

# Straw Wars

## *Full Spectrum Sycophancy*

By Ken Coates

‘Tony Blair has told President Bush that he supports American plans for a Missile Defence shield but cannot say so publicly for fear of further alienating Labour left-wingers, according to a senior US official.’

So reported the *Daily Telegraph* on Friday August 10<sup>th</sup> 2001. The report was not exactly a surprise. Blair’s equivocation had already been seized upon by the media in the run up to the General Election of 2001. The Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, had made a series of public statements, in which that equivocation was strongly laced with sympathy for the American proposals. On one occasion, while Blair spoke softly in the House of Commons, his spokesman, Alastair Campbell, was briefing almost at the same time outside the House of Commons. Campbell indulged none of the reservations in which the Prime Minister was seeking refuge. Before the Election, it was clear that the Prime Minister did not wish to antagonise peace people unnecessarily, and did not wish to provoke any shadow of a debate among Labour Party supporters.

But after the Election, all nuances were shed, as Toby Harnden wrote in the *Telegraph*:

‘The White House is content to accept the Prime Minister’s private word for the time being but has indicated that more open backing will be needed later in the year when Mr. Bush intends to give six months notice of American withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

‘Tony Blair has told us his political situation within the Labour Party is very difficult and he needs to deal with the left’

said the official.

‘But he has said that, ultimately, it will not be a big issue. Britain will support us.’

It remains to be seen whether the Prime Minister has the measure of this problem, and whether it might become a somewhat bigger issue than he imagines. But the impact of his affirmation of faithful

allegiance to President Bush should not be underestimated. The *Telegraph* reports that

'Mr. Blair's assurances, given during Mr. Bush's visit to Chequers last month, have bolstered the US position at a time when positive signals from Russia have isolated sceptical France and Germany among the big Western nations on the 'Son of Star Wars' issue ...

Mr. Bush's advisers were heartened by comments from Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, in the journal *Tribune*. He went much further than Robin Cook, his predecessor, in supporting the Missile Defence plans in his column. Mr. Straw rejected the arguments of Labour MPs opposed to Missile Defence. Russia was no longer an enemy, but 'rogue states' such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya posed real threats, he wrote ...

There was little of substance in the column that Mr. Bush would have rejected had his own speech writers drafted it for him.'

That Jack Straw may be open to suggestion from extremely reactionary American administrations may not come as a total surprise. Perhaps this outcome confirms the speculations, in *Private Eye*, and elsewhere, that Jack Straw was drafted into, and Robin Cook was expelled from, the Foreign Office, precisely in order to deliver what the President wanted on this question.

The political presumptions of the *Daily Telegraph* and Jack Straw will not stand up to any independent scrutiny. None of the named rogue states have the capacity to train missiles on the United States, and even if they had, such action would be the ultimate suicide commitment. President Putin has been strongly insistent on this truth, and his opposition to the destruction of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is rather stronger than this report implies.

But the Russians are in a dilemma: they cannot follow the Americans in a matching surge of insane military expenditure, and they are finding it difficult to maintain their present strategic arsenal of nuclear weapons with any degree of safety. They would like to reach an agreement with the Americans about mutual reduction in such forces, and they would like it even more if they could persuade the Americans to foot the bill. It is such problems that enable President Bush to announce, not entirely tongue-in-cheek, that Russia is no longer an enemy.

But Russia has its own interests, which the Americans by no means

respect. Putin has made it clear that he expects the territory of the former Soviet Union to be respected as a Russian sphere of influence. But Bush responds by proclaiming the imminent expansion of Nato to include the Baltic Republics, and possibly even more significant territories of the former USSR. Nato has joint exercises with the forces of Ukraine and Georgia. The Partnership for Peace, widely seen as a softening up process to prepare for Nato membership, still plays a conspicuous public role in American designs on the former Soviet Union.

Putin cannot face the Americans down in a military confrontation without raising the levels of risk beyond tolerable thresholds. He can try to negotiate more space within what is a subordinate relationship. He has pursued a more aggressive policy than his predecessor, as the Chechens know to their very great cost. But, in the last analysis, because the world is no longer bipolar, it does not really change the picture whether the Russians can be constrained to accept Son of Star Wars as a *fait accompli* or not.

The real issue is whether the rest of the world can accept the unchallenged domination of the world's one remaining superpower. If that world watches, while all the treaties which have hitherto provided some inadequate controls over nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are set aside unilaterally by that one megapower, then it connives at the destruction, not only of arms control measures, but of the United Nations as a system, the remnants of national sovereignty, and ultimately, with those remnants, the remnants of democratic autonomy in all the lesser States of the world which include most of us.

Small wonder that Mr. Blair is cautious about whether his Party colleagues can be relied upon to swallow the President's modest proposal. If he cared a fig for Europe, he might be even more worried about whether the European allies may not be willing to buy into this highly dubious package.

The first coherent statement of the new Foreign Secretary's attitude to Missile Defence was made in his article in *Tribune*, which appeared on the 27<sup>th</sup> July 2001. We reproduce that article as part of this pamphlet, together with an answer which was written for *Tribune* during August 2001. Subsequently, Mr. Straw circulated a more extensive paper to the members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, which expanded on the

views he had presented in *Tribune* in a more measured way. Here we also reproduce that statement, with a response.

Most of the members of the present Government began their political lives as earnest supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and following that, of European Nuclear Disarmament. In those far off days, leading Labour Members represented their Party, officially, on the Liaison Committee of END.

Mr. Blair thinks those days are over. With the help of the British American Project for the Successor Generation, he thinks that the most talented of the early rebels have, like Dr. Strangelove, stopped worrying and learnt to love the bomb.

But there is one fact that he has not allowed for. The movement for

### **President praises Blair over missile defence**

By Andrew Parker, Political Correspondent, *Financial Times* 20.7.2001

George Bush last night praised Tony Blair for his willingness to consider the merits of controversial US plans for missile defences against rogue nuclear states.

The US President said the Prime Minister, unlike some leaders, was prepared to listen to why it was necessary to set aside the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty. The treaty has been regarded as the cornerstone of arms control between the US and Russia.

Many European Union member states are opposed to Mr Bush's plans for missile defences, and Labour MPs have expressed strong concerns because they fear a new arms race. But

Mr Bush, speaking during his first visit to Britain as US President, said: 'The thing I appreciate about the Prime Minister is he is willing to think anew as we head into the future. There are some leaders who, out of hand, reject any new thinking about security. Prime Minister Blair is not that way.

'He has been very forthcoming. He has been more than willing to listen to the philosophy behind moving beyond a treaty that has codified a relationship that no longer exists.' Mr Bush indicated he thought the treaty was irrelevant because the US no longer saw Russia as its enemy. 'As we head into the 21<sup>st</sup> century we must think about new ways to keep the peace,' he said.

Mr Blair stopped short of supporting Mr Bush's wish to set the treaty aside. He said it was a matter for

nuclear disarmament arose in a bipolar confrontation, the Cold War, in which two nuclear giants could threaten all our destruction. Fear of the bomb was generated in a conflict, and opposition to that fear was enfeebled by competing preferences for either side. What the argument about Missile Defence will expose is the new world order, in which the United States officially proclaims the solo goal of its own 'Full Spectrum Dominance' of space, sea, land, air and information (see box on page 8). Taken separately, most will be reluctant to dare to declare their independence from this over-mighty power complex. But, when we are all forced to read it accurately, we shall surely begin to seek alternatives to domination. If we face this fear together, co-operation may be seen to be possible. It is already necessary.

the US and Russia, the treaty's signatories, to resolve. But he praised the US President for consulting allies on his plans for missile defences, and for conducting a dialogue with Russia.

Mr Blair also indicated he was prepared to ignore the opposition from Labour MPs. 'I think Mr Bush is right to raise the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and say that needs new and imaginative solutions,' said Mr Blair. 'It is a huge threat facing the whole world.'

Mr Bush insisted it was too early to say whether the US would need to upgrade radar stations in Yorkshire for the missile defences.

The US President also defended his decision to repudiate the Kyoto protocol that seeks to tackle global warming. He said he wanted the US to

reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases, but insisted the protocol would damage jobs and prosperity.

Mr Bush and Mr Blair both hailed the 'special relationship' between Britain and the US. Mr Blair enjoyed a strong working relationship with Bill Clinton, the former US President, because they are political soul-mates. However, Mr Blair said he was delighted to play host to Mr Bush at Chequers, his country retreat. The two leaders fly to Genoa for the G8 summit today. Earlier, Mr Bush and his wife Laura were confronted by protesters as they arrived for lunch with the Queen at Buckingham Palace. Mr Bush also visited the Cabinet Office war rooms, because Winston Churchill is one of his heroes, and the British Museum, where Mrs Bush read to schoolchildren.

# Countdown to a Sensible Defence

By Jack Straw

Four questions for the next pub quiz: (A) Which was the first country to be subjected to missile attacks? (B) Which is the only country which currently has a functioning anti-ballistic missile system? (C) Which international treaty allows the deployment of missile defences with a range of less than 3,500 kilometres? (D) Which country proposed in February 2001 the development of non-strategic ballistic missile defences?

Answers: (A) The United Kingdom. (B) Russia – the system protects Moscow and is permitted under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The United States had an option under the ABM Treaty to do likewise but did not proceed. (C) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty updated by the US and Russia in 1997. (D) Russia.

I confess that I came fairly fresh to the debate on Missile Defence when I was appointed Foreign Secretary. If these four questions had been posed to me when I was Home Secretary, I might have guessed the answer to (A), but I would have had no chance with (B) or (C) or (D). I know much more now. What is fascinating about this issue is that it is not a black and white issue where a simplistic: ‘Let us not have anything to do with the idea’ would serve the interests of Britain.

This country’s experience, as the first victim of missile attacks, should underline the necessity for nations to consider and where appropriate put in place missile defences. I was born the year after the Second World War, but I can still recall the absolute horror with which older friends and relations recounted their transfixed terror of the Nazis’ V2 rockets which they launched against this country in the closing months of the war – much worse, they said, even than the blitz, or V1 raids. Why? Because with bombers and the V1 doodlebugs there was some warning, and some chance of fighting back. With the V2, there was no warning, no chance, no defence. It came straight out of the sky. If the V2 had been introduced earlier the result of the war might have been different.

The result of our experience should at least give pause for thought as the US, its allies and now Russia, all start constructively to consider the role which defences against ballistic nuclear missiles might play in making the planet a safer place.

Russia is no longer an enemy. However, a threat could emerge from other states such as Iraq and North Korea. Other countries are developing worrying capabilities such as Iran and Libya. Such countries are actively engaged in developing their own ballistic missile systems and weapons of mass destruction. They are devoting substantial resources to this. We have to work on the basis that they are doing so for a purpose – with the aim of influencing others by threatening their use and *in extremis*, of using them.

It is no good arguing that ‘rogue’ states could always resort to terrorist bombings or biological warfare instead. They could, but that does not answer the question about what more responsible states should do to reduce the threat posed by these states, and others, from missile attack. It was considerations of this kind which probably led Russia to make its proposals for Europe to develop non-strategic missile systems in collaboration with Russia. True, such systems would not be outside the ABM Treaty as it stands. But the principle remains the same. And the only key differences between a ‘non-strategic’ system and a ‘strategic system’ boils down to its range. Although these ‘theatre’ missile defences are primarily designed to protect deployed forces, they could be used to protect countries with a relatively small geographical area – Japan, or parts of Southern Europe, for example. Should those countries with large land masses be prohibited from taking steps to protect their populations?

The British Government has warmly welcomed George Bush’s initiative last weekend with Vladimir Putin and Russia’s positive response. There are many considerations which have to be included in the equation, including what kind of technology will be employed, and the effect of Missile Defence on those states that are developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems (though it is hard to argue that such an effect should be malign). And it is surely right for Britain to engage freely in these considerations rather than jumping to a hasty and ill-judged conclusion against them.

There is a fifth pub question. Who opposed MAD (mutually

assured destruction) in the Cold War and prefer it now to missile defence? The answer is some of those who say we should have nothing to do with Missile Defence. It's not a very convincing position.

*This article appeared in Tribune on 27 July 2001.*

## **Full Spectrum Dominance**

'The ultimate goal of our military force is to accomplish the objectives directed by the National Command Authorities. For the joint force of the future, this goal will be achieved through full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.

The full range of operations includes maintaining a posture of strategic deterrence. It includes theatre engagement and presence activities. It includes conflict involving employment of strategic forces and weapons of mass destruction, major theatre wars, regional conflicts, and smaller-scale contingencies. It also includes those ambiguous situations residing between peace and war, such as peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as non-combat humanitarian relief operations and support to domestic authorities.

The label full spectrum dominance implies that US forces are able to conduct prompt, sustained, and synchronised operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations and with access to and freedom to operate in all domains — space, sea, land, air, and information. Additionally, given the global nature of our interests and obligations, the United States must maintain its overseas presence forces and the ability to rapidly project power world-wide in order to achieve full spectrum dominance.'

*United States Department of Defence,  
**Joint Vision 2020, 30<sup>th</sup> May 2000***

# A Reply to Jack Straw

By Ken Coates

Jack Straw candidly informs the readers of *Tribune* that he 'would have had no chance' with three out of four questions on Missile Defence, before he became responsible for dealing with the issue as Foreign Secretary. Evidently some officials of the Foreign Office have begun a crash course to prepare the Foreign Secretary for his new duties, and as he claims, equipped him fully for any discussion which might be forced upon him during his visits to the pub. Going beyond this, they have apparently been kind enough to script his letter to the Parliamentary Labour Party.

Unfortunately, the discussions which will test the Foreign Secretary are not those which may be held in his local, but those which will determine, in some very exalted places, the state of military policy in the world for years to come.

The first hurdle at which the Foreign Secretary falls is in defining the problem. 'Son of Star Wars' is really nothing to do with defence at all, nuclear or otherwise. It is to do with crashing through the inadequate barriers established by Cold War Treaties to prevent the militarisation of space. The \$8.3 billion missile shield that President Bush and Defence Secretary Ronald Rumsfeld are canvassing for approval among allies and subordinates concerns one of three significant technologies which, the American Air Force believes, will give them total space control, or, as the official jargon has it, 'Full Spectrum Dominance'.

The present programme, massive though it seems to those of us who live in countries which cannot maintain elementary health and education provision, is a drop from the ocean of intended future military investment, in which the American space planners seek to unleash an arsenal from science fiction.

'They envision a high-tech arsenal that will take full advantage of the military potential of space ranging from the near term possible to long term notional: kinetic energy rods, microwave guns, space-based lasers, pyrotechnic electromagnetic pulses, holographic decoys, robo-bugs,

suppression clouds, 360-degree helmet-mounted displays, cluster satellites, oxygen suckers, micro satellites, destructo swarmbots, to name a few.'

reports Jack Hitt in the *New York Times* (5<sup>th</sup> August 2001).

Hitt explains the sophisticated surveillance technology which has gone into the preparation of the satellite called Warfighter, which is due to be launched in September 2001 by a private company called Orbital Imaging. This is developing a new form of imaging called hyperspectral, which will immensely assist American forces in engagements like the recent Kosovo war. Indeed, more elementary satellites were already very much involved in the conduct of the Gulf War, which one American scholar has described as 'the first space war'.

Part of the new space technology involves the capacity for taking offensive action against the satellites of opponents. Not so long ago, there were few non-American satellites in orbit. Today, there are about a thousand such devices altogether, including those belonging to other governments. One-eighth of the total belongs to the American military, and more and more belong, like Warfighter, to private companies. Hence the need to invent miniature satellites, using microwaves, to attack and disable 'enemy' ones, or to neuter those whose purpose is uncertain.

American military space research, however, goes far beyond this. It already involves intensive enquiry into the deployment of lasers which can shoot down enemy missiles, and which is expected, perhaps by 2008, to be tested in prototype for battlefield use. At that point, after expending the estimated \$5 billion which has been earmarked, the American military will stand on the brink of being able to zap their opponents from space.

All this frenetic activity goes on in the laboratories of the USA: perhaps, if treaty-shredding is a criterion, the world's major rogue state. Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya added altogether and multiplied by one hundred could not mobilise a fraction of the destructive capacity which is already being deployed by the United States, never mind that which is being designed.

Iraq, Libya and Iran are all situated in the Middle East theatre. Also situated in that zone is Israel, which has developed an arsenal of real nuclear weapons, including thermo-nuclear weapons, which are purpose-built to 'deter' such enemies. Strangely, the British Foreign

Office does not list Israel among the rogue states, although it has more nuclear weapons at its disposal than Britain, and has also angered more of its neighbours.

Jack Straw makes heavy weather of the capacity of Missile Defence systems. He is not wrong to point out that a so-called 'theatre' system designed to protect deployed forces, could be used (as indeed some may already be used) to cover small countries. Why, he asks 'should countries with large land masses be prohibited from taking steps to protect their populations?' But the truth is that the only country that can target such 'protection' is the United States, and although it might be quite near to developing its space-based lasers, it is technically very far from able to protect any substantial territory in the United States from incoming missiles, and economically even more unprepared.

Fortunately, there are, up to now, no rogue state missiles able to hit the United States, and so the painful development of the new technologies which the Americans hope will enable them to 'hit a bullet with a bullet' does not have a practical impact on any conceivable actual aggression.

But the continued unilateral development of these technologies has a shattering impact on the framework of international agreements, which is the only realistic defence framework we have got. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty (see page 40) cannot simply be reduced to defence of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, as Jack Straw implies. They were the wholly inadequate recognition by the then superpowers that it was necessary to reach agreement to check further encroachments of madness. Standing with them, developed within the same logic, are the agreements concluded and anticipated within the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) process.

Today, of course, there is only one megapower. It is not difficult to see why it wishes to dominate North Korea or Libya or Iran. Using quite different instruments, it has sought with some success to dominate Russia and China. But Full Spectrum Dominance is not only a threat to opponents or enemies. It applies with equal force to allies.

All the fiendish new wizardry in the US Space Command's laboratories, serves only to reinforce the question: is the *Pax Americana* enough? Jack Straw's advisers have no doubts about this matter. Indeed, where else would they go for *their* advice? But for the rest of us it is a

threat. Today, if there should be no taxation without representation, still more surely, there should be no domination. Co-operation, which we do all need, is quite impossible without representation.

### **From CND's Response to Jack Straw**

'This Briefing on Missile Defence could well have been written in the White House or the Pentagon. Full of inadequate argument and misinformation its most outstanding feature is the lack of reference to British security, which is surely the main responsibility of the Foreign Secretary.

The Briefing also fails to deal with the use by the United States of the Fylingdales and Menwith Hill bases, and the dangers that will pose for the United Kingdom. Although the clear support in the Briefing for the US deployment of missile defence indicates a willingness to allow them to use the bases. The financial cost to Britain of this support is not discussed, nor the strain which it would put on an already over-stretched UK Defence Budget.

Jack Straw should put British security and world stability ahead of the US desire for global military domination.

Opposition to President Bush's plans for Missile Defence is widespread in Britain. There is real disquiet across political parties and growing opposition from the general public. The Chief of Defence Staff's public opposition must be indicative of wider concerns within the military establishment.

Missile Defence could well become the defining issue of the next Parliamentary Session and Parliament should have a full debate on the issue with a free vote. By refusing the US the use of Fylingdales and Menwith Hill, the Government and Parliament will have a real opportunity to make a positive impact on the destabilising foreign policy of the United States.

As the large majority of countries agree, the alternative based on treaties, respect for international law, conflict prevention and the United Nations in the context of a multi-polar world should be pursued with vigour.'

*These extracts are from a paper by CND's Chair, Dave Knight, in response to Jack Straw's briefing on Missile Defence for the Parliamentary Labour Party (see page 13). CND's full point-by-point response has been circulated to Members of the Parliamentary Labour Party, and is available from CND, 162 Holloway Road, London N7 8DQ ([www.cnduk.org](http://www.cnduk.org)).*

# Parliamentary Labour Party Briefing on Missile Defence

**From the Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign  
and Commonwealth Affairs, Rt Hon Jack Straw**

Jack Straw's office has offered us a twenty-four point briefing on Missile Defence, conveniently launched on the 1<sup>st</sup> August 2001. Not only is Parliament not sitting, but most of the MPs who might be tempted to answer him are on holiday.

This is a preliminary attempt to fill the gap, by responding in detail. The Straw paper is reproduced here in *italic type*. Our responses are in ordinary type.

## 1

*Defence against missile attack is not a new problem. During the Second World War Britain became the first country in the world to suffer missile attack when it was the target in 1944-5 of the Nazi V1 (flying bomb) and V2 rocket. Against the V2 in particular there was no defence. It has often been noted that it was fortunate for the Allies that these advanced German weapons were deployed so late in the war.*

Perhaps for demagogic reasons, the Foreign Secretary begins by recalling the missile attacks on Great Britain by the Doodlebugs and V2 rockets. As a child, I lived through these attacks, and although I never saw any panic, I can certainly agree that they were profoundly disturbing.

But the Nazis could only equip their missiles with high explosive warheads. Nonetheless, the damage which they did was considerable. I can remember one horrific attack, in which a huge queue of people waiting to buy ice cream (still in very short supply during the War) was wiped out in Brighton by a missile which fell short.

But is it true that there was 'no defence' against these weapons? The doodlebugs could be, and were, shot down by the Royal Air Force. More sinister were the V2s. The Royal Air Force devoted a

great deal of attention to the need to destroy the launch pads of these missiles. Today, existing surveillance techniques would make this very much easier. The reason why 'it was fortunate for the allies that these advanced German weapons were deployed so late in the war' is, quite simply, that allied troops were fighting their way across Northern France, and were soon to overrun the bases which brought so much destruction to Southern England.

We are told that National Missile Defence in the United States is necessary to control the threat from 'rogue States'. But, according to Intelligence which has been published by President Putin,<sup>1</sup> the North Korean missile is fundamentally very similar to the German V2 rocket of 1944-5. It might be able to threaten the Americans, exactly where they are threatening Korea, from the island of Okinawa, which is a colossal American military base designed to dominate that Asian theatre from Japanese territory. But American Intelligence will know from its satellites already, exactly where North Korean rockets are deployed, and the US Air Force, striking from Okinawa, could eliminate all such bases within a matter of minutes, if it was really felt that any threat was imminent.

American superiority in all the other areas in which so-called rogue States exist is also very marked already. Why should a threat from these small fry necessitate a new system of missile defence which entails the destruction of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the achievements of the START process in restricting vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, and such trust as has hitherto been shakily established during the post-Cold War years?

The total military budgets of Iran, Iraq and Libya run at some \$8.5 billion, while the Israeli budget has been totalling \$11 billion. North Korean military expenditure of all kinds is less than one-sixth of South Korean expenditure, at a total of \$2 billion. The United States already, before the insane lurch into Star Wars, is spending \$266 billion, out of a Nato total of \$444 billion.

In short, the comparison with the German missile threat in 1944 is absolutely unsustainable. Britain and its allies were gaining the upper hand in the war with Nazi Germany in 1944, but the rogue States, so-called, are not even bit players in the stand off of the

dawning 21<sup>st</sup> century. If they so much as looked like entering hostilities with the United States, they could be removed from the map, using only yesterday's technology, and involving what for the United States military would be a relatively minor effort.

Missile Defence cannot be justified with reference to German rockets in the Second World War, and still less can it be justified by rogue State threats. The only way to understand Missile Defence is that it is part of a process which involves the militarisation of space, taking the Americans up several rungs in the ladder to a whole new military dominion, in which rockets will be but a small part in the threat to world peace.

## 2

*With the end of the Second World War and the onset of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union developed significant strategic air defences consisting of ground radar sites, fighter aircraft and surface to air missiles. In the 1950s and early 1960s the principal threat was perceived to come from intercontinental bombers against which it was possible to develop a range of defensive mechanisms. No one questioned the value of such defences in the circumstances of the time.*

The Foreign Office gives us a potted history of the development of military technology following the Second World War. Quite rightly, it says that for a long time the principal threat was seen to come from intercontinental bombers, against which a number of defences were conceivable. But the point is that the alleged rogue attackers are still largely vulnerable even to those antique forms of reprisal. The level of their military spending alone can tell us about the degree of their lack of sophistication in the arts of destruction.

## 3

*With the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile threat in the mid 1960s, and the enormous difficulty and cost of defending against them, the rationale for significant strategic air defences was eroded. Neither of the two superpowers saw it in their interest to develop missile defences of dubious efficacy and potentially enormous cost. It was against this*

*background that Republican President Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev concluded the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The ABMT was a bilateral treaty between the two countries and not multilateral.*

Continuing its history the Foreign Office tells us that intercontinental ballistic missiles became a threat in the mid-'60s, and led Presidents Nixon and Brezhnev to conclude the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. The ABMT, they say 'was a bilateral Treaty between the two countries, and not multilateral'. But this Treaty ceased to be bilateral with the break up of the USSR, and the key nuclear-armed states of the former Soviet Union all become parties to it in their own right.

The presumptions of the Treaty have hitherto been accepted by all of the serious nuclear contenders. It is true that there have been calls for the widening of the Treaty, involving its formal 'multilateralisation'. This proposal was spelt out by Nick Ritchie and Scilla Elsworthy, at a conference in Beijing in March 2000, organised by the Chinese Peoples' Association for Peace and Disarmament<sup>2</sup>. The Chinese were showing the extent to which they had come to accept, and even depend upon, the Treaty by the attention they devoted to this conference.

But the argument that the Treaty was concluded bilaterally is a dangerous one for the British Foreign Office, if it may be taken to imply that unilateral withdrawal is sufficient to put an end to the matter. A unilateral withdrawal by the United States would run the immediate risk of jeopardising Russian co-operation in a whole series of dependent processes, starting with the START agreements, which are already in difficulty as a result of the overall worsening of relations between the USA and Russia. Still worse may be the consequences of disregarding China's interests.

#### 4

*It is important to remember that the ABMT did not completely ban missile defence. Research, development and testing of such a system was acceptable within the constraints of the ABMT. Indeed, each side was allowed to develop one ABM system. Initially, the US intended to*

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*develop a missile defence system to protect ballistic rocket sites in North Dakota, but never proceeded with it. At the present moment Russia is the only country to have a functioning strategic ABM system – around Moscow.*

Of course the Foreign Office is not wrong to insist that the original ABM Treaty did not outlaw all forms of missile defence. It set out to control the extent of research, development and testing, and to restrict the deployment of systems by agreement. The Russians did, under this accord, deploy a system of some kind around Moscow, and the Americans were committed to deployment in North Dakota, but are understood to have abandoned this project. If they could not make a limited system work, of course this poses important questions about whether their more grandiose proposals can be made to work either.

But the question is not whether a given system will work. It is whether the repudiation of the ABM Treaty will launch a whole programme of space militarisation which might work and which will certainly unleash qualitatively new threats to international stability.

### 5

*In addition to this both the US and Russia have deployed Theatre Missile Defence (defined as countering missiles with a range of less than 3500 km). These are explicitly permitted by the ABM Treaty, which was amended by a US-Russia protocol in 1997. They are designed mainly to protect deployed forces, although in theory they would be able to protect whole countries (e.g. Japan, Taiwan, much of Southern Europe) from nearby threats. No one has suggested that TMD will not work or that it will cause further proliferation or an arms race. Missile defence has existed for many years in this form.*

In point 5, the Foreign Office emphasises some of the activities which are specifically permitted by the ABM Treaty. Nobody in the so-called international community has proposed that such exemptions should be abolished. The question at issue is whether the Treaty as a whole should be abolished, restoring a free for all not only in missile defence, but in the development of space

technologies which are currently outlawed.

**6**

*Russia accepts that there is a missile threat and that missile defence has a role to play in defending against it. It is for this reason that it has deployed theatre missile defences. It has also engaged in discussions with NATO about possible areas of co-operation with regard to theatre missile defence.*

The response to point 5 above is the context within which we should interpret the Foreign Office claim that Russia accepts that there is a missile threat, and is willing to explore reasonable responses to it. But if the ABM Treaty is annulled, then there is no basis for negotiations of this kind.

The British Foreign Office receives regular, and sometimes accurate, information about developments in Russia. They are certainly aware that President Putin has walked a very narrow tightrope on all these issues, and that the Russian political class is extremely jealously watching him. In case they have not read this, here is a typical judgement by Alexei Arbatov, the Deputy Chairman of the Defence Committee of the State Duma<sup>3</sup>.

Asked 'How would you describe Russo-American dialogue since the new administration came to power in the USA six months ago', he replied:

'The sides' positions have clearly become softer at the level of state rhetoric. The Presidents established a personal contact and even developed friendly feelings for each other. Personally, I don't think this is good for bilateral relations. I want to remind you that the largest agreements were reached by those Russian and US leaders who were not friendly to each other. First, personal relations interfere with business dialogue, and second, they are taking the place of serious solutions and negotiations.

There was some improvement at the level of rhetoric and personal relations, but the result is nil at the level of practical dialogue. This is especially true of the vital issue of strategic relations, relations related to global strategic factors, and issues of ABM and offensive weapons.'

## *Full Spectrum Sycophancy*

At this point Arbatov's interrogator interrupted to say 'That is, you think that the Genoa agreements and consultations with Washington have no practical base and would lead to nothing?' Arbatov replied:

'They haven't led and will not lead to anything. Because there is no material base for these talks. Why are they talking about consultations now? Because they don't intend to hold talks. Talks is when I give you something, and you give me something in return. I make a concession, and you make a concession in reply. It is diplomatic bargaining, serious discussions and a search for a balance of interests. And what is consultations? I put forth my view, and so do you. I say that I don't agree with you, and so do you. And this is the end of consultations.'

But, protested Arbatov's interlocutor, can't consultations clarify the sides' positions? 'I mean above all those provisions of the 1972 ABM Treaty that do not suit the USA.' Arbatov was pessimistic:

'Washington is not going to lay its cards face up. Why should it? The Republican administration is embarrassed by the change in the lineup of forces in the Senate, the allies ask it not to overdo it, and it would not be diplomatically reasonable to break up with Russia at a time when the US ties with China are far from favourable. The US wants to soften these general political moments. This explains the 'diplomatic dancing' around the issues of offensive and defensive weapons, when nothing is discussed in earnest. Step forward, two steps back.'

Statements at the top level are subsequently well nigh disavowed by the official stands of the sides.'

Arbatov believes that the Americans can continue this game for some time, whilst the USA simultaneously steps up its tests within the permitted limits of the ABM Treaty itself, and the 1997 protocol delimiting strategic and theatre ABM systems. He also thinks that the Americans may be more subtle about the way that they repudiate the ABM Treaty than is commonly expected, both in Russia and among the Western powers.

'The Treaty will not be killed by one blow. It will be eroded and undermined, and eventually everyone will believe that the Treaty is dead'.

Of course, Arbatov may well be wrong about this. On the other side, President Bush himself may be wrong about what can be done, proceeding by stealth: the new systems are likely to prove altogether more difficult to install than is assumed by their protagonists.

Arbatov's candid remarks will help us to focus on the state of Russian opinion. A very much stronger response came from the Russian Foreign Ministry on August 16<sup>th</sup>. It insisted that Moscow was unwilling to compromise on US Missile Defence plans, and argued, alongside Arbatov, that all negotiations on the issue which had been held so far 'had been futile'. 'There is no use looking for signs of compromise in recent statements by the US and Russian Presidents, in that they were prepared to consider the issues of offensive and defense weapons together', the unnamed senior Ministry official told Russia's main news agencies.

There is no question of Russia giving up its stance on the ABM Treaty, signed between Moscow and Washington in 1972, which prevents the US construction of the overall missile shield.

### *The growing missile threat*

#### 7

*During the 1980s missile technology became more readily available. In 1982, during the Falklands War British forces faced attack from Argentinean Exocet missiles. In the 1991 Gulf war Allied forces were subject to attack from Iraqi Scud rockets and Saddam Hussein launched a number of missile attacks on civilian targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Without the deployment of US Patriot defensive missiles the Iraqi Scuds would have inflicted far worse damage and greater casualties.*

In a new chapter of argument, the Foreign Office focuses its attention on the growing missile threat. It begins by reminding us that missile technology became more available in the early 1980s, and tells us that in 1982 British forces faced attack from Argentinian exocet missiles. It did not. The missiles certainly belonged to the Argentinians, but they were French exocet missiles. Proliferation was, in that case, an allied problem, and a direct result of commercial activism.

The use of American patriot missiles to shoot down Iraqi Scud rockets during the Gulf War proves a point which the Foreign Office does not wish to make: to wit, that existing early technology was quite enough to contain the very worst that the Iraqis could do. If Iraq at the height of its powers could not prevail against the patriot missiles, why is it necessary to tear up all the Treaties, and ascend the ladder of escalation in order to conduct the next containment war from the heavens? What valid reason does this offer for the scuppering of the agreements which were reluctantly entered during the Cold War, at a time when the Cold War is supposed to be finished?

8

*Over the past two decades missile proliferation has become a grim reality. In the 1980s during the Iran/Iraq war both sides made use of short-range ballistic missiles to attack each other's civilian populations, the so-called 'war of the cities'. The alarming development and spread of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems has been well documented by bodies such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the NGO Saferworld. For almost half a century after the Second World War missile technology largely remained the preserve of the five permanent members of the Security Council. That monopoly broke down completely in the 1990s as new missile producers, above all North Korea, came on the scene and some of the existing producers such as Russia and China began significantly to increase their exports of missile technology. (see comment below 9)*

9

*Since then a substantial number of other states have acquired missiles including India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya. Whereas in the past the main threat appeared to be from short or medium range ballistic missiles, several of these countries are moving towards acquiring intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is difficult to see for what purpose these countries would want an intercontinental missile capability other than to threaten and deter the United States. US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in Congressional testimony on July 12 argued that 12 countries now had nuclear weapons*

*programmes and 28 ballistic missiles – up from 5 and nine respectively in 1972 – a striking indication of the world changes in the past thirty years.*

In the same vein, the Foreign Office considers missile proliferation as ‘a grim reality’. For almost half a century, says the Foreign Office, missile technology ‘remained the preserve of the five permanent members of the Security Council. That monopoly broke down completely in the 1990s’, partly because Russia and China are alleged to have increased their exports of missile technology, but also because other States have learnt how to manufacture their own equipment.

US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz is cited as claiming that 28 States now possess ballistic missiles. One reason for this is that the former USSR has been divided up into numerous nation States. Some have missiles, and some don’t. India and Pakistan have missiles, primarily because they are frightened of each other, but also because they have uneasy relationships with other powers in the Asian theatre.

It is touching to see that the Foreign Office is primarily concerned with whether the flourishing of intercontinental missiles could be used for any other purpose than to threaten and deter the United States. Some of us think that the United States might not attract quite all this attention if it behaved in a less threatening way itself. But such heresies aside, the Foreign Office is probably mistaken in its presumption. Why is it ‘difficult to see’ what these countries want missiles for, if not to attack or deter the USA? Is that what the British or French missiles are for? Before the USA was at war with Iraq, Iraq was itself at war with Iran, with tacit Western support. India has one eye on Pakistan and the other on China as it installs its missiles.

But the deployment of Missile Defence by the USA does involve a variety of overseas facilities, in Thule in Greenland, Fylingdales, Menwith Hill, and Northern Norway. If we are entering into the spirit of the renewed phobias of rogue Warrior States, we must see all these outbursts of American militarism as nominating candidates for other missile attacks. But Jack Straw’s advisers do not seem to think it advisable to advertise this possibility.

*Dealing with 'Rogue States'*

**10**

*Aside from India, none of the countries that have acquired substantive missile capability in recent years are democracies. Indeed, many of them are amongst the most oppressive regimes in the world with appalling human rights records. Most of these countries, for example, have consistently refused access to impartial monitors of human rights such as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Amnesty International.*

Most of these proliferators of missiles are not democracies, and many of them have very bad human rights records, we are told. It is convenient to make this point, because one of the main justifications for initiating modern wars is that it is necessary to uphold human rights. But a human rights map will tell us some interesting things on this score.

Human rights in Iraq are very much abused. How much worse a state are they in than human rights in Saudi Arabia? The one is deemed suitable for attack, the other is presumably not. Human rights in other Middle Eastern States are also far less well established than most of us in Britain think they ought to be. Some Middle Eastern countries do not figure on any Foreign Office list of basket cases, however.

During the Gulf War, the Pope made an appeal for a peaceful solution. I wrote to the Dalai Lama, who had recently spoken to the European Parliament's Sub-committee on Human Rights while it met under my Chairmanship. I asked what he felt about the Pope's initiative. He replied that human rights were obviously in a very bad way in Iraq, as they were also in Tibet. 'But', he went on, 'unfortunately, in Tibet, as far as any of us knows, there is not a single drop of oil to be found'.

Unfortunately, we all know many countries which have failed to listen to the representatives of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or Amnesty International. One of the countries with a record which is dubious in some respects is the United States of America, which maintains a very high rate of

executions, in spite of frequent interventions by Amnesty and other concerned bodies. Yet, at the same time, in other areas, most of us consider that the United States is a country which upholds many very fundamental human rights.

The record is patchy, and the same thing is true far across the wider world. Before we range ourselves into Outer Space to zap wrong-doers, we ought to explore the terrestrial means that are available to extend the sway of human rights by agreement. Rights imposed at gunpoint are prone to evaporate when the gun is taken away.

## 11

*Nor are they party to all international instruments that might give cause for less concern about their behaviour. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is the only existing multilateral arrangement covering the transfer of missiles and related equipment and technology relevant to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) delivery. China has said that it abides by the MTCR but will not become a binding party to it. In practice it has not always lived up to that commitment.*

At this point, the Foreign Office is anxious that we should understand that the rogue States do not uphold the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)<sup>4</sup>. Rightly they say that this is the only existing multilateral arrangement covering the transfer of missiles and related equipment. But the MTCR is an unusual institution. It did not result from any normal disarmament or arms control process, but originated in a private agreement at the G7 meeting of Heads of State in 1987. This agreement was subsequently extended to include 28 nations, one of which, the Russian Federation, endorsed as late as 1993 at the instance of Boris Yeltsin.

The MTCR is not a Treaty, and is not binding, but is instead, a voluntary arrangement. It is open to divergent interpretations, and subject to varying levels of compliance and enforcement. Before the MTCR, export of missiles was as free as export of aircraft, tanks, or naval equipment. By 1992, the Director of the CIA testified that only North Korea was actually still dealing in this trade. There have, however been allegations that China has been an exporter, even

though the Foreign Office tell us here that China abides by the MTCR without becoming 'a binding party to it'.

Certainly, the MTCR was not the subject of a negotiated East West agreement. It is part of a new generation of accords, entered into on the initiative of the United States, during the alleged post-Cold War interregnum.

**12**

*Efforts to prevent North Korea, the largest proliferator, passing on this deadly technology have failed. The Clinton Administration offered substantial incentives for North Korean compliance with restraint on weapons of mass destruction but Pyongyang's response has been half hearted at best, notwithstanding the fact that North Korea is the main recipient of US aid in Asia, whether in the form of heavy fuel oil as a substitute for the abandoned nuclear power or as straight humanitarian aid. The Bush Administration has recently confirmed its willingness to continue the agreement with North Korea reached by President Clinton. There are indications that some recipients of North Korean technology, such as Pakistan, have in turn, passed it on to others. North Korea's unwillingness to observe commitments it has already made indicate the limitations of relying solely on powers of persuasion.*

What the Foreign Office fails to see is that, although the missile control regime has never attracted support in North Korea, this gap in the provision of the MTC regime would cost almost nothing compared to the results of a breakdown in the relations on these matters between the United States and Russia. Why should the Russians wish to maintain such a voluntary agreement at a time when the Americans are tearing up a formal Treaty, which they regard as the cornerstone of some of the most important weapons control agreements underpinning the present military balances? Does no-one in the British Foreign Office see that a return to hectoring and bullying in international relations is quite likely to have damaging consequences in a wide area of relations? Yes, of course, the United States is a megapower, for which it is tempting to see the world as an oyster. But the Russian power cannot be ignored, has its own concerns, and has the means to punish invasive trespass

on them. Was it more convenient, following the Cold War, to have a regime of compromise and give and take, or will it now be better to follow the third way back to confrontation and antagonism?

Concerning Korea, the Foreign Office styles it 'the largest proliferator'. What exactly does this mean? Which others is it larger than? Who is proliferating in what? The Foreign Office charges that 'some' recipients of North Korean technology, such as Pakistan, have in turn, passed it on to others. Which others have received technology? To whom has it been passed? North Korea has made no commitments to restrict the sales of missile technology to others, since it has not sought to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). What efforts have been made to persuade it so to do? It is not necessary for the purposes of this argument to explore the fractious relations between North Korea and the United States, but neither is it necessary uncritically to believe the one-sided story which has been presented by the Foreign Office in this case.

### 13

*A suitcase bomb? Missile Defence would not work against the terrorist suitcase or car bomb. It is not designed to. The US already counters this threat – they spent about \$11 billion last year on counter-terrorism efforts, about twice that spent on Missile Defence. The point is that missiles pose a much more visible and effective threat than a suitcase bomb.*

It may be presumed that we all knew already that even the most gung-ho of President Bush's supporters might not attempt to shoot down a suitcase bomb with a missile interceptor. But this debating point raises an interesting question. Upon what did the United States spend \$11 billion last year, in the interests of counter-terrorism? Does counter-terrorism include, for instance, expenditure headings such as those incurred in bombing pharmaceutical factories in Sudan? Or is the money spent at home, in the United States? In earlier years, was it counter-terrorism to fund unofficial wars in Nicaragua? Is the present confrontation in Colombia resourced out of this budget line? One man's counter-terrorism is another's terrorism, and trigger-happy Americans have

a developed reputation for promoting conflicts in many parts of the world.

Only now does the full extent of their murderous involvement in Indonesia before and after 1965 emerge in the revelations of Roland Challis<sup>5</sup>, the South East Asia correspondent of the BBC during the *coup d'état* which brought Suharto to the Indonesian Presidency, and organised, with direct involvement of the CIA and British Intelligence, the slaughter of up to one million supposed Communist sympathisers. This massacre was the largest genocide since the Second World War.

No doubt the guidance it required would have been very expensive. No doubt it would also have cost a lot of money to bring about the destruction of Patrice Lumumba, who was murdered somewhat earlier on the 17<sup>th</sup> January 1961. Today all of this is tumbling out, as a result of the exposures by Ludo de Witte<sup>6</sup>. So much State terrorism must surely motivate new terrorists among the victims of every one of its successful onslaughts. The British Foreign Office is, perhaps, revealing something, if it is telling us that this kind of budget exceeds the insane extravagance of the Missile Defence expenditure.

Suitcase bombs are the missiles of the poor, whose numbers are being increased from one year to the next, largely as a result of determined American policy. As the United States Space Command itself insists:

‘The globalisation of the world economy will also continue, with a widening between “haves” and “have-nots”.’<sup>7</sup>

Modern technology will allow the have nots to be punished, perhaps eliminated, on a grand scale.

### *Clinton and Bush Administration plans*

#### **14**

*Missile Defence is just one part of a US strategy aimed at dissuading countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ballistic missile capabilities in the first place; to discourage those who have*

*already acquired such capabilities from investing further; and to deter them from the use of such capabilities. It is not a substitute for nuclear deterrence, but part of a strategy of 'layered deterrence', including a mix of capabilities, both offensive and defensive. It is aimed at supplementing not supplanting non-proliferation efforts.*

Missile Defence, says the Foreign Office, is only one part of an overall strategy to discourage the horizontal proliferation (to new countries) of ballistic missiles, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and all of the horrors involved in preparing mass destruction.

'It is not a substitute for nuclear deterrence, but part of a strategy of "layered deterrence".'

But, as Frank Blackaby pointed out in the last article<sup>8</sup> he wrote before his death, 'counter proliferation' and 'non-proliferation' are mutually exclusive alternatives. As he said:

'Counter proliferation, put baldly, is the policy of blowing up, or threatening to blow up suspect sites. Non-proliferation is a policy of support for non-proliferation regimes.'

We could go beyond Blackaby, to warn that the extension of counter proliferation will, if it continues, make non-proliferation impossible. The more that small countries are blasted, or even intimidated and blockaded, the more non-proliferation will come to be seen as an eccentric, not to say perilous option.

All of the arguments of the blue rinse Tories in Britain, about why Britain needs the bomb, even if it is an American bomb held under licence under very restrictive conditions, will start to be heard in all the main neutral countries, at present the stronger voices of non-proliferation.

This weakening of resolution by the non-proliferators was seen at the last review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The great nuclear powers were threatened with a rebellion, in which they were told that their platonic commitment to their own nuclear disarmament was no longer sufficient. To secure another round of adherence to the Treaty, it would be necessary for the nuclear

powers themselves to do something, more than simply to praise non-proliferation.

As a result of this confrontation, the main nuclear powers agreed to jointly press ahead towards comprehensive nuclear disarmament. The NPT was saved. Unfortunately, the powers forgot to agree on any timetable or objective test by which their proposals might be continuously assessed.

It gets harder to uphold nuclear-free zones and other similar important arms control measures. Surely this is because there is no moral justification for one group of nations, armed to the teeth with weapons of mass destruction, to use their leverage to impose conformity to higher standards on another group, bereft of all such arms.

All this should emphasise that arms control regimes are themselves a very imperfect measure, when compared to what we all need, which is actually disarmament, total disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, and total prohibition of intercontinental ballistic missiles. It would be absurd to turn a blind eye to arms control measures because they fall short of comprehensive disarmament. But even if we can defend the most stringent controls, we still need to confront the issues of overall disarmament, if we are to restore a common sense of humane values to a world which is in dire need of such moral unity.

If George Bush may think that he can enforce counter-proliferation by blasting rogue States, in reality he is more likely simply to succeed in enlarging the ranks of the rogues. It is by working for a more peaceful world that we may achieve a more peaceful world.

## 15

*The Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration before it has seen Missile Defence as just one element in the new US deterrence framework including diplomacy, arms control, counter-terrorism, and counter-proliferation. As a senior Bush Administration official Paul Wolfowitz has noted, 'It is not an effort to build an impenetrable shield around the US. This is not Star Wars. We have a much more limited objective to deploy effective defences against limited missile attack.'*

The Foreign Office thinks that the Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration, has seen Missile Defence as just one element in the new US deterrence framework. Surely there are continuities of policy between the two Administrations, and it would be surprising if there were not, since both are funded by the same vast complexes of military industrial corporations, and both are subject to the same sustained and eloquent lobbies of arms salesmen.

But there have been differences, and it is surprising that the Foreign Office does not see fit to mention them. Instead, it tells us that for the money which is currently thought to be available, it would not be possible 'to build an impenetrable shield around the US. This is not Star Wars.' It was our impression that after the frenzy of the Reagan years, it had been understood that such an 'impenetrable shield' was not possible in any case, no matter how much treasure was lavished upon the fantasy.

This is not what the argument is about, and the argument is not about whether this, that, or the other fiendish new invention will 'work' or not. What this is about is whether the Americans will repudiate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty. If these Treaties are unilaterally kicked away, then with them will fall all the intricate and interconnecting arms control measures which have mushroomed under their umbrella. American diplomats have been consistently clear about this. They do not wish to waste time negotiating revisions to the ABM Treaty, which they see as an obstacle to the realisation of their military programme. Donald Rumsfeld stated in public before his recent meeting with Russian Defence Minister Ivanov that 'the 1972 ABM Treaty was outdated after the end of the Cold War and should be abandoned'. But Ivanov, on August 13<sup>th</sup>, following the meeting, said that Rumsfeld had failed to convince him.

'We still think that the ABM Treaty is one of the major important elements of the complex of international Treaties on which international stability is based.'

Never mind the arguments about technique, or the physical possibility of some of the Heath Robinson schemes which American

scientists are canvassing. That is all about fostering business in the military-space communities. Never mind impenetrable shields, or square circles. The destruction of the basic Treaties of the Cold War settlements would only be a rational step if the Post-Cold War settlements were more secure and more trusting. The contrary is true. Post-Cold War, we have a heaving mess of competing interests, with one predominant bully appearing to be in charge some of the time if not quite most of the time.

Nothing is stable, and the result is that Britain is at war in Europe for the first time since 1945. Some Britons think that that is all right, if Britain wins. But these are wars which no-one is likely to win, and they are very likely to seed further wars. The removal of agreements on nuclear and other mass destruction systems is, in such circumstances, an insane project. But for the Americans, this insanity already has a coherent expression. It is all summed up in the doctrine of Full Spectrum Dominance.

## 16

*Under Clinton, US plans for missile defence were limited to one design. The Clinton Administration designed their missile defence architecture (research, development and testing of a fixed ground-based system designed to intercept missiles in the mid-course of their flight) to be as Treaty-compliant as possible. Research, development and testing of such a system was acceptable within the constraints of the ABMT (though deployment of a system of territorial defence would not have been). The Clinton Administration accepted the need to negotiate changes to the Treaty before any deployment.*

At last the Foreign office concedes that the Clinton Administration would have sought to negotiate changes to the ABM Treaty before it went ahead with deployment. How can the Blair Government in Britain possibly ignore this commitment, and relate to the successor American Administration, with its directly contrary policies, as if there were a seamless continuity? Is this not the ultimate opportunism, and will it not discredit this Government more thoroughly than any of its other apostasies?

17

*The Bush Administration has taken a fresh look at missile defence plans. Like the Clinton Administration, they are committed to a system designed to defend against limited missile attack only. But they have declared their intention to develop and deploy layered missile defences to intercept missiles of any range at every stage of flight – boost (take-off), mid-course, and terminal (descent). They are looking at all options including fixed and mobile ground-based, sea-based, air-based and space-based operations, based on feasibility and effectiveness. They are looking to build incrementally, evaluating technologies as they go, deploying capabilities as soon as the technology is ready and adding to these as technological advances are made.*

Here we are told that President Bush intends to develop and deploy new technologies across the panoply of ‘layers’ that are deemed necessary. The race to develop such technologies in space, sea, land, air and communications will go ahead as if there were no Treaty prohibiting them. At some point this brigandage will presumably be noticed. Even the Foreign Office has noticed the intention. In the circumstances, how can anybody license the use of British facilities as a subordinate part of this piratical enterprise?

18

*President Bush has made clear that US plans on Missile Defence will be combined with substantial reductions in the American nuclear arsenal. He has also placed far greater emphasis than his predecessor, President Clinton, on the need for a wide-ranging series of international consultations that have so far involved not only NATO allies, but also Russia, China and India.*

The Foreign Office has touching faith in President Bush, who, it says, will combine its onslaught on the framework of Treaties with substantial reductions in the American nuclear arsenal. He will also ‘consult’ more widely than his predecessor. As we have already been warned by Mr. Arbatov:

‘What is consultations? I put forth my view, and so do you. I say that I

don't agree with you, and so do you. And this is the end of consultations.'

**19**

*The Administration has emphasised that the missile defences they propose will be no threat to Russia. President Bush has repeatedly said that the United States no longer considers Russia an enemy. With more than 6,000 nuclear warheads, Russia can easily overwhelm any missile shield the United States might conceivably construct. The proposed US missile defences are designed to protect against limited missile attacks from an increasing number of possible sources – but not against the thousands of missiles in Russia's arsenal.*

Does the United States consider Russia an enemy? Well, it does not consider it to be a possible ally in Nato, and has pooh-poohed the suggestions made by President Putin that Russia might wish to join that Alliance. That application is deemed to be quite unsustainable, because the Russians would be inside all the discussions, the outcome of which might otherwise discomfort it.

Nato has systematically been driven further and further East, in spite of quite explicit promises that were made to Gorbachev upon his agreement to abandon Russian influence in East Germany. The day before he met President Putin in Slovenia, President Bush insisted that no-one had the right to stop the Baltic Republics from adhering to Nato. The Partnership for Peace continues to organise joint military actions with former Member-states of the Soviet Union, wherever it can.

No. President Bush does not consider Russia as an enemy, but as a *defeated* enemy. The United States would like to maintain civil relations with Russian leaders, while American businessmen Hoover up all the resources that they can in the former Soviet Union, and the generals pick and mix any strategic assets.

True, Russia is economically and militarily weaker than the old Soviet Union, by some considerable measure. This weakening is already harming the economic potential of the rest of the world, and fostering social deprivation on a very serious scale. None of these disorders takes place on an island, and all large States find themselves to be 'part of the main'.

Meantime, if we must evaluate potential military conflict, we are bound to ask, if, as the Foreign Office maintains, Russia with so many missiles can 'easily overwhelm any missile shield' this must encourage other powers with missiles to increase their numbers. Who can then say that a shield does not imply an arms race?

**20**

*The Administration has emphasised their intention to reach an understanding with Russia on a new co-operative strategic framework. During their first summit in Slovenia in June Presidents Bush and Putin had extensive discussions on the issue of missile defence. For its part Russia has shown clear signs of a strong interest in either amending the ABMT of 1972 or in developing a new strategic framework with the US. President Putin confirmed this at a press conference in Moscow on July 18.*

Small powers with great pretensions tend to generate high levels of wishful thinking. Here the Foreign Office surpasses itself. If President Putin really wants to develop a new strategic framework with the United States, he too must be generating a wishful thinking capacity of some strength. On this matter, Arbatov is far more likely to be right than Jack Straw.

**21**

*At their bilateral meeting in Genoa on July 22 Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that their two countries would start talks soon on offensive and defensive missile systems. They also said they were looking at substantial cuts in their strategic arsenals. Their joint statement noted 'We agreed that major changes in the world require concrete discussions of offensive and defensive systems. We already have strong and tangible points of agreement.'*

In the final four points, wishful thinking blanks out the Foreign Secretary's every other faculty. At Genoa, the feel-good vibrations at the summit were profoundly necessary, to distract attention from a truly daunting series of crises, and to win back the cameras from Mr. Berlusconi's mayhem squads. President Bush thinks that soft soap

will get him anywhere, and leaves the tough talking to his subordinates. President Putin quickly adopted the same strategy. We have already discussed this, and need only say that there is no evidence at all that the Russians want to annul the ABM Treaty.

**22**

*The UK has been actively encouraging both countries to expedite their discussions on these important matters. We have also emphasised to the Bush Administration the need for wide-ranging discussions with NATO allies and other key international players such as China.*

To encourage Russia and America to talk means ... exactly what? Do they not know the way to each other's doors? Can Mr. Blair mediate? Or for that matter, Mr. Straw? The idea is not very plausible. Nor does it look very helpful if our friends Don Quixote and Sancho Panza ride off to Beijing in order to encourage the Chinese to conform to American wishes. It might be easier to sell ice cream to Eskimos.

**23**

*As the most progressive of all the nuclear weapons states the British Government is examining new initiatives to stem the tide of proliferation. Possibilities might include looking at ways in which the MTCR can be turned from a voluntary supplier's regime into a universal, legally binding treaty. We have also been in the forefront of international discussions to secure a Missile Code of Conduct.*

The British Government's wishful thoughts here need the services of Walter Mitty. Why not turn the Missile Technology Control Regime into a proper Treaty? Why not? If proper Treaties can be torn up to suit the convenience of the strongest powers, then why should anybody worry whether the MTCR is a Treaty or a begging letter? About to condone the destruction of real Treaties, on which much international agreement has depended, the Right Honourable Walter Straw shows no appreciation of the certain result of his behaviour on related instruments.

Britain, we notice here, has now been nominated as 'the most

progressive of all the nuclear weapon States.’ This is a fascinating nomination. Who made it? In respect of what achievement was it proposed?

## 24

*At the same time the UK attaches great importance to its long-standing relationship with the United States. It is in Britain and Europe’s interest that our two countries work closely together internationally. Without active American involvement it would have been unimaginable that President Milosevic would have been forced out of Kosovo, or that Saddam Hussein would have left Kuwait. The United States is far more likely to stay engaged internationally if it feels free from attack from missiles.*

But at last, as if we did not know it, the UK attaches great importance to its long-standing relationship with the United States. This is a stand too far. The argument that the bonfire of the Treaties has nothing to do with Star Wars can only be sustained by those who do not know about the recent evolution of American thinking on space strategies, and on Full Spectrum Dominance.

In order to cut through all this web of evasion, half-truths and misrepresentation, we only have to look at the United States Space Command’s *Vision for 2020* which we append to these comments (see page 41 onwards).

The Foreign Office concludes its statements with this summary:

### *Key points*

*Missile defence is not new. It exists already – Moscow, for example, is protected by an anti-missile defence system allowed by the 1972 ABMT.*

*Russia and the United States have already amended the 1972 ABM Treaty by an additional protocol in 1997 which allows both countries to develop and deploy theatre missile defences.*

*The threat of proliferation is real. Many states have acquired a missile capability over the past two decades. More worrying still is that a small but growing band of states – almost all of them non-democratic – have acquired long-range ballistic missiles. All of these states are also developing weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical and biological.*

## *Full Spectrum Sycophancy*

*Missile Defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort, but part of it. Proliferators are not irrational. All our non-proliferation instruments – the multilateral Treaties, national and international export controls, interception/disruption operations etc. are ultimately aimed at affecting the cost / benefit calculation that all proliferators must make, however crudely. Effective Missile Defence can do the same, by reducing the likely benefit of developing WMD-armed missiles (or by raising the cost, through the need to build more, or more sophisticated, systems). It therefore complements, not replaces, the other tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.*

*We are actively promoting a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) which comprises principles, commitments and confidence building measures on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This would be the first international norm on ballistic missiles. The EU committed itself at Gothenburg to seeking to launch the ICOC formally in the course of 2002.*

*We are also very active in addressing the drivers of most missile proliferation: i.e. regional insecurity and tension. To that extent, all the UK's efforts to address India / Pakistan problems, to support the Middle East Peace Process, and to encourage rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula are part of our wider counter-proliferation work.*

*Following their meeting in Genoa on July 22, Presidents Bush and Putin are engaged in a wide-ranging series of discussions which will extend into the autumn covering both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both leaders have already said that they are looking forward to substantial cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals.*

*At the end of July the US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing for wide ranging talks with the Chinese leadership. China agreed to hold a dialogue of experts on Chinese missile technology exports which have been a major source of concern. Following the talks Secretary Powell stressed that he wanted to convey President Bush's desire 'to develop constructive, forward-looking relations with the People's Republic of China'.*

*For further information contact Dr. Michael C. Williams, Special Adviser to the Foreign Secretary, tel: 0207 270 2112, fax: 0207 270 2336.*

In sum, it is a complete red herring to talk about restricted missile defences of the kinds which were possible and licensed by the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty. The question is not whether such restricted schemes should be abrogated. It is whether the Treaty itself should be abrogated, altogether a more momentous question. Yes, the two initial partners did amend the Treaty by an additional protocol in 1997, and, given talks and agreements, it is not at all inconceivable that it could be amended in 2002, or whenever. We are told that this approach was the one adopted by President Clinton.

But it is not at all the approach adopted by the Bush Administration, which has specifically insisted that it did not envisage proposing any amendment, which would be “a waste of time”.

Is the threat of proliferation real? Yes, and it will become more real, the more arbitrary and domineering the behaviour of the great powers.

## **References**

1. See *The Spokesman* No. 72. 'You know what the so-called "rogues" have in their arsenal' said Mr. Putin ... 'it is Soviet Scud missiles. What are Soviet Scud missiles? Strictly speaking, they are modernised ... V2s.' North Korea has apparently made most progress in modernising them, but it has hit the limits of such modernisation.
2. Reported in a special issue of the Association's journal, *Peace*, June 2000, Serial No. 55. Of course, the repudiation of the ABM Treaty will be a serious blow to the Chinese, and it has already been made abundantly clear that they will take appropriate counter action. This could mean a fierce escalation in the nuclear arms race, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, the Chinese could install many more intercontinental ballistic missiles, and they could add to the threat that these would pose by equipping them with multiple warheads, or 'mirving' them. Horizontally, the Chinese could take a more relaxed attitude about the export of whole categories of armament and technology to countries of which the United States does not approve.
3. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, August 14, 2001, translation from RIA Novosti.
4. See Federation of American Scientists ([www.fas.org](http://www.fas.org)) for information about the Regime.
5. cf. *Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals*, Sutton Publishing, London, 2001.
6. *The Assassination of Lumumba*, Verso, 2001.
7. United States Space Command, *Vision for 2020*, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, 1996.
8. *The Spokesman*, No.68, p.41.

**TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE  
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF  
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS**

*Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972  
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972  
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972  
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972  
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972  
Entered into force October 3, 1972*

**Article V**

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

**Article VI**

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

**TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE  
EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE, INCLUDING THE MOON AND  
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES**

*Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, January 27, 1967  
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate April 25, 1967  
Ratified by U.S. President May 24, 1967  
U.S. ratification deposited at Washington, London, and Moscow October 10, 1967  
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 10, 1967  
Entered into force October 10, 1967*

**Article III**

States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

**Article IV**

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.

The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.

*United States Space Command*

**VISION**

**FOR**

**2020**






A handwritten signature in black ink.

Howell M. Estes III  
General, USAF  
Commander in Chief



A handwritten signature in black ink.

Edward G. Anderson III  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Commanding



A handwritten signature in black ink.

David L. Vesely  
Major General, USAF  
Commander



A handwritten signature in black ink.

K. A. Laughton  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Commander





## GENERAL HOWELL M. ESTES III

"The increasing reliance of US military forces upon space power combined with the explosive proliferation of global space capabilities makes a space vision essential. As stewards for military space, we must be prepared to exploit the advantages of the space medium. This Vision serves as a bridge in the evolution of military space into the 21st century and is the standard by which United States Space Command and its Components will measure progress into the future."


*US Space Command--dominating  
the space dimension of military operations  
to protect US interests and investment.  
Integrating Space Forces into warfighting  
capabilities across the full spectrum  
of conflict.*

## A Historic Perspective—the Evolution of Space

Historically, military forces have evolved to protect national interests and investments – both military and economic. During the rise of sea commerce, nations built navies to protect and enhance their commercial interests. During the westward expansion of the continental United States, military outposts and the cavalry emerged to protect our wagon trains, settlements, and railroads.



As air power developed, its primary purpose was to support and enhance land and sea operations. However, over time, air power evolved into a separate and equal medium of warfare.



The emergence of space power follows both of these models. Over the past several decades, space power has primarily supported land, sea, and air operations—strategically and operationally. During the early portion of the 21st century, space power will also evolve into a separate and equal medium of warfare. Likewise, space forces will emerge to protect military and commercial national interests and investment in the space medium due to their increasing importance.



*"Joint Vision 2010 provides an operationally based template for the evolution of the Armed Forces for a challenging and uncertain future. It must become a benchmark for Service and Unified Command visions."*

*GEN John M. Shalikashvili  
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

## Joint Vision 2010

The medium of space is the fourth medium of warfare—along with land, sea, and air. Space power (systems, capabilities, and forces) will be increasingly leveraged to close the ever-widening gap between diminishing resources and increasing military commitments.

The Joint Vision 2010 operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics are enabled by information superiority and technological innovation. The end result of these enablers and concepts is Full Spectrum Dominance. Information superiority relies heavily upon space capabilities to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while denying an adversary's ability to fully leverage the same.

The emerging synergy of space superiority with land, sea, and air superiority, will lead to Full Spectrum Dominance. Space forces play an increasingly critical role in providing situational awareness (e.g., global communications; precise navigation; timely and



accurate missile warning and weather; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR]) to US forces.

Space doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel will evolve to fully realize the potential of space power. Space power

is a vital element in moving towards the Joint Vision goal of being persuasive in peace, decisive in war, and preeminent in any form of conflict.

**Information superiority  
relies heavily upon space  
capabilities**

## Future Trends

Although unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor, the United States will continue to be challenged regionally. The globalization of the world economy will also continue, with a widening between "haves" and "have-nots." Accelerating rates of technological development will be increasingly driven by the commercial sector -- not the military. Increased weapons lethality and precision will lead to new operational doctrine. Information-intensive military force structures will lead to a highly dynamic operations tempo.



## Space Trends

Space systems, commercial and military, are proliferating throughout the world. Space commerce is becoming increasingly important to the global economy. Likewise, the importance of space capabilities to military operations is being widely embraced by many nations.

Indeed, so important are space systems to military operations that it is unrealistic to imagine that they will never become targets. Just as land dominance, sea control, and air superiority have become critical elements of current military strategy, space superiority is emerging as an essential element of battlefield success and future warfare.

## Implications for US Space Command

The political, economic, technological, and military trends hold significant implications for USSPACECOM. An increased dependence upon space capabilities may lead to increased vulnerabilities. As space systems become lucrative military targets, there will be a critical need to control the space medium to ensure US dominance on future battlefields. Robust capabilities to ensure space superiority must be developed—just as they have been for land, sea, and air.

Our adversaries can be expected to attain ready access to space-derived information through the proliferation of space systems. Turn-key space systems are available to nations with the necessary resources allowing for significant increases in capabilities in a relatively short time. Military use of civil, commercial, and international

space systems will continue to increase. However, the military must preserve certain core space capabilities, e.g., missile warning, assured space communications, and large portions of ISR. Other space capabilities, once the domain of the military,

can reasonably migrate to the civil and commercial sectors, e.g., weather, GPS, and multi-spectral imagery.

Space operations must be fully integrated with land, sea, and air operations. USSPACECOM must assume a dynamic role in planning and executing joint military operations. Included in that planning should be the prospects for space defense and even space warfare.

Development of ballistic missile defenses using space systems and plan-

ning for precision strike from space offers a counter to the worldwide proliferation of WMD.


### Space systems will be targets



Space superiority is essential

## Space as an Area of Responsibility (AOR)

Space is a region with increasing commercial, civil, international, and military interests and investments. The threat to these vital systems is also increasing. The space AOR is global and requires a combatant commander with a global perspective to conduct military operations and support regional warfighting CINCs. USSPACECOM is the only military organization with operational forces in space. Establishing space as an AOR merely states an operational reality.



## Vision


Just as land, sea, and air warfare has evolved, USSPACECOM, operating in the space medium, will evolve to perform the missions required by the future environment foreseen in the trends and implications on the preceding pages. This Vision charts a course to purposeful and orderly change.

The two principal themes of the USSPACECOM Vision are dominating the space medium and integrating space power throughout military operations. Today, the United States is the preeminent military space power. Our Vision is one of maintaining that preeminence -- providing a solid foundation for our national security.



**US Space Command**  
 space dimension of  
 to protect US nation  
 investment. Integra  
 into warfighting cap  
 full spectrum

# COM Vision



**d - Dominating the military operations  
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capabilities across the  
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## Operational Concepts

To move towards the attainment of our Vision, we have adopted four operational concepts:

- **Control of Space**
- **Global Engagement**
- **Full Force Integration**
- **Global Partnerships**

These operational concepts provide the conceptual framework to transform the Vision into capabilities.

# Dominating the space dimension of military operations


## Integrating Space Forces into warfighting

### Control of Space

Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required.

The medium of space is recognized as the fourth medium of warfare. Joint operations require the Control of Space to achieve overall campaign objectives. The Control of Space will encompass protecting US military, civil, and commercial investments in space.

As commercial space systems provide global



The ability to dominate space

information and nations tap into this source for military purposes, protecting (as well as negating) these non-military space systems will become more difficult. Due to the importance of commerce and its effects on national security, the United States may evolve into the guardian of space commerce—similar to the historical example of navies protecting sea commerce.

Control of Space is a complex mission that casts USCINCSpace in a classic warfighter role and mandates an established AOR.

#### Control of Space Capabilities

- Real-time space surveillance
- Timely and responsive spacelift
- Enhanced protection (military and commercial systems)
- Robust negation systems

# Command

to protect US national interests and investment capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.

## Global Engagement

Global Engagement is the application of precision force from, to, and through space. USSPACECOM will have a greatly expanded role as an active warfighter in the years ahead as the combatant command responsible for National Missile Defense (NMD) and space force application. Global Engagement combines global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability.

The requirement for Global Engagement is based upon the increasing proliferation of missile systems, the requirement for precision strike, and



Strategic Deterrent and Precision Strike

the need for effective forward presence with reduced forward basing.

The proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires an NMD. NMD will evolve into a mix of ground and space sensors and weapons.

Existing land, sea, and air missions will be enhanced by space systems. Current sea and air strategic attack missions will be augmented by the deployment of space force application systems. Likewise, surface and air surveillance systems (e.g., AWACS and JSTARS) will be augmented by space-based surveillance systems.

### Global Engagement Capabilities

- Non-intrusive global surveillance
- Key to National Missile Defense
- Enhanced C2
- Space-based strike weapons

# US Space


## Dominating the space dimension of military operations

### Integrating Space Forces into warfighting

#### Full Force Integration

Full Force Integration is the integration of space forces and space-derived information with land, sea, and air forces and their information. The bottom line is that space power will contribute to getting the right military capability and information to the right people, at the right place, at the right time.

Space forces must be fully integrated in all planning, training, exercises, and operations. Full Force Integration in-



cludes the merging of information and information systems into a "system of systems" approach. The goal is to achieve the same level of joint operations between space and the other mediums of war-fighting as land, sea, and air currently enjoy today. Innovative organizations, operational concepts, information flows, and people are key elements of Full Force Integration. Of these, the dedicated professionals that fill our ranks are our most indispensable assets.

Truly joint military forces require fully integrated space power

#### Full Force Integration Capabilities

- Enhanced "sensor-to-shooter"
- Common protocols, communications standards, and fused databases
- Precise modeling and simulation
- "One-stop shop" for space support

# Command


to protect US national interests and investment. capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict.

## Global Partnerships

Global Partnerships augments military space capabilities through the leveraging of civil, commercial, and international space systems. The growth of non-US military space systems provides the opportunity for the United States to gain increased battlespace awareness and information connectivity in a cost-effective manner. These partnerships provide shared costs, shared risks, and increased opportunities.

Global Partnerships is based upon these factors:

- Dramatic growth in commercial and international space-based capabilities.



A fundamental change in space operations

of advanced space systems will be primarily driven by the commercial sector

- Constrained military spending
- Growth in multi-national operations and alliances

The most evident benefit of Global Partnerships will be decreased pressure on existing military infrastructure and operations, and reduced maintenance costs by off loading functions to civil and commercial providers. The military can no longer rely solely upon DoD owned and operated capabilities.

Global Partnerships-- a fundamental change in providing military space support to the warfighter.

### Global Partnerships Concepts


- Sharing of space-based information
- Influencing space system designs
- Satellite sharing
- Space system architectures to facilitate rapid flow of information
- International standardization


## Implementation

The United States Space Command's Space Planning and Requirements System (SPRS) is the established process that will be used to implement this Vision. This end-to-end planning system uses Joint Vision 2010, the National Security Space Master Plan, and the United States Space Command Vision as overarching guidance.

Annually, we assess current and future space requirements, capabilities, and shortfalls in sup-

port of all warfighters. With our Vision, we will extend our time horizons from the Future Years Defense Plan to 2020. External organizations (e.g., CINCs, Services, National and Defense organizations) provide valuable input throughout the SPRS process. We fully expect that our Vision and SPRS will drive long-term changes in space doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership, and personnel.





For additional copies of this publication, or to comment on the Vision, contact:

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# SPACE

*...the Warfighters' Edge*

