

Global Tinderbox

Time for Europe's Nuclear- Weapon-Free Zone?

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The threatened withdrawal of the United States and Russia from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty drastically undermines peace and security in Europe. The risk of 'limited' nuclear war has emerged once more. The call for a European Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) is a coherent countermeasure to both the undermining of arms control regimes and to the threats posed by 'limited' nuclear war and 'useable' nuclear weapons. There are, however, issues – some practical, some a matter of historical reckoning – that need to be addressed in order for a useful approach to the question of a NWFZ in Europe to be formulated.

Background

As nuclear weapons proliferated from the 1950s onward, so did moves to create Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Such zones exist on every continent of the planet and extend from the floors of our oceans to the moon.¹ Europe is one of the few regions bereft of NWFZs, despite repeated efforts. Indeed, the whole concept of NWFZs originated in initiatives, consultations and negotiations of varying compositions and political orientations, to safeguard Europe.²

Why, then, did such efforts fail? In the early 1980s Ken Coates of the Russell Foundation argued:

“If the pressure for denuclearised zones began in Europe, and if the need for them ... remains direst there, why have governments in the Third World been, up to now, so much more effectively vocal on this issue than those of the European continent? Part of the answer surely lies in the prevalence of the non-aligned movement among countries in

the Third World. Apart from a thin scatter of neutrals, Europe is the seed-bed of alignments, and the interests of the blocs as apparently disembodied entities are commonly prayed as absolute within it. In reality, of course, the blocs are not 'disembodied'. Within them, in military terms, superpowers rule. They control the disposition and development of the two major 'deterrents'. They keep the keys and determine if and when to fire..."³

Coates, through the Appeal for European Nuclear Disarmament (END) – which he and the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation launched together with others – campaigned for a NWFZ to be established in Europe. The END Appeal, formally launched in April 1980, declared:

"We must act together to free the entire territory of Europe, from Poland to Portugal, from nuclear weapons, air and submarine bases, and from all institutions engaged in research into or manufacture of nuclear weapons. We ask the two superpowers to withdraw all nuclear weapons from European territory."⁴

Like previous such initiatives and despite significant political mobilisation and coordination across Europe, END was unsuccessful in these particular respects. However, success emerged elsewhere. Coupled with the call for a European NWFZ was the following text:

"In particular, we ask the Soviet Union to halt production of the SS-20 medium range missile and we ask the United States not to implement the decision to develop cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles for deployment in Europe."⁵

The enormous CND demonstrations, the grassroots camps at Greenham Common and Molesworth, and END initiatives coupled with similar Europe-wide mobilisations of the '80s demanded that such weapons be withdrawn from the continent. These mobilisations were sparked by the deployment of SS-20 and Pershing missile systems from 1977 onwards. Both the Soviet Union and NATO states – in practical terms, the USA – pursued a "dual-track" strategy, combining deployment with preliminary Treaty talks which began in 1980.⁶

A full ten years after the first deployments and seven years after the opening of negotiations, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) was signed whereby:

"...the Soviet Union and USA agreed not to possess, produce or flight test a ballistic missile or ground-launched cruise missile ... with a range capability of 500 to 5500 kilometres, or to possess or produce launchers for such missiles."⁷

Over the course of negotiating the INF Treaty – a full seven years of meetings, proposals, formulations, summits, ‘walks in the woods’ and *tête-à-tête*s between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev – many other aspects of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation were discussed. For example – and at the extremes of what was discussed – on 15 January 1986 General Secretary Gorbachev announced plans for a ‘Soviet Nuclear Disarmament Initiative’ with the commitment to achieve “complete nuclear disarmament by the year 2000”.⁸

The nature of the INF Treaty negotiations throws significant light on Ken Coates’ diagnosis of the historic problems surrounding European NWFZ proposals: within Europe, “superpowers rule”.

The remarkable processes through which the INF Treaty was finally agreed reflect significant political changes within the Soviet Union at the time and robust international structures, a ‘mature’ diplomatic outlook and a willingness to engage. Indicative of the seriousness of Gorbachev’s commitment is the following comment, made in the context of the economic, social, environmental and military issues faced by the Soviet Union and the world at large:

“Many have suddenly begun to perceive all these things not as something abstract, but as quite a real part of their own experience. The confidence that ‘this won’t affect us’, characteristic of the past outlook, has disappeared. They say that one thorn of experience is worth more than a whole forest of instructions. For us, Chernobyl became such a thorn...”⁹

The nuclear reactor at Chernobyl, Ukraine, exploded in April 1986, contaminating wide areas. Likewise, President Reagan publicly professed a personal commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons.¹⁰ To suggest that no such individual commitments and diplomatic conditions exist today should be uncontroversial. As such, the United States, which now conceives of itself as the sole superpower, is prepared to tear up the INF Treaty and, in so doing, significantly escalate nuclear tensions in Europe.

In its 2018 *Nuclear Posture Review*, (NPR) the United States made the following ‘commitment’ to ‘Strengthening Deterrence in Europe’:

“The United States will make available its strategic nuclear forces, and commit nuclear weapons forward-deployed to Europe, to the defense of NATO. These forces provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America and are the supreme guarantee of Alliance security. Combined with the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, as well as Allied burden sharing arrangements, NATO’s overall nuclear

deterrence forces are essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defense posture now and in the future."¹¹

The bulk of 'analysis' in the *Nuclear Posture Review* is given over to highlighting the 'risks' posed by Russia in particular and the growing 'risks' associated with China's rise as a global power. The commitment to maintaining the 'availability' of US strategic nuclear forces¹² as the "supreme guarantee of Alliance security" – above and beyond the nuclear capabilities of Europe's two declared nuclear powers – emphasises once more the degree to which the US continues to dominate the European defence and security agenda via its status as 'superpower'.

Note also the clear intertwining of 'Europe' and 'NATO'. It is no secret that the majority of the 28 EU member states are also members of NATO, with exceptions including neutral Austria and Ireland. From 2001 onwards, relations between NATO and the EU were institutionalised but the scope of the relations does not extend to nuclear weapons.¹³ It should be assumed, then, that the EU was not consulted in any substantial way before Trump announced withdrawal from the INF Treaty despite the importance placed on 'protecting Europe' as outlined in the latest NPR and despite seventeen years of institutional relations between NATO – in which the US is the major force – and the EU. No wonder, then, that the response from a number of European leaders to news of the INF Treaty withdrawal was so sharp.¹⁴ Others, notably the UK and Poland, supported the move. The typical response from European leaders was exemplified by French President, Emanuel Macron, who firmly re-stated the importance of the INF Treaty and asserted France's commitment to regimes of arms control.¹⁵

In fact, the text of the *Nuclear Posture Review*, Trump's high-handed conduct at the 2018 Brussels NATO summit¹⁶ and his unilateral withdrawal from the INF Treaty are rendered comprehensible by simple acknowledgement that the US has enjoyed the status of an unrivalled hegemonic power – sole superpower status – since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US is taking reckless measures to shore-up its position in response to the emergence of rival centres of global power. As the global situation develops from a uni-polar to a multi-polar order, as the risks of nuclear confrontation grow¹⁷ and in the absence of countervailing political will – governmental or otherwise – the US will likely continue to assert itself in this manner. This means that NATO as an organisation and individual NATO member states will continue to be subjects of US dominance. In the context of a substantially expanded and expanding

NATO, which pushed to the borders of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union against previously stated intentions of the organisation,¹⁸ the dominance of the US within NATO structures is pointing European states and their armed forces towards increasing confrontation with Russia.¹⁹

It is in this context that the call for a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe should again be posed. “If the powers want to have a bit of a nuclear war, they will want to have it away from home”²⁰ wrote Ken Coates some 38 years ago. That warning, and the calls for action that came with it, are as pressing today as they were in 1981.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones – how they work

If the INF Treaty arose, at least in part, from the campaign for a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe, then it acted as an important instrument against the threat that Europe could become an actual ‘theatre’ of nuclear war. Such a function is an essential component of NWFZ proposals. It has been suggested that the INF Treaty, in combination with the START 1 Treaty and ‘Presidential Nuclear Initiatives’ signed in 1991 and the 1992 Lisbon Protocol, combined – to all intents and purposes – to create a NWFZ in the Baltic States, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine.²¹ This combination of states composed the ‘core group’ of a NWFZ proposed by Belarus in 1990.²² The states in the core group have no nuclear weapons deployed within their boundaries. With the unilateral withdrawal of the US from the INF Treaty, this arrangement is under severe threat.

Threats to this arrangement are of some considerable consequence, not only due to the likely disestablishment of a quasi-NWFZ in and of itself but because NWFZ’s carry the function of reducing risks of proliferation and escalation. The location of a quasi-NWFZ in the geographical periphery of Russia is of obvious importance and functionality:

“To the extent that the incentive to acquire nuclear weapons may emerge from regional considerations, the establishment of areas free of nuclear weapons is an important asset for the cause of nuclear nonproliferation. Countries confident that their enemies in the region do not possess nuclear weapons may not be inclined to acquire such weapons themselves.”²³

More broadly, the objectives of NWFZs were deliberated in some detail in a 1976 report by the United Nations Committee on Disarmament:

“the purpose of nuclear-weapon-free zones is to provide additional means for averting nuclear-weapon proliferation and halting the nuclear-arms race ... It is thus argued that [NWFZs] provide complementary machinery to other collateral measures of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Most experts felt that [NWFZs] must not be regarded as alternatives to the principle of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ... but should be entirely consistent with the objectives of the Treaty.”²⁴

The complementary nature of NWFZ proposals is important to emphasise. Any proposal for a new initiative for the creation of a European NWFZ should be seen as a specific measure in response to the proposed US withdrawal from the INF Treaty and not as an alternative to existing disarmament measures such as the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.²⁵ In fact, encouraging the creation of NWFZs is the responsibility of signatories to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In the action plan agreed at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Action 9 states:

“Action 9: The establishment of further nuclear-weapon-free zones, where appropriate, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, is encouraged. All concerned States are encouraged to ratify the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols, and to constructively consult and cooperate to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States are encouraged to review any related reservations.”²⁶

So the basis for the creation of a NWFZ in Europe is established, but what – beyond a response to the destabilising of the INF – could be its main objectives? The 2016 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) working paper, *A Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Europe: Concepts-Problems-Chances*,²⁷ outlines a number of such objectives: 1. Security objectives in the narrow sense, 2. Political-symbolic objectives and 3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe. More detail is given within each of the three objectives, as outlined below:

1. Security objectives in the narrow sense

Confidence-building in the regional neighbourhood: “All states in the region are loyal parties to the NPT, and for many of them, membership goes beyond compliance and involves active promotion of the spirit and

letter of that treaty.”²⁸ Acting upon Action Point 9 of the 2010 NPT Review Conference would build and reinforce trust amongst regional signatories to the NPT, and would signal to neighbours – Russia in particular – that no threat is posed.

Irreversibility and Stability: The creation of the NWFZ in Europe would be the result of a legally binding, verifiable and therefore “hard to revoke”²⁹ arrangement.

Immunizing the region against the consequences of a nuclear confrontation: “one objective of any NWFZ has always been to protect the region concerned against becoming a nuclear battleground”.³⁰

2. Political-symbolic objectives

Strengthening the non-proliferation regime: Developing a NWFZ in Europe would mean signatories to the NPT acting on the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. Such an act could only reinforce existing arms control and disarmament regimes.

Fostering nuclear disarmament: “Sub-strategic nuclear weapons are today one of the most nagging issues for nuclear disarmament ... A NWFZ in Europe would intend to, eventually, cover an area in which NATO’s sub-strategic nuclear weapons are presently sited and to stimulate adequate reciprocal concessions by Russia concerning her capabilities in the same weapons category”.³¹

Helping delegitimize nuclear weapons/provoking debate: As the PRIF study points out, the legitimacy of nuclear weapons as an issue of debate has never been “dormant”. There have, however, been identifiable periods when debate and discussion adopted a much higher pitch than usual. The stark threats posed to the continuation of the INF should be an opportunity for the debate to gain traction and the proposal for a NWFZ in Europe can only boost such debates.

3. Adapting defence policies to the political situation in Europe

“One of the most frequently heard observations by non-Europeans is the disconnect between the nuclear constellation and the political situation in Europe. The relation between the West and Russia is not without disputes and occasional tensions ... but the idea of a war against each other sounds still far-fetched.”³²

Developments since the PRIF study was published now make it much easier to imagine war, even nuclear war, breaking out between “the West and Russia”. Further, the general political situation in Europe has deteriorated markedly in the three years since the PRIF study, much ‘adaptation’ of defence policies is already underway.³³ The development of plans for the NWFZ in Europe would add something definitively more positive to the current debate and could unleash an all-too-necessary political counter-dynamic to the current direction of travel.

An important aspect of any proposal for a NWFZ in Europe is that it would, in fact, benefit from being part of a international system of such zones. In his indispensable study, *Security without Nuclear Deterrence*, Commander Robert Green notes:

“Every year since 1996 the UN General Assembly has adopted a resolution introduced by Brazil calling upon the states parties and signatories to the regional NWFZ treaties ‘to promote the nuclear weapon free status of the Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas’, and to explore and promote further cooperation among themselves.”³⁴

The first conference of states already participating in NWFZs took place in Mexico in April 2005. The declaration adopted by the conference reaffirmed a commitment to the “consolidation, strengthening and expansion of NWFZs, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the achievement of a nuclear weapons free world.”³⁵ So not only do signatories to the NPT share a commitment to establish NWFZs, but existing such zones are committed to their expansion.

This leaves the rather important question of ‘who’, or ‘what’, will have the capacity to drive forward the call for the NWFZ in Europe.

Steps Forward

The President of the United States has pledged to begin the process of withdrawing from the INF Treaty on 2 February 2019. The immediate priority of peace and disarmament campaigns has been to campaign against the withdrawal. This is the right, proper and obvious course of action when faced with such a threat. As already considered, US withdrawal from the INF poses significant threats and sends ominous signals of the shape of things to come.

The unfortunate reality is that conventional campaigning is unlikely to reverse Trump’s decision, nor will it be enough to deal with the

consequences of withdrawal. The reason for this is not simply because of his individual failings, his appalling conduct, reactionary outlook and the rest. Trump's presidency has coincided with a global political situation commonly heralded as another 'Cold War'. As Michael Klare, senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, and others have pointed out, things are actually much worse.³⁶ Klare describes not a "New Cold War" but a "new global tinderbox" where we are being steered "ever closer to a new Cuban missile crisis, when the world came within a hairsbreadth of nuclear incineration."³⁷

Such a miserable state of affairs is characterised by a blurring of distinctions between 'peace time' and 'war', "as the powers in this tripolar contest engage in operations that fall short of armed combat but possess some of the characteristics of interstate conflict";³⁸ a perpetual state of military assertiveness best represented by enormous and aggressive military exercises; a commitment to developing new – and 'useable' – nuclear weapon systems; economic protectionism and burgeoning trade wars; and the breaking down of 'conventional' diplomatic practice, amply demonstrated by the flight of experienced diplomats from the US State Department.³⁹

In 1981, Ken Coates posed the situation thus:

"Solemnly, we must ask ourselves the question, knowing what we know of the acute social and economic privations which beset vast regions of the world: is it even remotely likely that humanity can live through the next ten years without experiencing, somewhere, between these or other conflicting parties, an exchange of nuclear warheads?"⁴⁰

Solemnly, we must again ask ourselves these questions, knowing what we know: aren't we now talking about such a risk in a much slimmer time-frame? Are we not at the point where another 'Cuban Missile Crisis' could develop at any time? As such, isn't Coates' 1981 call to action even more relevant?

"In this new world of horror, remedies based on national protest movements alone can never take practical effect, while Governments remain locked into the cells of their own strategic assumptions. Yet something *must* be done, if only to arrest the growing possibility of holocaust by accident.

We think the answer is a new mass campaign, of petitions, marches, meetings, lobbies and conferences. The fact that ... confrontation has replaced negotiation only makes it more urgent that the peoples of Europe should speak

out. All over Europe the nations *can* agree, surely *must* agree, the none will house nuclear warheads of any kind. The struggle for a nuclear free Europe can unite the continent, but it can also signal new hope to the wider world...No-one believes that such a campaign as this can win easily, but where better than Europe to begin an act of renunciation which can reverse the desperate trend to annihilation?"⁴¹

Notes

1. NWFZs exist and are regulated under the following treaties: The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America and the Caribbean), The Treaty of Rarotonga (South Pacific), The Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia), The Treaty of Pelindaba (Africa), Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. Source: *Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) At a Glance*, Arms Control Association, www.armscontrol.org. Other Treaties that also deal with denuclearisation include: The Antarctic Treaty, Outer Space Treaty, Moon Agreement, Seabed Treaty. Source: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz/
2. NWFZ efforts and initiatives in Europe include: 1956 proposal from Soviet Union to USA, 1957 Rapacki Plan, 1957 Balkan Initiative, 1963 Mediterranean Initiative, 1963 Nordic Initiative, 1964 Poland proposed a Central European plan, 1969 Soviet Union revises Balkan Initiative, 1982 Palme Commission. Source: *A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Concept – Problems – Chances*, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Working Papers No. 27, January 2016
3. Coates, Ken (1984) *The Most Dangerous Decade: World Militarism and the New Non-aligned Peace Movement*, Spokesman, Nottingham, p 51
4. The full text of the 1980 END Appeal can be accessed at: <http://www.russfound.org/END/EuropeanNuclearDisarmament.html>
5. Ibid
6. *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chronology*, Federation of American Scientists. Source: <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm>
7. Sile, Shannon N. (2018) 'II. Russian-United States nuclear arms control' in *SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, Oxford.
8. *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chronology*, Federation of American Scientists. Source: <https://fas.org/nuke/control/inf/inf-chron.htm>
9. Gorbachev, Mikhail (1987) 'The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World', *Pravda*, 17th September 1987 quoted from Coates, Ken (Editor) (1988) *Perestroika: Global Challenge*, Spokesman, Nottingham
10. In a message to Congress on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Reagan stated: "My central arms control objective has been to reduce substantially, and ultimately to eliminate, nuclear weapons and rid the world of the nuclear threat. The prevention of the spread of nuclear explosives to additional countries is an indispensable part of our efforts to meet this objective. I intend to continue my pursuit of this goal with untiring determination and a profound sense of personal commitment", 25th March 1988

11. *Nuclear Posture Review*, United States Department of Defense, 2018, page 36
12. Strategic nuclear forces include weapons and weapon systems trained on territory away from an immediate battlefield according to a systematic, strategic plan. A chilling example of such a plan, the *Strategic Air Command Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959*, which includes detailed assessments of projected casualty figures, can be viewed online at the US National Security Archive: <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb538-Cold-War-Nuclear-Target-List-Declassified-First-Ever/>
13. ‘Relations with the European Union’, 18th July 2018, NATO website. Source: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm
14. The German Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, criticised the “damaging effect” of Trump’s unilateral action and warned that international agreements struck with the US were “no longer reliable”. Source: <https://www.politico.eu/article/heiko-maas-attacks-donald-trump-on-foreign-policy/>
15. Source: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/eu-us-nuclear-arms-race-inf-treaty-bolton-moscow>
16. For a taste of what transpired, see <https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-nato-summit/>
17. See Rogers, Paul (2018) ‘Nuclear Posture Review: Sliding Towards Nuclear War?’, *Will we be blown up? The Spokesman 138*, Spokesman, Nottingham for an assessment of the risks
18. See Sarotte, Mary Elise (2014) ‘A Broken Promise? What the West Really Told Moscow About NATO Expansion’, *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2014 for a survey of evidence on what assurances were made about NATO expansion and for a lively engagement with counter-claims
19. See Mikhail Gorbachev’s most recent intervention on this question, published as an editorial in the *New York Times* here: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/25/opinion/mikhail-gorbachev-inf-treaty-trump-nuclear-arms.html>. For an analysis of the impact of withdrawal from the INF on US/China relations, see Jude Woodward’s article ‘US launches ‘all-front’ attack offensive against China’ here: newcoldwar.typepad.com/blog/2018/11/us-launches-all-front-offensive-against-china.html
20. Coates, Ken (1981) *European Nuclear Disarmament*, Spokesman Pamphlet No. 72, Spokesman, Nottingham
21. Finaud, Mark (2014) *The Experience of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones*, BASIC. Source: <http://www.basicint.org/publications/marc-finaud/2014/experience-nuclear-weapon-free-zones>
22. Non-core states included Albania, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the states of the former Yugoslavia, with Norway, Denmark and Germany proposed as additional members. Source: www.basicint.org/publications/marc-finaud/2014/experience-nuclear-weapon-free-zones. See also fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/ArmsControl_NEW/nonproliferation/NFZ/NP-NFZ-CE.html for more on the Belarus proposals of 1990.
23. Goldblat, Joseph (1997) ‘Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment’, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Spring-Summer 1997

24. *Comprehensive Study of the Question of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in all its Aspects*, Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, United Nations, New York, 1976
25. See www.icanw.org/why-a-ban/positions/ for the most recent information on the status of the TPNW
26. Text accessed at <https://dfat.gov.au/international-relations/security/non-proliferation-disarmament-arms-control/policies-agreements-treaties/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons/Pages/2010-npt-review-conference-64-point-action-plan.aspx>
27. Müller, Harald et al (2016) *A Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Europe: Concepts-Problems-Chances*, PRIF Working Paper No. 27, January 2016
28. Ibid
29. Ibid
30. Ibid
31. Ibid
32. Ibid
33. See Lösing, Sabine (2018) 'Militarising Europe Again', *Europe for the Many*, The Spokesman, issue 140, Spokesman, Nottingham
34. Green, Robert (2018) *Security without Nuclear Deterrence*, Spokesman, Nottingham
35. Ibid
36. Klare, Michael (2018) 'This is Not Your Mother's Cold War', *The Nation*, 30 October 2018, accessed at <https://www.thenation.com/article/this-is-not-your-mothers-cold-war/>
37. Ibid
38. Ibid
39. Savransky, Rebecca (2018) '60 percent of State Department's top-ranking career diplomats have left: report', *The Hill*, 17 January 2018, accessed at <https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/369279-60-percent-of-state-depts-top-ranking-career-employees-have-left>
40. Coates, Ken (1981) *European Nuclear Disarmament*, Spokesman Pamphlet No. 72, Spokesman, Nottingham
41. Ibid

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The first European Nuclear Disarmament Convention met in Brussels in 1982, with this poster prominently displayed. They convened annually throughout the following decade. ►