Europe: Time for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone! New campaign

We are entering a new decade that appears to be even more dangerous than that of 40 years ago. In January 2020, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists set the hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ – measuring the likelihood of man-made global catastrophe – at one hundred seconds to midnight – closer than it has ever been before due to the imminent threats of nuclear war and climate disaster.

Now, 75 years after the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by nuclear weapons dropped on human targets, arms control treaties are no longer upheld, and governments have started updating and expanding nuclear arsenals. New technologies of command and control minimise human intervention and shorten the time available to consider possible responses, the probabilities of a catastrophic accident or mistake are increasing dramatically.

The world is at a crossroads and Europe has to make a strategic choice: remain part of the arms race or demonstrate global leadership by promoting a peaceful approach towards common global security.

The COVID-19 pandemic and the recession which will follow teach lessons we must embrace to overcome the existential threats of the 21st century: nuclear war and global warming. Recent studies show that increased military expenditure puts pressure on investment in social, including health, infrastructure, while extensive military exercises and operations make major carbon emissions, driving us closer to extinction in more ways than one. All three threats result from forces of nature made dangerous by triumphs of human intelligence and all three can be solved by human intelligence.

Appeal for signatories

On the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombing, we, the signatories join our voices to those of the survivors and call upon our fellow citizens, politicians and governments to support a European nuclear weapons free zone as a matter of urgency. We call on European governments to: end the modernization of all nuclear weapons; end nuclear sharing; sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Initiated by: International Peace Bureau, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War Europe, International TUC, Quaker Council for European Affairs.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki 75 Years On

To mark the 75th anniversary of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we re-publish Gar Alperovitz’s 2011 article, ‘The Decision to Drop the Bomb’ (first published on the CounterPunch website, www.counterpunch.org). Alperovitz’s work on the decision conclusively demonstrates the cynical falsehood of the ‘military necessity’ argument around the use of the bomb. Sadly, public consciousness of his analysis and the truth of the matter remains low. We re-publish this article to aid wider understanding.

No to the NEW COLD WAR

An international campaign opposing a new Cold War against China was launched on Saturday, 25th July, with an online gathering of scholars and activists. People from 49 different countries registered for and watched the event, with huge numbers viewing on social media streams. The organisers of the campaign have issued the following statement:

A New Cold War against China is against the interests of humanity

We note the increasingly aggressive statements and actions being taken by the US government in regard to China. These constitute a threat to world peace and are an obstacle to humanity successfully dealing with extremely serious common issues which confront it such as climate change, control of pandemics, racist discrimination and economic development.

We therefore believe that any New Cold War would run entirely counter to the interests of humanity. Instead we stand in favour of maximum global
The alleged 15 July 2020 testing of the Cosmos 2543 Russian satellite has provoked an outpouring of accusations and threats. The *Financial Times* (31/07/20) declared in one headline that ‘Russia satellite weapon test reignites space arms race fears’. This headline and the quotes in the article from a variety of US military sources suggest that Russia alone has provoked the ‘militarisation of space’.

In fact, the Cosmos 2543 satellite seems to be a rather rudimentary affair when compared to the ‘all-singing-all-dancing’ [United States Space Force](https://www.space4peace.org) and the aspirations for the ‘control of space’ contained in the Joint Vision 2020 documents of the mid-2000s. As far as we know, the Russian satellite contains no laser weapons systems or any other particularly ‘high-tech’ devices. Rather, the Russian ‘space weapon’ functions by firing a projectile of some kind at other satellites.

Of course, the hypocrisy of US commentators and politicians surrounding the alleged Russian test and attempts to lay the blame on Russia and China for igniting an arms race in space, should not surprise us. It is important to be aware of the degree to which the US and allies have already militarised space and the dangers created by such a process. Writing in the Spring/Summer edition of *Space Alert* ([www.space4peace.org](http://www.space4peace.org)), Bruce Gagnon explains:

> “The US has been leading the way to militarize and weaponize [space] since the start. For a while the former Soviet Union was in the game—until its collapse in 1991. Neither Russia nor China could keep up with the US in the following years and they continually begged the US to join them in negotiating a treaty to ban all weapons in space—close the door to the barn before the horse gets out. During Republican and Democrat administrations the response to Moscow and Beijing was the same from Washington—NO.”

**One year on from the INF Treaty**

Comment by the Information and Press Department of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation a year after the end of the INF Treaty 03/08/20

The INF Treaty ended a year ago when the US walked away from it, unilaterally. We still believe Washington made a grave mistake. Although the treaty was less than ideal in today’s security environment, it definitely promoted predictability and restraint in the missile and nuclear weapons area.

Russia firmly believes that the INF Treaty should have been preserved. It was possible and necessary to duly mitigate the crisis around it. The sides should have promptly started settling the accumulated differences in its implementation. However, this would have taken political will on both sides. Regrettably, the US did not have this and began to see the treaty as an obstacle on the road to victory in the US-proclaimed “Great Power Rivalry.”

It is regrettable how the Americans prepared to discard an agreement they no longer wanted. To justify its destructive actions, the US orchestrated a propaganda campaign based on completely groundless accusations against Moscow. Instead of a Russia-suggested practical and professional analysis of reciprocal grievances, the Americans set forth patently unacceptable ultimatums. The US instantly rejected Russia’s realistic solutions on settling existing concerns by taking measures on reciprocal transparency. Having blocked the potential paths to resolve the problems, the US deliberately engineered the end of the treaty.

Now, there are no limitations on short- and intermediate-range missiles, whereas the threats for universal security and stability have increased manifold. After abandoning the treaty Washington immediately embarked on completing the development of missiles previously banned under the treaty. The US conducted full-scale tests of these missiles, which fully confirmed that Russia’s long-standing grievances with Washington regarding the treaty were fully justified. The US publicly announced its intention to deploy advanced missiles as soon as possible, primarily in the Asia-Pacific Region. Deployment in Europe has not been ruled out, either.

Obviously, the deployment of US ground-based short- and intermediate-range missiles in various parts of the world will seriously undermine regional and global security and provoke a new and dangerous round in the arms race. Russia cannot ignore the potential risk of additional missiles adjacent to its territory, which would be of a strategic nature for us. This would require an immediate response regardless of whether these are nuclear or conventional missiles.

After the INF Treaty, a number of specific steps were made to ensure predictability in the missile area and the preservation of a “window of opportunity” for dialogue-based solutions. President of Russia Vladimir Putin announced a moratorium on the deployment of these missiles on the ground as long as US weapons of similar classes were not deployed. The US and other NATO countries were directly urged to announce a reciprocal moratorium. Moscow announced its willingness at the highest level to hold a discussion on the parameters and potential verification measures as regards mutual commitments.

We strongly believe that the only viable step now is a joint search for settling the existing situation through political and diplomatic means. Russia remains open to equitable and constructive approaches to restoring trust and enhancing international security and strategic stability. We hope the US will also display an interest in this responsible approach.
New warheads: UK lobbies Congress

The United Kingdom likes to describe the Trident nuclear weapons system as an ‘independent nuclear deterrent.’ Nuclear disarmers have long argued that the system is neither ‘independent’ nor a ‘deterrent’ of any kind. A letter seen by the Guardian newspaper (01/08/20) adds to a substantial body of evidence confirming Britain’s dependence on the US.

Home Secretary Ben Wallace wrote to members of the US Congress in April this year, asking them to approve spending on the development of a new warhead, the W93. Wallace wrote:

“These are challenging times, but it is crucial that we demonstrate transatlantic unity and solidarity in this difficult period ... Congressional funding ... for the W93 program will ensure that we continue to deepen the unique nuclear relationship between our two countries, enabling the United Kingdom to provide safe and assured continuous-at-sea deterrence for decades to come.”

What moved Wallace to write to Congress in these terms and on whose behalf, exactly, was he writing? Wallace’s letter suggests that without Congressional funding, the UK will not be able to maintain a “safe and assured” capability.

In a written Ministerial Statement issued in February this year, Wallace stated:

“As set out in our annual updates to Parliament on the Future of the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent the Ministry of Defence’s Defence Nuclear Organisation is working with the Atomic Weapons Establishment: to build the highly skilled teams and put in place the facilities and capabilities needed to deliver the replacement warhead; whilst also sustaining the current warhead until it is withdrawn from service. We will continue to work closely with the U.S. to ensure our warhead remains compatible with the Trident Strategic Weapon System.”

In this statement, which was only made after US officials ‘accidentally’ disclosed British involvement in new warhead plans, Wallace also uses the word “ensure” with respect to US/UK cooperation on warheads. Without such cooperation, would the UK be able to ‘do it alone’? It seems not.

The US debate on whether to grant funding is taking place within the context of the upcoming US election and the fact that billions of dollars have already been agreed to upgrade existing warheads. There is obviously some concern that should Trump be replaced, then development of the W93 would be in doubt. Where would this leave Britain’s ‘independent nuclear deterrent’?

Without Congressional funding, the UK will not be able to maintain a “safe and assured” capability. In a written Ministerial Statement issued in February this year, Wallace stated:

“Any kind. A letter seen by the Guardian newspaper [01/08/20] adds to a substantial body of evidence confirming Britain’s dependence on the US.

Trump: US troops out of Germany

Despite attempts to block the move (see ENVI 7), President Trump has announced confirmation of his intention to withdraw 12,000 troops from Germany. Whilst the Pentagon insists the move is part of a long-term strategy of troop redeployment, Trump characterised it as “punishment” for Germany’s low levels of defence spending.

It looks likely that the US will transfer its European command centre to Brussels. The US Africa command centre looks set to be transferred from Stuttgart to an unknown location.

The Pentagon plans to expand the numbers and increase the rotation of US troops in Poland, the Baltics and Black Sea region. Some US commentators have claimed that withdrawal of troops from Germany would ‘please the Russians’ but transferring large numbers of troops closer to the Russian border hardly seems designed to please President Putin.

Rather, in the wake of the aborted Defender 2020 NATO ‘war game’, such redeployment looks designed to increase tensions further.

How will Germany and other NATO ‘allies’ in Europe react? Will Germany and other states – which, contrary to Trump’s claims, already meet their NATO spending commitments – now invest more in ‘national security’? Will this move accelerate EU-wide military cooperation, joint-command and spending?
and good governance. Among these, nuclear war is perhaps the least visible threat. However, it is the most likely to have an immediate and devastating impact.

During the 1980s, a powerful mobilisation along with the European Nuclear Disarmament initiative, which was deeply concerned about the strategy of containing a ‘limited’ nuclear war in Europe, generated the necessary pressure on politicians. Mass protests and demonstrations against the stationing of short and intermediate range nuclear weapons (Cruise Missiles and Pershing 2) throughout Europe forced Presidents Gorbachev and Reagan to sign the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the US and Russia in 1987 that removed all ground-based missiles – nuclear and conventional – with ranges between 500 and 5500km from European soil.

The recent collapse of that Treaty heralds the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Europe. We are facing the modernization of all nuclear weapons in Europe and the danger of new ones. And it has opened the door to Europe becoming a nuclear battleground.

The US’s wider withdrawal from important international agreements, upgrading of the world’s nuclear arsenals, the production of new ‘low yield’ and ‘more usable’ nuclear weapons, threatened resumption of nuclear testing, aggressive positioning of nuclear weapons and missile defence/offence systems, and the severe global economic and social problems caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, have increased international tensions and mistrust and driven us once again to a position where, in the words of the original European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal in the 80’s, “a third world war is not merely possible, but increasingly likely”. This time however, the threat arises from military confrontation on two fronts – Europe and in the Pacific.

The discussion on global military spending has recently been highlighted by the latest report of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). This notes that, of the $1.9 trillion (€1.7 trillion) global military expenditure, $72.9 billion (€65.2 billion) was spent by nine countries on nuclear weapons in 2019. The report calculates that this amounts to $138,699 (€124,065) spent on nuclear weapons every minute. European countries (UK, France, Russia) play a very important role in military spending on nuclear weapons, while in addition the US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) turns out to be the main cause for the new push in spending on modernization and new military spending on nuclear weapons.

This money should be better spent on public services, especially health and care as well as education, both of which need substantial extra investment in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.

For years the people of Europe have expressed their desire to be nuclear-weapon-free by calling for the removal of the US nuclear weapons held under NATO auspices and, more recently, by pushing for their governments to ratify the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

So far, too few governments have responded, but as the costs of nuclear participation and militarism rise and economies struggle with the pandemic’s increasing social and political strain, these calls can no longer be ignored. Generations have grown accustomed to living in the shadow of nuclear war, but concern and awareness are increasing again especially among the young.

The recent development in European countries hosting US nuclear weapons (Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Italy) to question the policy of the US “nuclear umbrella” is a sign of hope for a nuclear weapon free Europe. Likewise, we welcome the heightening voice of medical, environmental and humanitarian organizations and faith groups worldwide to join the movement for a nuclear ban treaty. We call for a Just Transition for workers engaged in the nuclear weapons industry to ensure their livelihoods and skills are protected.

The remedy lies in our own hands. 40 years after the original European Nuclear Disarmament Appeal (END Appeal), we must act together to free the entire territory of Europe from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons, again, with a Just Transition plan for the workers involved in these activities.

More European governments can, like Austria, commit to this by ratifying the TPNW and requesting the United States to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory and engage in meaningful negotiations on an inclusive new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) as a necessary step towards the renewal of effective negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

Every European government has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and should therefore take steps towards the creation of a European nuclear-weapon-free zone.

We must work together in the light of an understanding that all lives on the planet are intertwined, rethink what we mean by safety and defence and developing the ideas of ‘common security’. We must understand each other better – not seed mistrust and blame. As Olof Palme’s Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) set out, a nuclear war could never be won. A nuclear weapon free Europe would be the most important step to a transition to civil and a shared security, abandoning the road of continuous militarisation. Civil security, shared security means adopting appropriate lifestyles and revising global trade and economic relations to sustainable and socially just relations, as described in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

While nuclear tensions are increasing, we call on all citizens to organise against our possible extinction and to fight for a just, green and peaceful Europe, free of nuclear weapons, with security for all provided through other means. The situation is urgent. As we emerge from the pandemic, we need to build an irresistible pressure for change. As the risks of nuclear confrontation spread from Europe, through Russia, the Middle East, China and the Korean peninsula Europe should take a stand.

We appeal to everyone in Europe, of all faiths and persuasion, to consider urgently the ways in which we can work together for these common objectives. As before, we envisage a European-wide campaign, in which every kind of exchange takes place; in which representatives of different nations and opinions confer and coordinate their activities; and in which less formal exchanges – between universities, faith groups, women’s organisations, trade unions, youth organisations, environmental campaigners, professional groups and individuals – take place to promote a common object: to free all of Europe from nuclear weapons.

**Europe must become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.**

Visit: www.nukefreeeurope.eu

---

**Support the Appeal and help to build a Europe-wide campaign**

The launch of this Appeal is only the start of what we hope will be a lively, imaginative and broad-based effort to rid Europe of nuclear weapons. The campaign will involve meetings and conferences, the sharing of ideas and perspectives, debate and discussion. As important, it will involve active coordination, protests and demonstrations to unite and renew the peace movements.
**No to the NEW COLD WAR**

...Continued from page 1

cooperation in order to tackle the enormous challenges we face as a species.

We therefore call upon the US to step back from this threat of a Cold War and also from other dangerous threats to world peace it is engaged in including: withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces agreement; withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accords; and its increasing disengagement from UN bodies. The US should also stop pressuring other countries to adopt such dangerous positions.

We support China and the US basing their relations on mutual dialogue and centering on the common issues which unite humanity.

***

The China-based Xinhua news website posted the following report from the event:

International scholars said ... that aggressive statements and actions by the U.S. government towards China poses a threat to world peace and a potential new cold war on China is against the interests of humanity.

The comments came during a virtual meeting on the international campaign against a new Cold War on China, which gathered experts from a number of countries including the United States, China, Britain, India, Russia and Canada.

Jenny Clegg, author of China’s Global Strategy, said China-U.S. relationship is one of the most important bilateral relationships and its deterioration would pose significant threat to world peace.

John Ross, senior fellow at Chongyang Institute, Renmin University of China, listed the threat of war by the United States, including launching major wars in Iraq and Libya, taking the dangerous step of withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and unilateral sanctions on Iran and Venezuela.

"Of course, a threat of war with China itself would be an unimaginable catastrophe," he said.

Medea Benjamin, co-founder of Codepink, a women-led grassroots organization working to end U.S. wars, said it was concerning that the U.S. leaders claim a new Chinese aggression when the United States itself has military bases around the world.

"The U.S. needs to understand China is not our enemy. We call for cooperation with China," Benjamin said.

Margaret Kimberley, a columnist at Black Agenda Report, said the U.S. government made wrong accusations of China on issues relating to ... controlling the coronavirus pandemic and its forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston violated international law.

Some experts attending the meeting issued a statement calling upon the U.S. side to step back from this threat of a Cold War and also from other dangerous threats to world peace it is engaged in.

They said the United States goes in a wrong direction by withdrawing from the INF Treaty and the Paris Agreement on climate change, and increasing disengagement from UN bodies.

"We support China and the U.S. basing their relations on mutual dialogue and centering on the common issues which unite humanity," the statement said, urging collective effort on addressing global challenges like climate change, the pandemic and the economic development.

***

The development of this campaign is of great importance. Quite rightly, the statement accompanying the launch of the campaign does not simply seek to unite those who support China or define Chinese society in a certain way. The aim is to unite as many groups and individuals as possible around the notion that the US threat of a New Cold War against China is against the interests of all those committed to a more peaceful ordering of global society. More than that, the tensions and dangers arising from such a New Cold War are against the interests of the vast majority of humanity.

The analysis offered in END Info and The Spokesman journal has been clear that the recent behaviour of the US on the world stage, its aggressive posture and destructive actions are a result of a shift from that country enjoying ‘sole superpower status’ to a situation where there are now several poles of global power. China’s economic and political rise is clear evidence of this. Faced with a changing world order, President Trump and those who advise him are striking a recklessly aggressive posture.

We have written about a situation which amounts to a ‘global tinderbox’: a combination of risks so sharply posed that one mistake, one misstep, could engulf the world in flames. These risks include not only the aggressive political stance of the US, but also the rapid development of technology, which accelerates the rate at which dangers multiply and potentially spiral out of control.

In the face of decades of threats and provocation, China has been very restrained. It is to be hoped that this restraint endures. In this context, the creation of a global campaign is vital. In the US, UK and other NATO states the peace movements must be crystal clear about the process now underway, the roots of it and the vital issues on which we must focus. This will not necessarily be straightforward, as much of Western society – even the progressive sections of it – is woefully underexposed to the history and current politics of China. By ‘seeking truth from facts’ and uniting against a New Cold War, much can be remedied.
The Decision to use the Bomb
Gar Alperovitz

[2020 is the 75th] anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. Though most Americans are unaware of the fact, increasing numbers of historians now recognize the United States did not need to use the atomic bomb to end the war against Japan in 1945. Moreover, this essential judgment was expressed by the vast majority of top American military leaders in all three services in the years after the war ended: Army, Navy and Army Air Force. Nor was this the judgment of “liberals,” as is sometimes thought today. In fact, leading conservatives were far more outspoken in challenging the decision as unjustified and immoral than American liberals in the years following World War II.

By the summer of 1945 Japan was essentially defeated, its navy at the bottom of the ocean; its air force limited by fuel, equipment, and other shortages; its army facing defeat on all fronts; and its cities subjected to bombing that was all but impossible to challenge. With Germany out of the war, the United States and Britain were about to bring their full power to bear on what was left of the Japanese military. Moreover, the Soviet Union—at this point in time still neutral—was getting ready to attack on the Asian mainland: the Red Army, fresh from victory over Hitler, was poised to strike across the Manchurian border.

Long before the bombings occurred in August 1945—indeed, as early as late April 1945, more than three months before Hiroshima—U.S. intelligence advised that the Japanese were likely to surrender when the Soviet Union entered the war if they were assured that it did not imply national annihilation. An April 29 Joint Intelligence Staff document put it this way: “If at any time the U.S.S.R. should enter the war, all Japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable.”

For this reason—because it would drastically shorten the war—before the atomic bomb was successfully tested (on July 16, 1945) the U.S. had strongly and repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to join the battle as soon after the defeat of Hitler as possible. A target date of three months after Germany’s surrender was agreed upon—which put the planned Red Army attack date at roughly August 8, the war in Europe having ended on May 8. (In late July the date was temporarily extended by a week.)

Nor was there any doubt that the Soviet Union would join the war for its own reasons. At the Potsdam Conference in July (before the successful atomic test) President Truman entered the following in his diary after meeting with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin on July 17: “He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about.”

The next day, July 18, in a private letter to his wife, the President wrote: “I’ve gotten what I came for – Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it... I’ll say that we’ll end the war a year sooner now”. The President had also been urged to offer assurances that the Japanese Emperor would be allowed to remain in the Pacific. The next day, July 19, in a private letter to the British Minister of Defence, summarized the latest (early July) intelligence evidence for Prime Minister Churchill this way: “[W]hen Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”

As the President’s diary entry and letter to his wife indicate, there is little doubt that he understood the advice given by the intelligence experts as to the likely impact of the upcoming Russian attack. Further evidence is also available on this central point: The American and British Joint Chiefs of Staff—the very top military leaders of the two nations—also met at Potsdam to consolidate planning for the final stages of the war in the Pacific. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence, summarized the latest (early July) combined US-UK intelligence evidence for Prime Minister Churchill this way: “When Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.”

The July joint intelligence finding, of course, for the most part simply restated what had been the essential view of American intelligence and many of the President’s top advisers throughout the spring and summer months leading up to the July meeting at Potsdam.

Among the many reasons the shock of
Soviet entry was expected to be so powerful were: first, that it would directly challenge the Japanese army in what had been one of its most important strongholds, Manchuria; second, it would signal that there was literally no hope once the third of the three Great Powers was no longer neutral; and third, and perhaps even more important, with the Japanese economy in disarray Japanese leaders were extremely fearful that leftist groups might be powerfully encouraged, politically, if the Soviet Union were to play a major role in Japan’s defeat.

Furthermore, U.S. intelligence had broken Japanese codes and knew Japanese leaders were frantically hoping against hope as they attempted to arrange some form of settlement with Moscow as a mediator. Since their strategy was so heavily focused on what the Russians might or might not do, this further underscored the judgment that when the Red Army attacked, the end would not be far off: the illusory hope of a negotiation through Moscow would be thoroughly dashed as Soviet tanks rolled into Manchuria.

Instead, the United States rushed to use two atomic bombs at almost exactly the time that an August 8 Soviet attack had originally been scheduled: Hiroshima on August 6 and Nagasaki on August 9. The timing itself has obviously raised questions among many historians. The available evidence, though not conclusive, strongly suggests that the atomic bombs may well have been used in part because American leaders “preferred”—as Pulitzer Prize–winning historian Martin Sherwin has put it—to end the war with the bombs rather than the Soviet attack. Impressively, the Soviets during the early diplomatic sparring that ultimately became the Cold War also appears likely to have been a significant factor.

Some modern analysts have urged that Japanese military planning to thwart an invasion was much more advanced than had previously been understood, and hence more threatening to U.S. plans. Others have argued that Japanese military leaders were much more ardently committed to one or more of four proposed ‘conditions’ to attach to a surrender than a number of experts hold, and hence, again, would likely have fought hard to continue the war.

It is, of course, impossible to know whether the advice given by top U.S. and British intelligence that a Russian attack would likely to produce surrender was correct. We do know that the President ignored such judgments and the advice of people like Secretary of War Stimson that the war could be ended in other ways when he made his decision. This, of course, is an important fact in its own right in considering whether the decision was justified, since so many civilian lives were sacrificed in the two bombings.

Moreover, many leading historians who have studied both the U.S. and Japanese records carefully (including, among others, Barton Bernstein and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa) have concluded that Japan was indeed in such dire straits that—as U.S. and British intelligence had urged long before the bombings—the war would, in fact, have likely ended before the November invasion target date once the Russians entered.

It is also important to note that there was very little to lose by using the Russian attack to end the war. The atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and August 9. There were still three months to go before the first landing could take place in November. If the early August Russian attack did not work as expected, the bombs could obviously have been used anyway long before any lives were lost in the landing.

(Despite of use the atomic bombs and Russia’s entry into the war came at almost exactly the same time, scholars have debated at great length which factor influenced the surrender decision more. This, of course, is a very different question from whether using the atomic bomb was justified as the only way to end the war. Still, it is instructive to note that speaking privately to top Army officials on August 14 the Japanese Emperor stated bluntly: “The military situation has changed suddenly. The Soviet Union entered the war against us. Suicide attacks can’t compete with the power of science. Therefore, there is no alternative…” And the Imperial Rescript the Emperor issued to officers and soldiers to make sure they would lay down their arms stated: “Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war, to continue under the present conditions at

The Spokesman
Journal of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Waging Peace The Spokesman 144
Festschrift for David Krieger

Daisaku Ikeda on Wonderful Encounters | David Barush on Unmasked Deterrence
John Scales Avery on Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence | Robert Green on New Nuclear Crisis | Steven Starr on Blind Eye to Armageddon | Richard Falk on The Nuclear Abolition Struggle and much more...

142 Pages | A5 Paperback | ISBN 978 0 85124 8882 | www.spokesmanbooks.com
home and abroad would only result in further useless damage... Therefore...I am going to make peace.”

The most illuminating perspective, however, comes from top World War II American military leaders. The conventional wisdom that the atomic bomb saved a million lives is so widespread that (quite apart from the inaccuracy of this figure, as noted by Samuel Walker) most Americans haven’t paused to ponder something rather striking to anyone seriously concerned with the issue: Not only did most top U.S. military leaders think the bombings were unnecessary and unjustified, many were morally offended by what they regarded as the unnecessary destruction of Japanese cities and what were essentially noncombatant populations. Moreover, they spoke about it quite openly and publicly.

Here is how General Dwight D. Eisenhower reports he reacted when he was told by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson that the atomic bomb would be used:

“During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.”

In another public statement the man who later became President of the United States was blunt: “It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”

General Curtis LeMay, the tough cigar-smoking Army Air Force “hawk,” was also dismayed. Shortly after the bombings he stated publically: “The war would have been over in two weeks... The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all.”

Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, went public with this statement: “The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace... The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan.”

I noted above the report General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence, made to Prime Minister Churchill that “when Russia came into the war against Japan, the Japanese would probably wish to get out on almost any terms short of the dethronement of the Emperor.” On hearing that the atomic test was successful, Ismay’s private reaction was one of “revulsion.”

Shortly before his death General George C. Marshall quietly defended the decision, but for the most part he is on record as repeatedly saying that it was not a military decision, but rather a political one. Even more important, well before the atomic bombs were used, contemporary documents record show that Marshall felt “these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave—telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers...”

As the document concerning Marshall’s views suggests, the question of whether the use of the atomic bomb was justified turns not only on whether other options were available, and whether top leaders were advised of this. It also turns on whether the bombs had to be used against a largely civilian target rather than a strictly military target—which, in fact, was the explicit choice since although there were Japanese troops in the cities, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki was deemed militarily vital by U.S. planners. (This is one of the reasons neither had been heavily bombed up to this point in the war.) Moreover, targeting was aimed explicitly on non-military facilities surrounded by workers’ homes. Here we can gain further insight from two additional, equally conservative military leaders.

Many years later President Richard Nixon recalled that

“[General Douglas] MacArthur once spoke to me very eloquently about it, pacing the floor of his apartment in the Waldorf. He thought it a tragedy that the Bomb was ever exploded. MacArthur believed that the same restrictions ought to apply to atomic weapons as to conventional weapons, that the military objective should always be limited damage to noncombatants... MacArthur, you see, was a soldier. He believed in using force only against military targets, and that is why the nuclear thing turned him off.”

Although many others could be cited, here, finally, is the statement of another conservative, a man who was a close friend of President Truman’s, his Chief of Staff (as well as President Roosevelt’s Chief of Staff), and the five star Admiral who presided over meetings of the Combined U.S.-U.K. Chiefs of Staff during the war—William D. Leahy:

“[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... In the first to use it, we... adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.”
What’s up at NATO?

by Xanthe Hall
First published 16 July 2020 on the IPPNW blog

You could be excused for having missed the fact that NATO is in the process of updating its nuclear strategy, including substantial and significant steps. These include technologically more ambitious weapons that can be used more easily. This is the implementation of a decision made at the NATO Warsaw Summit in 2016 to revise nuclear strategy. In order to follow what’s going on, you have to dig deep on the internet. While this is a little easier because of Covid-19, as a lot more is happening online and NATO is just a little bit more transparent than before the pandemic, it is still difficult because NATO discussions are still shrouded in secrecy.

An article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine (FAZ), a leading German newspaper, covered the topic following a press conference on the meeting of NATO defence ministers on June 17th. At that conference, the Secretary General explained that NATO has now agreed on additional steps to keep its nuclear deterrence “effective” with a “balanced package of political and military elements”. Stoltenberg says these are needed to “fix gaps” in NATO’s deterrence capabilities in all domains. However, he could not go into details because “some of the decisions are secret”.

What: More and better technology

Thomas Gutschker writes in FAZ that Alliance military planners have already worked out in detail a military plan to defend the whole operational area, including the Baltics, the far North, central Europe, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea from Russian nuclear weapons in all domains – land, sea, air, space and cyberspace – using defensive and offensive capabilities, from missile defence to launching nuclear weapons.

One of these steps is apparently the decision to strengthen advanced conventional capabilities while at the same time blurring the division between nuclear and conventional capabilities, as the Brussels summit in 2018 concluded to be necessary in order to counter Russia. This includes the option to deploy new conventional intermediate-range missiles. In a crisis, there is the possibility of loading nuclear warheads onto such missiles. So, while Jens Stoltenberg maintains that NATO has “no intention” of deploying new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, they will be increasing capabilities that lead to that option.

The technology for this potential escalation has already been developed by the USA. Long-range missiles with low-yield nuclear weapons have been deployed on nuclear submarines and a new cruise missile is in development. Added to this, new B61-12 nuclear warheads have been tested and will soon go into production. They will be deployed in NATO nuclear sharing countries in Europe in the near future. These also have a variable yield and can be used as “mini-nukes”.

With all of these new developments, the message is clear: These new technical features enable NATO to use nuclear weapons earlier in a conflict with Russia than it could before.

Why: Mirrors and signals

NATO is making new decisions on deterrence because the security environment has changed, they say. Stoltenberg explains that this is entirely due to what he perceives as Russian bad behaviour. However, he maintains that NATO is not “mirroring” Russia and does not want an arms race but seems convinced that Russia is the sole instigator of this security crisis. “NATO is responding to what we see when we see Russia investing heavily in new, modern capabilities, updating and modernising the nuclear weapons systems, and especially when it comes to all the new, different missile systems they are deploying or are in the process of developing.” However, there is no mention of the Russian claim that they are “mirroring” what they see as massive modernisation and investment in nuclear and missile defence capabilities in the US. While Europe is caught between these two heavily-armed nuclear adversaries, European NATO members are required to remain loyal to one side and buy into the narrative originating from the US that only Russia is aggressively increasing its nuclear arsenal and capabilities and is also responsible for the demise of arms control treaties.

Ironically, Stoltenberg goes on to proudly describe NATO’s increased capabilities which, undoubtedly have an influence on Russia’s feelings of insecurity: “We have increased the readiness of our forces over the last years. We have deployed battlegroups in the eastern part of the Alliance in the Baltic countries and Poland. We have increased our presence in the Black Sea Region. And we have modernised, also, the parts of our defence, modernised and adapted the command structure. And we are also seeing that the fact that NATO Allies are now investing more in defence. NATO Allies are also acquiring more and a wider range of different capabilities, including air defence, fifth generation aircraft, investing in naval capabilities and, for instance, also upgrading their cyber defences.”

Summing up this apparent contradiction, the director of NATO nuclear policy, Jessica Cox, explained how this signalling to Russia works in an online meeting with RUSI. She says that NATO deterrence credibility is maintained through demonstrating capabilities, such as exercising and making political statements. In her introductory input, however, she says that Russia’s use of these same methods to make their deterrence credible was evidence of escalation and aggression. Stoltenberg goes even further: “We have also seen a pattern over many years of irresponsible Russian nuclear rhetoric, aimed at intimidating and threatening NATO Allies. Russia’s behaviour is destabilizing and dangerous.”
Why now: New Russian strategy

The article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper claims that NATO is responding to a new Russian nuclear strategy that contains the so-called “escalate to deescalate” concept. This would mean that Russia could use nuclear weapons pre-emptively in a regional or local context to signal commitment to retaliating with nuclear weapons on a large scale. It has been claimed that this policy was evident by its use in exercises in 2009 and 2013 where nuclear attacks were simulated on Poland and on the Swedish island of Gotland to signal their readiness to use nuclear weapons. NATO was also alarmed in 2014, during the Crimean crisis, when the same long-range nuclear-capable bombers were seen flying over the western and southern Russian flanks.

Yet, experts say that this “escalate to deescalate” policy is not to be found in the new Russian nuclear strategy, which states that “The Russian Federation views nuclear weapons exclusively as a means of deterrence, the use of which is an extreme and compelled measure, and is making all the necessary efforts to reduce the nuclear threat and not allow the aggravation of interstate relations that could provoke military conflicts, including nuclear ones.” This basic doctrine has not changed much in the last 20 years: “The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.” The conditions for use are then listed, whereby two of these are not responses to nuclear or WMD attack, but conventional and are not closely defined, referring to “adversary actions affecting critically important state or military objects” that could lead to disruption of capability to retaliate with nuclear forces. This could be a reference to a cyber attack on nuclear command and control.

The Russian President can warn others of the readiness to use nuclear weapons. There was some discussion that Putin did this during the Crimean crisis when he communicated to NATO such a readiness and later confirmed this on Russian TV.

The German Debate

On top of all this, there is a rather public debate on possibly shifting B61 nuclear bombs allocated to NATO from Germany to Poland which, despite the consequences for the relationship to Russia and the NATO-Russia Founding act, NATO is not ruling out. On the contrary, they are making a show of seriously considering it, possibly to signal to Russia their willingness to escalate in a crisis. However, this may, as Michal Baranowski of the German Marshall Fund in Warsaw points out, simply be a way of the US and NATO putting pressure on Germany to put a lid on the nuclear sharing debate.

Commenting on Twitter, Oliver Meier, a German expert on arms control, says the deployment of new nuclear-capable systems and the lowering of the nuclear threshold, as well as the further integration of nuclear and conventional deterrence “is viewed with scepticism in the German debate”. That is, in my view, very under-stated. Many in Germany, including myself, view this development with increasing alarm. Rolf Mützenich, leader of the SPD parliamentary party, is also worried that the Trump administration is worsening the situation, and writes in IPG Journal:

“Over the next few years, the Trump administration also intends to replace all strategic systems, procure low-yield nuclear warheads, increase the range of air-launched cruise missiles and install nuclear weapons in sea-launched sub-strategic systems that were withdrawn under Bush and Obama as a confidence-building measure. The increasing geopolitical competition between the nuclear weapons states, the development of new types of weapons, the combination of conventional and nuclear deterrent potential and the continuing modernisation and diversification of nuclear weapons arsenals is leading to new arms races. They are a concrete threat to Germany and Europe.”

While people in Germany are aware of the nuclear threat posed by Russia, which clearly states the willingness to target all countries hosting US nuclear weapons, the current escalation and threat to strategic stability seems to be driven by the United States. NATO members are, in the name of solidarity and a united front, propagating the US narrative that only Russia is modernising its arsenal. Jens Stoltenberg and Jessica Cox even go as far as to claim that the Russian nuclear arsenal is growing, while researchers at SIPRI clearly show that it is still decreasing due to new START.

The strength of the response by political and military leaders, including US democrats, to Rolf Mützenich’s remarks on nuclear sharing show that proponents of nuclear deterrence are clearly rattled. Arguments have gone back and forth in major newspapers in Germany, and also on Twitter. While some say that B61s are only needed for alliance cohesion or to signal to Russia that NATO members are on board, risk and all, Cox says that the bombs do in fact have a real operational utility. Ask any German military expert and they will say they definitely view that with a large portion of scepticism.

Jessica Cox is proud of her success in “educating” the Allies on the relevance and need for nuclear deterrence. Just four years ago I heard a NATO official complain at a conference on arms control that this was necessary, because they seemed to have forgotten the language of nuclear deterrence. And yet Cox admits that she has been less successful in educating the public, who frequently indulge in “ban treaty type discussions”. I take that as a compliment, as it it seems that ICAN remains a thorn in her side and balances out a debate that is only just getting started.
Distinguished Colleagues,

Thank you for your letter on ‘Nuclear Testing Alert’ dated 29 June 2020.

Nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions represent a serious threat to international peace and security and undermine the global non-proliferation regime. The European Union has been a consistent and staunch supporter of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of its Organisation. Since its opening for signature in 1996, the CTBT has helped stop nuclear testing while also serving as a strong confidence- and security building measure. Support for the CTBT within the EU is strong and universal; all EU Member States have signed and ratified the Treaty. We promote actively its entry into force and universalization in line with the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

Let me assure you that the entry into force of the CTBT remains our political imperative. We use every opportunity to encourage new CTBT ratifications using our political, diplomatic and financial tools. We raise the issue of CTBT ratification in our political dialogues and through diplomatic outreach to the remaining Annex II and non-Annex II countries alike. We decided to become a supporter of promoting the entry into force of the CTBT action in the UN Secretary General’s Agenda for Disarmament. We contribute to the CTBT Article XIV process and count ourselves among the ‘Friends of the CTBT’.

In parallel with our political demarches, we continue investing significant amounts to underpin the CTBTO efforts in promoting capacity building and the Treaty’s entry into force. Regular contributions from EU Member States to the CTBTO comprise roughly 40% of the Organization’s total annual budget. The EU is one of the largest providers of voluntary funds to the CTBTO. Since 2006, the Council of the European Union has adopted eight Decisions in support of the CTBTO: 3 Joint Actions in 2006, 2007 and 2008 and 5 Council Decisions in 2010, 2012, 2015, 2018 and 2020 committing EUR 29.5 million. The EU provides financial support to the CTBTO for training and education work aimed at building up and maintaining the necessary capacity in the technical, scientific, legal and policy aspects of the Treaty and its verification regime.

The CTBT is the result of the dedicated efforts of policy makers, colleague diplomats and civil society. With strong support from the UN General Assembly, what we have today is an incredibly strong instrument, fully verifiable, signed by 184 States and ratified by 168 States. The EU believes that every single signature and ratification matters. Every single country can lead by example and help universalise the Treaty. Through the CTBT, countries with differing perspectives have demonstrated their ability to think strategically and responsibly. This is the spirit we have to nurture and the EU is your friend in this endeavour.

Yours sincerely,

Joanneke BALFOORT
Let us try out in a purely imaginative way, what pattern a European nuclear weapon free zone might take – or, more realistically, how the circle of agreements for nuclear disarmed countries, covered by guarantees of non-attack with nuclear weapons, grow in a rather self-generated manner.

Led on by the already thorough public discussion, well prepared proposals and perceptions, embodied in the Rapacki, Undén and Kekkonen plans, I have come to deal fairly extensively with prospective projects in a rank order from those which seem most feasible to the more difficult ones. Thus first the core neutral nations: Sweden and Finland, Yugoslavia, Austria and Switzerland; next the rather cohesive Nordic flank nations: Denmark and Norway in addition to the aforementioned Sweden and Finland; and finally the crucial Central European states which might offer themselves as “balanceable”: the two Germanies and Poland, perhaps taking in also Czechoslovakia or some other East European nation.

Extensions
As the interest in obtaining such added security as an acknowledged status of nuclear disarmament is probably shared by most, if not all, countries in Europe, one might dare to suggest some further extensions. For instance, Holland and Belgium might be early joiners, to judge from their own lively public debate on the issue. On the southern side, Roumania might perhaps be expected to follow up earlier initiatives to help establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Balkans. If balancing is necessary, either Greece or Turkey or both, might then have to be won for a matching agreement. But perhaps Roumania might go it alone, considering its many initiatives to loosen the constraints of the military blocs, whilst preserving their political systems unaltered.

The two minor nuclear powers in Europe, France and Great Britain, have another context. Their *quid pro quo* problem is very different and much more directly concerns the superpowers’ major interests.

In this essay advocating European nuclear disarmament, I have restricted the attention to those tactical and Eurostrategic weapons which, although some may be important for an overall superpower context, are deployed by them – or intended – for use against European territories. They are definitely against our most vital interests.

Two remarks must be explicitly stressed. One is to remind us – and the superpowers – of the great positive value for the European countries attainable by buttressing *security* with their promised pledges not to attack us with nuclear weapons when we keep our own territories free from such weapons.

The second is that I have been moved to write as I do in the conviction that at bottom, not just a few, but all, people do realise the compelling need to begin now to lift the fear of doomsday which we sense in appreciating that the all-to-mighty nations in their spiralling mutual hostility use our peoples in Europe as hostages, at a time when we ourselves have become so free from aggressive impulses.

My own proposal definitely favours a stepwise approach but one to be incessantly pursued at the unilateral, as well as the bilateral levels.

Starting now
Europe is now given a chance to negotiate – if we are prepared to take it. The two superpowers have been brought, at last, to agree that negotiations about medium range nuclear missiles for Europe should start, before the end of this year.

This is good. But it is not enough, neither in terms of timetable nor of participants. The negotiations cannot proceed above the heads of the parties mainly concerned, namely the European countries themselves. Nor can these countries passively wait until next year to discover which directions the negotiations might take.

We should make up our own minds and act, both on a schedule of more tightly planned, speedier negotiations and on building up an agenda which could produce desirable results.

How can we hasten the many faceted pattern of negotiations? Probably we should be tentative to begin with, allowing different nations to “feel out” the possibilities of cooperation with other nations. Likeminded states like the free, nonaligned nations would be in order to open talks right away, and so would such others as the smaller and “next to nuclear free” states like those of Benelux. Members of the military alliances must begin by opening dialogues with their superpower leaders to gain insight as to how they can go forward in winning freedom from the nuclear weapon option; thus Norway and Denmark can explore how safely they can become free from being drawn into NATO’s planning for using nuclear weapons in wartime.

We, the European countries – must prepare a variety of inputs for what as yet are only prospectively bilateral negotiations between the two superpowers. They should not be left alone to decide on what Germans call “Nach-Rüstung” – making some additions of new nuclear-weapon systems on European soil seem inevitable, a foregone conclusion.

Our chance to influence the decisions is the greater the sooner we start and the more decisively we act in presenting plans.