently, people in Germany are increasingly aware of the pre-war situation that their government has allowed to develop and are aware of the key role of their country in US planning.

So actually Germany has the key in its hands. For efficient self-defense Germany can and should do the same as the French did since 1966: Stop tolerating foreign military in your country! Such a presence today is no longer any protection but a deadly danger. The innocent and clueless German population abused as living shields for US aggression against us. What shall we do about this?"

That's enough fictional thinking from the Russian military man from the Moscow region.

In 2016 in a town forum in Green Bay, Wisconsin USA, the journalist Chris Matthews insisted on a certain question to Donald Trump who tried so evade a clear answer, finally with the following exchange:

Matthews: "Well, just say it. 'I will never use a nuclear weapon in Europe'."

Trump: "I am not – I am not taking cards off the table." ¹⁰

What to do? Scrap the Doomsday Machines

The prime issue of this paper is what to do after the US and Russia cancelled the INF treaty, in which no European countries except Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (plus the Asian state of Kazakhstan) were contracting parties. A new nuclear arms race in the field of land-based intermediate-range missiles is to be expected, at the cost of endangering the Europeans. There is a basic asymmetry in the situations of Russia and the US because the Russian government may see its country encircled by US military and due to weapons development see reasons to fear a conquest by the US starting with a decapitation strike. The reverse situation is physically, militarily and geographically not possible.

The refusal to allow deployment of new US missiles by Western

European countries is a minimum measure. However, this doesn't help against the danger from sea-borne intermediate-range missiles carried by US navy ships in the European seas, as long as Europe doesn't ban this danger in common effort – particularly a European mirror version of the US *Monroe doctrine* of 1823 (claiming the right of US military resistance against any European interference into North or South American affairs, in violation of international law – with the Cuba crisis of 1962 as a practical example).

Beyond this European-regional problem there is a real and growing danger that – including the lack of communication between the US and Russia – a nuclear war is started *accidentally* between these two countries. It will lead to the detonation of thousands of thermonuclear warheads with the consequence of wide-area devastation and contamination plus giant fires. In the target countries of the warheads hundreds of millions will be killed immediately or die within months. The fires will carry masses of smoke into the stratosphere. The darkened sunlight on the entire Northern hemisphere will cause a nuclear winter without harvests, killing further hundreds of millions – if not even billions – by frost and hunger. This worldwide danger deserves even higher priority than the consequences of the INF Treaty cancellation, which concerns only Europe.

As the former US nuclear war planner Daniel Ellsberg points out in his book *The Doomsday Machine*¹¹, the nuclear weapons arsenal of the US represents such a machine, as the Russian counterpart represents a *second* such machine. Both these machines are not under political control. Even if they were, there would arise the question which the former US Senator Robert Kennedy, brother of US President John F. Kennedy, intended to bring into public discussion by a book which he could not finish before he was murdered in 1968. According to the final note of the editor of this book:

“What, if any, circumstance or justification gives this government or any government the moral right to bring its people and possibly all people under the shadow of nuclear destruction?”¹²

But there is no political control over these two Doomsday Machines. Instead they both work together like robots, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Ellsberg points to an unbelievable danger: Assuming that a humankind-hating terrorist group succeeds in acquiring a nuclear weapon, smuggles it into Moscow or an American metropolitan area and detonates it. Exactly

such an event is the trigger for one Doomsday Machine, triggering immediately its counterpart. There is no time or procedure to analyze what has *really* happened. After decades of international dispersion and smuggling of nuclear materials and know-how it is probable that the ability to build at least a crude nuclear device is existent in more than one terroristic group. So you need only one nuclear weapon as the match to ignite about 10,000 of them in Russia and the US. Doomsday is achieved, with the minimum effort of only one nuclear device of low yield, more fantastic than even the most ingenious terrorists could dream of.

Beyond this extreme but not impossible case Ellsberg analyzes the situation and gives the most valuable hint to a solution:

“No state ever set out to acquire a doomsday capability. Nor does the existence of one such machine compel or even create a tangible incentive for a rival or enemy to have one. In fact, having two on alert against each other is far more dangerous for each and for the world than if only one existed. If the two existing machines were dismantled (in terms of their doomsday potential), there would never be any strategic rationale for anyone to reconstruct that capability, any more than there was a conscious intention in the first place.

The good news is that dismantling the Doomsday Machine in one country or both would be relatively simple in concept and in physical operation (though politically and bureaucratically incredibly difficult). It could be accomplished quickly, easily within a year.”¹³ (emphasis added).

So dismantling *just one* of the two Doomsday Machines would strongly stabilize the present extremely unstable situation.

What about the US Doomsday Machine? Ellsberg, at the end of his book, estimates the chances of dismantling it to be rather small. He sees a parallel in the refusal by the US administration to take any measures to avert catastrophic climate change. Indeed the initiative by President Trump to cancel the INF Treaty and his pushing the US military budget to about ten times the Russian military budget probably will be the start of a new round of an arms race with Russia. This is the opposite of dismantling the US Doomsday Machine, destroying hope instead of creating hope.

So the hope has to be generated elsewhere. Ellsberg points to three completely unexpected events from the last three decades: the downfall of the Berlin Wall, the nonviolent dissolution of the Soviet empire and the shift to majority rule in South Africa¹⁴. Perhaps one should count as a number four Gorbachev’s surprising offer of 1986 to dismantle all nuclear weapons within ten years which didn’t become reality because of Reagan’s refusal.

Taking up these thoughts: what about the *Russian Doomsday Machine*? During the Cold War, NATO kept claiming that the Soviet Union in its conventional power would be manifold superior over the West – and therefore the US *nuclear umbrella* allegedly would be indispensable as protection for Western Europe. Today the situation is exactly reversed: European NATO alone – without US and Canada – in *conventional armament* is manifold (presumably at least three times) superior to the Russian side. So the Russians are putting emphasis on their nuclear weapons toward Western Europe, keeping them as a alleged balance for their conventional inferiority. This is the reversed image of the NATO position in the Cold War. However, the Russians don't need a foreign *nuclear umbrella*, they have their own.

The Eastern expansion of NATO towards Russia is widely seen as a fraud by the West. This point of view apparently keeps large parts of the Russian population behind its present leader Putin.

The Russians will observe that severe political differences have emerged between West European governments and the US government. These differences begun under President Bush junior, grown under President Obama and increased to theatric dimensions under President Trump.

Now a *speculation*:

In the wake of the INF Treaty cancellation a broad peace movement in Germany becomes aware of the danger of Russian attacks against US bases in Germany. A newly elected German government removes all foreign military from the country, like the NATO neighbors France and Denmark are practicing.

By this fundamental change in Western Europe the Russian government becomes courageous. It announces the dismantling of its Doomsday Machine – and really does it, under highlighted international press coverage. They perform unilateral nuclear disarmament, except a temporary small number of warheads and missiles reserved against the US underground hardened bases in Western Europe. These are the only US targets in Europe which technically cannot be destroyed by conventional weapons.

Except for this temporary detail, the Russian military becomes conventional-only. On the same day the Western European countries report the removal of US military infrastructure from their territories, the reserved Russian nuclear weapons are scrapped too, again an

internationally monitored event. So Russia has become a non-nuclear-weapon-state. 70 years after having entered the nuclear club and it has left it for good. Europe without Britain and France declares itself and the surrounding seas a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Russian leaders don't come into office by corporations paying for their election campaigns. Assuming the Russian leader had dared such a radical step toward nuclear disarmament, this may at first perhaps not be popular in his own country, but it will be in Western Europe. This is why Gorbachev in 1986, with his disarmament initiative, became much more popular than his US counterpart, President Reagan, who scared the Europeans with US plans for new space weapons. This positive resonance in Western public opinion and media was a most uncommon experience for a Soviet leader at that time, actually the first time since the foundation of the Soviet Union in 1922. Gorbachev obviously had been encouraged by the widespread and politically independent peace movement resistance comprising a majority of the population rejecting US missiles in Western Europe. The NATO missile plans of 1979 had brought the danger of nuclear war back into the minds of millions of people, and the demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of participants had brought this issue back into the media. So a positive feedback occurred between public opinion and the main 'published opinion', in common favor of peace and disarmament.

This self-propelling mechanism would be revived by a decisive unilateral measure – not only talking but acting – by the Russian government towards radical nuclear disarmament. If the Russian leadership shows the courage to step out of the nuclear race against the US – dismantle the Russian Doomsday Machine – it will get the hearts of the Western Europeans even more intensively than Gorbachev did from 1986 on.

Expectable counter-propaganda focusing on democracy deficits in Russia will have low effect today in view of severe democracy deficits in some EU states too, and much worse in autocratic but economically valued trade partners of the EU. Is democracy in better health in NATO state Turkey than in Russia? What about democracy in Germany which – different from all other European states – does not allow referendums on the federal level?

So the wave of public consent in Western Europe for a radical Russian nuclear disarmament initiative will force the European governments to react in kind and to resume direct contacts with the Russian government, broken off under the pretext of 'Crimea

annexation' and 'war in Eastern Ukraine'. The European sanctions against trade with Russia will be considered an unjust mistake and lifted immediately. West European companies swiftly will re-intensify their reduced or frozen economic contacts with their neighbor Russia. This in turn will improve the economic conditions in Russia, on top of the internal benefits of reduced military spending. Conversion of NATO and EU into a comprehensive European system including Russia, Belarus and Ukraine will become a political issue, or even via OSCE "from Vancouver to Vladivostok", according to Gorbachev's intention of 1990.

Without nuclear weapons the Russians don't require any deep underground command shelters. The reason is that the strict and secure command and control chain is no longer necessary, with its conflicting goals (a) to ensure execution of firing commands for nuclear weapons by hesitant unit commanders and (b) at the same time to prevent unauthorized use of any nuclear weapon by such commanders under deadly threat in battle. Now with only conventional weapons the responsibilities for the use of the weapon systems can be delegated down to the local military leaders, like in the centuries of the pre-nuclear era, without the danger of excessive damage in individual cases of abuse.

Without a central bunkered military command structure in Russia there is no longer any benefit for the US from a nuclear decapitation strike against Moscow because there are no longer suitable targets. The Russian operational command structure is mobile, distributed and robust again, like in all non-nuclear-weapons-states. To destroy government buildings and kill politicians is technically no problem for the US but it brings no relevant military advantage, rather the opposite.

What can go wrong? Assuming the US will still launch a nuclear attack against Russia while or after the voluntary nuclear disarmament of this country: the horror about such a war crime committed by a US government would be worldwide. It would be the immediate end of NATO and the US military presence in Europe, presumably in Asia too. The US would become a pariah state for decades. The nuclear attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 could be claimed to be actions to end a war. For a nuclear attack on Russia which had laid down its nuclear weapons there would be no excuse. The effects of such a situation on US international trade would be extremely negative. Therefore such a scenario is most improbable in the light of the absolute priority of economics in the US.

Assuming the US would start a conventional attack against Russia: It

is hardly imaginable that West European states would go along with such a war against their neighbor, who at the same time would be most popular with the European public because of the unilateral nuclear disarmament action. If any European government in this situation would dare to follow the US in an attack against Russia, a public revolt would probably remove that government within hours or days. This of course is also valid for Germany in its geographically central role in Europe. In the case that the German government would dare to allow the US use of its territory for an attack against Russia, the political landscape – with presently six competing parties in the Bundestag – is expected to be dynamic enough for the required instant regime change.

Assuming the US, having lost most West European countries as ‘host nations’ for their military, they might still be able to keep logistics centers, transit rights and airbases in one or two former Warsaw Pact European countries. Thus the US might attack Russia by air and sea, as they did in the initiation of the wars in Iraq, Afghani-stan and Libya. However, such an attempt against Russia cannot be successful for various reasons: they cannot win wars from air and sea alone, but would be forced to wage a land war in Russia; the US forces with their professional army will not be able to fight, let alone win a land war against Russia which has nearly twice the size of the USA and with a population having historic experiences with invaders. The US ground wars of Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of this limitation. The US high-tech weaponry will fail under the arctic winter conditions as will the logistics supply over thousands of kilometers through hostile population. This time Russians in the villages would not greet the foreign soldiers as liberators, as many Ukrainians had done in 1941 under the Stalin tyranny towards the Nazi invaders – until they quickly found out about the murderous character of these “liberators”.

With the Russian Doomsday Machine dismantled there would only remain the US Doomsday Machine left, with a serious functional problem: it has lost its ‘enemy’ – the worst accident imaginable from a ‘business standpoint’. Without its ‘enemy’ the US Doomsday Machine worth trillions of dollars runs idle and into fuel shortage. To replace the lost ‘enemy’ Russia with a plausible new enemy, China, would pose a task which is hardly solvable for the US military-industrial complex, because of massive economic interweaving between the US and China.

And China over decades has shown its priorities in civilian fields of the economy. It possesses nuclear weapons but kept the warhead number at one twentieth of either the US or Russia, resulting in a

nuclear arsenal similar to Britain or France. So the demand from the US public might come to at least downsize the US Doomsday Machine to a similarly low size – thus largely removing its danger to the existence of humanity.

By Russia's return into the common European home – unfortunately three decades delayed – and by the immediate economic advantages of this comeback, the Russian leader will quickly gain back any popularity at home which he may have lost temporarily by his apparent surrender under an alleged US triumph. Actually, such a step would be a victory with the greatest positive consequences for his country, for Europe and the entire world.

When the Russian Doomsday Machine is dismantled, the goal of worldwide nuclear disarmament will not yet be achieved but the most difficult part of the journey to this goal would be accomplished.

To be clear: this all is a **speculation**. But such speculation might be more realistic than the permanent Doomsday Machine stand-off which pushes towards the destruction of humanity.

Proposals for Measures to be Taken in European Countries

There is not one simple remedy to cure the damage done by the cancellation of the INF Treaty first by Trump, then by Putin. Russia is again allowed to build and deploy land-based ballistic missiles with ranges beyond 500 km, in any number it chooses. But such new dangers towards Western Europe are the result of a bundle of absurdities which many European people are not aware of and which therefore must be brought into public discussion in the European countries.

With this goal, a positive aspect of Trump's coup against the INF Treaty may be seen that he – presumably unintentionally – laid the required ground to re-enable such discussions in Europe. Before the INF Treaty cancellation the issue of nuclear war was widely considered irrelevant and out of date.

Trump didn't stop at this 'help': recently he 'threatened' to remove the US military from Germany if the German government doesn't increase military spending, another incentive for citizens' discussion in Germany. One of the six parties in the Bundestag (LINKE) welcomed Trump's idea as a way to get rid of the US military, while the other five (CDU, SPD, Greens, AFD, FDP) have proven themselves as reliably NATO-minded. As a result one might even be *thankful* to Trump that he didn't only launch

the public discussion on the INF Treaty but also – and even more important – on the madness of the two Doomsday Machines. There has been a revival of the main reasoning of the US and European peace movements in 1983: total destruction on hair-trigger by two robots with multiple overkill arsenals – this madness has to be stopped and reversed.

Here are some points which might be helpful to revive discussions about security policy:

(1) Advertise in public the immorality of nuclear deterrence: indiscriminate and merciless murder of millions of innocent and clueless hostages as *revenge* for mistakes of their rulers. Reason: nuclear deterrence violates the basic principles of all civilized religions and of international law. Revenge only makes a bad situation worse. Revenge contradicts Christian principles.

(2) Demand that the US and Russia scale down their nuclear warhead arsenal to the size of China's (meaning reduction of warhead numbers on both sides by a factor of about 20). Reason: the reduction would decrease the danger of a world-wide nuclear winter caused by a conflict between these two states (comprising 7% of world population) out of 193 states in UN. At the present warhead numbers and yields nuclear war between US and Russia will result in the destruction of humanity. This fact is widely unrecognized or even unknown (after it was widely known in 1983) and has to be brought into the political discussion in Europe again.

(3) Demand banning launch-on-warning schemes of US and Russia, by separating warheads from carrier vehicles. Reason: the same as (2), plus banning trip-wire automatics launch of nuclear weapons.

(4) Demand from the nuclear-weapon-states the removal of thermonuclear mechanisms (H-bombs) from their nuclear weapons, as a first step toward nuclear disarmament. Reason: total nuclear disarmament (A-bombs *and* H-bombs) is necessary. But as a first stage the excessive yields of H-bombs have to be avoided, since they would be the cause of nuclear winter. Due to the improved accuracy (reduced CEP) of weapon carriers including ICBMs there are no 'counter-force' targets which for their destruction require H-bomb yields; even in extreme demands the much lower yields of A-bombs are militarily sufficient (the question of legality of any such uses is omitted here); even in this role A-bombs are challenged in their military efficiency by modern high precision

conventional munitions. Any ‘counter-value’ targeting – cities and such – is considered a war crime internationally. This is even acknowledged by the major nuclear-weapon-powers who therefore claim to perform ‘counter-force’ targeting only. So H-bombs, from the standpoint of military planning have become an obsolete danger. In the course of UN nuclear disarmament activities a sideline to immediately ban all military thermonuclear devices (not devices for civilian nuclear fusion power generation) might receive wide public acceptance, and the nuclear-weapon-states would have problems to claim any legality of the continued possession of H-bombs. Most of the nuclear warheads in the strategic arsenals today are H-bombs. However, by removing the fusion fuel (or even only one of the required components of it, for instance tritium) there remains the nuclear yield of the fission initiator, converting the H-bomb into a A-bomb, with a yield probably in the lower kiloton range, considered “low yield” by the military today. The total yield released by US and Russian nuclear arsenals in a large-scale war between these two powers after removal of the thermonuclear mechanisms would presumably be reduced by a factor between 10 and 100, reducing the danger of Northern hemisphere nuclear winter by this scale.

(5) Demand national signatures and ratifications of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) of 2017. Reason: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1972 is obviously malfunctioning: all 5 official nuclear-weapons-states failed their NPT obligation to nuclear disarmament, and are instead modernizing their nuclear weapons. Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea acquired nuclear weapons outside the NPT, with the help of official nuclear-weapons-states. So the TPNW is the only way to heal the deficiencies of the NPT and to ban nuclear weapons in the same way that chemical and biological weapons were banned in the 1990s. Nuclear weapons combine the damaging effects of kinetic weapons (bomb splinters, blast pressure wave), incendiary weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons (the latter: the biologically damaging effects of radioactivity are essentially chemical poison effects, for instance body cell water molecules are converted by radiation into chemically aggressive hydrogen peroxide molecules which crack and thus destroy the complex functional molecules of the cells).

(Side remark: The resistance of the nuclear-weapons-states to the TPNW is based on economic losses to military-industrial complexes. Any disarmament spoils their business. The worst case is peace. Therefore

nuclear proliferation is *most welcome* in the club of nuclear-weapon-states, even though their politicians publicly declare the opposite. Every new nuclear-weapon-state brings a new substantiation for increased nuclear weapons funding. Reviewing the nuclear weapons proliferation in the past decades it must not be forgotten¹⁵: the Soviet, British and French nuclear weapons were based on US designs which were obtained by sharing (Britain, France) or espionage (Soviet Union); the nuclear weapons of China were initially using Soviet technology; the nuclear weapons of Israel were developed with active help by France, US and Britain; the nuclear weapons of India and Pakistan were based upon purchased Western technology, partially by espionage too (Pakistan), besides Pakistan obtained help from China; North Korea cooperated with Pakistan, by exchanging its missile technology for Pakistan's nuclear weapon technology.)

(6) Demand via the EU that France scraps its nuclear weapons. Reason: with membership of nuclear-weapon-states no common European defense will ever be possible, because it would have to be a radical two-class-system, based on strategies which are illegal according to international law. This could not find acceptance in the European public. France has not even given guarantees to their EU partners that they never under any circumstances will use nuclear weapons against targets on or near their territories.

(7) Demand from European NATO governments the acknowledgement that the Geneva Conventions including the Additional Protocol of 1977 are valid for all kinds of weapons, of course including the worst ones. Reason: some European countries at ratification have given reservations to exclude nuclear weapons. These reservations urgently have to be retracted in order to grant the people of the European NATO countries the protection of the new humanitarian law of 1977.

(8) Demand declaration of the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon states in Europe a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, including absence of any nuclear command and logistics infrastructure. Reason: removal of US nuclear weapons from European non-nuclear-weapon-states (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands) and safety of life in Europe.

(9) Demand declaration of the Middle East as a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Reason: the problem of Israel having nuclear weapons and long-range carrier missiles and other states in the region looking for nuclear weapons for alleged national strength (Saudi-Arabia, Iran?).

(10) Demand ‘negative guarantees’ from NATO nuclear-weapons-states, under no circumstances whatsoever to use weapons of war, let alone nuclear weapons, against targets in NATO-allied non-nuclear-weapons-states. Reason: Friends and allies don’t bomb each other. So they can give according written guaranties recorded at the UN.

(11) Demand ‘negative guarantees’ from nuclear-weapons-states, under no circumstances whatsoever to use nuclear weapons against targets in non-nuclear-weapons-states being members of the NPT and not having nuclear-weapons-states’ military installations and personnel on their territory. Reason: these guarantees are a foundation of the NPT but have been illegally cancelled since 2001 by the US government (Bush Jnr.).

(12) Demand No-First-Use guarantees on nuclear weapons by NATO allies. Reason: the new assessment in international law on the illegality of nuclear weapons since 1996 (International Court of Justice).

(13) Demand via EU and OSCE a ban on long-range ballistic missiles in European seas. Reason: block the physical possibility of a US decapitation strike against Russia, which would make Europe the battlefield in a nuclear war.

(14) Demand to organize via EU and OSCE a massive European-Russian-US youth exchange program to be financed from European defense funds, as a fundamental element of European security. Reason: defense is more than armament. Non-violence is stronger than violence. Information is stronger than explosives.

(15) Demand to charge at the International Criminal Court (ICC) responsible politicians of nuclear-weapons-states refusing to guarantee No-First-Use of nuclear weapons. Reason: by this refutation they threaten the First Use of nuclear weapons, thereby committing a crime against international law of 1996.

Sources:

- [1] cited after: Commander Robert Green, *Security Without Nuclear Deterrence*, Nottingham (United Kingdom) 2018: Spokesman / Create Space, ISBN 978-1-7220-0180-3, p. 86.
- [2] cited after: Robert Kazel, *Ex-Chief of Nuclear Forces General Lee Butler Dismayed by Deterrence Theory and Missiles on Hair-Trigger Alert*, Interview, May 27, 2015, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, California, Internet „wagingpeace.org/general-lee-butler/” (extracted on April 13, 2019).
- [3] Martin Pfaffensteller, *Dritter Weltkrieg – die Weltvernichtungsmaschine*, [*Third World War – the Machine for the Destruction of the World*], Geo Epoche, Das Magazin für Geschichte, Nr. 91, Hamburg 2018: Gruner und Jahr Verlag, ISBN 978-3-652-00742-9, p. 116 ff.
- [4] cited after: Christian Schmidt-Häuer, *Der Zug ist abgefahren: Wie Moskau auf die bevorstehende Stationierung von Mittelstreckenraketen in Westeuropa reagiert*, [*The train has left: how Moscow reacts on the forthcoming Deployment of Intermediate Range Rockets in Western Europe*], Die Zeit, 28. Oktober 1983, S. 7, Internet „zeit.de/1983/44/der-zug-ist-abgefahren“ (extracted on March 2, 2019).
- [5] *Minotaur IV - Lite. Long-Range Suborbital Launch Vehicle*, Northrop Grumman Corp., 2018, Document DC18005_053118, Internet “northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/Minotaur/Documents/MinotaurIVLite_Factsheet.pdf” (extracted on August 23, 2019).
- [6] Hans M. Kristensen, *INF Weapons: Status, Modernisations, and Arms Control Prospects*, Toda Peace Institute (Tokio), Policy Brief No. 25, November 2018, Internet “toda.org/assets/files/resources/policy-briefs/t-pb-25-hans-kristensen_inf-weapons.pdf” (extracted on August 31, 2019).
- [7] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine – Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner*, New York/London 2017: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, ISBN 978-1-6081-9670-8, p. 3.
- [8] Mary Elise Sarotte, *1989 – The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009. Paperback-Ausgabe, Third paperback printing, with a new afterword by the author, 2014, ISBN 978-0-691-16371-0.
- [9] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 303 ff.
- [10] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 330.
- [11] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 339.
- [12] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 340.

[13] cited after: Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 341.

[14] Daniel Ellsberg, *The Doomsday Machine*, *ibid.*, p. 350.

[15] Commander Robert Green, *Security Without Nuclear Deterrence*, *ibid.*, p. 104 ff.

SICHERHEIT *ohne* ATOMARE ABSCHRECKUNG



COMMANDER
ROBERT GREEN

ROYAL NAVY (RET'D)

VORWORT VON
VIZEADMIRAL SIR JEREMY BLACKHAM KCB MA

ÜBERSETZT VON
DR.-ING JOACHIM WERNICKE

Die atomar bewaffneten Staaten und ihre Verbündeten behaupten die Abschreckung als die hauptsächliche Rechtfertigung, Atomwaffen beizubehalten. Deren Irrtümer müssen deshalb sichtbar gemacht werden, und, um die Atomwaffen abzuschaffen, müssen Alternativen angeboten werden. Als früherer Operateur britischer Atomwaffen gibt Commander Green eine Chronik der Geschichte, der praktischen Schwierigkeiten und der gefährlichen Widersprüche der atomaren Abschreckung. Er bietet statt dessen glaubwürdigere, wirksamere und verantwortbarere alternative Strategien, um Angriffe abzuschrecken und wirkliche Sicherheit zu erreichen.