SPOKESMAN BOOKS
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Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
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Catalogue
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THE BERTRAND RUSSELL PEACE FOUNDATION
DOSSIER
2007
Number 25
These
excerpts are taken from Alvaro de Soto’s confidential End of Mission Report
to the United Nations, dated May 2007. It was leaked shortly after he resigned
as the United Nations Special Co-ordinator for the Middle East Peace Process,
the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the Palestinian Authority, and as UN Envoy to the
Quartet, the Middle East grouping dominated by the United States which also
includes the European Union and Russia.
Barely
five days after the 25 January 2006 elections, the Palestinians received an
icy shower in the form of a pre-programmed Quartet meeting in London on 30
January
2006. Just as the dominant issue in September had been whether Hamas should
participate in the elections, in January it was how to handle the result.
Not
that the Palestinians were totally unprepared for the shock: warning shots had
been fired across their bow in two statements, both issued after
teleconferences between the Principals, issued on 28 December 2005 and on 26
January 2006, the day after the elections. In the first, the Quartet called on
all those ‘who want to be part of the political process’ to ‘renounce
violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm’, and ‘expressed
its view that a future Palestinian Authority Cabinet should include no member
who was not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to exist in peace
and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.’ In the
second, also issued after a teleconference, the Quartet said: ‘A two-state
solution to the conflict requires all participants in the democratic process
to renounce violence and terror, accept Israel’s right to exist, and disarm,
as outlined in the Road Map.’
Yet
in a 13 January meeting, I had gathered the impression that, though the United
States had clearly decided who were ‘the bad guys’, they were not entirely
averse to the approach, which I floated. This approach, drawing on the
flexibility of Russia and the UN – those members of the Quartet unencumbered
by legislative constraints regarding dealings with Hamas – would have been
designed to encourage Hamas to continue moving in the direction taken when it
decided to participate in the elections.
What
I had in mind was that the Quartet could adopt a common but differentiated approach
towards Hamas and the new government, and I recommended to UNHQ that we
avoid tying our hands in ways that we might come to regret later. I
also said that, whereas we had to acknowledge that the United States
and the European Union had real domestic constraints with regard to
assistance to a government involving members of a movement listed by them as
a terrorist organization, they should in turn acknowledge that a group that is
likely to hold a high percentage of seats in the Legislature could not be
effectively dealt with by pressure and isolation alone, that Hamas was
evolving and could evolve still more, that if we are to encourage that
evolution some channel of dialogue would be necessary, and that for the
UN to play such a role, as it had done successfully in many cases
elsewhere in the world, it had to be given some space. I also proposed
that, regardless of what position it took regarding the new Palestinian
dispensation, the Quartet should register concern about Israel’s creation
of facts on the ground, which impinge on the viability – indeed, let’s not
beat around the bush, the very achievability – of a future Palestinian
state, and agree to become more explicit about the need for
negotiations and convergence on the end-goal of the Road Map process
…
I
could not erase what the Quartet had already said on 28 December. However, to
me, it was one thing to take positions before the elections, when we all
assumed an outcome that would preserve Fateh’s majority, and another to take
positions in the face of an outright Hamas victory. The people had spoken in
free and fair elections whose holding had been encouraged by the international
community, and their wishes should be respected. We had an entirely new,
unforeseen situation before us, and we should adjust our reaction accordingly.
The 26 January statement, which in effect echoed the one of 28 December,
undercut me seriously in that respect.
On
29 January we received a draft statement prepared by the United States that
would have had the Quartet, in effect, decide to review all assistance to the
new
Palestinian
Authority government unless its members adhered to three principles:
nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and
obligations including the Road Map. It was quite clear that the
Secretary-General could not speak for donors. As a stopgap, therefore, with
the approval of the Secretary-General, I proposed that either the reference to
the review of assistance should be deleted altogether or the decision should
be taken only by the donor members of the Quartet.
I
had arrived in London bereft of guidance from UNHQ in response to
recommendations on the eve of the Quartet Principals meeting scheduled on 30
January, and was only able to consult with the Secretary-General at a rather
late stage.
The
Envoys met at 10am on 30 January in preparation for the Principals’ meeting
in the evening. I was subjected to a heavy barrage from Welch and Abrams [the
US representatives], including ominous innuendo to the effect that if the
Secretary-General didn’t encourage a review of projects of UN agencies and
programmes it could have repercussions when UN budget deliberations took place
on Capitol Hill. This question was resolved when the US stepped back from
insisting on a decision by the Quartet on the matter, and settled for language
– proposed, incidentally, by the US legal advisor, a veteran of Camp David
and other US Middle East efforts – under which the Quartet merely ‘concluded
that it was inevitable that future assistance to any new government would
be reviewed by donors against that government’s commitment to the principles
of nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements
and obligations, including the Road Map’.
Despite
the constraints under which I was operating, I pleaded with the Envoys for an
approach that would be more compatible with the United Nations playing the
role which comes naturally to us as explained above. I was weakened by the
willingness expressed by both my European Union and Russian colleagues, at the
outset, to accept the language proposed by the United States. I found myself
arguing alone for formulations that would be more consistent with the
Quartet’s support for Abu Mazen’s strategy of co-operation, firstly, and,
secondly, more conducive to conveying to Hamas the message that the
international community recognizes and welcomes the movement that they have
made by participating in the elections and respecting the electoral rules of
the game and by and large respecting the ‘Hudna’[ceasefire], and
that we earnestly hope that such movement will continue so that the
international community can maintain the support it has always provided to the
Palestinians. Predictably, I was unsuccessful in these endeavours; hence the
undesirably punitive-sounding tone of the 30 January statement from which we
have not succeeded in distancing ourselves to this day, and which effectively
transformed the Quartet from a negotiation-promoting foursome guided by a
common document (the Road Map) into a body that was all but imposing sanctions
on a freely elected government of a people under occupation as well as setting
unattainable preconditions for dialogue.
The impact of Quartet policy on the
Palestinians and
on prospects for a two state solution
The
devastating consequences of the Quartet position have been well documented,
including in UN Security Council briefings. Those consequences were, in fact,
predicted by the Office of the United Nations Special Co-ordinator (UNSCO) in
a paper that we circulated to Quartet partners before the London meeting on
the institutional implications of pulling the financial plug on the
Palestinian Authority.
The
precipitous decline of the standard of living of Palestinians, particularly
but by no means exclusively in Gaza, has been disastrous, both in humanitarian
terms and in the perilous weakening of Palestinian institutions. International
assistance, which had been gradually shifting to development and institutional
reform, has reverted largely to the humanitarian. The service-delivering
capacity of the Palestinian Authority, consisting of the thousands of doctors,
nurses and teachers, employees of the Palestinian Authority, who provide the
bulk of medical care and education, has suffered tremendously. Perversely,
this regression has made the already critical role of United Nations Relief
and Works Agency (UNRWA), as well as other UN agencies, even more crucial to
the well-being of the Palestinians.
The
underpinnings for a future Palestinian state have been seriously undermined,
and the capacity of the Palestinian security apparatus to establish and
maintain law and order, to say nothing of putting an end to attacks against
Israel, has diminished tremendously – hardly surprising, given that the
security forces who would have to risk their lives to achieve these goals
haven’t been being paid regular salaries.
Thus the steps taken by the international community with the presumed
purpose of bringing about a Palestinian entity that will live in peace with
its neighbour Israel have had precisely the opposite effect.
Beyond
the damage wrought in terms of international assistance, which in the final
analysis is voluntary, there is that which has been inflicted by Israel,
notwithstanding its responsibilities to the population, under international
law, as occupying power: not just the killings of hundreds of civilians in
sustained heavy incursions and the destruction of infrastructure, some of it
wanton such as the surgical strikes on the only power plant, as well as
bridges in Gaza; also the cessation of transfer to the Palestinian Authority,
since February 2006, of the VAT and customs duties which Israel collects,
under the Paris Protocol signed with the PLO pursuant to the Oslo Accords, on
behalf of the Palestinians. This is money collected from Palestinian exporters
and importers. It is Palestinian money. In normal circumstances it adds up to
a full one third of Palestinian income. It is the main source of payment of
salaries to Palestinian Authority employees. While the international community
demands from the Palestinian government that it should accept ‘previous
agreements and obligations’, Israel deprives the Palestinian Authority of
the capacity to deliver basic services to the Palestinian population in
violation of one such ‘previous agreement’, as well as its International
Humanitarian Law obligations regarding the welfare of the population whose
land it occupies.
Israel’s
cutoff of the main source of income of the Palestinian Authority was never
intended by three of the Quartet members. The UN (myself) was the first to
call on Israel not to do this, the very day that the decision was communicated
to international representatives. The European Union has since repeatedly
called on Israel to resume transfer; the sums withheld surely add up to the
high hundreds of millions of dollars by now. However, the Quartet has been
prevented from pronouncing on this because the United States, as its
representatives have intimated to us, does not wish Israel to transfer these
funds to the Palestinian Authority. It is interesting that in a recent
interview in the Financial Times Secretary Rice was quoted as saying
‘I do think that there are certain responsibilities that come with governing
and that Hamas has not lived up to those because it has been unable to deliver
because it is isolated from the international system because it will not give
up violence. So there’s a consequence to being in power and being unable to
deliver.’ One wonders whether it is credible to judge the ability of a
government to deliver when it is being deprived of its largest source of
income, to which it is indubitably entitled by virtue of an agreement endorsed
by the Security Council, by the State which largely controls the capacity of
that government and its people to generate income. In fact, the Palestinian
Authority government is being expected to deliver without having make-or-break
attributes of sovereignty such as control of its borders, the monopoly over
the use of force, or access to natural resources, let alone regular tax
receipts.
In
general, the other consequence of Quartet policy has been to take all pressure
off Israel. With all focus on the failings of Hamas, the Israeli settlement
enterprise and barrier construction has continued unabated. (In the same time
period, the idea has also gained ground in Western public opinion and even
some Arab governments that the problem in the region is Iran and the ‘Shia
crescent’ – a framing device which tends to mute attention to the
Palestinian issue.)
Palestinian realignment and the formation
of a National Unity Government
Soon
after the elections, Hamas expressed its desire to establish a broad-based
government. The reactions in Fateh were mixed, but before the idea could
advance any further the United States made it known that they wanted Hamas to
be left alone to form its government. We were told that the US was against any
‘blurring of the line dividing Hamas from those Palestinian political forces
committed to the two-state solution. Abu Mazen soon made clear that Fateh
members would not participate in a Hamas-led government. The US reportedly
also sent unequivocal signals to independents who had been approached about
joining the government that they would be ill-advised to do so. In the event,
Hamas formed a government that included some independents but was largely
dominated by Hamas. This naturally facilitated the continued quarantine of the
Palestinian Authority government, a.k.a. the ‘Hamas Government’.
Before going on, I want to stress that, in effect, a National Unity Government with a compromise platform along the lines of Mecca might have been achieved soon after the election, in February or March 2006, had the United States not led the Quartet to set impossible demands, and opposed a National Unity Government in principle. At the time, and indeed until the Mecca Agreement a year later, the United States clearly pushed for a confrontation between Fateh and Hamas – so much so that, a week before Mecca, the US envoy declared twice in an envoys’ meeting in Washington how much ‘I like this violence’, referring to the near-civil war that was erupting in Gaza in which civilians were being regularly killed and injured, because ‘it means that other Palestinians are resisting Hamas’. Please remember this next time someone argues that the Mecca agreement, to the extent that it showed progress, proved that a year of pressure ‘worked’, and we should keep the isolation going. On the contrary, the same result might have been achieved much earlier without the year in between in which so much damage was done to Palestinian institutions, and so much suffering brought to the people of the occupied territory, in pursuit of a policy that didn’t work, which many of us believed from the outset wouldn’t work, and which, I have no doubt, is at best extremely short-sighted ...
