

END INFO

European
Nuclear
Disarmament

Issue 26

September/
October 2021

@ENDInfo_
endinfo.net

Published by
the *Bertrand
Russell Peace
Foundation*

ISSN 2635-1854





800 people joined protests at the airbase near Büchel, Germany, on 5 September. The protest at the base, which houses US nuclear weapons, included a 'human chain', speeches and other events. This was the first event in a month of action coordinated the Nuke Free Europe network. Further events will take place across the month and in different countries, culminating in protests on 26 September, the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Human chain against nuclear arms in Büchel



Ludo De Brabander, Belgium

On Sunday 5 September, the European month of action against nuclear weapons in Europe kicked off in Büchel, Germany. 800 peace activists formed a human chain to protest against the US nuclear bombs stationed at the Fliegerhorst air base as part of NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements.

The action took place just weeks before the September 26 federal elections to call on Germany to join the UN nuclear weapons ban (TPNW), which has been in force since January 22, 2021. The peace movement has been campaigning against nuclear arms at the air base for 25 years. The human chain was organized by the campaign "Büchel is everywhere! Nuclear Weapon Free Now".

"The deadlock in nuclear disarmament must finally be broken. The incoming federal government can no longer ignore the nuclear weapons ban that came into effect in January and must finally join the treaty! The current government's arguments against this historic treaty are poor. That does not alter the fact that

billions are being invested in nuclear armament," said Marion Küpker, spokeswoman for the campaign. "Despite railway strikes and the deteriorating corona situation, we were able to send out a strong message with 800 participants," Küpker continues.

At around 1 p.m., a mile-long human chain was formed. To respect corona distances, the protesters used peace ribbons and banners. The participants also included activists from other European countries. Several speeches were held afterwards. To emphasize the European dimension, there were also speakers from Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy.

"The European peace movement is working together to end NATO's nuclear sharing. There is a need for a policy of détente, which means the extension of international cooperation on climate to security and peace," said Angelika Claußen, President of IPPNW Europe and Co-President of IPPNW Germany. Her organization, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), won the Nobel Peace Prize

month of action | September 2021

- ▶ End the modernization of nuclear weapons
- ▶ End nuclear sharing
- ▶ Sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Join: **bike tours** ... human chains ... **protests** ... vigils ... **across Europe**

more info at nukefreeeurope.eu

nuke free
EUROPE



in 1985 for its efforts to highlight the medical and environmental consequences of nuclear war.

Büchel Air Base is the last remaining US nuclear weapons site in Germany (Pershing II and Cruise Missiles were also deployed in Germany in the 1980s). As in Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and Turkey, the current nuclear bombs will soon be replaced by B61-12 nuclear bombs with a variable explosive power and a greater precision due to the digital guidance system. Germany has committed itself to expanding and modernizing the airbase, an investment for which EUR 256 million has been earmarked. In addition, it is also planned that new jets will be purchased to transport these nuclear bombs, which will cost billions. The German peace movement speaks of a 'ridiculous expenditure'. Representative opinion polls show that a large majority of the population wants the withdrawal of nuclear weapons (see page 13).

In the coming weeks, actions are also planned in Volkel (Netherlands, on September 25), Great Britain (in a dozen places on September 26) and in Italy. In Belgium, the Belgian Coalition against Nuclear Weapons calls on you to participate in the 'Bikes not Bombs' cycling tour on Sunday 26 September. That day has been declared by the UN as the International Day for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Published at <https://vrede.be/>

Nuke Free Europe Month of Action

Italy: Key dates: 11, 21 and 26 September for actions at the Aviano air base.

The Netherlands: Protest at the Volkel air base on 24 September.

Belgium: Protest at Kleine Brogel air base on 25 September.

UK: CND is coordinating a series of protests focussed on the UK's nuclear infrastructure. Protests will take place from Aldermaston in England to Faslane in Scotland and at every point between. See cnduk.org/sep26/ for full information.

visit nukefreeeurope.eu for full
information

Europe's turn



Angelika Claußen, Germany

Speech made by Angelika Claußen, IPPNW Chairperson and European Vice-President at Büchel military base, 05.09.2021.

From a peace and security policy perspective, the year 2021 has been particularly marked by two events in particular:

1. The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in January 2021 and
2. The defeat of the USA as a world power in Afghanistan.

The entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a huge success story for the worldwide peace movement! The peace movement is a real success story. We, global civil society, in alliance with the countries of the global South and courageous, outstanding politicians from countries in Europe, from Austria and from Ireland, have achieved a nuclear ban. We expected resistance from the nuclear weapons states, as the TPNW is diametrically opposed to their interests!

Now it's Europe's turn! Nuclear sharing must end in Europe: in Germany, in Belgium, in the Netherlands and in Italy. We can also achieve this goal together if we are clever in our approach.

The first step is to call NATO's nuclear dogma, the dogma of nuclear deterrence, into question.

And this is where the second major event comes into play: the defeat of the world power USA in Afghanistan. It is now crystal clear that military-based security policy is extremely destructive. The military and the arms race, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, are completely unsuitable as means to meet the humanity's challenges in times of climate crisis. The military itself is a climate killer.

Instead, we need a civil security and peace policy that implements the important steps towards a socio-ecological transformation in cooperation with other countries. Détente and cooperative security policies require drastic disarmament steps for climate justice.

The European peace movement is therefore putting nuclear disarmament in NATO on the agenda. Why does NATO need to use nuclear weapons at all?

Now is the time for nuclear sharing countries to take concrete steps together. "Nuclear free Europe" is the name of our joint campaign to create a dialogue between the peace movement and politicians on what a roadmap to end nuclear sharing in Europe could look like.

We are in the process of building our network in Western and Eastern Europe including Russia. Many NGOs and some willing politicians from European nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states are involved; ICAN, IPPNW, the IPB and the trade unions are also members.


Our deadline for ending nuclear sharing is in five years. That is the time that the START treaty between the US and Russia has been extended. Talks have begun between experts from the two states with the aim of reducing military-related nuclear risks. But this is not enough for us.

Let's build the campaign for a nuclear weapons-free Europe together in all of our countries! A campaign for a new policy of détente in Europe that explicitly includes Russia.

Let us jointly expand the cooperative relations that have long since begun in the area of climate policy to the area of security and peace! Let us look to our strengths, to our successes.

A world free of nuclear weapons, stemming the climate crisis including climate justice and our right to life and health - all these goals belong together! That is what we are working for together here in Büchel!

Peace, Power and Politics



The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), signed in 1951, extended Washington's 'nuclear umbrella' to two key states in the Pacific Region. Billed as a 'collective security' agreement, ANZUS clearly exposed the centrality of nuclear weapons in the US approach to foreign relations. One New Zealand government website describes the situation as follows:

Nuclear weapons played a major part in the United States' military arrangements, and the possible use of nuclear weapons or nuclear-powered vessels was implicit in any United States response to an attack on New Zealand.¹

Despite long-term objections to nuclear testing in the region, expressed from the 1960s onwards, the ANZUS agreement meant concessions on the part of the New Zealand government with respect to US nuclear weapons, military and naval operations and related issues.

By the early 1980s and following a determined campaign by nuclear disarmers, majority opinion in New Zealand was set firmly against the presence of US nuclear arms and nuclear powered ships in the country. The opposition Labour Party entered the 1984 election with the clear aim of introducing a 'Nuclear Free New Zealand Bill', campaigning throughout the election against nuclear weapons and propulsion but not against ANZUS itself.

Labour swept to victory and the new Prime Minister, David Lange, made clear that the electoral promise of a Nuclear Free NZ would be acted upon. The new government faced immediate problems. The US policy of 'neither confirm nor deny' with respect to nuclear weapons put a significant question mark over the future of ANZUS, which allowed for the presence of US Navy vessels in New Zealand harbours. How could the country be both nuclear free and tied to US military operations?

Lange's attempts to renegotiate ANZUS were met with hostility. Writing of the reaction some years later, Lange pointed out that:

Far from developing an irresponsible national policy on the subject, as most of our Western allies found it expedient to insinuate, New Zealand was in fact acting in a rational and calculated way, in the name of the traditional concept of strengthening national security. We were, simply, safer without nuclear weapons in our defence than with them ... (T)he policy as expressed in law stands as a statement of the political will to eliminate nuclear weapons and a rejection of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.²

Robert Green describes the international reaction to New Zealand's move towards nuclear free status:

With the US fearing that the 'Kivi disease' might spread to other allies such as Japan, Australia, the Philippines and Denmark, New Zealand was demoted from US ally to 'friend'; military co-operation under ANZUS was curtailed; the US and UK threatened trade; and New Zealand officials were ostracised from the Western group in the UN. Yet the government held firm, bolstered by massive mobilisation of public support by the peace movement in New Zealand and the US ...³

These moves against New Zealand by the US and allies would be more than your average political leader would be capable of withstanding. It is to David Lange's enormous credit that he stuck to the policy. It is also to his enormous credit that he respected and acted in tandem with the majority opinion of his own party, the international peace movements and, vitally, the majority of New Zealanders. Politicians who are willing to stand up to the US are an all-too-uncommon species.

In 1985 the US attempted to stage a provocation against Lange's government, in an

attempt to test resolve. The previously cited government website takes up the story:

Following confidential discussions over the selection of an acceptable ship, in late 1984 the United States requested that the ageing guided-missile destroyer USS Buchanan visit New Zealand. The Americans hoped that a perception that it was not nuclear-armed would be enough for it to slip under the political radar, and believed they had Lange's agreement. But on 4 February 1985 the government said no. 'Near-uncertainty was not now enough for us,' Lange later explained. 'Whatever the truth of its armaments, its arrival in New Zealand would be seen as a surrender by the government.' In response, Washington severed visible intelligence and military ties with New Zealand and downgraded political and diplomatic exchanges.⁴

The US Secretary of State at the time quickly confirmed that the security arrangements of ANZUS would no longer be maintained. This was the effective end of the Treaty. By 1987 New Zealand passed the 'New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987', legislation that is still in place and legislation accepted as the 'norm'. The country signed and ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the current prime minister is an important voice for nuclear disarmament.

What are the lessons of New Zealand's approach to nuclear disarmament for those in Europe who wish to achieve the same? There are surely thousands of lessons and we should aim to absorb, learn and act on them but the following examples seem clear enough:

1. Military and 'security' agreements with the United States like ANZUS and NATO have nuclear weapons at their core. The US expects total adherence to the nuclear dogma in exchange for 'security' assurances. It is unlikely that Europe will become nuclear free as long as European states adhere to NATO.
2. Independent, courageous and consistent political support is essential. More than that, this support must endure when political power is attained. Positive sentiments should not be taken at face value. Enduring commitment is key.
3. The peace movements play an essential role in sparking, building and sustaining both political and wider public support for nuclear disarmament. Without strong, coordinated peace movements our aim of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe will not arise.

If more European states are to sign up to the TPNW, if the 'nuclear-sharing' states are to send the nuclear weapons back to the US and if we are to make progress towards a nuclear-free zone, then the points above will serve us well.

Notes

1. <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/nuclear-free-nz>
2. Quoted from Green, Robert (2018) *Security without Nuclear Deterrence*, Spokesman, Nottingham
3. Ibid
4. <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/politics/nuclear-free-nz>

2ND IPB WORLD CONGRESS

(RE) IMAGINE OUR WORLD

ACTION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE

www.ipb2021.barcelona
@IPBWPC2021
facebook.com/IPBWPC2021



Scottish independence and the future of Trident



According to reports in the *Financial Times* (1 September 2021), the British government has “drawn up secret contingency plans to move its Trident nuclear submarine bases from Scotland to the US or France in the event of Scottish independence.”

The background to the formulation of these plans is that the Scottish National Party remains committed to pursuing independence; opposes nuclear weapons and was recently re-elected to head the devolved government with a strong mandate. In short, it is not out of the question that the people of Scotland will have the opportunity to vote again for independence and it seems possible that a majority will vote in favour.

Whatever your specific thoughts on independence, two things are clear: firstly, that the London government of Boris Johnson is deeply unattractive, reactionary and has pursued policies against the will of the majority of Scottish voters and to their material detriment; secondly, that an independent Scotland would pitch Britain’s nuclear weapons systems into crisis.

Writing in *The National* newspaper (6 September 2021), the SNP’s Stewart McDonald comments:

Negotiating Trident’s removal will be one of the most important tasks a newly independent Scotland will face, and capitals across Europe – indeed the world – will be looking to Edinburgh for assurance that we will be a reliable and trustworthy partner in this and in future international negotiations.

How we handle Trident’s removal will be our first big test on the international stage.

Building and maintaining strong international relationships is about more than stability, shared values and shared interests. It also relies on each state recognising and respecting the national interests of other states, even when they might diverge from their own.

Submarines armed with the UK’s nuclear weapons are based at the Faslane naval base at HMNB Clyde, near Glasgow, Scotland. The base is also home to a number of nuclear-powered but conventionally armed ‘hunter killer’ submarines, which are used to escort the nuclear armed, Trident subs. Glasgow itself is Scotland’s most populated city and locals are very well informed about the fact that their city is itself a potential target for nuclear attack.

The *FT* article raises possibilities for alternative arrangements for Trident should Scotland become an independent state:

The first (option) would be to relocate the bases elsewhere on the British Isles, with the Royal Navy’s Devonport base cited as the most likely location to replace Faslane...

The second option would be to move the UK’s nuclear bases to an allied country such as the US, with one defence expert citing Kings Bay, Georgia, the base for the US Navy’s Atlantic fleet of Trident submarines. Officials also examined moving the UK’s submarine base to Île Longue in Brittany, France.

The third option is to negotiate a new British Overseas Territory within an independent Scottish state that would contain the Faslane and Coulport bases, dubbed by one insider as a “Nuclear Gibraltar”.

The late John Ainslie, of Scottish CND, provides an indispensable guide for the questions raised by the *FT* and the SNP’s commitment to removing nuclear weapons from Scotland, in his 2013 report *Trident: Nowhere to Go*. Ainslie’s report makes clear that incredible barriers exist to the relocation of Trident to an alternative location in the British Isles. He writes:

50 years ago the (Ministry of Defence) drew up a list of possible locations for Polaris (the old nuclear missile system), including sites in England and Wales. Today these papers will be dusted off. Officials may

also revive an option that was raised in 1981 - basing the UK Trident fleet in the United States. A second overseas possibility would be Ile Longue in France. Building a floating support ship might be a further option.

There were three English sites on the Polaris shortlist. One was Portland, near Weymouth. This was dismissed because there was no suitable location for a nuclear warhead depot nearby. Today there are houses adjacent to the required area. The site was the venue for the sailing events in the 2012 Olympics.

A second alternative was Devonport. In 1963 the MOD considered transforming part of the Cornish shore, opposite the dockyard, into a nuclear weapons' store. A modern equivalent would be far larger. It would be adjacent to a residential estate as well as being close to the city of Plymouth. It is inconceivable that this would be permitted.

The third location was Falmouth. The proposed submarine base would be on National Trust land close to St Just in Roseland. Acquiring this would be very difficult. The warhead depot would be North of Falmouth. Two villages would be so close to the depot that they would have to be abandoned. In 1963 the MOD concluded that the costs of acquiring and developing this site for Polaris would be so great that the project wasn't feasible. A Trident depot would be much larger and even less viable ...

An existing nuclear site that might be considered is Barrow in Furness, where the submarines are built. This might be suitable if the Navy only deploys Trident when there is a full moon and a high tide. Otherwise it is a non-starter. Walney Channel is too shallow. The Barrow option was not seriously

considered in 1963.

The one Welsh location on the old shortlist was Milford Haven. Siting Polaris here would have resulted in the closure of one oil refinery. Introducing Trident in this estuary today would end four major petrochemical facilities and cut off one of Britain's main sources of gas. The grounds for dismissing Milford Haven, as with all the other sites, are even stronger today than they were fifty years ago.


In 1963 each of these options was rejected.

So it would seem that the first option listed by the *FT* and considered in the "secret contingency plans" looks like a complete non-starter.

What of option 2? What the British government still fancifully refers to as an "independent nuclear deterrent" is completely dependent on US nuclear operations. The *FT* refers to Kings Bay in Georgia, US, as being the base for the US Navy's Atlantic fleet, but fails to mention that this naval base is also the first stop for subs in Britain's nuclear submarine fleet on each voyage. As Commander Robert Forsyth points out in his book, *Why Trident?* (Spokesman, 2020):

When the government says UK Trident is 'Independent' they are being very economical with the facts. Whilst it is correct to say that RN missiles do not require specific US aid for targetting, launch or guidance in flight, with the notable exception of supply of missiles in the first case, the UK's deep dependency on US technical and political support means that the US does have the tools to inhibit or frustrate launch if it so wished ...


The UK Parliament's Defence Select Committee



Security without Nuclear Deterrence

Sicherheit ohne Atomare Abschreckung

by Commander Robert Green
RN (Ret'd)



Foreword by Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB MA
German translation by Dr.-Ing Joachim Wernicke

'It is hard-won wisdom that today's nuclear-armed states and those who would follow in their footsteps would do well to heed.' Dr Zia Mian, Princeton University

'One of the best informed and most searching critiques of the central strategic doctrine of the nuclear age - nuclear deterrence - that I know of.' Jonathan Schell, author of *The Fate of the Earth*, Yale University

Price: £17.99 | 266 Pages | Paperback | Fully indexed | ISBN: 9780 85124 8721

Contact Spokesman Books to obtain a copy of the German translation.

www.spokesmanbooks.com

detailed report of UK dependency on US support shows that the level of dependency is significantly higher than the Government would lead the public to believe. Not included in the report is the fact that the UK is designing and building (with US assistance) a common 12 missile module for both USN and RN Trident successor submarines.

Britain's 'independent nuclear deterrent' is wholly reliant on US missile capabilities, repair and renewal facilities. Not so 'independent'. Relocating the fleet to the US would expose this fantasy once and for all. For this reason alone, the British government may be reluctant to pursue such an option. If such a relocation did take place, how would the development, renewal and transit of nuclear warheads from Britain to the US function? Major obstacles exist to such an option, even though it may be entirely logical and consistent with reality.

What of relocating the fleet to France? Any such move would be a major political humiliation for the British government and would doubtless meet fierce resistance from the French peace movement.

The 'third option' is, in fact, no option at all. A follow-up report in the *FT* makes clear that a future independent Scotland would not accept the creation of a 'British Overseas Territory' at the existing base:

"There is just not a snowball's chance in hell of nuclear weapons being based here for any longer than is necessary," said one senior SNP member familiar with the party leadership's thinking on defence issues.

"It will become obvious to (UK policymakers) that madcap ideas like treaty ports from 100 years ago in Ireland will not be accepted and are unworkable for any state wanting to credibly operate a strategic nuclear deterrent," the senior party member said.

Britain's nuclear weapons may well have 'nowhere to go' in the event of Scottish independence. Such a possibility should cheer the hearts of all nuclear disarmers. The prospect of the British government going cap-in-hand to the US or France for assistance reveals the fragile nature of the nuclear infrastructure in the UK. John Ainslie struck an appropriately optimistic tone when he wrote:

Because there is no viable alternative site for Trident, Scottish independence could result in there being no nuclear weapons in Britain. This would be welcomed by all those around the world who seek disarmament, and it could encourage other countries to follow suit. A Scotland which votes for independence and then sustains a clear policy of banning these Weapons of Mass Destruction will also to set an example to the world.

Available from Spokesman Books

LEFT, LEFT, LEFT

A personal account
of six protest campaigns
1945-1965



Peggy Duff

Left, Left, Left

*A personal account of six protest
campaigns 1945-1965*
by Peggy Duff

"Peggy Duff is one of the unsung heroes of the struggles for peace and justice in the post-World War II period. She was a founder and leading figure in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which was instrumental in bringing the dire threat of nuclear war to general attention ... Truly a remarkable person, and speaking personally, a close and deeply valued friend."

Noam Chomsky

£15.99 | 308 pages | A5

Paperback

ISBN 9780851248813

www.spokesmanbooks.org

German elections: what prospects for peace and disarmament?



German voters go to the polls on Sunday, 26 September. The outcome of this election will determine not only who will replace Angela Merkel as German Chancellor, but the political composition of the Bundestag. Merkel is standing down from office after almost sixteen years, a period during which Germany has maintained and extended its position as Europe's most influential nation. Consequently, Germany is an important voice in international affairs.

Polling in the first week of September suggests that Merkel's party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), will not maintain control of the Chancellery. The polling may or may not change. The German electoral system has resulted in broad representation in the Bundestag. However, the much prized 'stability' of the German system has meant that the Chancellor comes from the party with the largest vote share: this will likely mean either the CDU or Social Democratic Party (SDP).

With a single party unlikely to achieve a basic majority of votes, a coalition government will be formed again. The political composition and dynamics of such a coalition is therefore important for determining the dimensions of future foreign, defence and security policy. If, for example, either the Green Party or Left Party were to join a coalition, what impact might this have? It is not possible to guess, but a brief survey of the stated positions of the main contending parties may provide some clues.

According to the 'Alliance for Securing Democracy', a US organisation with links to the security services and government:

The four centrist parties—CDU/CSU, FDP, Greens, and SPD—all have a strong commitment to the European and transatlantic orientation of German foreign policy. Despite varying policies, the parties all advocate for further European integration through the European Union (EU) and consider the transatlantic relationship and its defense alliance

NATO to be integral to German foreign and defense policy. In contrast, the (Left) calls on the EU to make major policy changes and structural reforms, while the AfD (right-wing) demands a renationalization of European politics. Furthermore, the AfD calls for NATO to limit itself to defense measures and refrain from deployments outside member countries. The (Left) considers NATO a relic of the Cold War and advocates for a new collective security alliance that includes Russia.

So in terms of the basic approach to the 'broad stroke' foreign policy agenda, the main parties look likely to continue as before. It is unlikely that Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) will be invited to join a coalition but it is not beyond the realms of possibility that the Left might achieve some influence. What might be achieved if they get the opportunity?

German policy towards Russia and China has been more nuanced than in the USA and UK. With regards to Russia, a continual process of engagement has been balanced with the 'containment' approach pursued by NATO. The Left calls for further engagement whilst the Greens call for maintaining EU sanctions. The 'Nord Stream 2' gas pipeline is an issue where the parties differentiate themselves, with the Greens calling for an immediate end to the scheme in contrast to the other parties. Whatever the exact approach to Russia, those interested in peace and security will not want to see a deterioration in relations.

The CDU, Greens, SPD and others parties of the 'centre' call for a coordinated European approach to China. At the same time, the Greens and CDU characterise China as having 'authoritarian, hegemonic aspirations', as wanting to 'divide Europe' and call for a 'transatlantic' approach.

The American Institute for Contemporary German Studies argues that the question of China is not a major concern for the German

public. 53% of German's see China's growing influence as either 'neutral' (43%) or 'positive' (10%). The same poll indicates that 82% think that Germany should remain 'neutral' in "the case of a new US-Chinese cold war". Will public opinion guide the new government or will existing alliances and demands determine Germany's course? If the outcome of the election looks unlikely to usher in a new, much less confrontational and completely independent, approach, it should be hoped that some constructive nuance and partial independence is maintained.

How will the new government approach the question of the 'militarisation of Europe'? The existing CDU/SDP coalition has failed to generate an overall strategic approach to defence questions but has been a key participant in the steady militarisation of the EU. Writing on the European Council on Foreign Relations website, Ulrike Franke speculates on what a 'Black-Green' (CDU-Green) coalition might produce in terms of defence policy. She writes:

(H)ow could a Black-Green coalition, of all things, improve this situation? After all, the Greens partly developed out of the peace movement of the 1970s, and they oppose most of the CDU's views on military and defence. The Greens want to introduce highly restrictive arms export rules, and are critical of what they see as the "militarisation" of the European Union.

There are three reasons to be optimistic. Firstly, the bar is low. It would be difficult for a new coalition to do worse than the current one. For the last few years, the CDU/CSU and its current coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, have been at loggerheads with each other, especially over defence questions.

Whilst there is room for optimism for those keen to see greater European military integration and spending, those who oppose such developments have fewer options. It seems that only the Left Party, which has consistently opposed European militarisation and which has used its platform in both the Bundestag and European Parliament to coordinate opposition, provides hope.

Although Germany is not itself nuclear-armed, the question of nuclear weapons is a live public issue in German politics. The questions of 'nuclear sharing' and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are issues of debate.

Germany hosts US nuclear weapons and under 'sharing' agreements the German armed forces are obliged to 'deliver' these weapons upon request. This arrangement is deeply contentious in the ranks of the SPD and in all political organisations to the left of it. Despite voices within the SPD being opposed to the continuation of this arrangement, the party itself has no settled view on the matter. Both the Greens and the Left are pledged to ending nuclear sharing as soon as possible. Such a move will be popular with the German public (see page 13). However, as Steven Pifer reports in a recent paper for the Brookings Institute (*Germany's Upcoming Election and the Future of Nuclear Sharing*):

(Some) argue that the Greens would not want to cause problems with NATO; while maintaining the aspirational goal of withdrawal of US nuclear weapons, they would be prepared to "stomach" continued nuclear sharing for the time being.

The 2009 coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and FDP offers a warning. Guido Westerwelle, then leader of the FDP who went on to become German Foreign Minister, secured the following clause in the agreement:

(The German government) will work to support the conclusion of new disarmament and arms control agreements internationally ... In this context and in the course of developing a strategic concept for NATO, we will work in the alliance and with our American allies to ensure that the nuclear weapons remaining in Germany are withdrawn.

No progress was made towards the goal of withdrawing US nuclear weapons following this agreement. What stopped the progress? Westerwelle encountered very strong opposition within NATO. It looks unlikely that progress will be made in the future without the question of NATO being confronted in a serious fashion.

Both the Greens and the Left are pledged to Germany signing and ratifying the TPNW. The significance of Europe's 'leading nation' taking such a move would be enormous. Writing a pledge to join the TPNW into any coalition agreement will be a massive step forward. However, Germany is likely to meet sharp resistance within NATO for any such move. NATO and Germany's membership of it remains a key issue for peace and disarmament in Europe.

ATOMKRIEG IN DEUTSCHLAND AB 2025 --- NUCLEAR WAR IN GERMANY FROM 2025

Joachim Wernicke, a regular contributor to *END Info* and translator of Commander Robert Green's *Security without Nuclear Deterrence* has produced a series of films in German and English titled 'Nuclear War in Germany from 2025', exploring the current nuclear dangers. They are available to view at the Friedensglockengesellschaft Berlin YouTube page:

<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCsVvdQgQU0PHsDR-U48BqJA>

Nuclear attitudes in Germany and the Netherlands

A recent paper in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* by Michal Smetana, Michal Onderco and Tom Etienne titled 'Do Germany and the Netherlands want to say goodbye to US nuclear weapons?' concludes that the people of those countries answer 'Yes'.

Of those surveyed, more than 75% of Germans and Dutch people disagree with the statement "US nuclear weapons should not be withdrawn under any circumstances" and more than 50% of both agreed with the statement "US nuclear weapons should be withdrawn without any preconditions" (see Figures 1 and 5 reproduced here).

As the authors point out:

"citizen's support for the withdrawal together with the changing political landscape in hosting states might soon create an unprecedented political momentum for the removal of US nuclear weapons from Europe that has not existed for a very long time ... a new push for the removal of nuclear weapons from Germany would likely create a domino effect and thereby strengthen the arguments of nuclear critics in other European hosting countries."

The will of the people is clear. Will politicians listen of their own accord? This seems unlikely, given that opposition to nuclear sharing has been strong in Germany for some time. The European peace movement must make the politicians listen with all the means at our disposal. The events coordinated by Nuke Free Europe across September are an excellent and necessary starting point.




Figure 1. US nuclear weapons should not be withdrawn under any circumstances.




Figure 5. US nuclear weapons should be withdrawn without any preconditions.

Reflections on Hiroshima

Tom Unterrainer

Tom Unterrainer delivered the following 'reflection' on behalf of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament at Coventry Cathedral, UK, on Hiroshima Day 2021.

On October 21, 1945, the physicist Daniel Posin wrote to an esteemed colleague in the following terms:

The final total confirmation of your principle ... should mark the beginning of an era of light; but we stand perturbed and seem to see ahead an impenetrable night ...

The recipient of this letter was, of course, Albert Einstein.

How could Einstein have possibly known the destructive, genocidal consequences of his discoveries in advance?

Is the world in which such creative impulses are inhibited by fear a desirable one? I think not.

Instead, we should question why an era of light gave way to impenetrable night. Einstein's last public act, in 1955, was to put his name to the 'Russell-Einstein Manifesto', which stated:

Remember your humanity, and forget the rest.

And continued:

If you can do so, the way lies open to a new Paradise; if you cannot, there lies before you the risk of universal death.

The light-seekers set an example for us all.

Take Setsuko Thurlow as an example. Thurlow was a 13-year-old schoolgirl when the United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, her home.



She recalls:

I still vividly remember that morning. At 8:15, I saw a blinding bluish-white flash from the window. I remember having the sensation of floating in the air ... Then, suddenly, I felt hands touching my left shoulder, and heard a man saying: "Don't give up! Keep pushing! I am trying to free you. See the light coming through that opening? Crawl towards it as quickly as you can."

Setsuko survived the bombing. She moved towards the light. Not everyone who survived the initial blast, not everyone who – like her – emerged from the rubble of a city destroyed by the American bomb made it. She continues:

As I crawled out, the ruins were on fire. Most of my classmates in that building were burned to death alive. I saw all around me utter, unimaginable devastation.

In the decades that followed Setsuko Thurlow deployed her powerful testimony and a determination that such events should never occur again to build an international movement to ban nuclear weapons once and for all. The fruits of her efforts and those of thousands of others can be found in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, or 'The Ban'.

'The Ban' is now in force. It is international law. The non-nuclear-armed world has come together to say "enough". Yet the nuclear-armed states retain their nuclear machines of mass death. 'The Ban' opened the prospect of a "new era of light", but the nuclear powers seem hellbent on perpetuating the "impenetrable night".

Yet we continue with our work, for to do otherwise is to abandon hope for the world. Our

task is obvious: the abolition of nuclear weapons, war and injustice.

The great American abolitionist John Brown once wrote that:

I cannot remember a night so dark as to have hindered the coming day.

Despite his forceful character and heroic efforts, Brown did not live to see the abolition of slavery in the United States. Will we live to see the abolition of nuclear weapons, war and injustice? Will the demands of "no more Hiroshima's, no more Nagasaki's" be heard in our lifetimes?

The night is, after all, pretty dark and it is getting darker.

When the world faces the triple threats of climate catastrophe, pandemic and nuclear dangers you would hope to see increased international cooperation and solidarity. Instead, a carrier strike group is making its way from these shores to the other side of the world. Whether this

voyage of provocation results in acute embarrassment or acute danger largely relies on the tolerance of others.

When international laws are broken and additional billions of pounds are expended on an increased nuclear warhead stockpile, sharp questions must be raised.

When poverty and inequality stalk the land, the world is re-arming: developing new nuclear weapons, new killer drones, automatic death machines and much else. There is a new arms race when the race that really matters – to vaccinate the world, to end poverty, eradicate inequality – has hardly begun.

In all this darkness, we must keep pointing and moving towards the light. In these efforts, we are not alone. We number in the millions. We exist in every village, town and city in every corner of the world.

With John Brown, surely we *cannot remember a night so dark as to have hindered the coming day.*

Subscribe to *The Spokesman*

Journal of the *Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation*

The Spokesman is the journal of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. It features independent journalism on peace and nuclear disarmament, human rights and civil liberties, and contemporary politics. **Founded by Bertrand Russell, Edited by Ken Coates 1970-2010.**



Drone Free Zone *The Spokesman 149*

Edited by Tony Simpson & Tom Unterrainer

On the Edge Joanna Frew | **Multiplying Risks** Drone Watch | **Iran and Biden** Assal Rad | **Afghanistan, Oil and Opium** Craig Murray | **Afghanistan's 20-year war** Steve Bell | **Last Words** Andrew Gamble | **A Palestinian Woman's History** Hamda Iraqi | **Indians of the Americas** Tony Simpson | **Reviews** | **END Info compilation**


137pages | ISBN 9780851249001 |
A5 paperback | £6

Subscribe | 3 issues per year | Individuals: £20 UK, £25 RoW | Institutions: £33 UK, £38 Europe, £40 RoW

www.spokesmanbooks.org

Hypersonic threat

Figure 1. Terrestrial-Based Detection of Ballistic Missiles vs. Hypersonic Glide Vehicles



Source: CRS image based on an image in "Gliding missiles that fly faster than Mach 5 are coming," *The Economist*, April 6, 2019, <https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2019/04/06/gliding-missiles-that-fly-faster-than-mach-5-are-coming>.

According to *Hypersonic Weapons: Background Issues for Congress*, produced by the Congressional Research Service (accessed at: www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf):

The Department of Defense (DOD) is currently developing hypersonic weapons under the Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike program, which is intended to provide the U.S. military with the ability to strike hardened or time-sensitive targets with conventional warheads, as well as through several Air Force, Army, and DARPA programs. Those who support these development efforts argue that hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence, as well as provide the U.S. military with an ability to defeat capabilities such as advanced air and missile defense systems that form the foundation of U.S. competitors' anti-access/area denial strategies. In recognition of this, the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* identifies hypersonic weapons as one of the key technologies "(ensuring the United States) will be able to fight and win the wars of the future." Similarly, the House Armed Services Committee's bipartisan Future of Defense Task Force Report notes that hypersonic weapons could present challenges to the United States in the years to come.

The report notes further that:

U.S. hypersonic weapons are to be conventionally armed. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. Indeed, according to one expert, "a nuclear-armed glider would be effective if it were 10 or even 100 times less accurate (than a conventionally-armed glider)" due to nuclear blast effects.

The different branches of the US armed forces are developing their own hypersonic weapons

systems:

U.S. Navy

In a June 2018 memorandum, DOD announced that the Navy would lead the development of a common glide vehicle for use across the services. The common glide vehicle is being adapted from a Mach 6 Army prototype warhead, the Alternate Re-Entry System, which was successfully tested in 2011 and 2017. Once development is complete, "Sandia National Laboratories, the designer of the original concept, then will build the common glide vehicles. ... Booster systems are being developed separately."

The Navy's Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with a booster system to create a common All Up Round (AUR) for use by both the Navy and Army ...

U.S. Army

The Army's Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon program is expected to pair the common glide vehicle with the Navy's booster system. The system is intended to have a range of over 1,725 miles and "provide the Army with a prototype strategic attack weapon system to defeat A2/AD capabilities, suppress adversary Long Range Fires, and engage other high payoff/time sensitive targets."

U.S. Air Force

The AGM-183 Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon is expected to leverage DARPA's Tactical Boost Glide technology to develop an air-launched hypersonic glide vehicle prototype capable of travelling at average speeds of between Mach 6.5 and Mach 8 at a range of approximately 1,000 miles. Despite testing delays due to technical challenges, ARRW successfully completed a "captive carry" test flight in June 2019; its first free-flight test failed in April 2021.

The development of these weapons is in part a response to similar developments in Russia and China, which the US and allies view as strategic competitor nations. The race to develop and deploy such weapons systems is part of the new 'arms race' which seeks to enhance existing military capabilities by introducing new technologies, robotics, artificial intelligence etc... into the battlefield.

The questions that remain unanswered are: when will these weapons be deployed and where will they be stationed?

According to a report (11 August 2021) on the *Breaking Defense* website:

The US Army is steadily progressing with its Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) prototype, to the point the service plans to start training operations staff on ground-based equipment by mid October, says Bob Strider, deputy director of the Army Hypersonic Project Office.

"We are moving very rapidly toward getting this capability put in place," he told the annual Space and Missile Defense Symposium on Tuesday. "We're very, very confident that we're going to meet our 2023 fielding date."

The U.S. Navy and Air Force versions of these weapons will be in use wherever the Navy and Air Force deploy their ships and planes (the US has an extensive 'boot print') and as such the range of the weapons will not limit the scope of deployment as they will be carried by machines that themselves have significant ranges. The exact positioning of the ground-based hypersonic weapons by the US Army has not been revealed.

Various news reports on the operational requirements of the LRHW indicate that nearby airfields will be required to supply the equipment and military bases will be needed to house troops, conduct repairs etc...

The nature of the ground-based LRHW's, their capabilities and the fact that they are intended to 'meet the threat' posed by Russia and China narrows down the likely field of deployment.

For example, with a reported range of 2,775km the LRHW could reach China from Guam. Likewise, if the LRHW was deployed in any part of Europe then Russia would be in range. It is worth noting that if LRHW was based in London, UK, for example, then it would be within comfortable range of Moscow, Russia, and the complex of command-and-control facilities in the area.


When these new weapon systems are deployed in Europe, it looks likely that they will be stationed in Germany or a neighbouring NATO member state (Poland, for example). It seems

unlikely, but not impossible, that they will be stationed in the UK and whether or not the US is able to station them in Germany will depend to one degree or another on the outcome of the upcoming Federal elections.

Wherever these missiles are based in Europe, they are unlikely to increase security on the continent. More likely, the presence of such weapons will increase tensions further and lead to a deterioration of general security. Their deployment will surely spark reciprocal deployments by Russia.

A further concern is addressed in more detail in Joachim Wernicke's article on page 18. Although the LRHW's are to 'conventionally' armed upon deployment, it appears that the missile technology is capable of 'dual use', which means that a conventional payload could be replaced with a nuclear payload. A similar situation exists with the Aegis Ashore missile systems: a fact we have pointed out on a number of occasions.

The European peace movements should be alert to the prospect of LRHW's being stationed in Germany, Poland, Romania or elsewhere on the continent. We should be clear that any such stationing will degrade security and increase risk. Wherever possible, the alarm should be raised on this prospect and plans formulated to resist the deployment.



NATO, nuclear weapons and Europe

Joachim Wernicke

Evaluation of the communiqué on the NATO summit on 14 Juni 2021

It was a major endeavor to evaluate the 31-page NATO communiqué of June 14, 2021 (covering 79 topics, with much self-praise and repetition), in search of facts about the possible stationing of new US intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Following US President Trump's termination of the 1987 INF Treaty in 2019, new such missiles – Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons (LRHW) for the US Army and Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) for the US Navy – were tested and ordered, for delivery from 2024.

What follows are selected and annotated citations from the communiqué (topic numbers in brackets), in their own translation, as the original NATO text is published in English, French, Russian and Ukrainian, but not in German:

(3) “Russia’s aggressive actions pose a threat to Euro-Atlantic security.” So NATO officially states Russia is a military adversary.

(9) “While NATO adheres to international agreements, Russia continues to break the values, principles, trust and agreements that underlie the NATO-Russia relationship.” No indication of which agreements have been broken from NATO's point of view. And the claim conceals the Western breaches of international agreements, for example: promises to the Soviet head of state Gorbachev in 1990 and the breaking of these promises by NATO's eastward expansion since 1997; permanent stationing of NATO units in countries of the former Warsaw Pact, thereby breaking the NATO-Russia Basic Act.

(11) “(...) the creation of modern dual-capable (i.e. conventional and nuclear) missiles in



Kaliningrad (...), which increasingly threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area.” NATO does not specify how, in its view, these missiles which have been stationed in the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly German North-East Prussia) since US President Trump's termination of the INF Treaty in 2019 “increasingly *threatens the security of the Euro-Atlantic area*”. What is the difference between whether the missiles are stationed in Kaliningrad, in the Russian heartland or on Russian naval ships? Unfortunately, NATO is silent about the presumably important reason that Russia stations missiles in vulnerable circumstances in the small Kaliningrad area which is only the size of Thuringia and in the crosshairs of NATO guns from Poland, Lithuania and the Baltic Sea. And NATO fails to mention that it was US President Trump's termination of the INF Treaty that allowed Russia to produce and deploy the intermediate-range missiles necessary to shell the US command structure in West Germany from Kaliningrad. Thus, this threat was caused by the NATO chief himself. The communiqué does not ask *why* this happened.

(22) “NATO is advancing a new military strategy through the implementation of two significant military concepts that will further strengthen our ability to deter and defend against any potential adversary and to maintain and develop our military lead in the future.” Thus, NATO confirms its superiority over the Russian armed forces, which is also known and documented by a comparison of the military budgets (the USA spends more than ten times that of Russia).

“The concept of warfare envisages a long-term vision for the maintenance and further development of NATO's decisive military lead.” NATO confirms that it is preparing for warfare. But it fails to specify where the battlefield would be.

There is a general consensus that any warfare

in Europe is incompatible with the protection of civilians in European countries, including Russia. That is why warfare in Europe inevitably means genocide. Successful military defence is no longer possible in Europe. On the other hand, non-violent civil defense is possible. Political problems in Europe can no longer be solved by military force. The *main task of any* European government is to prevent *any* warring party from bringing the effects of weapons of war to its territory. The reasons for this are Europe's centralized infrastructure, the extreme dependence on electrical power and the lack of shelters for the civilian population.

(25) "We will not be constrained by any possible adversary regarding the movement of Alliance troops on land, in the air or at sea and within any part of the Alliance territory." Thus, NATO claims the right to deploy new US intermediate-range missiles near Russia's borders, despite the violation of the NATO-Russia Basic Act, and on Europe's inland seas. NATO fails to mention that the presence and movement of foreign NATO troops on the soil of NATO members requires the prior permission of these members.

(26) "We reaffirm our commitment to respond in an appropriate, balanced, coordinated and timely manner to Russia's growing and evolving range of conventional and nuclear-equipped missiles, which is increasing in scale and complexity, and which poses significant risks to security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area from all strategic directions (...) We have no intention of stationing land-based nuclear missiles in Europe." Thus, the new US intermediate-range missiles are claimed as a "response" to Russian missiles (following the example of NATO's argument for the stationing of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe in the 1980s). And of the Russian missiles, it is claimed that they are "conventional and nuclear-deployable". However, NATO fails to add that the new US LRHW and CPS intermediate-range missiles have the same technical feature of dual capability.

NATO avoids talking more precisely about its intentions with regard to new US medium-range missiles. Land-based conventionally equipped missiles and sea-based nuclear and conventionally equipped missiles are expressly *not excluded*. The U.S. government claims that the new LRHW and CPS missiles will only carry conventional warheads — the "C" stands for "conventional". There are reasons to doubt the truth of this claim. Replacing conventional warheads with nuclear warheads is technically easy, and the lower weights of recent nuclear

warheads gives the missile greater range.

(31) "In cases of hybrid warfare, the (NATO) Council could decide to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, as in the case of an armed attack." The success of "hybrid warfare" against a state presupposes that it has delivered its critical infrastructure to insecure data networks — a self-inflicted vulnerability that can be easily avoided by appropriate technical protection measures and by humans instead of remote-controlled robots at critical control points. It is therefore doubtful that "hybrid warfare" or a "cyber attack" can be considered a military attack under Article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations — or whether it is merely a euphemism for and irresponsible dereliction of duty to exercise caution in data security. If I leave my front door open and then complain about a stolen item, who is to blame? The thieves or me? In World War II, no one could shut down a power plant or waterworks via a telephone line or a radio link.

NATO gives the impression here that the proclamation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty is a strong measure of the NATO Council, which inevitably leads to military action against an adversary. However, this is not the case. NATO is 'sovereignty-friendly'. Each member state decides individually how to proceed in the event of a NATO alliance case, ranging from a diplomatic touch of compassion to military participation. There is no obligation of any kind for the individual member state to participate in warfare that NATO intends or begins.

The only exception is those NATO member states that allow foreign troops on their soil. The sovereignty of these states is undermined because, under international law, foreign troops are allowed to stage military actions in alleged "self-defense", at their own discretion, with weapons of their own choice, regardless of the decisions or wishes of the host country. This problem affects Germany and Great Britain, for example. On the other hand, France, Denmark, the Czech Republic and other NATO members act differently: no deployment of US troops.

(34) "We continue to improve our increased forward presence in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland by adapting to plans and by ensuring the ability of the four combat-ready battle groups to operate in conjunction with the national homeland defense forces." Thus, NATO acknowledges that there is a permanent 'reinforced forward estate' in the territory of the former Warsaw Pact, consequently in violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

(40) “The Alliance’s strategic forces, especially those of the United States, are the highest guarantee of allies’ security. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have their own role and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. The separate decision-making centers of these allies contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of possible adversaries. NATO’s nuclear deterrence set-up is also based on United States nuclear weapons deployed forward in Europe and infrastructure provided by the allies concerned.” This fundamentally correct description results from the fact that NATO is legally a foreign legion of the US president. The Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Forces in Europe also serves as NATO Commander-in-Chief. The US nuclear weapons stationed forward in Europe allow the US president to cause crisis in Europe while keeping his the ‘homeland’ safe.

The French nuclear forces are outside this purely US national chain of command of NATO. Britain’s nuclear weapons use Trident II launchers leased from the US, so they must realistically be seen as part of the US national chain of command, at least as long as it is only a matter of blocking British actions that are not acceptable to the US government.

(44) “We have told Russia many times that the BMD system (ballistic missile defense) cannot work against Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and that there is no intention to redevelop this system in the future to give it the capability.” This claim is obviously false, because the GMD/GBI heavy defense system against intercontinental ballistic missiles is in use in California and Alaska.

(46) “NATO will continue to respond in an appropriate and responsible manner to the material risks posed by the Russian 9M729 missile to the security of the Alliance and by other short- and medium-range missiles (...) Russia’s proposal for a moratorium on the stationing of mid-lying missiles in Europe does not fit in with Russia’s unilateral and continued deployment of such systems on the continent and would not prevent Russia from deploying such missiles outside its European territory; this proposal is therefore not credible and unacceptable.” What kind of “essential risk” do Russian cruise missiles 9M729 (SSC-8) pose compared to Russian sea-based cruise missiles 3M14 (SS-N-30)? What other Russian short- and medium-range missiles pose such a “significant risk”?

Russia’s rejection of US claims of violation of the

INF Treaty by SSC-8 has never been independently investigated. The SSC-8 thus serves as a pretext for stationing new US missiles in Europe, as the Soviet SS-20 missiles did in the 1980s.

This paragraph reveals the structure of NATO’s public relations work for the stationing of new US medium-range LRHW and CPS missiles in Europe: unlike in the 1980s, there will be no negotiations on a new INF Treaty, claiming that the Russian proposal was “not *credible and unacceptable*”. Due to the prevailing media coverage of corona and climate change, the European public has not yet noticed the situation of the new US missile stationing and its consequences.

(47) “Allies remain strongly committed to the full fulfillment of the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968) and all its aspects, as an irreplaceable platform, and to strengthening the NPT through its mutually reinforcing three pillars (...) NATO’s nuclear arrangements have always been fully in line with the NPT, which is the only credible path to nuclear disarmament.” This NATO claim is obviously false: for more than 50 years, the three nuclear-weapon states in NATO have been permanently violating Article VI of the NPT, because during this time they have never sought nuclear disarmament “*in good faith*”, but have continuously participated in an international nuclear arms race.

“We reiterate our opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which does not fit with the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence strategy, is incompatible with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations of our countries regarding nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW in any way reflects or contributes to the development of customary international law.” NATO’s business model is based on nuclear weapons. That is why NATO rejects the TPNW, against the majority will of the peoples of NATO member states. But NATO’s claim that the TPNW “*does not get along with the existing architecture for non-proliferation and disarmament*” and “*undermines the NPT*” is false. The TPNW is based on the NPT and essentially corrects its fatal shortcoming, namely not to give a date for nuclear disarmament. Since 1968, the five nuclear-weapon states in the NPT have been taking advantage of this deficiency by mutual agreement, with the USA and Russia endangering the existence of civilization through their excessive nuclear armament. That is why

signing the TPNW is the most important task of all governments today, even with priority over domestic tasks such as corona pandemic, climate protection, education, social services, etc.

All NATO member states except the US and Turkey are members of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has been prosecuting and convicting war criminals since 2002. The legal standard for war crimes is the ICC's interpretation of the international humanitarian law of war. The state of customary international law on nuclear weapons was established by the International Court of Justice in 1986, at the request of the UN General Assembly. The TPNW continues to strengthen this status, which also becomes important for states that are not participants in the TPNW.

As Richard Falk points out in *The Spokesman* 147 (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 2021), UN General Assembly Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 1961 also has significance; it declared the threat of and use of nuclear weapons to be unconditionally illegal under the UN Charter. In addition, Falk points to the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons, which has been observed internationally since 1945, and to the NPT itself. Both documents have weight in delegitimizing and stigmatizing nuclear weapons, with 122 of the 193 UN members (63 percent) voting for the TPNW in 2017. Regardless of NATO positions, compliance with international humanitarian law is a duty of every single citizen of the European NATO states. After committing a war crime, he or she stands alone before the ICC – neither their government nor NATO are able to protect him or her against prosecution, conviction and punishment.

Conclusion

Russia is now in a much worse military situation than the Soviet Union was in 1984. At that time, there was a security strip about 1000 km wide as a separation from NATO territory. The Pershing II missiles in West Germany, with their accuracy of meters and flight time of about ten minutes, were seen in Moscow as presenting an acute danger of decapitation strike against the underground bunkered Soviet command structure. The Soviet missiles of that time did not yet have the accuracy necessary to reliably destroy deep underground bunker targets. Therefore, in a situation of acute military tension in Europe in the 1980s, the Soviet military would have led a massive area-wide first strike as far as foreseeable, primarily the mass of the European-based US military, concentrated in West Germany, with destruction of the entire country

as collateral damage, with an atmospheric total explosive force of a few tens of megatons, complete loss of the German population, moderate damage caused by radioactive fallout in neighboring states (mainly in eastern states due to the main wind direction) and a large area in Central Europe uninhabitable for at least future centuries.

The US forces in West Germany would have been destroyed in this proxy war. But by mutual agreement, both sides would have strictly avoided nuclear hits on the core countries of the USA and the Soviet Union. Both sides (Reagan/Gorbachev) recognized the remaining risks for their countries and defused the nuclear duel in Europe by concluding the INF Treaty with each other in 1987.

Today, the situation is fundamentally different. As a part of NATO's eastward expansion, the new US medium-range missiles will be stationed directly near the Russian land border and in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. As a result of their longer range (around 2700 km), these missiles will be LRHW and CPS – faster than the old Pershing II, which will shorten flight times. This makes a nuclear decapitation strike on the command bunkers in Moscow possible within about five minutes. Given this stronger US position, there will be no new INF Treaty, not even negotiations with Russia, as NATO has made explicitly clear.

On the other hand, instead of a few tens of megatons of nuclear explosive power on West Germany in the past, Russia has gained a *unique new and advantageous* situation, thanks to the termination of the INF Treaty by US President Trump. With this termination, Russia was again given the freedom to produce and station land-based medium-range missiles. Due to technical progress in accuracy, a first strike with "only" a small number of nuclear hits of so-called "small" explosive force (comparable to Hiroshima/Nagasaki) would be sufficient to decapitate the bunkered US command system in Europe, which is located (also for the new missiles) in West Germany (at least with targets in Stuttgart, Ramstein, Wiesbaden and Spangdahlem). The enclave of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg, East Prussia) is in a sufficiently close firing position for medium-range ballistic missiles, about 1000 km or seven minutes flight time away from the US bunkers in Germany. The required total nuclear explosive force would be a few tens of kilotons – a thousand times lower than in the 1980s.

This Russian first strike can be carried out at little risk for Russia, because the area of damage is limited to Germany, and a pretext is at hand, namely a *'regrettable computer error in the*

automatic alarm system, which is unfortunately required since the US stationed the new missiles'. Russia could even immediately take responsibility and offer help and compensation. The hard-hit target areas (explosion areas and radioactive fallout drags) would make up a few percent of the area of Germany, with less than one percent of the population as victims of the attack. In view of this "minor" damage only to economic rival Germany and the now non-existent operational capability of US troops in Europe, the US government would possibly refrain from reacting militarily, because the Russian command system and the intercontinental ballistic missiles targeted at the USA would be fully functional and in a high state of alert.

The German-Russian relationship would be severely disrupted. Russia would have lost export customers for a while. But presumably the US would have permanently lost the role it had held as a European power since 1945, so Russia would have significantly and permanently increased its security. When Stalin annexed the area around Königsberg in 1945, he was reportedly interested in an ice-free Baltic Sea port. He probably never expected that one day this small enclave could play an existential military role for Russia.

The scenario described above must never happen. It can easily be prevented: The nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Europe and in the European inland seas must be urgently established, starting with Germany immediately following Austria's example (since 2017) and signing the UN Nuclear Ban Treaty. This is a sovereign German decision, regardless of the assessments and wishes of the US and NATO. The German signature of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is demanded by 80 percent of the German population. The territory of the former GDR – a third of today's Germany – has been a nuclear-weapon-free zone since 1990, thanks to the Two-plus-Four Treaty. Now the rest of Germany must achieve the same status. Thus, there will be no more US targets for Russian missiles in Central Europe. The next step: NATO and Russia embedded in the pan-European peace order of the OSCE, and a ban on any future attempt to solve political problems in Europe through military force, with gradual demilitarization of the continent and meaningful reallocation of the saved funds for urgent civilian tasks.

Translated from German. Any errors the responsibility of END Info.

Available from Spokesman Books

WHY TRIDENT?

Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret'd)



Foreword by Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham KCB
Introduction by Professor Nick Grief

"The theory of nuclear deterrence is flawed, unproven and poses significant dangers from accidental use."

"It is timely to review our nuclear deterrent in the light of our overall posture, and of the moral, legal and practical issues involved. We can no longer simply assume it is essential, irrespective of its impact on our overall defence and security posture. Few people have done more to examine rigorously the related issues than Rob Forsyth and I am very glad that his work in this field is now being given the exposure it deserves. He has produced a book that all those involved in this field should read and carefully reflect upon."


Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham

£7.99 | 98 pages | A5 | Paperback
ISBN 978 085124 8905

www.spokesmanbooks.org

Nuclear Disarmament is a precondition for real security in Europe

Ludo De Brabander – Büchel 07/07/2021



We can look with optimism or pessimism to the future.

On the negative side: it appears that we are living in a more dangerous decade compared to even the difficult episodes of the cold war. In the last two consecutive years, the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* set the hands of the 'Doomsday Clock' – measuring the likelihood of man-made global catastrophe – at one hundred seconds to midnight – closer than it has ever been before, due to the imminent threats of nuclear war and climate disaster. Arms control treaties are no longer upheld, and governments have started updating and expanding nuclear arsenals.

But there are also hopeful developments. On 22 January 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. Meanwhile 54 states ratified the Ban Treaty. A milestone in history. Four years ago (the 7th of July 2017), after several years of negotiations, 122 countries voted in favour of the new Ban Treaty, with one against (Netherlands), and 1 official abstention (Singapore).

Unfortunately, 69 nations did not vote at all. They didn't even take part in the negotiations. Among them the nuclear weapon states and all NATO members except the Netherlands.

NATO: nuclear alliance

NATO and governments of member states claim that the TPNW is incompatible with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and even undermines it. It is important to recall that a key motivation of the states that negotiated the TPNW was to take forward the implementation of the nuclear disarmament obligations of article VI of the NPT. This intention is also clearly stated in the preamble of the TPNW. Article VI of the NPT legally obliges all states parties to pursue "negotiations" and "effective measures" "on a

treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". That is exactly what the TPNW does. UN secretary-general, António Guterres, flatly rejected in 2018 in Geneva claims that the TPNW undermines the NPT declaring that the two treaties are "fully compatible" and complementary. The research services division of the German federal parliament, wrote in a detailed paper in January 2021: "The TPNW does not undermine the NPT; it is part of a common nuclear disarmament architecture."

Nevertheless, despite the obligations under article VI of the NPT, most NATO member states as well as all nuclear states, have been boycotting the negotiations. Worse, NATO started a disinformation campaign with the false claim that the Ban Treaty undermines the nuclear disarmament regime. The real reason is that NATO sees the treaty as a threat to the organization's political unity over its nuclear strategy. According to NATO: "Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence, alongside conventional and missile defence forces. NATO is committed to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, it will remain a nuclear alliance."

However, NATO defined itself only recently as a nuclear alliance. In NATO's earliest years, nuclear weapons were in fact not even mentioned in the alliance's strategic concepts. Nuclear arms were considered as a responsibility of NATO's nuclear states. Only in the last decade did NATO accept a strategic concept in which it considered itself a 'nuclear alliance'.

The collectivization of nuclear responsibility

From the 1960s, the US began to deploy nuclear

weapons in other NATO member states, giving them a role in the planning and preparation of nuclear war. In the years that followed, all countries except France became involved in the nuclear deterrent policy, which was increasingly defined as a form of alliance solidarity. The reason?


International support among the population for nuclear disarmament grew. In the 80's many hundreds of thousands demonstrated in European and US cities opposing new deployments of nuclear arms. The strengthening of humanitarian and anti-nuclear norms during and after the Cold War played a key role in

pushing NATO to adapt.

This led to the collectivization of political responsibility for nuclear weapons.

Why? First, the nuclearization of NATO as an organizational identity allowed pro-nuclear actors to justify costly nuclear modernization programs and nuclear deployments as contributions to alliance "solidarity" and "cohesion". Second, this nuclearization of NATO undercut the potential for intra-alliance resistance to nuclear arms. Calls for nuclear disarmament could thus be seen as anti-NATO.

Nuclear sharing became a core component of NATO's strategy. Of the three nuclear powers



in NATO (France, the United Kingdom and the United States), only the United States has nuclear arms in other member states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. Once there were also US nuclear arms in Canada (1950-1984), Greece (until 2001) and the UK (until 1992). This means, by the way, that it was possible to send nuclear weapons back to the United States without it being considered an act against 'NATO obligations'.

Currently, the US has about 150 tactical B61 gravity bombs deployed in Europe. They have to be mounted into (not in Turkey) dual capable aircraft (DCA) in war time. This can be considered as a transfer of control by non-nuclear states of nuclear arms which would be in breach with the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) of 1970. The NPT prohibits the direct or indirect transfer or control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. But according to the US the NPT is not valid anymore in war time (argument: the purpose of the NPT to avoid war failed).

These bombs will soon be replaced by new B61-12 bombs. They are equipped with an electronic tail kit that can guide the bomb to its target. They have also lower yield options. The mixture of both, precision and lower yield options could be seen by war planners as more 'useable' allowing some targets that previously would not have been attacked because of too much collateral damage to be attacked anyway. This is a very dangerous development. The new B61-12 will increase the danger of a war with nuclear weapons eroding the concept of 'deterrence'.

European population opposes nuclear weapons

According to recent surveys in several European countries, a majority of the population in Europe is in favour of a ban on nuclear weapons. This is what 77% of those surveyed want in Belgium, 89% in Spain, 87% in Italy, 78% in the Netherlands and Denmark. The challenge for the peace movement is to translate that support from the population into political pressure and to get nuclear weapons back high on the political agenda. For several months, representatives of the peace movement have been preparing a call to hold a month of actions against nuclear weapons in September 2021. We must not miss that opportunity because in a few years' time the new B61-12 bombs will be deployed in Europe. We are also witnessing an increase in investments by nuclear weapon states for the maintenance and renewal of nuclear arsenals in nuclear weapon states. According to an ICAN report the nine nuclear weapon states invested 72.6 billion

dollars in 2020, an increase of 1.4 billion compared to 2019. The billions thrown away on nuclear weapons could instead be funding health care, climate measures or for the promotion of social justice.

The world is at a crossroads and Europe has to make a strategic choice: remain part of the arms race or demonstrate global leadership by promoting a peaceful approach towards common global security.

I invite all of you to participate actively in the new "Nuke Free Europe" network against NATO's nuclear sharing policy and for the removal of all nuclear weapons in Europe. During the month of September, in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and the UK there will be actions near military bases with US nuclear weapons. Our first goal is to get nuclear arms back on the political agenda and to raise awareness among other movements (trade unions, the climate movement, women and youth movement) about the planetary threat of nuclear weapons and the need to act.

We need to discuss and find ways to increase pressure on governments of the nuclear sharing countries to embrace the vision of nuclear disarmament as a preventative tool for shaping Europe's security environment. A first condition is to end nuclear ambiguity which means that the governments of nuclear sharing states acknowledge that nuclear weapons are deployed on its territories. We need a free and open democratic discussion so that the presence of nuclear weapons in the sharing countries can be politically and legally contested. As a peace movement we should join forces with social movements in Europe in making nuclear disarmament a political priority. We must believe that the return of the anti-nuclear mass movement of the eighties is not impossible. Secondly, we need a clear political commitment and time schedule for European nuclear disarmament, starting with negotiations between the US/NATO and Russia to dismantle US nuclear bombs followed by agreements on nuclear disarmament in France, UK and at least the European part of Russia. Once nuclear disarmament is achieved Europe can legally become a nuclear weapon free zone. At the same time the door is open for European countries to fulfil their obligations under the NPT and to sign and ratify the TPNW.

To recall the iconic slogan of Greenpeace: "No time to waste!"

Ludo De Brabander is a Belgian writer and spokesman for the Belgian peace organisation Vrede vzw. <https://vrede.be/en>

Europe and NATO Expansion

Frank Blackaby

Frank Blackaby was Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute from 1981 to 1986. First published as a pamphlet of the same title by Spokesman for the European Labour Forum in July 1996. We republish here for historical context and as a contribution towards further analysis of NATO's policy, dynamics and the dangers it poses.

* * * * *

Introduction

If you say 'Europe' to anyone in Britain these days, it triggers comments on beef, fish, the Conservative Party, and, just possibly, the Inter-Governmental Conference. These are ephemerae. The big issue is as it has always been – how do we make sure that we never again have a great war in Europe? We failed twice this century. It would be wicked to fail again. Could it happen? The way things are going, the answer is – Yes.

Five years ago, peace over the whole of Europe was there for the taking. Western Europe was already a 'security enclave', in this sense: that it was absurd to think that the three old contenders – France, Britain and Germany – would ever again resort to military force to settle disputes between them. Germany had been brought into the Western comity of states: it was no longer an expansionist power. Then from 1985 on, Gorbachev set about removing for good the idea of Soviet expansionism.

It is easy to forget the enormity, and the totality, of that change. Indeed it was not one change: it was about nine changes. The Berlin Wall came down. All Soviet troops left Eastern Germany, and all other Warsaw Pact states as well. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved. The USSR

broke up, and two new states were created – Belarus and the Ukraine which stood between Russia and Poland. So Russian troops, withdrawn to their new border, were over 1,000 kilometres away from the new German border. The USSR accepted the reunification of Germany.

There was more. In the five years before its dissolution, the USSR assented to a whole series of Western arms control proposals. It accepted a total zero for all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges from 500km to 5,500km – a proposal the US had put forward in the certainty that the USSR would turn it down. The USSR signed a Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe which meant far more dismantling and destruction of weapon systems on the Eastern than on the Western side. It agreed to a START Treaty reducing Soviet nuclear weapons much more than those of the US.

Finally, any idea of furthering the worldwide spread of Communism was abandoned. What else could the USSR (and later Russia) have done, to convince the world that it was not an aggressive expansionist power?

A chance

Here then was a chance. For the first time in recorded history there was a chance to create a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals where the risk of inter-state (not intra-state) war could be reduced down towards zero. This had already happened in Western Europe. Within the region of the European Union security was no longer a military matter. In any dispute between EU members, their relative military capability was irrelevant. Even the fiercest British Eurosceptic, angry at the ban on British beef exports, does not suggest calling the chiefs of staff into Cabinet meetings. The idea of settling disputes within the



EU by military means is off the map of political possibility.

This 'security enclave' could have been extended to Eastern Europe. Two things were needed. One was to bring Russia into the comity of nations as an equal partner as had already been done with the Second World War enemy, Germany. The other was to avoid at all costs the creation of a new dividing line in Europe. There should be no going back to the old pattern – an alliance of selected European states against the threat from a European enemy outside the group.

The opportunity was lost. It is not going to be easy to salvage things now.

NATO was clearly not the right body for the new Europe. The North Atlantic Treaty, the Washington Treaty, is a simple, monochrome Treaty. Security organisations fall into two classic categories. There are collective security treaties, which are concerned primarily with conflicts between their members and there are collective defence treaties, which are created to deal with an enemy or enemies outside the group. The Washington Treaty is a collective defence treaty, addressed to an outside threat. It is not - repeat not a collective security treaty. It has no provisions for dealing with conflicts between its own members. That is one reason why it is so short: it can be printed out on one sheet of A4 paper.

Further, NATO was a single-enemy treaty. It had one purpose and one purpose only – to deter the USSR from an attack on Western Europe. It was a military treaty, and nothing else. It had no concern with human rights – there was no question of suspending Greece or Turkey when they were under military dictatorships. It had nothing to do with economic issues. Its purpose was to confront an enemy, the Soviet Union, with military power.

How has it been possible to promote NATO as the dominant security organisation in Europe, when the Soviet Union was no longer the enemy? There has been no revision to the Washington Treaty of 1949. It is still for collective defence, and that presumes some enemy. These are some answers to that question.

The promotion of NATO

It soon became clear that, in spite of the loss of the enemy, NATO would remain the United States' chosen instrument of influence in Europe. The US had no intention of allowing the Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the CSCE, later the OSCE) to take its place. In NATO, the United

States had an undisputed position of leadership. It dominated NATO's decision-making process – for the threat, spoken or unspoken, of US withdrawal from Europe was always there. The CSCE was much too European for American tastes. The USA had (in its view) won the Cold War. Russia was in a chaotic state, so that there was no need to pay much attention to Russian views on any security issue. The general US attitude was: 'We are the masters now'.

In the early period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, some of the Eastern European states, former members of the Warsaw Pact, initially favoured the idea of a pan-European security body. They changed their minds when they understood the US position. Their long period of subjection to Soviet hegemony had left them with one main security obsession: to stay out of any Russian sphere of influence. They wanted a guarantee from the United States that this would not be permitted. The only way they saw of obtaining that guarantee was by becoming members of NATO. For them, NATO was still an organisation for deterring Russia. As one Polish diplomat put it – though not on a diplomatic occasion: 'We are not interested in the fun and games. (He was referring to Partnership for Peace manoeuvres, discussed below). We just want to make sure that, if there is trouble with Russia, the US marines will be there'.

NATO moved in a somewhat crab-like way to its present position, of accepting the idea that states which were previously members of the Warsaw Pact should be enrolled as full members of NATO. The first move, in 1991, was to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, open to all Central and East European states and later to all the successor states of the old USSR. Virtually all the eligible states joined. The Council's function was to provide consultation on defence planning and other military matters. Whether in fact Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have benefited much from such consultations is perhaps doubtful.

The next step was to develop with some of these states Partnership for Peace (PfP) programmes. It is always as well to be wary when military organisations adopt the word 'Peace'. The US Strategic Air Command had as its motto 'Peace is our Profession' at a time when it was sending B52s with nuclear bombs to loiter near the Soviet border. President Reagan decided to christen the MX Intercontinental Ballistic Missile the 'Peacekeeper' – though most of those writing about US nuclear weapons seem to have jibbed at using this designation.

'Partnership for Peace' programmes might suggest such items as educational programmes

The Enlargement of NATO, 1949–2018



in schools designed to encourage children not to hate other nationalities, or the financing of films which show the appalling consequences of modern war. In fact the NATO Partnership for Peace programmes are concerned exclusively with the military: peace was a military matter, to be obtained by military means. So PfP programmes involve such items as joint military exercises, force planning and the development of interoperability. Russia accepted the idea of PfP programmes because it assumed that they were a relatively innocuous substitute for full NATO membership.

Then in January 1994 NATO, at US instigation, decided in principle to admit former Warsaw Pact states as full members of NATO. This epoch-making decision was taken with little public debate in Europe. Europeans were preoccupied with Maastricht and all that. So PfP programmes, instead of being substitutes for NATO membership, were billed as part of the necessary preparations for full membership. The promise of full NATO membership has perhaps been made most explicitly to Poland. In July 1994 President Clinton, no doubt with Polish-American votes in mind, stated before the Polish Parliament: 'Bringing new members into NATO, as I have said many times, is no longer a question of whether, but when and how'.

NATO eventually published a study on enlargement in September 1995. It conveys the message that this enlargement will improve security and stability for all states: the phrase 'security and stability', sometimes varied to read 'stability and security', appears thirty times in the first 11 pages of the paper. The early part of the paper accepts that things have changed, and that there is virtually no risk of 'a re-emergent large-scale military threat'. It then refers to 'risks to European security which are multi-faceted and multi-directional'. The facets or directions are not specified.

However, the later sections which deal with the modalities of expansion imply that nothing has changed. The conditions of membership are the same. There should be no change in the Treaty – it stays a collective defence Treaty. It is strongly suggested that it would be a good idea for new members to accept the stationing of other allied forces on their territory: '... the stationing of allied forces offers specific military advantages in relation to collective defence'. However, this should be 'neither a condition of membership nor foreclosed as an option'.

On nuclear weapons, 'there is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members': however, this also is not foreclosed. New

members must accept NATO's nuclear weapon doctrine, which still includes possible first use. President Havel of the Czech Republic recently changed the view he previously held, and now allows for the possibility of nuclear weapons on Czech soil. The document states: 'New members should concentrate, in the first instance, on interoperability'. That means that new weapon systems should be bought from manufacturers in NATO countries, not any longer from Russia.

Consequences

This decision – the Eastwards expansion of NATO – seems to have been taken without asking what would happen next. Here three questions are asked. What would happen to relations between Russia and the West? What about the new dividing line, between those states which are in NATO and those which are not? If Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic join NATO, will they be more secure?

The NATO document on enlargement has a section on relations with Russia. It leaves a vague impression of Russian cooperation, although it does concede that 'Russia has raised concerns with respect to the enlargement process of the Alliance'. This is a massive understatement. The document offers this anodyne reply to those concerns: '. . . The Alliance has made it clear that the enlargement process ... will threaten no-one and contribute to a developing broad European architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe, enhancing security and stability for all'.

How does the idea of NATO extension play in Petrozavodsk? Not well. In Russia, unlike Western Europe, the expansion of NATO has been extensively discussed. There is a consensus: it is negative. In 1993 Yevgeniy Primakov, now Foreign Minister, said that if 'the biggest military grouping in the world with colossal offensive potential moved closer to Russia's borders, then this would call for 'a substantial reassessment of the Russian defence concept and a redeployment of armed forces, a change in operative plans'. More recently we have had the speech of the Russian Deputy Defence Minister, Andrei Kokoshin, who in the 1988-92 period had been one of the more prominent advocates of Soviet accommodation with the West. In February this year he reminded a Munich audience that the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany prohibited the stationing of foreign troops in Germany's eastern Lander: the point of the prohibition had been precisely to prevent any Eastward move for NATO. Now NATO was proposing an extension

which leap-frogged east Germany and which could bring possibly nuclear weapons and very probably foreign troops even further to the East. Kokoshin said that it would usher in a new era of 'dangerous confrontation'.

In Russia the condemnation of the NATO decision seems universal – in articles, think-tank reports, reactions of political parties and collective statements from the Russian equivalent of the 'great and good'. Opinions differ about what Russia should do if it happens. These are three of the more moderate proposals (the extremists want a military reoccupation of the Baltic republics):

(a) Russia should move to build up a military-political alliance to counter NATO expansion. Belarus would certainly join, and Russia would put great pressure on Ukraine to join as well. President Kuchma of Ukraine has already spoken in Moscow, opposing NATO expansion. So a new, hostile border would be created, between Poland and the states to the East.

(b) Russia should then reintroduce ground-based tactical nuclear weapons to protect the border. Since NATO would then have a formidable superiority in conventional forces, Russia would have to rely much more on nuclear warheads. The decision to withdraw ground-based tactical nuclear weapons was a kind of gentlemen's agreement between Bush, Gorbachev and later Yeltsin. There is no Treaty to prevent their reintroduction. Agreement would be sought to put them on the Belarus-Polish border.

(c) Russia should not ratify either the START II Treaty or the Open Skies Treaty until the idea of an Eastward expansion of NATO is jettisoned.

For the moment Western politicians have put the idea of NATO expansion on the back burner. They hope, by their temporary silence, to be of some help to President Yeltsin's campaign. No doubt President Zyuganov would react more fiercely if the expansion does happen. However, in Russia the hostility to the idea is so widespread that any President would be bound to take some action of some kind - military as well as political – if the expansion goes ahead.

Which states?

The leading candidates for joining NATO are Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic; Slovakia is more doubtful. The states at the bottom of the list are the Baltic Republics. This is in some ways a rather odd ranking. In spite of disclaimers, the applicant states are interested in NATO membership for one reason and one reason only - as protection against a resurgent

Russia. The Baltic states could claim to be in the greatest need, because of their problems with substantial Russian minorities. However, NATO Governments recognise that if these states joined NATO all hell would break loose in Russia: so the Baltic states are at the end of the queue.

So what would happen if Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became full members of NATO? There would be a clear new dividing line in Europe. Further, there would be a de facto declaration of spheres of influence. The Western powers would be saying to Russia, in effect: 'We will take those three states into the Western sphere of influence. You can have the rest'. There is no way in which this decision could fail to make a new dividing line in Europe – and a hostile one at that. As a consequence Russia might well put pressure on the Baltic states, on Belarus and on the Ukraine to accept the stationing of Russian forces on their territory.

If Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO, would they in fact be more secure? One argument used a good deal is that these three states are in a 'security vacuum'. This metaphor was extensively used in the debates on NATO expansion in the US Congress. Representative Christopher Smith, for example, described central Europe as a 'no-man's land ... between Germany and Russia'. He cited US political, economic, and security interests on the continent, and argued that NATO could fill a vacuum that would sustain progress made towards democracy and free-market economies in the region.

The vacuum metaphor is not helpful. Vacuums have to be filled by something. The implication is clear: if NATO doesn't move in, Russia will. Why would Russia 'move in', whatever that might mean? It has no common border with the three states any longer. Which would be more profitable for Russia - good relations with these three states, or bad relations? Again, the parallel with Western Europe is useful. Belgium and the Netherlands have common borders with militarily powerful states. They are in a 'security vacuum': NATO does not fill it, since it has no provision for dealing with disputes between Treaty members. For Belgium and the Netherlands the concept of a security vacuum is meaningless: their relations with France and Germany are such that the overwhelming military power of those two states is not relevant.

The sensible course for the three applicant states is to work on developing good relations with Russia, which should not be difficult. If they join NATO, that will simply help to bring about the very thing they fear – a Russia which stops the decline in military spending, starts to build up

more powerful military forces, and moves back to military confrontation with the West.

The applicant states should note that the 'NATO guarantee' in Article V of the Washington Treaty is not unequivocal. It does begin by saying that 'an armed attack against one or more (allies) shall be considered an attack against them all'. However, it then goes on to say that each party to the Treaty will assist the ally under attack with 'such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force.' There is no unequivocal military commitment. In the US Congressional debate opponents of NATO expansion said that, due to US conventional force reductions in Europe, such expansion would 'create a dangerous gulf between our commitments in Europe and the resources required to meet them'. Representative Hamilton said that 'these conventional force reductions would leave too great a reliance on US strategic nuclear forces to meet the US commitment'. Would the US really threaten a nuclear war in defence of Poland?

However, in spite of this questioning, NATO's military establishment in Brussels has probably already started military contingency planning for three new entrants. It is hard to think of any realistic contingencies – a Russian incursion into Poland through Belarus? – but no doubt military imagination will think of something. There has already been discussion about Poland's flat terrain: does it give more advantage to the invader or the defender? It clearly suggests the use of heavy armour, and that in turn suggests prepositioning. The next stage would be military exercises, which would provoke counter-exercises on the other side. No doubt some of those on the military side in NATO would find it in some ways comforting to be back to business as usual.

For Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the cost of joining NATO, and obtaining such guarantees as Article V provides, is likely to be a much more hostile border to the East. This is a doubtful bargain.

How to get out of this mess

It will not be easy to find a way out of this foolish and unnecessary confrontation with Russia, because neither side will want to lose face. The Americans – fully conscious of their position as the one remaining superpower – have promised NATO membership particularly to Poland. They seem determined to take no notice of anything the Russians say. The Russians, increasingly angry at being treated as some kind of basket case whose views can be totally ignored, would have

to do something if this Eastward expansion went ahead. The NATO decision in principle, and the US refusal to accept any modifications which might make the decision more palatable, has already served to increase Russian hostility to the West.

Once it is accepted that NATO's present policy will build up great trouble for the future, it should be possible to find a proposal less provocative to the Russians. For example, NATO and Russia could jointly agree to guarantee existing borders in Central and Eastern Europe. There is the Ukrainian proposal, for a nuclear-weapon-free zone from Sweden in the North to Bulgaria in the South, taking in all the Central and East European states. The range of non-provocative possibilities is wide. The dominant requirements for European security remain - that Russia should be within the structure and not outside it, and that there should be no new dividing line in Europe.

According to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, any invitation to a new state to join NATO has to have the unanimous agreement of all the existing members. In the debates in the US

Congress, the representatives seem not to have noticed this particular clause. They clearly regarded NATO expansion as a matter for the United States alone to decide. Perhaps one or other of the European members of NATO might be prepared to incur US displeasure, and indicate that it might be better to wait for a more comprehensive European security agreement.

Envoi

It is silly to keep repeating that NATO's Eastwards expansion will not create a new dividing line in Europe. Of course it will. It is silly to revert to the old 'fallacy of the last move' that once NATO moves Eastwards, it is the end of the game. It is not. The Russian Government - any Russian Government - will react, militarily as well as politically. Those who draft NATO documents seem to believe that, if they intone the mantra 'security and stability' thirty times, all problems will disappear. They will not. The course is being set for Europe to drift gradually downwards towards Cold War II - 'that stale imposture played on us once again'.



END Archives

The European Nuclear Disarmament initiative of the 1980s produced a number of significant debates, discussion and analyses of nuclear threats, nuclear disarmament and political developments. Many of these can be found in the publications of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation at the time.

European Nuclear Disarmament: Bulletin of Work in Progress

Published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. 12 issues from 1980 to 1983.



The pages of the END Bulletin cover the initial development of the campaign, carry debates and discussions of the time and detail activities across the continent.



END Papers

Published by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. 23 issues from 1981 to 1993.

END Papers, incorporating The Spokesman (journal of the BRPF), carried long-form, more detailed and ranging analysis than the END Bulletin, featuring an array of international writers



For more information on these publications and our extensive archive of materials from the 1980s, contact tomunterrainer@rusfound.org

Subscribe to END Info ...

END Info is currently published every two months in electronic (pdf) and printed format.

To receive free, electronic copies of *END Info*, send your email address to: tomunterrainer@russfound.org

To receive printed copies of *END Info* or to discuss multiple copies for your campaign group, organisation or book shop, please contact: tomunterrainer@russfound.org

All articles are posted on eninfo.net at the time of publication.



Contents

Human Chain against nuclear arms in Büchel Ludo De Brabander	... 3
Europe's Turn Angelika Claußen	... 5
Peace, power and politics Editorial comments	... 6
Scottish independence and Trident	... 8
German elections	... 11
Nuclear attitudes	... 13
Hiroshima Tom Unterrainer	... 14
Hypersonic threat	... 16
NATO, nukes and Europe Joachim Wernicke	... 18
Security in Europe Ludo De Brabander	... 23
Europe and NATO Expansion Frank Blackaby	... 26

The next issue of *END Info* will be published in November, 2021. Please send information, articles, pictures, news items and reports to tomunterrainer@russfound.org.