Reviews

Bertrand Russell


Thanks to the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation we now have this new edition of a book which first appeared in 1959. I was not one who read it the first time round, and therefore it was interesting indeed to see how lasting and contemporary the Russell warnings of 1959 still are.

Yet so much has changed. Nuclear weapons have spread to at least eight countries. Largely unnoticed, two countries – the Ukraine and South Africa – have actually possessed nuclear weapons but have independently relinquished them. We have been through the lunacies of the Cold War, with nuclear weapons reaching levels which even George Kennan, one-time United States hawk, described as grotesque. We have, by the grace of God or sheer good luck, survived a whole series of accidents and misperceptions which could easily have resulted in catastrophic nuclear exchange.

Thanks to the lobbying and expertise of those involved in the World Court Project, we now have the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. That opinion makes it clear that in current circumstances the threat and use of nuclear weapons would actually be illegal. However, that was not a unanimous opinion of all the judges. What was unanimous was their ruling that the nuclear powers have a legal obligation to start and complete negotiations aimed at the elimination of all their nuclear weapons. There are still no such negotiations in progress.

Is Russell’s book relevant to all this nearly 50 years later? Very much so. There is much that is very contemporary. The Greens of today would certainly take him to their hearts: ‘…when I read of plans to defile the heavens by the petty squabbles of the animated lumps that disgrace a certain planet, I cannot but feel that the men who make these plans are guilty of a kind of impiety’. Theologians of a peaceful bent would warm to that word impiety as we contemplate the possibility of circling satellites armed with pinpoint lasers targeting the earth every minute of the day. Scientists and politicians get a practical reminder. ‘The spread of power without wisdom is utterly terrifying’. Russell even looks forward to a demilitarised world in which there could be for everyone ‘a life of joy such as the past has never known’.

His reputation is that of a rather eccentric prophet of doom urging instant action to avert immediate disaster. This book shows him to have been not only idealistic but highly practical. Clear steps are proposed for United Nations reform. Stages on the way to general disarmament are laid out in pragmatic fashion. Though he clearly believed in unilateral nuclear disarmament for
Britain, he makes no such proposals for the major powers. Perhaps some proposals are so far into the future as to seem bizarre even today. What would the Royal Navy think of crewing its submarines with sailors ‘of different nations so that mutiny in some national interest would be impossible’? That sounds odd, but is it really so different from the UN peacekeeping forces of today, drawn from many different countries but deployed together in a common cause?

The dangers of aggressive nationalism which Russell describes have not gone away. There is happily today strong public support for the development of democratic globalism as opposed to selfish corporate globalism. Russell’s stress on education is quite inspiring. ‘It should be one of the tasks of education to make vivid in the minds of the young both the merits of the civilised way of life and the needless dangers to which it is exposed…’

The book comes with a very contemporary 27-page foreword by Ken Coates, who knew Russell well, and it starts out with a commendation from Noam Chomsky. One critical note. I did not find very satisfactory, or even convincing, Russell’s attempt to justify his suggested threats in the late 1940s of military action against the pre-nuclear Soviet Union. But then some great men with more than average egos find it hard to admit inconsistencies or mistakes. The same goes for lesser men, too.

Russell’s little book is well worth reading even now, long after it first appeared. Plenty of people are always wrapped up in the problems of the day. Too few can look to the long future with hope. Russell clearly did.

Bruce Kent

Nukes in South Asia


As war clouds gather in South Asia after the December 13 attacks on the Parliament, and as the prospects of a nuclear confrontation grow larger, this volume on the Indian and Pakistani decisions to test and deploy nuclear weapons is a timely ‘intervention’. Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian, two well-known South Asian academics/activists, have produced a wonderful anti-nuclear handbook – and something much more than that. This handsome, portable volume is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand what happened in May 1998 when India and Pakistan tested a series of nuclear weapons and what the consequences of those fateful decisions may be. Indeed, as the two countries joust in public and threaten retaliation and counter-retaliation, it seems clear enough that we are living one of the consequences of those momentous, flawed decisions. For all the talk of peace and stability attendant on going nuclear, this is the third crisis since 1998 (the Kargil war and the hijacking of flight IC 814 being the earlier ones).
Out of the Nuclear Shadow is not just the best collection of anti-nuclear writings ever assembled anywhere, it is also a rare political handbook. The many distinguished contributors, some of whom are household names in the region if not internationally, don’t stop at a critique of the Indian and Pakistani tests and the two nuclear weapons programmes. Their nets are cast wider, on the larger question of what the tests tell us about contemporary State and society in South Asia and the larger structure of international relations.

Whether you agree with the anti-nuclear positions held by the authors or not, Out of the Nuclear Shadow is a book that you should have on your shelf for a third, not trivial reason and that is the pleasure of engaging, passionate, intelligent, critical writing by some of the best known ‘public intellectuals’ of the Subcontinent. Where else can you get, in one place, Mahatma Gandhi, Eqbal Ahmed, Rajni Kothari, Beena Sarwar, I.A. Rahman, Praful Bidwai, Amartya Sen, Tanika Sarkar, Surendra Gadekar, Anand Patwardhan, Kumkum Sangari, Shiv Vishwanathan, Ashis Nandy, Aijaz Ahmad, Zafarullah Khan, T. Jayaraman, Pervez Hoodbhoy, Achin Vanaik, Lalita Ramdas, A.H. Nayar, Bittu Sehgal, and Amulya Reddy, amongst others?

As a concerned citizen, there is a fourth reason to invest in this fine volume. A full 150 pages are devoted to anti-nuclear statements by groups right across the region (from the smaller countries in South Asia as well), six thoughtful, evocative poems, an excellent, largely ‘non-partisan’ bibliography (where you will get references to pro-nuclear writings too), and a list of films, peace organisations, and websites. Anyone who wants more information, alternative perspectives, and a way of getting involved in anti-nuclear and other peace initiatives will find no better source – and will have run out of excuses for his or her apathy and indifference.

The volume consists, in the main, of 30 or so essays – some short and some long, some spectacularly well known such as ‘The End of Imagination’ by Arundhati Roy, some much less well known but no less important; some written in the immediate shocking aftermath of the tests (Eqbal Ahmed, Aijaz Ahmad), some written up to two years later, such as Amartya Sen’s ‘India and the Bomb’. Virtually all of the pieces published here are reprints or revisions of earlier articles: putting them all together is a contribution to the anti-nuclear struggle in and of itself. Those who are anti-nuclear but faint of heart, or who falter now and then, should draw sustenance from the fact that the best minds and spirits of the region are unequivocally and forthrightly against these terrible weapons. Those who are published here may themselves be surprised by the quantity and quality of what was written in the wake of the tests. Many probably did not know each other until the publication of Out of the Nuclear Shadow. In that sense, the book performs yet another function, namely, to bring into being a new, virtual community of novelists, poets, social and natural scientists, journalist, and activists.

What is the message of the book? Clearly, it is ranged against the testing, development, deployment, and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Virtually everyone, either explicitly or implicitly, is for complete nuclear disarmament by
both India and Pakistan but also by the other nuclear powers. No one sees any merit in the arguments of nuclear deterrence. Even Amartya Sen’s essay, easily the least polemical in the volume, in the end must be read as anti-deterrence. There are no Pollyannas here. No one thinks that the Indian and Pakistani programmes can be easily stopped and dismantled and that the addiction to nuclear weapons can be overcome in the near future. Nor does anyone think that global nuclear disarmament is around the corner. No one is predicting immediate nuclear war either: there are no irresponsible alarmists here. As for building an anti-nuclear movement, there is a goodly sense that this will be arduous and will encounter great resistance. There is a passionate, critical intensity in many of the essays and a cool, analytical sensibility in others; some essays crackle and pop, others are matter-of-fact and descriptive (such as the essays on the media’s reactions to the tests). There are no fanciful, wide-eyed agitators here. No one is trivial or innocent.

What will readers learn from these various essays? They will learn that there is a whole range of military, economic, political, moral, and existential reasons for opposing nuclear weapons. Militarily, it can be shown that nuclear weapons produce more insecurity than security, as indeed they are producing today in the standoff between India and Pakistan after December 13, and that deterrence is an edifice that must eventually fail. Economically, they will learn of the toll that nuclear weapons can take on economic growth and development even if they do not beggar us completely. Politically, they will learn that atomic decisions affect internal institutions and the cut and thrust of ideological contests, that they threaten democracy and accountability in public life, that they militarise societies and debase science, and that they impoverish our notions of nationalism – in sum, that these decisions are not merely ‘security’ choices in the ‘the national interest’. Morally, this book shows that nuclear weapons are an abomination as no other weapons have been historically and that even deterrence, which is the threat to use nuclear weapons, is objectionable. Lastly, they will learn that nuclear weapons are an existential nightmare, for any use of nuclear weapons will be a physical catastrophe, one that will kill and maim millions of human beings, destroy their societies, and burn and poison the lifeworld of all living things.

Could the anthology have been better than it is? At 500 pages, it is a big book already. Nevertheless, I think that there are gaps here that could have been filled. For instance, it might have been useful to include at least a couple of pieces by non-South Asians – an independent-minded Chinese scholar or activist, someone from Japan, and a Westerner. So also a former general or admiral who made the case for the uselessness of nuclear weapons would have been a ‘tactical’ gain for the collection – Admiral L. Ramdas from India could have written just such a piece, or the American, Lee Butler (the volume does have a statement by retired South Asian generals, but it is too hortatory to be very useful). Third, the collection lacks a really good, exclusive essay on the prospects of global disarmament. Fourth, it would have been strengthened by an essay that would have struggled with the difficulties and contradictions that exist, and that will have to be faced, within the anti-nuclear movement in both India and Pakistan.
(and the two movements are unlikely to face the same hurdles). Comparisons with the United States and European cases, or Japan, would have enlivened such an essay. Fifth, there are some personal favourites missing from the volume, especially the pieces by Sumit Sarkar, Partha Chatterjee, and Rustom Bharucha in Economic and Political Weekly. Also, why not an extract from Amitav Ghosh’s New Yorker article (and later book, Countdown)? And if memory serves, Ram Guha had some rather interesting commentary on the tests as well. Finally, a question: was there nothing in Hindi or the other vernacular languages worth reprinting?

These minor reservations notwithstanding, Out of the Nuclear Shadow is a terrific addition to the growing archive of sophisticated and critical-minded works on South Asian nuclearisation. Smitu Kothari and Zia Mian have done Indians and Pakistanis a service by publishing this fine selection of writings. Anyone who cares about war and peace and democracy and the welfare of a billion and a half people should buy this anthology. Read it, cherish it, and, if you can, act on it.

Kanti Bajpai

In Defence of Palestine


Two collections of Edward Said’s writings have just been published by Granta, The Edward Said Reader (edited by Mousafa Bayoumi and André Rubin), which includes a 1999 interview with Said, and Reflections on Exile and Other Literary and Cultural Essays (which ends with a previously unpublished response to Samuel Hartington’s essay ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ published in Foreign Affairs in 1993). Together they amount to over 1000 pages, first published in the United States in 2000 and now in the United Kingdom. They were therefore written before the horrors of the New York and Washington events and the Afghan War. But they provide essential reading for understanding Arab opinion and especially the implications of these events for Palestinians. Said is, however, much more than a defender of the Palestinian cause. He stands among the foremost literary critics of our times, and himself a pianist he is a most insightful music critic, with his special interest in the post-classicists.

All Said’s writing is coloured by the facts of his life, as an involuntary exile from the land of his birth. He was born in 1935 in West Jerusalem to Christian Protestant Arab parents who were both likewise born in what became the British colony of Palestine, but at the time of their birth was part of the Ottoman Empire. Edward Said’s father, to avoid being drafted to fight in Bulgaria for the Turks in 1911, emigrated to the United States and fought in France with the USAEF,
becoming thereby an American citizen. He returned to Palestine via Cairo in 1919 and married Said’s mother, who called her son Edward in honour of the Prince of Wales. The family like other rich Levantines moved between Jerusalem, Cairo and Beirut, Edward being educated in English language schools in Jerusalem and Cairo. In 1947, following the Israeli war, the Saids along with millions of others had to give up their home in Jerusalem and settle in Cairo; and in 1951 Edward was sent to a New England boarding school, from which he succeeded in gaining entry to Princeton. Despite the American citizenship inherited from his father, and his considerable academic success, he felt wherever he went that he was treated as an outsider, an Arab in an Anglo-Saxon world.

This sense of being what he calls ‘Other’ has evidently never left Said. It has given him his intense sympathy with the millions of Palestinians driven from their homes, many of them still in refugee camps and those remaining in their native land as what the Israelis call ‘non-Jews’, scattered among Israeli settlements, without legal rights, often without work and deprived of schooling or higher education. For some years Said served on the Palestine National Council, a kind of Parliament in exile, and gave his reluctant agreement to the recognition of partition. But when this Council was replaced by the Oslo Agreements, and the so-called ‘Peace Process’ with Arafat, he withdrew his support. He could see no future in a kind of apartheid, but only perhaps one day in some peaceful reconciliation ‘to join and recognise these two peoples together as indeed their common actuality in historic Palestine already has joined them together.’ Said sees all partitions – in Ireland, Cyprus, India, and he could have added Yugoslavia – as failures. He is haunted by the concept of ‘irreconcilables’. He takes this from Fanon’s description in the *Wretched of the Earth*, of the colonial enclave and the native quarter, a ‘reciprocal exclusivity’ as Fanon calls it, one which Said had experienced so sharply in British Cairo and then seen imposed upon Palestine.

Said insists that he has always kept separate his academic work as University Professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia and his political writing and activity in defence of Palestine. This was probably wise. His defence of Palestine has led to vilification from Zionists and even death threats, which are today surrounding all those American academics who question the United States Government’s response to the September 11th bombings. Said says that he has deliberately never lectured in Arab literature, although his writings reveal the riches of this cultural resource and have introduced me to Ahdaf Soueif’s novels, which are brilliant evocations of the gulf and unity between East and West. For this theme runs through all Said’s writing, that there can be no peace, no tranquillity, unless the ‘Other’, the East, is recognised by the West as complementary, and not a whit inferior. And this is where Said’s literary criticism and his politics come together. There is, he argues, no ‘clash of civilisations’, as Huntington proposes, except that drummed up by the arms manufacturers, but rather a failure to recognise the ‘Other’ as part of civilisation. This is not to deny to people their own national consciousness, what Said as an exile longs for – ‘to feel at home’ – but to oppose all forms of national dominance. This recognition
of the validity of the ‘Other’ is what informed Said’s book, Orientalism, and equally his Culture and Imperialism.

Said’s exposure of the imperial element in English writing started with his recognition of the true meaning of Heart of Darkness, the incomprehensible nature of Africa for most Europeans revealed by Joseph Conrad – a fellow exile. Perhaps, Said suggests, exiles alone can understand and express what is suppressed in the thinking and writing that comes from a dominant culture. He cites Theodor Adorno, Aime’ Cesaire, Franz Fanon, Henry James, James Joyce, Georg Lukacs, Karl Marx, VS Naipaul among others. It was because Said began to ask questions about the relationship of history and geography to literature, about the time and place of imaginative writers, questions that he attributes respectively to his reading of the works of Lukacs and Gramsci, that he was led to see the imperial element in Jane Austen’s Mansfield Park, Rudyard Kipling’s Kim, George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, Charles Dickens’ Dombey and Son, E M Forster’s Passage to India. I well remember when I first read Said’s Culture and Imperialism in 1993 having to re-read these books and revise some of my ideas about my hero John Ruskin, whose belief in the civilising mission of the British imperial race I had never noticed.

The core of Said’s argument is that, while such writers felt the iniquity of the imperial relationship, they regarded it as inevitable. Non-Europeans were ‘lesser breeds’ and could only improve their condition within the framework of European institutions and practices. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank still believe the latter, even if they have softened the views they express on the former. Today, Said recognises that some European writers have ‘crossed over’ to the ‘Other’ side, and cites Noam Chomsky, Basil Davidson, Eric Hobsbawm, Thomas Hodgkin, Jean Genet, Victor Kiernan, Albert Memmi, Terence Ranger. In arguing against Samuel Huntington’s provocative ‘clash of civilisations’ he mentions the ‘life long study of China’ by Joseph Needham, the ‘pilgrimage within Islam’ of Louis Massignon and Martin Bernal’s tracing of Greek civilisation to its Egyptian and Phoenician origins. He sees in these and similar studies ‘our most precious asset’ in face of ‘the virulent local, national, ethnic and religious sentiment, as in Bosnia, Rwanda, Lebanon, Chechnya and elsewhere’, that which consists in ‘the emergence of a sense of community, understanding, sympathy and hope which is the direct opposite of what in his essay Huntington has provoked.’

The emphasis on this ‘most precious asset’ in the last essay of Said’s in resisting Huntington’s arguments, so obviously seized upon by President Bush and the United States Establishment in claiming that they were engaged upon a ‘crusade’ after September 11th to defend ‘our way of life’, comes as a great relief. Up till then Said had seemed to be so anxious to pin down the Europeans’ inability to recognise the ‘Other’s’ contribution to our common civilisation that those who have not shared this European blindness could reasonably feel that they had been overlooked. Kiernan is more fully acknowledged in Culture and Imperialism. Davidson, Hodgkin, Kiernan, Massignon and Needham do not actually appear in the index of Reflections on Exile (The Reader doesn’t have an index). Arthur Waley’s translations of Chinese poetry get no mention. Just as
Said insists that Islam is not ‘one simple thing’, so the West has its dissidents.

One unresolved problem remains in Said’s wonderfully rich and voluminous engagement with the whole range of issues involved in cultural dominance. This is the problem of nationalism. He rejects the idea that nationalism is just a European invention, since this denies what he calls ‘nationalism’s much more variegated actual history.’ He has to see Palestine as a ‘nation’ – ‘where one may feel at home’ – for both Jews and Arabs, just as the British nation includes Scots, Welsh, English, Irish, Caribbeans, Pakistanis, Indians and others. He quotes with approval Ernest Gellner in *Nations and Nationalism*, when Gellner says, ‘having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such’. The framework which Tito devised in Jugoslavia for several nationalities and states within one nation state has been destroyed. This destruction was effected mainly by outside influences, but can such a framework be revived? The question is entirely relevant for Palestine, and there it is complicated by great numbers of Jews and of Arabs outside.

In a moving passage Said describes how in 1999, when he thought he was dying, he organised a concert with a new libretto he had written for Beethoven’s *Fidelio* for performance at Bir Zeit University to be conducted by Daniel Barenboim, as a ‘redemptive cultural exchange’. It moved many to tears, and shows us what we have most to thank Edward Said for – so well said in Noam Chomsky’s tribute to him that ‘he helps us to understand who we are and what we must do if we aspire to be moral agents, not servants of power’. Several times in these extracts and essays, Said repeats words from Cesaire’s poem *Negritude*, translated by CLR James:

‘And no race possesses the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of force, and there is a place for all at the rendezvous of conquest’.

Ensuring that ‘place for all’ remains our great task as moral agents.

*Michael Barratt Brown*

**Poverty of Theory**


Justin Rosenberg in his first book, *The Empire of Civil Society*, refers to that famous query of the late Martin Wight, one of Britain’s most distinguished International Relations scholars. Why, asked Wight, is there no ‘great book’ or ‘great thinker’ in the discipline of international relations? Wight himself gave the wrong answer to this question. He concluded that the very nature of the
discipline precluded deeper thought since there was nothing much more to think or theorise about once the recurring mechanism of balance of power through the ages had been discovered. Balance of power, of course, has been the central motif of the dominant schools of international relations – Realism and its more structural variant of Neo-Realism. It is United States academia that has done most to elevate these schools to this utterly undeserving status.

There have been remarkable books about international relations but they have come from outside the discipline, in works of history and historical sociology. Of twentieth century international relations, one of the strongest candidates (despite weaknesses) for this status is Eric Hobsbawm’s *The Age of Extremes*. Rosenberg’s own book, *The Empire of Civil Society*, is itself an outstanding critique of international relations theory, above all of Realism and its Neo-Realist offshoot. Indeed, it has presented the single most powerful challenge to conventional international relations theory. Whether its critique is effectively unanswerable, as many of his admirers (including this writer) contend, we do not know for sure, since the leading lights of the international relations academic fraternity, especially in the United States, have preferred so far to avoid attempting any answer at all! To ignore Rosenberg’s challenge was a much safer option than to essay a riposte that could fail. Clearly, too much was at stake. For, if Rosenberg’s assault on the ‘theoretical castle’ of Realism/Neo-Realism was to be accepted as having left it in such ruins that it was unable to resurrect itself, then the foundational claims of conventional international relations to being a distinctive discipline with a distinct theory within the social sciences would be irretrievably undermined.

Too many reputations would be damaged and conventional international relations would be exposed for what it has always been – the bastion of intellectual mediocrity, not much more than the apologetic handmaiden of, and extremely crude guide to, the practice of foreign policy statecraft, itself understood in very conventional terms. Indeed, in the United States not even economics departments have the same depth and range of extra-intellectual connections to the government structures of policy-making and policy-shaping as international relations does in the case of foreign affairs and defence matters. This is an obvious enough clue to what a major (some would say the major) role of international relations in the United States has been throughout the latter half of the twentieth century – the justifier-cum-mystifier of the practice of United States imperialism. Those who have long argued that international relations required a multi-disciplinary approach whose essential tools of analysis were already provided by classical social science would then have a field day. International relations would then have been revealed for what it really is – a sub-set of the study of capitalist modernity and therefore best integrated within that wider field of study.

In so far as international relations can claim with some legitimacy to having a distinct subject matter it arises from what Rosenberg calls, with others, the ‘problematic of the international’. Only, conventional international relations treats this as having a form beyond history and sociology when this trans-historical and general ‘problem’ always has, and can only have, *particular* and
historical forms of resolution. This is what makes the study of contemporary international relations an integral part of that wider study of the emergence, consolidation and unfolding of capitalist modernity. What the conventional abstractions of Realism/Neo-Realism do is to obscure and mystify this reality (the utter unrealism of Realism) through the erection of ahistorical notions of anarchy and of the ‘autonomy of the political’ unit as the central actor in that international system or order characterised by anarchy.

The modern form taken by this order is assumed to have been initiated by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 or what is referred to in the conventional international relations literature as the emergence of the Westphalian states system. Today’s international order is deemed not different in kind from that Westphalian system though obviously different in scale. The modern form of the autonomous political unit is the ‘sovereign state’, whereas earlier it might have been imperial and hierarchical states, feudal lords, tribal groups, even roving bands. And, of course, this ‘veritable menagerie of historical forms’ have all engaged in that supposedly eternal activity of power balancing.

This preamble on the deficiencies of conventional international relations thinking, drawing on Rosenberg’s first book, is relevant because his second book under review here proceeds by way of a critique of three theorists and writers, two of whom – Jan Aart Scholte and Rob Walker – have themselves arrived at their current positions through criticisms of conventional international relations. The last of the trio taken on by Rosenberg is Anthony Giddens, arguably the single most important theorist of globalisation as a new paradigm. The layout of the book is thus simple enough. There are three central chapters on each of these theorists in turn, flanked at both ends by an introduction and a conclusion.

In his introduction, Rosenberg is at pains to point out that globalisation cannot be both explanandum and explanans, i.e., it cannot simultaneously be the process of which it is itself the outcome. There is a ‘theory of globalisation’ and there is ‘globalisation theory’. In the first approach, globalisation is the outcome or result, in the late twentieth century, of certain prior processes that must be explained through classical social theory. However, once having arrived (like capitalism from pre-capitalist sources) one can argue that it (again like capitalism) becomes the dynamic that propels future world developments. One cannot therefore, a priori, rule out the possibility of a viable globalisation theory, a new paradigm that transcends both capitalism and the problematic of the international. After all, the claims of globalisation theorists are precisely these. Although it may have emerged from capitalism’s unfolding on an international scale, globalisation is said to refer to a qualitatively new form and level of worldwide ‘intensification of social relations’ that can no longer be adequately captured by notions such as the ‘latest phase of capitalism-imperialism’, or by existing notions of an international order, system or society.

What Rosenberg aims to do, very successfully it should be added, is to show that up to now, globalisation theory has failed. In order to pose as a new paradigm it must inflate the conceptual importance of the ‘spatio-temporal
problematic’, more specifically of the notion of space, which like time, must be rendered ‘empty’ and ‘homogeneous’, no longer embedded in history or society. They would then be able to serve as trans-border/trans-historical tools of analysis. And it is Giddens with his notion of ‘space-time distanciation’ (the emergence of new structures and mechanisms which are able to exercise influence and control over ever greater expanses of space and time) who has sought to go furthest in this re-conceptualisation of social theory.

In his chapter on Giddens, Rosenberg moves away from the aporias of contemporary international relations theory towards classical sociological theory and an assessment of Giddens’s challenge to it in the name of constructing a new globalisation theory. The key text here is Giddens’s *The Consequences of Modernity* (1990). In it Giddens decisively moves away from his own past when he saw his work as derivative from Marx and Weber.

What explains Giddens’s subsequent trajectory towards globalisation theory and the utterly vacuous politics of a supposed ‘Third Way’ that is ‘Beyond Left and Right’ (the titles of two books by Giddens in the nineties)? This is not something that was written into, and inevitable, given Giddens’s earlier theoretical concerns and commitments. The notions of ‘time-space distanciation’ and ‘time-space edges’ were initially introduced to establish a ‘typology of social forms’ in which societies of low (tribal) and medium (class-divided, pre-capitalist) time-space distanciation were contrasted to the high level of time-space compression of capitalist society. Here the distinction between the capitalist and pre-capitalist eras was seen as the crucial boundary marker, not that between ‘high/late modernity’ (globalisation) and the capitalism of ordinary modernity. Similarly, the notion of ‘time-space edges’ was used to describe and theorize historical movement of a supposedly non-evolutionary kind whereby overlapping societies created newer social forms because of historically contingent factors e.g., explaining the emergence in Western Europe of capitalism.

Why does Giddens subsequently see ‘high modernity’ as a qualitatively new order gravitating then towards a ‘beyond capitalism and socialism’ so-called Third Way as his political recipe for shaping a globalised future? Rosenberg implies that the source of this shift lies in the ‘logic’ of his key conceptual category of time-space distanciation. But it may be more accurate to say that, somewhere in the latter half of the eighties, for reasons to do with the relationship between personal psychology and external circumstances (e.g., the decline of radical socialism and Social Democracy), Giddens decided to take his conceptual apparatus in directions which were neither necessary nor logically determined.

At any rate, it is with this new theoretical reformulation of ‘high modernity’/globalisation that Rosenberg is most concerned. Giddens seeks to justify his new paradigm through i) a critique of the classical social theory of Marx, Weber and Durkheim; and ii) a presentation of the distinctive ‘psycho-dynamics of globalisation’ as the heart of his new theory. Rosenberg attacks Giddens on both these fronts. He shows that Giddens’s criticisms of classical social theory – that it is not sufficiently self-reflexive, not sufficiently sensitive
to the institutional multi-dimensionality of modernity, not sufficiently armed theoretically to understand the ‘high risk’ and ‘double-edged’ potential of modernity, and teleological to boot – are simply off the mark. As for Giddens’s own new theory, this has considerable problems.

Giddens sees trust as the ‘bracketing of space and time’ where ‘basic trust’ in individual psychological dispositions is established in ‘normal’ conditions in infancy through the playing out of ‘absence-presence’ in the infant-mother relationship. The key to understanding the break between pre-modernity and modernity resides in understanding the different forms taken by the ‘spatio-temporal conditions of ontological security’, or the different ways in which trust is generated and sustained. These modern forms are so very different from the older structures of institutionalizing trust — kinship, religious cosmology, tradition. Where once Giddens’s category of time-space distanciation had to do with the different ways and degrees (extensive and intensive) in which the resources for the exercise of social power were distributed, i.e. whether for ‘allocative’ control over nature (the economy) or for ‘authoritative’ control over persons (the polity), now it is all about the institutional forms through which the ‘bracketing of space and time’ is done to provide individual ontological security.

This is a flimsy foundation indeed on which to build a new sociological theory, and it cannot bear the weight of being considered the most ‘causally significant feature of modernity’, whether ‘early’, ‘middle’ or ‘late’. In fact, Giddens’s earlier theories about the variant distribution of social power, his notions of ‘episodic transitions’ in history, nation-states as ‘power containers’ and bounded entities, etc, all provided a far more useful conceptual apparatus for helping us to understand our times and how we have arrived where we have.

In the end, Rosenberg’s assessment is harsh but accurate. Giddens’s construct fails to meet each of the three criteria by which one judges scholarly efforts. Its argument is internally inconsistent. It does not use its own sources reliably — Giddens caricatures Marx, misrepresents Weber, infiltrates Parsons without adequate acknowledgement and to unhelpful effect, and does not properly comprehend the authors from whom he borrows the notion of ‘ontological security’. Finally, his argument fails to achieve what it sets out to do — to provide a newer and better social theory, which through its elevation of the conceptual nexus of time-space also aims to provide a globalisation theory.

It must be the fate of authentically perceptive thinkers that, given the great power that extra-intellectual factors have in determining the reception of so much of intellectual activity, the degree of recognition of, and reward for, such creative work is rarely commensurate with its quality. Rosenberg’s first book should have taken the academic world of international relations by storm. This book, though not quite as iconoclastic as the first one, is none the less a worthy successor and will add to the ranks of those who have come to expect work of the highest quality from Rosenberg and have not felt disappointed. One awaits the future unfolding of his oeuvre with much anticipation.

Achin Vanaik