As Covid-19 rages US agrees $740 billion for war, nukes and troops in Europe . . .

The Armed Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives has approved the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), after passing a number of amendments designed to limit the ability of President Trump to reduce troop numbers deployed overseas. It is likely that a similar Senate committee will pass the Act without major modification.

Of specific interest is the amendment that blocks Trump’s plan to remove 10,000 US troops stationed in Germany. It should be noted that this Committee is dominated by Democrats, who worked closely with the outspokenly pro-war Republican Representative Liz Cheney (daughter of Bush’s Vice President), to implement these hawkish policies. According to reports by Glen Greenwald and others, this same faction failed to back other amendments designed to hold the Trump administration to account, rather than blocking ‘undesireable’ policy proposals. For instance, Cheney and her Democrat co-thinkers failed to support an amendment supported by Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D), who spoke to an amendment calling for the White House to provide a ‘national security rationale’ for withdrawing from the INF Treaty - something they have so far failed to do, despite previous commitments.

The 2021 NDAA contains plans for military spending on a colossal scale. The $740.5 billion earmarked is more than three times China’s budget, ten times that of Saudi Arabia, fifteen times that of Russia and a greater amount than the next fifteen counties combined. As Greenwald notes, the Committee “authorized this kind of budget in the midst of a global pandemic as tens of millions ... struggle even to pay rent.”

The US spends billions on war as millions of Americans suffer.

US launches New Cold War against China . . .

The UK is to deploy its new £3bn aircraft carrier to join US and Japanese vessels in ‘exercises’ close to Chinese waters. The fact that the UK ‘carrier’ doesn’t actually carry any aircraft, as the UK government has failed to procure them, could make this whole story look faintly ridiculous. But it is far from ridiculous, it is very dangerous indeed. The UK had joined forces with the US in issuing threats and militaristic rhetoric against the Chinese government. China is used to being threatened but it now looks clear that the US, followed by the UK, are preparing to unfold a full-scale ‘New Cold War’. This will consist of more than verbal threats and accusations. It will consist of provocation and deployments that will heighten global tensions even further. See pages 7 & 8 for more...
Nuclear Testing Alert!

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation initiated the following letter, which was sent to all State Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, as a response to mounting threats from the Trump administration that it will resume nuclear testing.

Founding President: the Earl Russell, OM, FRS (1872-1970)

The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Ltd.

Recipients:
State Signatories to the Comprehensive Nuclear­Test­Ban Treaty
Josep Borrell Fontelles, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs
António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres, Secretary-General of the United Nations

29th June 2020

Dear Ambassador/High Commissioner,

The United States last exploded a nuclear device in 1992. For several years, there was an international halt to nuclear testing until 2006, when North Korea exploded the first of six devices. Now, the Trump Administration openly discusses the US also conducting new nuclear tests.

Of approximately 2,000 nuclear tests to date, more than 1,000 were carried out by the US. Each nuclear test not only has geopolitical significance and associated risks, but also causes substantial human and environmental consequences. The legacies of harm from such testing are widespread and well documented.

President Trump may view nuclear testing as a means by which to boost his standing – domestically and internationally. It is deeply worrying that, during election year, deterioration in President Trump’s domestic support makes it thinkable that he will resort to even more extreme measures.

We call on the United States to abide by the international prohibition on nuclear testing. We call on those many states that have signed the Comprehensive Nuclear­Test­Ban Treaty to uphold and defend its provisions. We call on all concerned parties to raise the alarm on the risks associated with a resumption of nuclear testing before it is too late.

Yours sincerely,
Tony Simpson & Tom Unterrainer, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Supporting Organisations: Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (UK), International Peace Bureau

Signatories:
Dr Becky Alexis-Martin, Author of Disarming Doomsday
Colin Archer, Secretary-General, International Peace Bureau (Retired), UK.
Ludo De Brabander, Vrede vzw, Belgian Peace Organization, Belgium.
Reiner Braun, International Peace Bureau, Germany.
Christopher Butler, Chair, Shipley CND, UK.
Noam Chomsky, USA.
Dr Jenny Clegg, National Council, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK.
Tamara Coates, Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.
Marguerite Doyle, Greece.
Dennis DuVall, First U.S. citizen to be convicted of protesting against H-bombs at NATO base Büchel, Germany.
Commander Robert Forsyth RN (Ret'd), 2nd in Command Polaris submarine, commanded two other submarines and the Commanding Officer's Qualifying Course, UK.
Benjamin Gottberg, Coord Group, TIME FOR PEACE - active against war, Denmark.
Commander Robert Green RN (Ret'd), author of Security without Nuclear Deterrence, New Zealand.
John Hallam, UN Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Co-Chair of Abolition 2000 Nuclear Risk Reduction working group, Australia.
Geir Hem, Norway.
Dr Kate Hudson, General Secretary, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK.
Kristine Karch, co-chair international network "No to war - no to NATO", Germany.
Ulla Klötzer, Coordinator of Women Against Nuclear Power, Finland.
Lizette Lassen, Coordinating Group, TIME FOR PEACE - active against war, Denmark.
Lea Launokari, Coordinator of Women for Peace, Finland.
Jeremy Lester, Clerk of the Quaker Council for European Affairs, Belgium.
Professor Catherine Rowatt, former Green MEP, UK.
Alice Slate, World Beyond War, USA.
Allan Soeborg, Coordinating Group, TIME FOR PEACE - active against war, Denmark.
Rae Street, Peace Activist, UK.
Earl Turcotte, Chair, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, Canada.
Carol Turner, Vice Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK.
Andy Vermunt, Human Rights Activist, President of [PostVersa], Belgium.
Professor Dave Webb, Chair, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, UK.
Julie Ward, former Labour MEP, UK.
Lucas Wirt, Executive Director International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, Germany.
Michael Youlton, Chairperson of the Irish Anti War Movement, Ireland.
Safardeen Yusuf, Student and Activist, Cyprus.
Protests at Büchel Air Base

From July 4 to 7, activists protested against the US nuclear weapons stationed at Büchel Air Base, Germany. The third anniversary of the nuclear weapons ban treaty was also celebrated.

“Germany has been debating the successor to the Bundeswehr tornadoes for months, with which, in an emergency, German soldiers would drop US atomic bombs over their destination. That is why our protest against nuclear weapons and nuclear participation is particularly important this year,” said Johannes Oehler (30), ICAN member of the organization team. On the occasion of the third anniversary of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Kantar polling institute carried out a survey on behalf of Greenpeace which showed that 78 percent of those questioned opposed buying new fighter jets for atomic bombs.

Activists from the Netherlands and Germany spent four days protesting against nuclear weapons with a colorful program. In numerous workshops on Saturday, the participants dealt, among other things, with the modernization of nuclear weapons in Germany, with the criticism of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the connection between civil and military use of nuclear power.

On Sunday there was an approximately 3.5 km long peace hike around the air base. On Monday, some activists blocked various gates spontaneously. “Through our action of civil disobedience, we have expressed our rejection of nuclear weapons. With a creative music group at one gate, we disrupted operations, blocked another gate for six hours, and made our presence known at the main gate because of our permanent presence on the nearby meadow.

Speeches followed in the evening and the third anniversary of the TPNW was celebrated - this was adopted on July 7, 2017 as part of the United Nations. Since then, 38 states have ratified it. The treaty enters into force three months after the 50th ratification.

Translated from and photographs downloaded via www.ippnw.de

Visit www.russfound.org for information on the work of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and for more on the END campaigns in the 1980s | Email tomunterrainer@russfound.org for more information
The TPNW and International Law
by Joachim Wernicke, Berlin

After the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) comes into force, it can be expected that all nine nuclear weapon states will assert that the treaty is not valid because they have not acceded to it. The 26 non-nuclear weapon states in NATO will probably follow the United States, Britain and France on this line. Formally, they are right. However, the members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are subject to its commitments, even if they continuously disregard them.

Thirty-one states in the NPT, including the NATO states, are also likely to claim that the TPNW, even if it came into force, is not universal international law. But they will not be able to say that the NPT does not apply to them. The TPNW does not replace the NPT, but supplements it.

So it is worth taking a look at which obligations the TPNW has assumed from the NPT and what is new about it. The similarities and differences are clear from the decisive wording in the two.

From the NPT:

**Article 1:** Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.

**Article 2:** Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

**Article 6:** Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

In contrast, from the TPNW:

**Article 1.** Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:

- Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
- Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
- Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
- Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

From this can be seen immediately:

1. Almost 50 years after the NPT came into force, all five nuclear weapon states in the NPT violate its Article 6 by failing to fulfill their disarmament commitments, instead - as of 2020 - they upgrade their nuclear weapons. In doing so, they show that they have only faked “good faith” to nuclear disarmament.

2. The United States violates NPT Article 1 by directly transferring nuclear weapons to non-nuclear NATO states.
and control over them [nuclear sharing].

3. The five non-nuclear weapon states with nuclear sharing in NATO violate NPT Article 2 by directly undertaking to receive the transfer of nuclear weapons and of control over them, from the USA: In the event of war, their pilots have this control, even if during the mission flight only for a short period of time (or for a longer period of time: the pilot who ever wants to sleep without nightmares again after this flight has the freedom, for example, to desert to an enemy airfield with his unused dangerous cargo).

4. For non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT, TPNW points (a) and (c) correspond to the contents of the NPT.

5. The TPNW point (b) concerns nuclear weapon states and specifies their obligation according to NPT Article 6.

6. The TPNW point (d) reflects general international law, as the International Court of Justice ICJ found in 1996 at the request of the UN.

7. The ICJ’s 1996 statement left open whether the use of a nuclear weapon is illegal in the event of a state’s existence being jeopardized. However, this only applies to the owner of the nuclear weapon, not to supporting allies, because such support from third parties does not affect his own livelihood. Nuclear participation within the framework of NATO is therefore illegal according to the ICJ’s statement in 1996.

8. The TPNW points (e) and (f) relate to the general fulfillment of the contract, not expressly to nuclear weapons.

9. The last TPNW point (g) prohibits non-nuclear weapon states from tolerating nuclear weapons on their territory. Among the non-nuclear weapon states it is only NATO countries that tolerate nuclear weapons on their territory. According to the NATO strategy, these serve as a nuclear deterrent, i.e. as a means of threat. However, this is prohibited according to the ICJ’s statement in 1996.

10. The “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mentioned in NPT Article 6 has been created with the entry into force of the TPNW. This goal of the NPT is thus fulfilled and the TPNW thus indirectly applies to members of the NPT, regardless of whether they are direct members of the TPNW.

It can therefore be stated that the TPNW contains nothing that has not been international law for a long time due to the NPT and the ICJ declaration of 1996. The TPNW has therefore not changed the current legal situation, but only specified it and provided it with a time stamp. Already today, definitely from its entry into force, the essential points of the TPNW are also valid international law for the five official nuclear weapon states and for the NATO member states, regardless of whether or not they have signed the TPNW separately.

NATO-oriented voices will likely give a different assessment of the situation. In contrast to the natural sciences, there is no uniqueness in legal questions, but usually the opposite of an assertion can be proven too. Generations of lawyers live from this language design option.

The fact that the 2017 agreement received the approval of the vast majority of the 2017 United Nations General Assembly may also play a role in the value of the TPNW: 122 out of 193 states, i.e. 63 percent. The 9 nuclear-weapon and 25 nonnuclear states in NATO (excluding the Netherlands) stayed away from the vote, leaving 159 states. This increased the approval rate in the vote to 77 percent, a clear vote by the international community.

The decisive difference between the TPNW and the NPT is the time schedule for nuclear disarmament: Instead of “Saint-Nevery-Day” in the NPT, “Immediately” in the TPNW. The nuclear-weapon states should appreciate that the non-nuclear weapon states have waited patiently for half a century for the promised nuclear disarmament before they resorted to self-help.

Does the TPNW apply to a state that has ratified it before 50 ratifications have enacted it? This is at the discretion of the state.
Dear Leader McConnell,

As scientists with expertise on nuclear weapons issues, including many with long involvement in the US nuclear weapons program, we strongly oppose the resumption of explosive testing of US nuclear weapons. There is no technical need for a nuclear test. Indeed, statements attributed to administration officials suggest the motivation is that a nuclear explosive test would provide leverage in future nuclear arms control negotiations with Russia and China.

In anticipation of signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), in 1995 the United States established the Science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program, which included building a wide range of experimental facilities as well as powerful supercomputers to allow weapons scientists to understand more deeply how nuclear weapons work. Based on non-nuclear tests on each warhead type, as well as information provided by computer modeling and experimental data, since 1996 the Department of Energy (DOE) weapons laboratories have conducted an annual assessment of the safety, reliability, and performance of each weapon type. They also assess whether it is necessary to conduct an explosive nuclear test to resolve any identified problems. The Defense Department assesses the military effectiveness of each weapon type. Each year since 1996, the annual assessment has determined that the arsenal remains safe, reliable and militarily effective and that explosive nuclear testing is not needed.

Thus, nuclear explosive testing of any US warhead would serve no technical or military purpose.

While the CTBT is not yet in force because the United States, China, North Korea, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan have not ratified it, all signatories are obligated to abide by its terms. The administration has alleged that Russia and China are conducting very-low-yield nuclear tests, in violation of the CTBT. The administration has reportedly offered these alleged tests as another rationale for a US explosive test.

If Russia and China are conducting very-low-yield tests, the yields are low enough that these tests have not been detected by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which operates an extensive array of seismic and other sensors that would be used to verify the treaty once it comes into force. As the National Academy of Sciences 2012 report The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States argues, any such tests would provide no military advantage to Russia or China.

The CTBT includes provisions for resolving questions of compliance, including the right of any signatory that has information indicating another signatory is not in compliance to request an onsite inspection in that country. Because the Treaty is not in force, the United States cannot avail itself of this option.

If the United States believes that Russia and China are conducting tests prohibited by the treaty, however, it should initiate a consultative process with these countries with the aim of providing greater transparency and developing confidence-building measures about the subcritical “zero yield” nuclear testing facilities all three nations operate, and where Russia and China presumably would conduct any very-low-yield tests.

A US nuclear explosive test would have significant negative repercussions. A likely response to a US test would be a resumption of testing by Russia and China, and perhaps also by North Korea, India, and Pakistan. This would further undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which includes 185 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) who have pledged to forgo nuclear weapons. When the NNWS voted in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely, they did so in part because the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) assured them a CTBT would soon be in force.

Many NNWS are questioning the value of the NPT because the United States and other NWS have failed to make meaningful progress on their obligation, in Article VI of the NPT, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” They negotiated a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was passed by the United Nations General Assembly and opened for signature in July 2017. A US explosive nuclear test would severely weaken the nuclear nonproliferation regime—which could lead to new nuclear-armed states.

In sum, there is no technical or military need to conduct a nuclear explosive test. At the same time, doing so would have serious negative security consequences for the United States. We urge you to work with other members of Congress to ensure the United States does not conduct a nuclear explosive test.

Sincerely,

Philip E. Coyle, III
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Test and Evaluation
Steve Fetter Professor and Dean, University of Maryland
John P. Holdren Professor of Environmental Science and Policy, Harvard University
William H. Press Professor, The University of California, Berkeley
Robert Rosner William E. Wrather Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Raymond Jeanloz Professor of Earth and Planetary Science, University of California, Berkeley
R. Scott Kemp Associate Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering, MIT
Robert Latiff Major General (Ret), USAF
William H. Press Professor, The University of Texas at Austin Former Deputy Laboratory Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory
Robert Rosner William E. Weather Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago
Roy Schwitters Professor of Physics, Emeritus, The University of Texas at Austin
Ellen D. Williams Distinguished University Professor, Department of Physics, University of Maryland Chair, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States, National Research Council (2012)
China and the Bomb: measuring fear

In the first days of June 1985 there was a remarkable meeting in Beijing. Representatives of the main European peace movements, together with their Japanese and South Pacific opposite numbers gathered in a forum “for safeguarding world peace”. During this forum the Chinese hosts announced the formation of a new peace committee. For China to join in a multilateral forum, and to promise a whole series of further international contacts, was no small change in policy. The following text is an excerpt from Ken Coates’s book, China and the Bomb, which was an attempt to repair the gap in the knowledge of Western peace movements about China’s attitudes to nuclear proliferation and disarmament. We reprint this excerpt in the spirit of the popular Chinese dictum: “Seek truth from facts”. China has been the recipient of more threats of nuclear bombardment than any other country in the world. The threats have not gone away and have manifested themselves in a belligerent campaign by the US, supported by the UK, to commence a New Cold War against China. If they are to resist these new threats, the peace movements in Europe and beyond must “Seek truth from facts”. We offer this article as a contribution to that process.

If American statesmen are sometimes garrulous, the Chinese themselves have always been very discreet about the ... nuclear threat, although it was widely reported ... An immediate result of this threat was a feverish campaign of air raid precautions, including the development of a massive deep shelter programme.

While I was in China attending the Beijing Peace Forum, I asked my hosts about these deep shelters which have recently been partially converted to civilian use. At the end of the Forum, they invited me to visit one. So traumatic was this experience that I wish it had been shared with all the other participants in the Forum, who at the time had set off on a tour of other areas in the country. My guide was Mr Chang, a clever young graduate who works for the Chinese Association for International Understanding. Mr Chang was deeply interested in relations with Europe, and interrogated me ceaselessly not only about the European peace movement, but also about the prospects for economic cooperation. He clearly saw the Chinese opening to Europe as an important part of the campaign to modernize the country, but he was also concerned to benefit from the cultural exchanges that became possible. Deep in discussion; we drove through the main Tiananmen Square and arrived at a crowded shopping centre a couple of hundred yards or so further on. Beijing’s main shopping centres are not like those in England. Somehow there are always more people, closer together. The streets, all pedestrian precincts now, were absolutely crowded. We turned into Qianmen Avenue.

It cut through the middle of its area, and was about 300 yards long. On the corner was a draper’s store, quite large. A little further on was a massive drugstore, dispensing herbal remedies under the guidance of a panel of qualified doctors. Along the way we passed an ornate cast iron shop front, imposing a touch of Victoriana on this strictly working environment. This, apparently, was the seat of the former imperial court tailors, now given over to more democratic customers. All the puzzles of modern China range themselves along this street. Opposite the shop dispensing acupuncture tools and guides was another retailing Japanese computers.

We went into the drapery where our exploration had begun. Ms Ma Jinli, the manageress, greeted us. Hardly were we introduced before she motioned us to stand back and pushed a button under the counter by the main entrance. Instantly, as if in a James Bond film, the whole floor behind the counter wound back under the wall, revealing a deep staircase. Not even the most practised eye would have detected that such an entrance might exist. Ms Ma led us down the stone steps. We entered an underground tunnel, which ran down some yards before we came to an archway. Carved around it was the rubric “Keep in mind that China is being threatened” and the date 1975, which, I was told, was the date of completion of this part of the network. On the wall opposite the archway was a large inscription by Mao Tse-tung: “To serve the people against war and against disaster”.

Beneath the arch we went, in to a veritable warren of underground lanes and streets. The complex began in 1969, I was informed. It was dug out by manual labour, using picks and shovels. We entered an underground street which has the name Da Sha Lan. The complex around this took ten years to complete. It is constructed at two levels. At the point we entered, an intricate pattern of lanes and chambers lies eight metres below the surface, and is protected by elaborate insulation from whatever may pass above. At a deeper level (15 metres further down) lies a parallel web, just as intricate. These two complexes involve 3000 metres of tunnelling, and a number of installations. Now these have been converted to civilian purposes. They are extensive. There are 45 above ground shops over these tunnels, with 2000 staff members, and all 2000 were involved in the work of underground conversion under the guidance of professional designers.

I went straight away to one of the subterranean shops, selling a variety of fancy goods. The Da Shan Lan underground shop is obviously a tourist attraction, full of lacquer work, jade ornaments and pretty silks. A row of chairs down the middle accompanies a...
fairly rudimentary Coca Cola Bar, busily patronised. Several shoppers were browsing among the bangles and necklaces. Moving further into the Warren from this shop there was a kind of command post. A curtain at the end of the room framed a plastic map board which was illuminated from behind to provide a map of both upper and lower tunnel levels. Ms Ma took a pointer, and described it all very precisely. Near the shop was an underground hotel, which we later visited. Above the hotel stood the pharmacy at street level, so that in time of war all the vital drugs could speedily be lowered down, to function as part of the underground hospital which the hotel would then become. Below, the lanes of apartments at the deep level were currently used as storehouses. The entire network is studded by entrances, in all, more then 90. Every important shop above ground has one or two access points so that, said Ma Jinli, , within six minutes everyone in the district could be safely underground.

But, if they dropped a megaton on Beijing, I asked Mr Chang, would you not all be cooked? “I hope not”, he replied. Assuming they were not, there were a number of long exit tunnels, leading towards the suburban outskirts of the city. One ran past the famous Peking Duck Restaurant. It took, said Ms Ma, three hours to walk the length of one of these tunnels. Our eyes returned to the plastic map. It blinked intelligence about the different services which were available: water pumping stations, air pumps, telecoms, generator room. “But”, said I, “what about the electric pulse? Nuclear explosions do unfamiliar things to electronic communications. They fuse circuits and render equipment inoperable.” My hosts were not sure about EMP, but they were sure that the tunnel complex had made a big contribution to solving the problem of civilian space. Overcrowding above ground meant that it was a God-send to be able to call up so much unused warehousing, not to say so many community amenities.

“How many people would use this shelter?” I asked. “It can house 10,000 people”, I was told. “But there are ten million citizens of Beijing”, I said. “They are all catered for” said Ms Ma. The shock of this statement, mercifully, hit me rather slowly. But there it was. These other underground complexes, too, had now been opened to solve peacetime problems. Roller skating rinks, restaurants, wholesale stores, a 24,000 square metre fruit depository, rifle ranges, theatres, clinics, libraries, a gymnasium, all fan out beneath the surface of Beijing’s streets. What did this extraordinary labyrinth entail in social investment over the ten years it took to build? How much of China’s social surplus went into delving underneath her cities?

Quite clearly, Beijing is not alone. Recently, the Chinese press reported the civilian conversion of shelters in Shanghai, Tianjin, Guangzhou, and Chongqing. If all were as extensive as the Beijing complex, then the Chinese digs since 1969 represent a labour not greatly inferior to that involved in building the Great Wall. Such a labour also represents a great fear; since it is quite apparent that no one, not even a madman, would contemplate such a vast diversion of resources unless there were reason to think it necessary.

I continued my underground exploration. On the way to the hotel, Ms Ma threw another switch which dropped the floor of the tunnel into a neat self-lowering staircase and led us down to the deep level. Here, the ventilation blew a distinct chill, and we felt our skins tingle with the cold. We passed large stacks of merchandise, and peered through the windows of underground chambers into further locked storehouses. In every direction the tunnels ran, and it would have been easy to have lost one’s way. Ducking and weaving, we wound our way round a wide circle until we emerged again outside the underground hotel. This, because at the time of its excavation it had been scheduled as a wartime hospital, consisted of a number of rooms, equipped with several bunk beds each. “It is open to a variety of clients”, said Ms Ma. “But priority is given to the relatives of those who work on the staffs of the shops and enterprises above ground.” The hotel staff were busy sweeping and polishing as we left, to emerge once again above ground in the draper’s shop...

Travelling in China among all those people, your mind takes a fancy that it can understand what a billion is. It also takes a fancy that it can begin to appreciate the enormous audacity, even sacrilege, of the Chinese plan to modernise by the year 2000.

This involves an aim to achieve an annual per capita income of 1000 dollars, which would be a sea-change indeed. But, in this exploration of the Chinese underground, I realized for the first time the depth of the fear which had been aroused by all those nuclear threats, all that blackmail, all that intimidation. It is a fear which can be measured in cubic yards of earth removed, in feet per second of air pumped through vast tunnelled emplacements, in social productivity foregone. The removal of such fear would not only render the world the safer. It would, in China, be a major economic resource in its own right.