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Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
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Catalogue
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Genocide Old and New
The Spokesman, 93
Editorial by Ken Coates
The mid-term Congressional Elections in the United
States gave a clear majority to the Democrats in the House of Representatives.
They even gave the Democrats a narrow victory in the Election for the Senate.
Of course, the Democrats reflect a variety of views on the war in Iraq: but
whatever their own views, it was quite impossible to see their triumph as
anything rather than a repudiation of the policies of President George W.
Bush. As if to confirm this judgement, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
instantly resigned. He was replaced by Robert Gates, a close intimate of the
present President’s father, President George H. W. Bush. His foreign policy
team diverged in many respects from the current President’s policy.
Mr. Gates was already a member of the Iraq Study Group,
which was led by a colleague of his, James Baker, former Secretary of State.
It involved a number of leading old-school Republicans and senior Democrats.
It was widely expected that the ISG would ultimately argue for direct talks
between the United States and Iran, as the other preponderant influence over
events in Iraq. If clues were sought about the outcome of this report, it
would be hard to find them in the statements of the British Prime Minister.
Certainly he was voluble as ever after the defeat of his American allies. But
he still proclaimed the need for co-operation in their efforts in shrill and
peremptory tones, clothing his peace initiative towards Iran and Syria (if
such it was) in the language of near-hysterical denunciation.
Of course, the neo-cons, both in their American and
British incarnations, have boxed themselves into an impossibly uncomfortable
corner. They insist that the Iranians furnish a core component of the axis of
evil, whilst at the same time proclaiming, with no evidence whatever, that
they are simultaneously hell-bent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
It is very difficult to maintain these views with the
requisite degree of stridency whilst calling upon your adversaries to initiate
a major new peace initiative. All the time, in the background, is the
insistent report of military preparations.
Colonel Gardiner, who had been commissioned to identify Iranian
installations for targeting for possible bombardment, made a blunt report of
his activities shortly before the mid-term Elections.1t1
For some years there had been concern about the
confrontation between the United States and Iran. This has continuously given
rise to apprehension, as leaks from the American Intelligence Services, and
the notable dispatches of Seymour Hersh, have raised alarm from time to time.
But there have been other voices which, without being
sanguine, have been somewhat more reassuring. Discounting the apologists for
the American administration, there have been serious voices from the United
States Intelligence, and the American military, explaining why the military
and social costs of an extension of the Middle East war to Iran would be
prohibitive, wreaking far more damage on American interests than it would be
rational to risk. This view has not usually been founded on any moral
rejection of the awful consequences of war, but on calculations of its likely
consequences.
Quite generally this nowadays excludes the possibility
of any ground offensive.
What has been a more open question has been whether the
United States might launch air attacks.
The remarkable story of the offensive against Lebanon,
which suffered prolonged Israeli bombardment and immense destruction, and yet
remained undefeated, would have given serious thought to military planners in
the United States. It certainly seems that the opposition of the British and
American Governments to an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon was based on the
calculation that, given sufficient time, the Israelis would be able to destroy
Hezbollah, even if this process involved the most widespread material
destruction, and very large numbers of civilian casualties. But Hezbollah was
not crushed, and indeed, according to its leader Sayed Hassan Nasrallah, it
emerged from that terrible conflict stronger in popular support, and indeed,
even in a stronger military position than it held at the beginning.
But there have been insistent noises from the Bush
entourage, not only accusing Hezbollah of being proxies for Iran, but also
threatening to visit a similar destruction upon Iran from the air, like that
which has afflicted the Lebanon. As sometimes happens, events that might
provide an awesome deterrent to rational people may sometimes be an incentive
to military adventurism.
At this point we received the report from Sam Gardiner.
He thinks that the consequences of a serious air strike on Iran can be
incalculable. But he thinks that whereas military rationality might have
prevailed heretofore, today the issue is perilously more uncertain.
His conclusion is very chilling. Just prior to any
anticipated strike, he says we can expect the quiet deployment of Air Force
tankers to staging bases, and ‘we will see additional Navy assets moved to
the region’. There will also be a fierce intensification of the propaganda
preparations for war on terrorism.
All of us are well aware of some of the recent
propaganda moves in this direction. Now, more ominously, a significant
‘Strike Group’ of ships has arrived in the Persian Gulf. On September 21st
it
was reported in The Nation that: ‘the Eisenhower Strike Group bristling with
Tomahawk cruise missiles, has received orders to depart the United States in a
little over a week … other official sources … confirm that this armada is
scheduled to arrive off the coast of Iran on or around October 21st.’
Even after the Elections, Seymour Hersh reiterated his
views that the White House feared that the victorious Democrats might prohibit
the financing of operations aimed at overthrowing or destabilising the Iranian
Government, to prevent it from acquiring the bomb.
‘They are afraid that Congress is going to vote a binding resolution to
stop a hit on Iran, à la Nicaragua in the Contra war.’ Hersh
recalled that in late 1982 Edward P. Boland, a Democrat, introduced the first
of his amendments which restricted the Reagan administration’s ability to
support the Contras, who were actively seeking the overthrow of the Sandinista
Government in Nicaragua. This led directly to the White House initiating the
clandestine sale of American weaponry, via Israel, to Iran, in order to raise
covert funds for onward transmission to the Contras in Nicaragua. All this,
said Hersh, was recollected by Vice President Cheney shortly before the
mid-term Elections, when he claimed in a conversation (of which he now says he
has no record) that whatever Congress under new management might say, the Bush
administration would be able to find ways to circumvent it. So we came to hear
a new mantra: ‘We are not looking for an exit strategy. We are looking for
victory.’
So it comes about that the alliance recruits a powerful
new task force of Leprechauns, and all stride forth armed with shovels, to the
end of the rainbow where victory is to be found in a pot of gold. Or maybe not
… But for now, we must continue to try to decode the barrage of
contradictory messages which come from officialdom. Perhaps the most
interesting of these is to be found in the report of the Task Force
established by the Council on Foreign Relations, under the co-chairmanship of
the same Robert M. Gates, and President Carter’s former adviser, Zbig
Brzezinski. This has the encouraging title: Iran: Time for a New Approach.2
t2
Their Task Force reasserts the uncertainty of its
members about the precise nature of the Iranian Government’s policy on the
development of nuclear weapons. But,
For these reasons, the members advocate a revised strategic approach to
Iran.
A Revised Approach to Iran
The Task Force concludes that the current lack of sustained engagement
with Iran harms
1.
A political dialogue with Iran should not be deferred until such a time as the
deep differences over Iranian nuclear ambitions and its invidious involvement
with regional conflicts have been resolved. Rather, the process of selective
political engagement itself represents a potentially effective path for
addressing those differences. Just as the United States maintains a
constructive relationship with China (and earlier did so with the Soviet
Union) while strongly opposing certain aspects of its internal and
international policies, Washington should approach Iran with a readiness to
explore areas of common interests, while continuing to contest objectionable
policies. Ultimately, any real rapprochement with Tehran can only occur in the
context of meaningful progress on the most urgent US concerns surrounding
nuclear weapons, terrorism, and regional stability.
2.
A “grand bargain” that would settle comprehensively the outstanding
conflicts between Iran and the United States is not a realistic goal, and
pursuing such an outcome would be unlikely to produce near-term progress on
Washington’s central interests.
Instead, the Task Force proposes selectively engaging Iran on issues
where US and
3.
US policies towards Tehran should make use of incentives as well as punitive
measures. The US reliance on comprehensive, unilateral sanctions has not
succeeded in its stated objective to alter Iranian conduct and has deprived
Washington of greater leverage vis-à-vis the Iranian government apart from
the threat of force. Given the increasingly important role of economic
interests in shaping Iran’s policy options at home and abroad, the prospect
of commercial relations with the United States could be a powerful tool in
Washington’s arsenal.
4.
The United States should advocate democracy in Iran without relying on the
rhetoric of regime change, as that would be likely to arouse nationalist
sentiments in defense of the current regime even among those who currently
oppose it. The US government should focus its rhetoric and its policies on
promoting political evolution that encourages Iran to develop stronger
democratic institutions at home and enhanced diplomatic and economic relations
abroad. Engaging with the current government to address pressing regional and
international issues need not contradict US support for these objectives;
indeed, engagement pursued judiciously would enhance the chances of internal
change in Iran.
5.
The Task Force is mindful of repeated efforts over the last twenty-five years
to engage the regime in Tehran, and that all of these have come to naught for
various reasons. However, the
Task Force believes that the US military intervention along Iran’s flanks in
both Afghanistan and Iraq has changed the geopolitical landscape in the
region. These changes may offer both the United States and Iran new incentives
to open a mutually beneficial dialogue, first on issues of common interest,
such as regional stability, and eventually on the tough issues of terrorism
and proliferation. We recognize that even the most perspicacious policy toward
Iran may be stymied by Iranian obstinacy.’
Apparently we live in an age in which the world’s
major megapower has evolved not one but a plurality of foreign policies,
alongside their military concomitants. At
such a time it is more than ever urgent that the task of watching over these
sombre developments be undertaken by a large and resourceful peace movement.
It is also more important than ever that the peoples of the world should
resist the concentration of far more fearful weapons of mass destruction in
the hands of such unstable, indeed volatile powers.
*
* *
When last the Polaris nuclear system was upgraded in
Britain, the decision was virtually clandestine. Although it was to prove most
costly, when the true story was revealed under the Thatcher administration, it
caused an unholy row in the Labour Party, which, at the end of the seventies,
had been told nothing, or nearly nothing, about it. Now John Reid has tried to
make a great virtue of what he pretends is ‘greater openness’. True, there
will be some sort of a vote, about something, in the House of Commons. What
exactly it will entail is still, however, shrouded in mystery. What seems
clear is that the new Trident programme will be scheduled to continue over
several decades, and to involve prodigious continuing expenditure. It seems
equally likely that the Government will seek to build in a variety of failsafe
mechanisms, to prevent a more humane or rational administration from altering
the programme.
Obviously the Americans will have a powerful influence
on all this. The wholly subservient ‘British’ deterrent is pretty much the
most significant material remnant of the special relationship between Britain
and the United States, but the current administration will undoubtedly see it
as part of the contract which was accepted when Tony Blair signed up for
George Bush’s Iraq war. There
are two snags about confirming the deployment of this renewed programme to
create weapons of mass destruction.
Firstly, there will be a Parliamentary vote to give its
approval in some form or other. This may not amount to overmuch, but it will
at least afford the citizens an opportunity to vote against every one of their
representatives who has given support to the new generation of nukes. Within
the prevailing state of political alienation, many heads should roll. The big
Parties in Parliament may well become smaller, as a result. The small Parties,
where conscience may survive, may equally well increase. Few will doubt that
this process will be good for British morals, not to say morale. But second,
this particular vote may give rise to a qualitatively new constitutional
development.
Below we publish statements by two most distinguished
Church leaders in
Scotland. Both are firmly opposed to the new Trident
programme, which impacts with especial force on Scotland.
The so-called British deterrent is now situated solely
in Scotland, and the weapons which were formerly deployed in England have all
been dismantled since the late years of the last century. Scots are
increasingly aware of the dangers involved in the nuclear facilities at
Faslane. The clones will heartily insist that the Scottish deployment of
weapons of mass destruction is a direct response to the defence needs of the
United Kingdom. But the electorate may take a dim view of this commitment,
since it offers no benefits to Scotland. Indeed, there could be few more
telling arguments in favour of Scottish independence than this: that it offers
the most secure road to Scottish disengagement from Mr. Blair’s poisonous
wars, and from his illegal weapons. Mr. Blair’s shrill nuclear patriotism
may bring about the implosion of more than the allegedly British WMD. It might
also terminate the United Kingdom, and thus the Labour Party. If Scotland
secedes,
All in all, the temptation of nuclear defence could
quite possibly remove that which was supposed to be defended. Will anybody
think of this in time?
*
* *
We are honoured once again to be able to publish the incomparable Robert Fisk in this number of The Spokesman. ‘The First Holocaust’ is a chapter from his book on The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East. This represents a vast labour, and, he tells us, was sixteen years in the making. It has consumed 1,368 pages, and earned great praises on all sides. Its literary quality needs no commendation from us. But why have we chosen a chapter on the Armenian genocide to represent this great book here, when it is also alive with reports of contemporary traumas, in Afghanistan or Lebanon, Iraq, Iran or Algeria?
There have been, in short, innumerable cruelties in the
conquest of the Middle East, but in one sense the most shocking thing about
these often criminal acts is that the screams of their victims have so
frequently gone unheard. The great warriors who have sought to impose their
own mean civilisation on peoples whose culture is as old as time, have also
imposed selective hearing, discriminate memory. A celebration of happy
indifference.
Fisk has unerringly homed in on the Armenian massacres
as a classic symbol of these responses. With his help, we can try to count the
dead. But far more significantly, we can begin to understand the vital
necessity of memory in defending the humanity of its victims. Because of its
length, we have divided this piece into two parts, the first of which appears
below. The second will follow.
Footnote:
1. The End of the ‘Summer of Diplomacy’:
Assessing US Military Options in Iran, Sam
2. Iran: Time for a New Approach, Report of an
Independent Task Force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. Zbigniew
Brzezinski and Robert M. Gates, Co-Chairs,
