On 1 March 1954, the United States carried out its largest ever nuclear test. Named ‘Castle Bravo’, the test was part of a series of similar events, ‘Operation Bravo’, designed to assess the feasibility of high-yield and therefore high-energy devices.

‘Castle Bravo’ was expected to produce a yield of six megatons (375 times larger than the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima) but the scientists involved miscalculated. The actual yield was fifteen megatons, 2.5 times higher than predicted and more than 900 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb. Becky Alexis-Martin, author of *Disarming Doomsday*, describes the test as “the most significant radiological incident in US history.” How so?

The test resulted in a massive nuclear radiation fallout that contaminated the inhabitants of the various atolls close to Bikini Atoll, where the test took place. Coral reefs were vapourised. Radioactive gas spread across the planet. It took three days for nearby residents to be evacuated from the area. The legacies of harm from this test, and others like it, endure.

The tests that Trump is proposing are likely to involve ‘low-yield’ or what the US military likes to call ‘useable’ nuclear weapons. Regardless of the size, any nuclear testing is not only criminally wasteful in terms of the resources involved. Nuclear testing also has an enormously destructive long-term environmental and human impact. For these reasons alone, any moves towards future testing must be vigorously opposed.

The US last conducted an explosive nuclear test in September 1992. Four years later it signed up to, but did not ratify, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Since then, the US has not conducted any nuclear testing. If the US has not tested since 1992, why start again now?

The only technical reason for conducting explosive nuclear tests is to assess new warhead designs. Data from previous tests and sophisticated computer modelling made ‘live’ testing redundant. It would therefore be reasonable to assume that the US intends to fully develop and deploy a new class of warheads.

Of course, Trump does not need a ‘technical’ excuse to violate global arms control agreements. He requires no excuse to ditch yet another multilateral treaty. Such facets of the ‘old’ global order do not seem to concern him very much as he is engaged in desperate and desperately dangerous efforts to assert US power on the global stage.

Any new tests would further destabilise the situation and feed into the already existing, technologically supercharged arms-race. It is possible that any US test would be followed by similar such tests from major nuclear powers.

Opposition to testing should unite peace and anti-war activists, environmentalists, rights campaigners and other. The time to voice our united opposition is now.

Campaign Update

Activists from across Europe have been in discussion on launching an updated joint-statement and plans for common activity following demands from some politicians for US nuclear weapons to be removed from Germany and the ongoing rise in nuclear risks. The only path to safety is to make Europe a nuclear-weapons-free zone and to unite the peace movements with this common aim. More information on the statement and activity will be included in future issues of *END Info*. 
New Start negotiations

Negotiations on the New Start Treaty look set to resume following concerns that President Trump would allow the agreement, first negotiated by Presidents Obama and Medvedev, to expire. The Trump administration has overseen a ‘Bonfire of the Treaties’, where treaty after treaty, agreement after agreement, has gone up in smoke. It looked likely that New Start would face a similar fate but in an apparent concession by the Trump administration, which had previously declined Russian offers to open talks, the 10-year-old Treaty will now be the subject of bilateral talks.

This is a move in the right direction. However, President Trump continues to insist that China is included in discussions. Specifically, the US may be willing to extend the Treaty if Russia agrees to ‘three-way arms control with China’ and encourages China to attend talks in the future.

It is in all of our interests that New Start is renewed and extended. The Treaty, which calls for the halving of numbers of strategic nuclear missile launchers and limits the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed by Russian and the US, is an important device for nuclear reduction. It should not be treated as a political football by the US administration, or anyone else.

Unfortunately, the US’s insistence that China participates in New Start looks set to severely disrupt efforts to preserve the Treaty. China’s nuclear arsenal is tiny as compared to those of the US and Russia. It seems clear that the US’s demands on China are part of an ongoing provocation. “China has repeatedly stated its position,” said Hua Chunying (a foreign ministry spokesperson). “We have no intention to participate in the so-called trilateral arms control negotiations with the US and Russia. That’s consistent and clear.”

If New Start falls, it is clear that the US will seek to point the finger of blame at China. Nuclear disarmers should be consistent in asserting the importance of preserving New Start and in clearly identifying who is to blame if it is added to the already burning mass of Treaties.

French sub catches fire

A fire broke out on the French nuclear-powered submarine, Perle, on the morning of 12 June. The fire damaged the rear section of the sub as it lay in drydock in the port of Toulon. The fire was only brought under control by completely flooding the rear compartments with foam. Personnel had to escape through torpedo tubes but none were injured and the nuclear reactors are reported to have remained “untouched”.

The Perle is not itself a nuclear-armed submarine but it plays a vital role in protecting France’s nuclear-armed SSBN’s. Le Monde suggested that if Perle had sustained “irremediable damage” there was the possibility of “the entire organisation of French nuclear deterrence” being “rethought. And the Navy may have to give up on certain strategic missions.”

Forbes magazine reports that “France’s six-ship attack submarine fleet operates by a tight schedule: one boat in long-term overhaul, another in mid-term overhaul, a third dedicated to training, one boat each assigned to patrols in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, and the last free to operate in either theater or in the Indian Ocean.”

There is speculation that a prolonged investigation of the cause or causes of the fire onboard the Perle may put the vessel out of action for some time. It may also be necessary to dock the other five attack submarines of the same class until the investigation is complete and repairs are made. If this is the case, then France’s nuclear-armed submarines will not be operational.

We should be thankful that such a fire did not break out on a nuclear-armed submarine and that no lives were lost. However, the consequences of the incident and the risks and dangers it illustrates should concentrate our minds. Such incidents are not confined to the French Navy. They and others should urgently consider short-term measures to prevent such incidents.
French M51 Missile Test

At 8.20am on Friday, June 12, the French nuclear armed submarine, the Bold, fired an M51 strategic ballistic missile at the tip of Penmarch, Finistère. “This test demonstrates our technological excellence and our attachment to French sovereignty” declared Florence Parly, Minister of Defense.

The French government persists in launching its new missile systems in violation of the NPT and in the face of the real financial and environmental crises. M51 missiles each cost 120 million Euros, which is the gross annual salary of 7500 nurses.

This missile is designed to carry six warheads, each of which could destroy Paris in a few seconds. There have been protests against the test. The pandemic has revealed that the real priorities of society are health, social and environmental emergencies and not costly tests for enhanced weapons of death.

In compliance with health precautionary measures, demonstrations called by the French Peace Movement - which denounces these tests - took place in different cities across the country and on the premises of the command center of the operation where around sixty people found their way to the tip of Penmarch, near the buildings providing logistics for the fire command.

Ramstein Airbase Online days of action

Even in the Corona crisis, the military-industrial complex wants to inform the world that it is armed to the teeth. Germany has reported to NATO its 2020 defense spending of more than 50 billion euros (2015 figure: 35.5 billion euros). This is money that is urgently needed for health care, education, social issues and nature conservation.

Several media sources report that Trump wants to withdraw a large proportion of the US soldiers stationed in Germany. We naturally welcome that. We hope that the US soldiers can go home and not be used in other senseless conflicts and wars. In any case, relocating the troops to Poland or other European countries does not bring us closer to world peace.

All of this shows us that protest is more necessary than ever. We have long considered which forms of action would make sense within the scope of our possibilities. After much discussion, we are of the opinion that a peace camp and a demonstration with a limited number of participants in July under the current general conditions are of little use for the protest against the Ramstein air base. However, we will not do without street protests in 2020 either. We are in Berlin from September 25th to 27th with street protests and other actions.

But we did not want to keep you waiting until September and have therefore launched the online campaign days from July 8th to 11th. With our online action days, we hope to reach all those who are interested in the topic of drone war, but who have so far been too far from Ramstein.

We want to reach more people with our educational work! Only enlightenment enables the necessary transparency for resistance against the current arms policy - this in turn puts pressure on our politicians when making their decisions!

To speak with Stéphane Hessel: We wish everyone, each one of you, a reason for outrage.

https://www.ramstein-kampagne.eu/

CND Webinar: Disarming Doomsday
The Human Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Since Hiroshima

Saturday 4 July, 2pm-3pm see www.cnduk.org to register
Join Dr Becky Alexis-Martin in conversation with CND vice-chair Tom Unterrainer, discussing her book Disarming Doomsday: The Human Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Since Hiroshima.

The Spokesman
Journal of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation

Waging Peace The Spokesman 144
Festschrift for David Krieger

Daisaku Ikeda on Wonderful Encounters | David Barush on Unmasked Deterrence
John Scales Avery on Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence | Robert Green on New Nuclear Crisis | Steven Starr on Blind Eye to Armageddon | Richard Falk on The Nuclear Abolition Struggle and much more...

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Visit www.russfound.org for information on the work of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and for more on the END campaigns in the 1980s | Email tomunterrainer@russfound.org for more information
Return of the European Missile Duel?

By Joachim Wernicke

In the period 1985-87 Europe was the scene of a nuclear missile duel between the USA and the former Soviet Union. In 1983 US intermediate-range ballistic missiles, Pershing-II, were deployed in Western Germany, followed in 1985 by the deployment of Soviet short-range missiles, SS-23, in the former GDR and Czechoslovakia. The nominal range of the Pershing-II was 1850 km, reaching the Moscow region. A technical innovation was the terminal guidance of the missile’s warhead with a hit accuracy of some ten meters. This precision allowed for the destruction of deep underground hardened shelters by nuclear hits, even with so-called low yield warheads comparable to the Hiroshima bomb of 1945.

In the Soviet Union the political-military command system was concentrated in the Moscow area. The talk was about 100 underground shelters. Due to the improved hit accuracy of the missiles since late 1980s the term of decapitation strike came into the official military vocabulary of the USA, meaning a surprise attack in order to destroy the Soviet leadership. A precondition would be the rush to overthrow the Soviet warning system. The ten-minute flight time of Pershing-II from Western Germany would leave the Moscow leadership no time for situation assessment and ‘rational reaction’.

In order to destroy a target with sufficient confidence, at least two missiles have to be fired on it. Thus a total of about 200 missiles would have been required for a decapitation strike against Moscow. The number of Pershing-II in Western Germany, according to NATO announcements, would be 108. In its open and unprotected deployment in the field these missiles were highly vulnerable and therefore unsuitable for a counterstrike after a Soviet attack: Use them or lose them.

As expected, the Soviet side reacted accordingly, deploying SS-23’s, with a flight time about 5 minutes. The purpose of the SS-23 was presumably to destroy by a nuclear first strike the Pershing-II sites before they could be used. Knowledge that a Pershing-II attack was imminent would have been based on espionage information which possibly would be incorrect, perhaps intentionally incorrect, but plausible for a government declaration in the international media. Following a Soviet first strike on Western Germany, a counterstrike by the USA would have been rather questionable. The Soviet Union, by striking first, would have experienced heavy damage to its international reputation. But the willingness of Continental European NATO countries to allow further US military installations and hardware on their territory would probably have been reduced. Thus the danger of a decapitation strike would have been diminished for the Soviet Union.

In 1987 the Soviet leader Gorbachev and US president Reagan agreed the INF Treaty for the destruction of all land-based intermediate-range missiles on both sides. In the process of agreeing the treaty it was revealed that the number of Pershing-II missiles was not 108 but 234.

Since 2018 Russia has deployed Iskander-M missiles in Kaliningrad, formerly part of the German province of Eastern Prussia. After US president Trump unilaterally withdrew from the INF Treaty, Russia is permitted to deploy land-based intermediate-range missiles. The approximately 500kg Iskander-M conventional warhead can probably be replaced by a nuclear warhead of lower weight, increasing the range.

Germany is the only Continental European country which provides territory to the USA for military bases at large scale. The USA is using these facilities in their wars in Africa and Asia. All their European command centres are located on German soil, including deep underground shelters in Stuttgart, Ramstein and Wiesbaden. Such shelters cannot be destroyed by conventional bombs but by precise
nuclear hits, the detonation of which would cause considerable radioactive fallout. Is it unrealistic to assume that amongst the targets of the missiles in Kaliningrad there are US military installations in Germany, with the priority on command shelters? The distance is about 1000 km, an intermediate range.

Today there are no US intermediate-range missiles in European countries, and it is questionable if any European government still would give the US permission for a new deployment on its territory. However, a development in going on which Europe hardly is noticed: In the Pershing-II era sea-launched ballistic missiles were not precise enough to destroy deep underground shelters. Today, with satellite navigation, they are sufficiently precise. Since 2017 tendencies from the US Navy and their supporting industries have introduced intermediate-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads for surface ships into military discussions. Sovereignty over the South China sea is given as the reason. As an example of the missile type required, the Pershing-II of 1983 is referenced. It could be redesigned with modern technology and adapted to the launch techniques used in surface ships. The working title employed is Pershing-III, at a different source Sea Pershing.

A missile Pershing-III would offer a new capability: at similar weight as Pershing-II it could be built more compact, in order to fit into the launcher geometry of naval ships. In this weight of a typical conventional warhead also a nuclear warhead can be placed. A main strength of the US Navy’s surface ships are cruisers and destroyers in the global Aegis system. Its European command centre is located in Ramstein, Germany. For the direct radio coordination of the ships such a regional centre is indispensable, because the time-critical commanding of the ships in European waters via satellite communication from the USA would be too sluggish, due to the signal propagation delay.

An Aegis destroyer contains 96 vertical launcher tubes usable for SM-3 air defense missiles or Tomahawk cruise missiles. From the launcher space available it should be feasible to accommodate in such a ship (or a similar type of ship) about 25 Pershing-III missiles in modified launcher tubes. Eight such ships would be sufficient in order to launch a decapitation strike against the Russian leadership, using a total of about 200 missiles from the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea or the Barents Sea, with about 10 minutes flight time. However, this describes a technical feasibility, not any real military conclusions.

It might take some years until missiles of a Pershing-III type will be deployed on US Navy ships. But in this case the nuclear duel of the 1980s would be revived in Europe, instead of Pershing-II/SS-23 this time it will be with Pershing-III and medium-range ballistic missiles from Kaliningrad. The question is: Independent of the real intentions of the US leadership, after observing the first medium-range ballistic missiles on US surface ships, would the Russian military wait until the number of these missiles is sufficient for a decapitation strike before taking action?

These are the tensions and dangers that are building. In order to avoid the dangers, could Germany negotiate a deal with Russia? Could Germany copy the example of neighbouring countries and NATO members France, Denmark or Czech Republic – no foreign military in the country – in exchange for Russia retracting its missiles from Kaliningrad?

In the same sense on the European level: could a treaty between the EU and Russia, for instance in the frame of OSCE, be arrived at? The verified ban on intermediate-range ballistic missiles not only in the European countries but also on the European seas? Here the geographical map and the international sea law gives a means to force such a ban towards Non-European states too, via the right for peaceful passage. Thus a new European missile duel would be permanently prevented. Indispensable for the success of such an effort would, however, be to bring the subject of a nuclear war danger into broad public discussion in Europe.

Notes
As the coronavirus rages across the world pushing the global economy into possibly the deepest recession since the 1930s, yet another crisis is brewing between the US and China.

To divert attention from his own callous incompetence, Trump has turned on China, reprising his winning formula of “China, China, China - its all China’s fault” as the date of the November election approaches. Trump, Pompeo, Pence - they all have racialised the pandemic agenda with their insistent references to the ‘China virus’ or ‘Wuhan virus’. China, unsurprisingly, if not always appropriately, has bristled. But this is far more than a ‘war of words’.

If there is one thing the Trump administration has succeeded in doing over the last four years it is in turning US China policy around from engagement to a more active containment, bringing it to the centre of the foreign policy agenda. Shifting from the so-called ‘war on terror’ to so-called ‘great power competition’ with Russia and China, US strategists have become ever more obsessed with China as the deadliest rival for global supremacy, more formidable even than the Soviet Union ever was. For at least one former Senior Director of Strategic Planning in the Trump administration, China poses “the most consequential existential threat since the Nazi Party in World War 2’.

The ‘China threat’ has justified massive increases in US military expenditure, with bilateral agreement last year to pump $1.3 trillion into the development of new ‘usable’ or low yield nuclear warheads, the militarisation of space and much else besides. Shockingly, as US states are forced into a life-and-death competition for ventilators, military officials have just put in a further bid of $20bn to bolster ‘deterrence’ against China.

Trump’s ‘blame China’ rhetoric is entering dangerous territory where ideology overwhelms rationality: in the disagreements over trade, it was possible to reach some sort of an agreement, but now, when one side just calls the other a liar, there can be no basis for negotiation.

Is China to blame? Some mistakes were made at first but the Wuhan lockdown, imposed on January 23rd, proved effective. The crucial question to ask is: why were some governments, for example in East Asia, able to contain the virus quickly whilst across Europe and the US the death rate mounts by thousands upon thousands? The fact is that our governments got the priorities badly wrong, we were ‘defended’ against the wrong threats even when the NHS failed the pandemic practice run in 2016. For all the hundreds of billions spent on ‘hard power’ in Britain, we were not kept safe.

In Britain an influential group of Tory Party hawks have joined the ‘blame China’ chorus. They seek closer alignment with Trump and, post pandemic, will fight tooth and nail to defend, and even demand an increase in, military spending in a delusional commitment to ‘Global Britain’. Pushing against any public pressure to shift government spending priorities, they will insist on the £14bn needed to pay for fleets of F-35 fighter jets to equip our aircraft carriers so as to stand shoulder to shoulder with the US against China’s rise.

Trump’s racist offensive has reverberated around the world, framing China as the new enemy in a campaign of demonisation. Here in Britain, sinophobia is rife across the media, creating a climate of suspicion, fear, anger and hatred. East Asians are targeted in hate crimes; mysterious fires destroy 5G masts across Britain and Europe; Chinese people are made to appear less than human; and a stream of fake news about China fills the political vacuum where racism and jingoism breeds. The situation is not unlike the lead up to the Iraq war over its non-existent weapons of mass destruction.

The new narrative of China’s plot to take over the world is in fact a not-so-new revival of the old familiar ‘Yellow Peril’ trope: some one hundred years ago, the public on both sides of the Atlantic were held in horrified thrall by Hollywood fictional tales featuring the insidious Dr. Fu Manchu and his treacherous schemes for world dictatorship.

International cooperation is desperately needed: the virus knows no borders and cannot be tackled by national action alone. Global powers need to come together to share information, exchange good medical practice and develop a vaccine to be made accessible to all. Scientists from different countries working together are spearheading the way forward. The fact that the Chinese government is sending medical specialists to help in our emergency makes a nonsense of attempts to portray the country as our ‘adversary’. But the bitter truth is that anti-China propaganda stands in the way of the fight against the virus.

Tensions with China may well get even worse as economies around the world deteriorate and governments try to avoid blame for the epidemic. Open hostility will make it harder to limit economic damage. And ahead, climate change threatens new catastrophes. We need a complete reassessment of what security means.

The case for peace and international cooperation could not be stronger. Yet right now British foreign policy is under pressure as the Tory anti-China ideologues seize on the crisis as an opportunity to break with China and follow Trump on the path to confrontation.

Labour’s Atlanticist ‘opposition’ front benchers are out of their depth. Peace campaigners in the US are now speaking out against the deadly ‘blame China’ game, warning of a second Cold War. Britain’s anti-war and peace campaigners must prepare to join them: the enemy is not China; it’s the virus.
Arms Production and Trends in Technology

by Ken Coates

In March 1987, the Transport and General Workers Union (now part of Unite) in the UK convened a European Trade Union Conference on Arms Jobs Conversion. Ron Todd, TGWU General Secretary at the time, wrote: “duty surely calls upon us to look for the next steps in our work for peace, and specifically for arms jobs conversion. We need now to start to build international trade union commitment to these aims, involving working people directly and actively in this vital work for humanity’s future.”

More than thirty years on, interest in the work envisaged by Todd and others is increasing, including amongst a large layer of trade unionists. Are the successors of the TGWU willing to take up this important work again? It is to be hoped that they are. We reprint an extract from Ken Coates’ paper to the conference as part of ongoing efforts from END Info to contribute to the debate around arms conversion, socially useful production and nuclear disarmament.

The arms economy takes up somewhere between 5 per cent and 10 per cent of the whole world’s income, at least a quarter of all manufacturing production. This is the kind of proportion that has been used by nations in the past to set aside annually for their economic development. The industrially developed nations, in fact, set aside today much larger proportions of their income for investment (around 25 per cent); but when arms expenditure is added to this, then current consumption is reduced to take up two-thirds only of all economic activity. Since the less developed nations spend similar proportions on arms, their investment in development which spend the highest proportion of their income on arms (e.g. the USA and UK) spend much lower proportions on investment than others (e.g. Japan and Denmark) whose arms bill is much less. As a result, increases in productivity are least in the USA and most in Japan.

However we look at it, such a waste of up to one tenth of human effort can only be regarded as insane, and the implications of nuclear arms escalation are positively suicidal. What is more, arms production is a less and less labour intensive industry. Even the real increases in arms spending of the last few years - of about 3 per cent a year - have resulted in average cuts in unemployment of 4 per cent a year. In the UK 47 per cent of the arms budget is now spent on equipment, 33 per cent on personnel. Ten years ago 33 per cent went on equipment and 47 per cent on personnel.

The employment effects of this kind of expenditure are quite complex. World-wide, unemployment runs at some ninety million, while a further three-hundred million people are working precariously in underemployed occupations. But the population explosion means that the workforce is going to rise very rapidly, from its present level of 2.2 billion to at least 2.8 billion at the end of the century. World-wide, then, we must create six hundred million jobs for the newly arriving workforce, and nearly four hundred million for those out of work or inadequately employed. Ninety per cent of this billion job short fall is in the underdeveloped south, which is gripped in a massive debt crisis, that eats up every possibility of productive investment for many years to come. This is the context in which military expenditure must be evaluated. Ruth Leger Sivard calculates that war budgets generate employment for one hundred million people worldwide. Why do we not see these jobs as at any rate a small step towards the solution of the problem?

Fewer jobs The answer is that military spending undercuts other investment and displaces it. Arms expenditure creates many fewer jobs than those which could be seeded by a similar investment in labour intensive occupations, in education, health, transport or community care. More employment in these sectors creates an immediate increase in civilian demand, and therefore stimulates economic growth in all other sectors of the economy. There are only two ways in which military expenditure can stimulate growth, and both of them are exceptionally painful. It can enter a technological race in which ever more capital is burned up in the production of ever more elaborate weapons systems, employing ever fewer workers. This is the process which Mary Kaldor has called “Baroque Technology”. Such a process will enlarge arms corporations at the tax payer’s expense, but it will do nothing for jobs and real growth in useable goods and services. The second option is to have an actual war, which will certainly create big destruction, and if we survive it, big demand for re-construction.

Up to now, since 1945 mankind has been “lucky” in that such wars have been confined to conventional weapons and “limited” zones: even though they have been incredibly costly in human life... The grotesque butchery of the battlefield is carefully sustained by arms manufacturers, who cheerfully sell to [all] sides.

Whether we have such wars or not, is not an economic decision, but we are entitled, as trade unionists, to say that this is a political option which we reject. If we should reject it when it involves the slaughter of our own populations, we should reject it no less when it involves the export of mass-destruction to Third World peoples. Human politics is impossible if we do not oppose war, and also military build-ups and the cynical trade in arms. In this sense, of course, the political war is the prior domain, and should determine economic choices.

There are also, however, very solid economic reasons why military spending worsens the employment situation. It can outbid civilian industry for resources, because it is funded by central state provision, whilst others...
must usually assemble their resources in the competitive market place. It imposes strict secrecy which can only impede the spread of technological knowledge, and hinder the development and application of new techniques. And it seeds inefficiency as every student of the military is abundantly aware. This last problem is the worst, because it dooms its victims to lose out in competition, and thus raises levels of crisis, deepening economic slumps.

Because military investment is now so capital intensive, it skews every effort to redistribute income. One billion dollars create 8,250 jobs in the manufacture of Trident missiles, while for the same cost, 52,000 people could be employed in education and 102,500 in public services. The multiplier or knock-on effect of 102,500 jobs is obviously highly significant in all other sectors of the economy, whether public or private. Military spending thus reinforces social, geographical and sectoral inequalities, and locks those engaging in it into growing structural crises. To move out of mass unemployment, the advanced economies have to generate redistribution between classes, spatially between rich and poor areas nationally and internationally, and industrially towards new projects and modern technologies.

The worst feature of military spending is that, in addition to debilitating the present economy, it devastates the future. As military R&D gobbles up more and more of the social investment in future technologies, it lays waste the opportunities of new generations...

Key Factors The possibilities of converting arms production and research to peaceful use depend on a number of factors which need to be held in mind together:

1. Arms production and research is financed by nation state governments which have a popular consensus behind this expenditure, however much such support may be artificially encouraged by the propaganda of authoritarian or military regimes.

2. It is much more difficult to develop a consensus behind state expenditure on non-arms production, since opinion tends to be divided between many alternative directions for state spending, e.g., health education, housing, transport, etc.

3. The very large companies have a vested interest in arms production because a) arms quickly become obsolete and have to be replaced; b) the cost of military goods is very difficult for governments to control by comparison with other costs; and c) arms do not compete with other products of big companies, as, e.g., public transport does with the private car.

4. Although, in fact, state spending on arms employs fewer people for any sum spent than does state spending on peaceful purposes, nevertheless, workers in the arms industry have no confidence in their re-employment as a result of arms conversion.

5. There are some real technical problems in converting production from military to peaceful use, though these tend to be exaggerated and are far less important than the structural reasons, by which arms production is built into the military industrial complexes of company and government, which can be seen to dominate the economy of the USA and of other states.

It follows from consideration of these factors that the main requirement of any programme of arms conversion is that clear alternatives should be put forward for the use of the productive capacity now devoted to arms. Such alternatives have been put forward by a number of company wide committees of trade unions in Britain, especially by Lucas Aerospace and Vickers combine committees. The essential elements in such alternative programmes are:

a) taxpayers can be assured that “their” money is going to meet needs that they feel to be equally or more demanding than defence;

b) non-taxpayers (pensioners, unemployed, etc.) can believe that they will benefit in goods or services and in employment opportunities from the conversion policy;

c) workers can be assured that as many (or more) jobs will be generated by the alternative programmes.

None of this can be left to the market and private enterprise; but will require planning by governments with strong involvement of both unions and local government authorities, encouraging local community organisations to think through and agree on alternative claims for resource use. Conversion from the present arms economy can only be successful as part of a wider programme of popular economic activity. The alternative to arms has to grow in the hearts and minds of the people, as they explore new and exciting ways of using the vast resources at the disposal of human beings in the world today. The strongest moral appeal must be to raise the incomes of the people in the Third World. In the Socialist International’s report Global Challenge it is estimated that a cut of just one tenth in the current level of spending on armaments could not only create 20 million new jobs in Europe in a decade, but could also raise output in the Third World by more than 50 per cent over the same period.