The United States has withheld the overwhelmingly larger part of Iraq’s report on weapons of mass destruction from the elected members of the United Nations Security Council, according to reliable reports which we have received. The Russell Foundation has raised the crucial issues which follow from this strategic intervention by the United States in the implementation of resolution 1441 with the United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan, and the members of the Security Council themselves. We have also sought Nelson Mandela’s help in this vital matter.

To Mr Kofi Annan
Secretary General
The United Nations

Dear Secretary General,
We are deeply disturbed by a news item which has appeared in the Scottish press, which reports that of the 11,800 page dossier on weapons of mass destruction, prepared by the Iraqi Government in response to resolution 1441 of the Security Council, ‘more than 8,000 pages’ have been withheld from the ten non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

Can you inform us by what right this decision was taken, in accordance with which rule of procedure? It would seem to us that members of the Security Council have equal right to receive all communications which arise out of the operation of the Council’s resolutions. Are you arguing that this is not the case?

How did it come about that one member-state arrived in a position in which it could censor communications to ten other members? We think this matter is of some considerable importance, and we hope that you will be able to explain to us how it has been justified.

With our respect and good wishes.
Yours sincerely,
Ken Coates
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
To Mr Nelson Mandela

Dear Mr Mandela,

As I am sure that you will have seen, pursuant to resolution 1441 of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Iraqi Government submitted a dossier of no fewer than 11,800 pages to the United Nations, reporting on weapons of mass destruction. It was subsequently reported that the United States Government had obtained possession of this dossier by the expedient of offering to photocopy it for the officials of the UN. On this unbelievable pretext, it became possible for the United States to impose its own regulation on the distribution of the dossier. It is alleged that the five permanent members have been acquainted with the full contents of the dossier. But it was quite widely reported that the non-permanent members were acquainted with a shorter version of the dossier, excluding certain information about the technical details of the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, and other information about the suppliers of equipment for this manufacturing process, which could be deemed to incriminate some Western companies.

However, the truth seems to be very much more disturbing. Under the byline of Felicity Arbuthnot and James Cusick, the Glasgow Sunday Herald published a story which alleged that ‘more than 8,000 crucial pages’ of the Iraqi dossier submitted under resolution 1441 had been suppressed in the versions made available to non-permanent members of the Security Council. I spoke to Ms. Arbuthnot about this report which seemed, quite frankly, unbelievable. But she assures me that it is true, and that she had it on the authority of Hans von Sponeck.

If the majority of the members of the Security Council can be prevented from reading a dossier which, after all, is addressed to them, how can they reach a dispassionate judgement on the terrible question of war and peace? Is it not necessary to find ways to call the United Nations to order on this matter? I have asked Kofi Annan to explain by what authority this decision was taken. I am sure that if you were able to press this question, it is possible that you might be far better placed to get an answer. In any event, I think that the danger of war is already dire. If war breaks out, Iraq will not be the only casualty, desperate though its fate is likely to be. The other main casualty will be the United Nations, which will be seriously discredited if procedures of this kind cannot be challenged.

With my respect and very good wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Ken Coates
Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation
In the latest of a series of official statements spelling out its new military doctrine, the Bush administration has given its clearest warning yet of preparations for pre-emptive military strikes against perceived enemies alleged to be in possession of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Such strikes may be with nuclear weapons. Issued in December 2002, this document has aroused widespread international concern.

‘The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. ...History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.’

President Bush – The National Security Strategy of the United States of America
September 17, 2002

Introduction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, biological, and chemical – in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represent one of the greatest security challenges facing the United States. We must pursue a comprehensive strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.

An effective strategy for countering weapons of mass destruction, including their use and further proliferation, is an integral component of the National Security Strategy of the United States of America. As with the war on terrorism, our strategy for homeland security, and our new concept of deterrence, the US approach to combat weapons of mass destruction represents a fundamental change from the past. To succeed, we must take full advantage of today’s opportunities, including the application of new technologies, increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis, the strengthening of alliance relationships, and the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries.

Weapons of mass destruction could enable adversaries to inflict massive harm on the United States, our military forces at home and abroad, and our friends and allies. Some states, including several that have supported and continue to support terrorism, already possess weapons of mass destruction and are seeking even greater capabilities, as tools of coercion and intimidation. For them, these are not weapons of last resort, but militarily useful weapons of choice intended to overcome our nation’s advantages in conventional forces and to deter us from responding to aggression against our friends and allies in regions of vital interest. In addition, terrorist groups are seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction
with the stated purpose of killing large numbers of our people and those of friends and allies – without compunction and without warning.

We will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons. We must accord the highest priority to the protection of the United States, our forces, and our friends and allies from the existing and growing weapons of mass destruction threat.

**Pillars of our National Strategy**

Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction has three principal pillars:

*Counter-proliferation to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Use*  
The possession and increased likelihood of use of weapons of mass destruction by hostile states and terrorists are realities of the contemporary security environment. It is therefore critical that the United States military and appropriate civilian agencies be prepared to deter and defend against the full range of possible weapons of mass destruction employment scenarios. We will ensure that all needed capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction are fully integrated into the emerging defence transformation plan and into our homeland security posture. Counter-proliferation will also be fully integrated into the basic doctrine, training, and equipping of all forces, in order to ensure that they can sustain operations to decisively defeat weapons of mass destruction-armed adversaries.

*Strengthened Non-proliferation to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation*  
The United States, our friends and allies, and the broader international community must undertake every effort to prevent states and terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and missiles. We must enhance traditional measures – diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls – that seek to dissuade or impede proliferating states and terrorist networks, as well as to slow and make more costly their access to sensitive technologies, material, and expertise. We must ensure compliance with relevant international agreements, including the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The United States will continue to work with other states to improve their capability to prevent unauthorised transfers of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, expertise, and material. We will identify and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national criminalisation of proliferation activities and expanded safety and security measures.

*Consequence Management to Respond to Weapons of Mass Destruction Use*  
Finally, the United States must be prepared to respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction against our citizens, our military forces, and those of friends and allies. We will develop and maintain the capability to reduce to the extent
possible the potentially horrific consequences of weapons of mass destruction attacks at home and abroad.

The three pillars of the United States national strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction are seamless elements of a comprehensive approach. Serving to integrate the pillars are four cross-cutting enabling functions that need to be pursued on a priority basis: intelligence collection and analysis on weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and related technologies; research and development to improve our ability to respond to evolving threats; bilateral and multilateral cooperation; and targeted strategies against hostile states and terrorists.

**Counter-proliferation**
We know from experience that we cannot always be successful in preventing and containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to hostile states and terrorists. Therefore, the United States military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess the full range of operational capabilities to counter the threat and use of weapons of mass destruction by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies.

**Interdiction**
Effective interdiction is a critical part of the United States strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means. We must enhance the capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the movement of weapons of mass destruction materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist organisations.

**Deterrence**
Today’s threats are far more diverse and less predictable than those of the past. States hostile to the United States and to our friends and allies have demonstrated their willingness to take high risks to achieve their goals, and are aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as critical tools in this effort. As a consequence, we require new methods of deterrence. A strong declaratory policy and effective military forces are essential elements of our contemporary deterrent posture, along with the full range of political tools to persuade potential adversaries not to seek or use weapons of mass destruction. The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – including through resort to all of our options – to the use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.

In addition to our conventional and nuclear response and defence capabilities, our overall deterrent posture against weapons of mass destruction threats is reinforced by effective intelligence, surveillance, interdiction, and domestic law enforcement capabilities. Such combined capabilities enhance deterrence both by devaluing an adversary’s weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and by posing the prospect of an overwhelming response to any use of such weapons.
Defence and Mitigation

Because deterrence may not succeed, and because of the potentially devastating consequences of weapons of mass destruction use against our forces and civilian population, United States military forces and appropriate civilian agencies must have the capability to defend against weapons of mass destruction-armed adversaries, including in appropriate cases through pre-emptive measures. This requires capabilities to detect and destroy an adversary’s weapons of mass destruction assets before these weapons are used. In addition, robust active and passive defences and mitigation measures must be in place to enable United States military forces and appropriate civilian agencies to accomplish their missions, and to assist friends and allies when weapons of mass destruction are used.

Active defences disrupt, disable, or destroy weapons of mass destruction en route to their targets. Active defences include vigorous air defence and effective missile defences against today’s threats. Passive defences must be tailored to the unique characteristics of the various forms of weapons of mass destruction. The United States must also have the ability rapidly and effectively to mitigate the effects of a weapons of mass destruction attack against our deployed forces.

Our approach to defend against biological threats has long been based on our approach to chemical threats, despite the fundamental differences between these weapons. The United States is developing a new approach to provide us and our friends and allies with an effective defence against biological weapons.

Finally, United States military forces and domestic law enforcement agencies as appropriate must stand ready to respond against the source of any weapons of mass destruction attack. The primary objective of a response is to disrupt an imminent attack or an attack in progress, and eliminate the threat of future attacks. As with deterrence and prevention, an effective response requires rapid attribution and robust strike capability. We must accelerate efforts to field new capabilities to defeat weapons of mass destruction related assets. The United States needs to be prepared to conduct post-conflict operations to destroy or dismantle any residual weapons of mass destruction capabilities of the hostile state or terrorist network. An effective United States response not only will eliminate the source of a weapons of mass destruction attack but will also have a powerful deterrent effect upon other adversaries that possess or seek weapons of mass destruction or missiles.

Non-proliferation

Active Non-proliferation Diplomacy

The United States will actively employ diplomatic approaches in bilateral and multilateral settings in pursuit of our non-proliferation goals.

We must dissuade supplier states from co-operating with proliferating states and induce proliferating states to end their weapons of mass destruction and missile programmes. We will hold countries responsible for complying with their commitments. In addition, we will continue to build coalitions to support our efforts, as well as to seek their increased support for non-proliferation and threat
reduction co-operation programmes. However, should our wide-ranging non-proliferation efforts fail, we must have available the full range of operational capabilities necessary to defend against the possible employment of weapons of mass destruction.

**Multilateral Regimes**
Existing non-proliferation and arms control regimes play an important role in our overall strategy. The United States will support those regimes that are currently in force, and work to improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those regimes. Consistent with other policy priorities, we will also promote new agreements and arrangements that serve our non-proliferation goals. Overall, we seek to cultivate an international environment that is more conducive to non-proliferation. Our efforts will include:

**Nuclear**
- Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including through ratification of an IAEA Additional Protocol by all NPT states parties, assurances that all states put in place full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreements, and appropriate increases in funding for the Agency;
- Negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty that advances United States security interests; and
- Strengthening the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee.

**Chemical and Biological**
- Effective functioning of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons;
- Identification and promotion of constructive and realistic measures to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and thereby to help meet the biological weapons threat; and
- Strengthening of the Australia Group.

**Missile**
- Strengthening the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), including through support for universal adherence to the International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

**Non-proliferation and Threat Reduction Co-operation**
The United States pursues a wide range of programmes, including the Nunn-Lugar programme, designed to address the proliferation threat stemming from the large quantities of Soviet-legacy weapons of mass destruction and missile-related expertise and materials. Maintaining an extensive and efficient set of non-proliferation and threat reduction assistance programmes to Russia and other former Soviet states is a high priority. We will also continue to encourage friends
and allies to increase their contributions to these programmes, particularly through the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. In addition, we will work with other states to improve the security of their weapons of mass destruction related materials.

Controls on Nuclear Materials
In addition to programmes with former Soviet states to reduce fissile material and improve the security of that which remains, the United States will continue to discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and to minimise the use of highly-enriched uranium. As outlined in the National Energy Policy, the United States will work in collaboration with international partners to develop recycle and fuel treatment technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant.

United States Export Controls
We must ensure that the implementation of United States export controls furthers our non-proliferation and other national security goals, while recognising the realities that American businesses face in the increasingly globalised marketplace.

We will work to update and strengthen export controls using existing authorities. We also seek new legislation to improve the ability of our export control system to give full weight to both non-proliferation objectives and commercial interests. Our overall goal is to focus our resources on truly sensitive exports to hostile states or those that engage in onward proliferation, while removing unnecessary barriers in the global marketplace.

Non-proliferation Sanctions
Sanctions can be a valuable component of our overall strategy against weapons of mass destruction proliferation. At times, however, sanctions have proven inflexible and ineffective. We will develop a comprehensive sanctions policy to better integrate sanctions into our overall strategy and work with Congress to consolidate and modify existing sanctions legislation.

Weapons of Mass Destruction Consequence Management
Defending the American homeland is the most basic responsibility of our government. As part of our defence, the United States must be fully prepared to respond to the consequences of weapons of mass destruction use on our soil, whether by hostile states or by terrorists. We must also be prepared to respond to the effects of weapons of mass destruction use against our forces deployed abroad, and to assist friends and allies.

The National Strategy for Homeland Security discusses United States Government programmes to deal with the consequences of the use of a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon in the United States. A number of these programmes offer training, planning, and assistance to state and local
governments. To maximise their effectiveness, these efforts need to be integrated and comprehensive. Our first responders must have the full range of protective, medical, and remediation tools to identify, assess, and respond rapidly to a weapons of mass destruction event on our territory.

The White House Office of Homeland Security will co-ordinate all federal efforts to prepare for and mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks within the United States, including those involving weapons of mass destruction. The Office of Homeland Security will also work closely with state and local governments to ensure their planning, training, and equipment requirements are addressed. These issues, including the roles of the Department of Homeland Security, are addressed in detail in the National Strategy for Homeland Security.

The National Security Council’s Office of Combating Terrorism co-ordinates and helps improve United States efforts to respond to and manage the recovery from terrorist attacks outside the United States. In co-operation with the Office of Combating Terrorism, the Department of State co-ordinates interagency efforts to work with our friends and allies to develop their own emergency preparedness and consequence management capabilities.

**Integrating the Pillars**

Several critical enabling functions serve to integrate the three pillars – counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management – of the United States National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.

*Improved Intelligence Collection and Analysis*

A more accurate and complete understanding of the full range of weapons of mass destruction threats is, and will remain, among the highest United States intelligence priorities, to enable us to prevent proliferation, and to deter or defend against those who would use those capabilities against us. Improving our ability to obtain timely and accurate knowledge of adversaries’ offensive and defensive capabilities, plans, and intentions is key to developing effective counter- and non-proliferation policies and capabilities. Particular emphasis must be accorded to improving: intelligence regarding weapons of mass destruction-related facilities and activities; interaction among United States intelligence, law enforcement, and military agencies; and intelligence co-operation with friends and allies.

*Research and Development*

The United States has a critical need for cutting-edge technology that can quickly and effectively detect, analyse, facilitate interdiction of, defend against, defeat, and mitigate the consequences of weapons of mass destruction. Numerous United States Government departments and agencies are currently engaged in the essential research and development to support our overall strategy against weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
The new Counter-proliferation Technology Co-ordination Committee, consisting of senior representatives from all concerned agencies, will act to improve inter-agency co-ordination of United States Government counter-proliferation research and development efforts. The Committee will assist in identifying priorities, gaps, and overlaps in existing programmes and in examining options for future investment strategies.

**Strengthened International Co-operation**

Weapons of mass destruction represent a threat not just to the United States, but also to our friends and allies and the broader international community. For this reason, it is vital that we work closely with like-minded countries on all elements of our comprehensive proliferation strategy.

**Targeted Strategies Against Proliferators**

All elements of the overall United States strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction must be brought to bear in targeted strategies against supplier and recipient states of weapons of mass destruction proliferation concern, as well as against terrorist groups which seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

A few states are dedicated proliferators, whose leaders are determined to develop, maintain, and improve their weapons of mass destruction and delivery capabilities, which directly threaten the United States, US forces overseas, and/or our friends and allies. Because each of these regimes is different, we will pursue country-specific strategies that best enable us and our friends and allies to prevent, deter, and defend against weapons of mass destruction and missile threats from each of them. These strategies must also take into account the growing co-operation among proliferating states – so-called secondary proliferation – which challenges us to think in new ways about specific country strategies.

One of the most difficult challenges we face is to prevent, deter, and defend against the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. The current and potential future linkages between terrorist groups and state sponsors of terrorism are particularly dangerous and require priority attention. The full range of counter-proliferation, non-proliferation, and consequence management measures must be brought to bear against the weapons of mass destruction terrorist threat, just as they are against states of greatest proliferation concern.

**End Note**

Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction requires much of all of us – the Executive Branch, the Congress, state and local governments, the American people, and our friends and allies. The requirements to prevent, deter, defend against, and respond to today’s weapons of mass destruction threats are complex and challenging. But they are not daunting. We can and will succeed in the tasks laid out in this strategy; we have no other choice.
A report on United States plans for military experimentation in Iraq was published in Australia’s Sidney Morning Herald (4 January 2003) over Paul McGeough’s byline.

Weapons manufacturers have an array of frightening new high-tech devices ready to play a part in any attack on Iraq. If the fighting starts in Iraq, Saddam Hussein and his forces will be instant guinea pigs for a new generation of US weapons which may be used for the first time in all-out war. The keyword will be ‘remote’. This is not to gloss over the risks facing tens of thousands of US and allied troops who will be on the ground, but such is the excitement at the new gee-whiz in the armoury that Washington is shipping, or hopes to ship, to the Gulf, that observers could almost believe that the men in white coats had devised the ultimate video game – a war without troops.

The design and deployment audacity of what the United States likes to call its ‘robo-assassin’ hardware was displayed in Yemen early in November when the CIA used a remote-controlled, pilotless Predator drone to launch a Hellfire missile from 7500 metres above the desert. It obliterated a vehicle travelling on a desert road and killed six Al Qaeda suspects inside.

In the years since the last Gulf War it has emerged that America’s so-called smart bombs were not as precise or as plentiful as the world had been led to believe. This time the United States and its weaponry have to be smarter – if Washington wants world acceptance of its role in Iraq during and after a war, it cannot afford to trash the country and its civilian infrastructure as it did last time. Which is where a new suite of US weapons will come into their own. These are high-powered microwave devices, ‘directed energy’ weapons that the US hopes can be used to render a fleet of army vehicles useless by destroying their ignition or fuel systems. They will also cause disorientating pain – but apparently no lasting damage – by playing with nerve-ends in the enemy’s skin.

A military affairs analyst, William M. Arkin, elaborates: ‘Microwave weapons work by producing an intense surge of energy, like a lightning bolt, that short-circuits electrical connections, interferes with computer motherboards, destroys memory chips and damages other electrical components. They send a narrow beam of energy that penetrates into [human] skin, to where nerves that cause pain are located.’ Describing the panic-causing intensity of the pain inflicted by the high-powered microwaves, he quoted a military officer who had experienced it: ‘All the glossy slide presentations cannot prepare you for what to expect when you step in the beam.’ The weapon is at an advanced stage.

In the much-vaunted surgical precision of the 1991 conflict, only 7 per cent of the munitions used were ‘smart’. That proportion jumped to 30 per cent in Kosovo in 1999, and to 60 per cent in Afghanistan. The Pentagon is punting on 100 per cent smartness in the coming conflict.

The improving targeting accuracy comes from a new device called a Joint
Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), a tail assembly fitted to ‘dumb’ bombs so that they always know where they are and where they are going – either by data relayed from the aircraft that will drop them or being sent by satellite once they have been launched. The JDAM costs a mere $US27,000 ($48,000), compared with the $US1 million-plus cost of a cruise missile. The JDAM engineers promised the Pentagon that 50 per cent of the weapons fired would hit within 13 metres of their targets. But an Air Force general who had a hand in the Afghanistan war bragged to *Time* magazine that they fell within three metres of their target 100 per cent of the time.

But there is more upside to the JDAMs. In Afghanistan, the Taliban air force and anti-aircraft defences were never a serious threat. In Iraq it’s a different story, but the JDAMs promise to keep United States pilots out of harm’s way – pilots had to fly at 4500 metres to drop the old laser-guided bombs, but the JDAMs can be launched from more than 10,000 metres up and while the aircraft is a good 25 kilometres from the target. They take as little as 10 minutes to launch compared with up to an hour for a cruise missile, and instead of being dropped in ones and twos, as was the case in 1991, these bombs can be dropped in dozen or two dozen lots. Such are the precision and flexibility of US firepower that there are confident predictions from within the Pentagon that less than half of the 500,000 troops who were deployed to the Gulf in 1991 will be needed in 2003 – but that still leaves up to 250,000 allied troops on the ground in what could be a bloody and brutal war zone.

Each day six US intelligence satellites over Iraq hoover up imagery and data which flood into the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, near Washington. There, mapmakers have been refining what is called the Digital Point Positioning Database with the co-ordinates of every possible target for the coming war. One of the few brakes on American enthusiasm as the Iraq conflict looms is a desperate shortage of satellites. Masses of mapping data is being funnelled through space for the targeting database and for the creation of three-dimensional street-by-street maps of Baghdad and other Iraqi cities. As US troops go in, their commanders will be able to watch their every move on instant video links that will be overlaid on the maps. This technology is so sophisticated that during the Afghanistan war, the President and Commander-in-Chief, George Bush, had a live feed in the Oval Office. It is this flood of electronic information that is clogging satellite capacity. That capacity is needed to control the pilot-less Predators and their weapons as they link up with commanders who might be thousands of kilometres away, manned aircraft that might be in the same skies and special operations troops who might be on the ground in the target area. The Predator drones also make brilliant – if terrifying – surveillance platforms. During the battle of Jenin, in the Israeli-occupied West Bank early last year, stricken Israeli army chiefs watched from their command bunker while a drone-borne camera gave them live footage as it hovered over a tiny courtyard in which an elaborate Palestinian booby-trap claimed the lives of 14 Israeli soldiers.

But it was in Afghanistan that the United States had the first opportunity to
test the drones to their limit. Air Force Captain Eilssa Beddow told The Wall Street Journal how, operating from hundreds of kilometres away in neighbouring Pakistan, she used a control stick, a computer keyboard and several television monitors to direct an unmanned 8.2 metre-long spy-plane up and down a road on which Taliban fighters had been sighted. After 30 minutes she found them. Using the same satellite links that ran the drone and relayed its video imagery, she called in a manned Navy fighter jet and directed it to a hut near where the men of Al Qaeda were milling around their parked four wheel drive vehicle. She told the Journal of her thoughts as she watched them die: ‘You almost wanted to scream, “run, get out of the way! You’re going to be killed”.

When the US was developing the drone technology in the early 1990s, it predicted that it would be able to call upon close to 1000 privately operated satellites. It didn’t happen and in Afghanistan it could keep only three of the eight drones it had in the area in the air at any one time because of the paucity of satellite capacity. That Beddow was able to call in the attack aircraft was the refinement early in the Afghanistan war that made the Predator and Global Hawk drones more than simple surveillance platforms. But the price was using up scarce satellite capacity. Now the Air Force Research Lab has teams hard at work in an attempt to defeat the satellite shortage by developing a new laser-based system of communication which would increase the throughput of the satellites. And the Pentagon is experimenting to further refine the application of the drone technology – by dropping small seismic sensors from the air that have the ability to detect vibrations from tanks and other heavy vehicles and beam signals to those controlling the drones. They will be able to manoeuvre the drones into the area to investigate enemy movement and take snapshots of targets that can then be relayed to bomber pilots to save time and errors caused by verbal descriptions of targets at the height of battle.

Arkin, the military affairs analyst, recently lifted the veil of secrecy on the newest so-called ‘agent defeat’ weapons in the United States, revealing the development of a new cluster bomb that would release 4000 titanium rods to cut through chemical and biological bunkers with explosive force, and a new incendiary device which he said would create a firestorm so intense that water would not extinguish it. Writing in the Los Angeles Times, he said that the new weapons would help the United States to seize or neutralise Iraqi weapons of mass destruction with greater speed and security and, at the same time, cause less damage to surrounding areas and people. But he cautioned: ‘There are risks, however, because some of the new weapons could arguably be construed as violating established codes of wartime conduct. And the risks of a backlash, whether at home or abroad, are magnified by the Administration’s almost total refusal to talk about what it is doing and thereby build public understanding and support. ‘Unfortunately one side effect of framing the war on terrorism in terms of weapons of mass destruction is that it instils in government officials a sense of moral certainty so great that they feel no need to explain or to justify themselves.’
In 1991, the United States and its allies mounted a 38-day air assault on Iraq before putting troops on the ground, but such is its confidence in the marriage of means and objective this time, the Pentagon believes it will have foot soldiers in Iraq within days of the commencement of bombing. The emerging technology is well suited to the US objective in Iraq – an assault on one man, his cronies and the machinery of his military and security apparatus. As one military planner put it to The Washington Post: ‘[We want to] very quickly decapitate the regime.’

**BISHOPS QUESTION WAR ON IRAQ**

‘The weakening of America’s commitment to the multilateral process suggests the moral, political and legal threshold for war has been substantially lowered.’

In October 2002, the House of Bishops of the Church of England submitted a 28 page document ‘Evaluating the Threat of Military Action against Iraq’ to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee’s ongoing inquiry into the War on Terrorism. The Bishops adopted a carefully reasoned and balanced approach in their evidence. They showed themselves very well informed about the resolutions and activities of the United Nations in relation to Iraq and their impact on Iraq’s weapons capacity. Beyond this, the Bishops examined the intention of the United States and Britain to get rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime in the context of the new world order and the new doctrines designed to ensure the universal dominance of American interests, and their implications for international law. We publish some short excerpts here.

‘It is difficult to understand current US policy to Iraq without recourse to the US’s National Security Strategy document published in September 2002. This document, more than any other, underpins not only US policy towards Iraq, but also US foreign policy priorities in a post Cold War era where the US finds itself more a hyper-power than a super-power… The current debate is not just about Iraq, but about the nature of the international community and its ability or inability to accommodate American hegemony.

‘To some, the ongoing crisis reflects not only Iraqi but also American intransigence towards the UN. Resolution 687 states explicitly that the ban on Iraqi exports will be lifted when Iraq complies with UN weapons inspections. However, even as early as 1997 President Clinton remarked, ‘sanctions will be there until the end of time or as long as Saddam Hussein lasts.’ In December 1998, on the eve of Operation Desert Fox, President Clinton again stated: ‘The hard fact is that so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he threatens the wellbeing of his people, the peace of the region, the security of the world. The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government, a government ready to live in peace with its neighbours, a government that respect
the rights of the people.’ This policy came to fruition in October 1998 when the US Congress passed the ‘Iraq Liberation Act’, which made significant money available for the funding of Iraqi opposition groups. This approach continued with President Bush. In February 2002 US Secretary of State Colin Powell stated: ‘We believe that Iraq would be better served with a different leadership with a different regime so we have had a policy of regime change. This really has been there all along but it was crystallised by President Clinton in 1998 at the time of Operation Desert Fox.’

‘The events of 11 September 2001 have provided the US with an opportunity to implement its policy of regime change. Initially this policy was phrased in terms of extending the war on terrorism to include those countries such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, listed by President Bush as constituting an ‘axis of evil’. Yet despite the best efforts of the CIA no evidence exists that establishes a link between Iraq and the Al-Qaeda network.’

*The Bishops pointed out how the British Government’s tune has changed to harmonise with that of the White House.*

‘The [Government’s] dossier [on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction] amounts to a repositioning of UK foreign policy towards Iraq. Up to the time when the Prime Minister visited President Bush at Camp Crawford, Texas, in March 2002, British foreign policy towards Iraq reflected the twin strategies of containment and deterrence. The objective was to apply diplomatic pressure on Iraq to force compliance with the UN, whilst relying on sanctions to deny Iraq the means to rebuild its WMDs. In a letter to the Roman Catholic Bishop of Leeds, the Rt. Rev David Konstant, in November 2000, Peter Hain, the former Minister of State with responsibility for Iraq wrote: ‘Sanctions have not been counterproductive to the disarmament objective. On the contrary, sanctions have kept a brutal dictator contained for ten years and have blocked his access to equipment and parts to rebuild his WMD arsenal.’ From this perspective sanctions effectively restrained Iraq’s capacity for military expansion…

‘There was general agreement between those bishops speaking in the Parliamentary debate that the evidence presented within the Government’s dossier did not constitute an imminent threat or just cause in support of military action at this juncture.’

*The Bishops sought to apply the Church’s traditional ‘just war’ teaching to the threatened war on Iraq, for the guidance of Christians and as a contribution to the public debate.*

‘The threat of further military action against Iraq forces the Church and Christians to grapple with whether or not any war could be considered a just war, or more specifically under what conditions might war be considered just… Traditionally just war theory allows countries to use force to repel an act of aggression… Morally a distinction is made between anticipatory self-defence, which is morally justified and preventive war, which is morally prohibited. To argue in favour of preventive action would be to undermine the need for war to be used as a last resort and would prejudice alternative efforts at conflict
prevention and resolution. Preventive wars against a perceived future threat would invariably raise questions as to the motive or intent behind the action.

‘The just war tradition provides an appropriate moral framework through which to evaluate the 2002 US National Security Strategy. The decision to ‘adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries’ is morally as well as politically hazardous. The collapsing of the boundaries between preventive and pre-emptive action runs the risk of opening a ‘Pandora’s box’, which once opened will be difficult to close. The National Security Strategy recognises this by indicating that ‘the US will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression.’ While the lack of clarity however as to which preventive wars are legally and morally justifiable is inarticulately spelt out in the document, the document leaves little doubt that the objective is the maintenance of a unipolar world with the US at its helm. The subsequent weakening of America’s commitment to the multilateral process suggests the moral, political and legal threshold for war has been substantially lowered. While preventive action against those terrorist organisations not tied to a nation state might legitimately be seen as a form of police enforcement, it remains problematic as a mechanism for resolving those tensions between nation states. Without this distinction the doctrines of containment and deterrence, and with it the commitment to resolve and accommodate international tensions through multilateral institutions could give way to a doctrine of unilateral preventive action, which nullifies the just war criteria of force as a last resort. In its application, questions will always be asked as to the US’s motive in using force.’

WORLD SOCIAL FORUM CHARTER OF PRINCIPLES


The committee of Brazilian organisations that conceived of, and organised, the first World Social Forum, held in Porto Alegre from January 25th to 30th, 2001, after evaluating the results of that Forum and the expectations it raised, consider it necessary and legitimate to draw up a Charter of Principles to guide the continued pursuit of that initiative. While the principles contained in this Charter – to be respected by all those who wish to take part in the process and to organise new editions of the World Social Forum – are a consolidation of the decisions that presided over the holding of the Porto Alegre Forum and ensured its success, they extend the reach of those decisions and define orientations that flow from their logic.
1. The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards fruitful relationships among Human Kind and between it and the Earth.

2. The World Social Forum at Porto Alegre was an event localised in time and place. From now on, in the certainty proclaimed at Porto Alegre that ‘another world is possible’, it becomes a permanent process of seeking and building alternatives which cannot be reduced to the events supporting it.

3. The World Social Forum is a world process. All the meetings that are held as part of this process have an international dimension.

4. The alternatives proposed at the World Social Forum stand in opposition to a process of globalisation commanded by the large multinational corporations and by the governments and international institutions at the service of those corporations’ interests, with the complicity of national governments. They are designed to ensure that globalisation in solidarity will prevail as a new stage in world history. This will respect universal human rights, and those of all citizens – men and women – of all nations, and the environment, and will rest on democratic international systems and institutions at the service of social justice, equality and the sovereignty of peoples.

5. The World Social Forum brings together and inter-links only organisations and movements of civil society from all the countries in the world, but does not intend to be a body representing world civil society.

6. The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate on behalf of the World Social Forum as a body. No-one, therefore, will be authorised, on behalf of any of the editions of the Forum, to express positions claiming to be those of all its participants. The participants in the Forum shall not be called on to take decisions as a body, whether by vote or acclamation, on declarations or proposals for action that would commit all, or the majority, of them and that propose to be taken as establishing positions of the Forum as a body. It thus does not constitute a locus of power to be disputed by the participants in its meetings, nor does it intend to constitute the only option for interrelation and action by the organisations and movements that participate in it.

7. Nonetheless, organisations or groups of organisations that participate in the Forum’s meetings must be assured the right, during such meetings, to deliberate on declarations or actions they may decide on, whether singly or in co-ordination with other participants. The World Social Forum undertakes to circulate such decisions widely by the means at its disposal, without directing, hierarchising, censuring or restricting them, but as deliberations of the organisations or groups of organisations that made the decisions.

8. The World Social Forum is a plural, diversified, non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party context that, in a decentralised fashion, interrelates
organisations and movements engaged in concrete action at levels from the local to the international to build another world.

9. The World Social Forum will always be a forum open to pluralism and to the diversity of activities and ways of engaging of the organisations and movements that decide to participate in it, as well as the diversity of genders, ethnicities, cultures, generations and physical capacities, providing they abide by this Charter of Principles. Neither party representations nor military organisations shall participate in the Forum. Government leaders and members of legislatures who accept the commitments of this Charter may be invited to participate in a personal capacity.

10. The World Social Forum is opposed to all totalitarian and reductionist views of economy, development and history and to the use of violence as a means of social control by the State. It upholds respect for Human Rights, the practices of real democracy, participatory democracy, peaceful relations, in equality and solidarity, among people, ethnicities, genders and peoples, and condemns all forms of domination and all subjection of one person by another.

11. As a forum for debate, the World Social Forum is a movement of ideas that prompts reflection, and the transparent circulation of the results of that reflection, on the mechanisms and instruments of domination by capital, on means and actions to resist and overcome that domination, and on the alternatives proposed to solve the problems of exclusion and social inequality that the process of capitalist globalisation, with its racist, sexist and environmentally destructive dimensions, is creating internationally and within countries.

12. As a framework for the exchange of experiences, the World Social Forum encourages understanding and mutual recognition among its participant organisations and movements, and places special value on the exchange among them, particularly on all that society is building to centre economic activity and political action on meeting the needs of people and respecting nature, in the present and for future generations.

13. As a context for interrelations, the World Social Forum seeks to strengthen and create new national and international links among organisations and movements of society that – in both public and private life – will increase the capacity for non-violent social resistance to the process of dehumanisation the world is undergoing and to the violence used by the State, and reinforce the humanising measures being taken by the action of these movements and organisations.

14. The World Social Forum is a process that encourages its participant organisations and movements to situate their actions, from the local level to the national level and seeking active participation in international contexts, as issues of planetary citizenship, and to introduce onto the global agenda the change-inducing practices that they are experimenting with in building a new world in solidarity.

THE COMMUNICATION
WORKERS’ UNION WANTS TO KNOW

How is it
WE HAVE MONEY FOR ARMS,
AND NOT FOR PUBLIC SERVICES?

How is it
WE CAN FINANCE WARS,
BUT NOT FIREFIGHTERS?

How is it
WE HAVE A LABOUR GOVERNMENT
ALLIED TO GEORGE BUSH?

WE SAY
NO WAR WITH THE IRAQI PEOPLE!

General Secretary
Billy Hayes

President
Andy Kerr

http://www.cwu.org

TRANSPORT & GENERAL
WORKERS’ UNION
South East & East Anglia

STOP THE WAR

Demonstate
15th February

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Jeremy Dear
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John Fray
Deputy General Secretary

"Freedom of the press belongs to those who own the press"