

Report Title

Russell, Bertrand = Russell, Bertrand Arthur William (Trelleck, Monmouthshire 1872-1970 Plas Penrhyn bei Penrhyndeudraeth, Wales) : Philosoph, Logistiker, Mathematiker, Literaturnobelpreisträger ; Dozent Cambridge, Oxford, London, Harvard University, Chicago, Los Angeles, Beijing

Biographie

- 1919 *Zhang, Shenfu*. Lian duo shi [ID D28288].
Zhang complained that, since Hegel, formal logics had almost been banned from philosophy and gave an overview of logics in Western philosophy, starting with Plato and ending with Russell. During the previous 40 years, mathematics and philosophy had grown closer together. This was, according to Zhang, mainly due to Russell's efforts and not without social implications ; such an approach to philosophy could offer models for responsible and rationalized thought. [Russ3]
- 1919 Suzanne P. Ogden : The immediate stimulus leading to the invitation to Bertrand Russell for a visit in China may have been the series of lectures given by John Dewey in Beijing in March 1919 on *The three great philosophers of our day, James, Bergson, and Russell*. [Russ10]
- 1920 Liang, Shuming. *Wei shi shu yi*. Vol. 1. (Beijing : Beijing da xue chu ban she, 1920).
唯識述義
Liang Shuming attacked Bertrand Russell vigorously, together with Henri Bergson. Though they used different methods, their mathematical and intuitive epistemologies respectively were nothing but 'delusion' that made true knowledge impossible. [Russ3]
- 1920 Raoul Findeisen : Bertrand Russell talked publicly on board the French liner 'Porthos' on what he had seen in Soviet Russia which incited some fellow-travellers to ask the British Embassy in China whether it would be possible to prevent him getting off board in Shanghai, since he had 'expressed pro-Bolshevik and anti-British sentiments' and would 'prove subversive and dangerous to British interests at Chinese educational institutions. The Chinese authorities were not of the same opinion and Russell held a triumphant première in Shanghai, together with Dora Black. They were 'treated like Emperor and Empress' and Russell would be represented even on a cigarette advertisement. They both had declared that they were not married to each other. Chinese newspapers announced Mrs. Black as 'the favourite concubine of the world famous English philosopher'.
Russell sometimes gave four introductory speeches on his ideas every day and the Western guests first travelled to Hangzhou, Nanjing, by boat to Hankou to reach Changsha. In Changsha, Russell met John Dewey and Mao Zedong. He gave four lectures in Changsha. When arriving in Beijing, Zhao Yuanren was assigned as official interpreter and lived in the household with Dora Black and Russell at Sui'anbo hutong no 2 (Chaoyang district). Chinese publications, declared as Russell's works, were usually based on notes taken during his lectures and sometimes even published in the next day's newspapers. So they do not necessarily correspond to books of the same title. [Russ3,Russ9]
- 1920 Formation of the Bertrand Russell Study Group in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920-1921

Chao, Yuen Ren [Zhao, Yuanren]. *With Bertrand Russell in China* [ID D28127].

Since there is much more to Bertrand Russell in China than can be covered in this brief article, I have prefixed the title with "with" to make it clear that it was my part as Russell's interpreter that I am going to write about. Russell arrived in China less than a month after I returned to

China after studying in America for ten years. I had been called back to teach mathematics and physics at Tsing Hua College in Peking. But on August 19, 1920, the third day of my arrival in Shanghai, I was asked by the newly formed Lecture Society to be Russell's interpreter. This society was formed by the Progressive Party, led by men like Liang Ch'i Ch'ao, Chiang Po Li, Fu T'ung, et al. My friends the Hu brothers, Hu Tun-Fu and Hu Ming-Fu, and (unrelated) Suh Hu (later better known as Hu Shih) warned me not to be misled by people who invited Russell here just to enhance the political prestige of their political party. When Chin Pang-Cheng (better known as P.C. King), President of Tsing Hua College, was approached about borrowing me to interpret for Russell, he agreed, provided that I did not leave the Peking locality. As a matter of fact, the Lecture Society was organized right in Peking and before I had taught a full month at Tsing Hua, I was on my way to Shanghai to meet Bertrand Russell arriving on October 13. This was what I wrote in my diary for that date:

"Bertrand Russell looked very much what I had expected from photographs and descriptions, except that he looked stronger, taller, and more gracious-mannered than I had thought. He looked like a scholar. It was easy for me to get acquainted with him thru mutual acquaintances at Harvard."

Before going to Peking both Russell and Miss Dora Black gave lectures in Shanghai, Hangchow, Nanking, and Changsha. I usually interpreted for them in Standard Mandarin. But, having always been interested in the Chinese dialects, I tried the Hangchow dialect in Hangchow and the Hunan dialect in Changsha, the capital of the province. After one of the lectures at Changsha, a member of the audience came up and asked me, "Sir, which county of the province are you from?" He had not realized that I was a speaker of Mandarin imitating Hunanese imperfectly and assumed instead that I was a Hunanese speaking Mandarin imperfectly. On the same trip I had to interpret a speech by Governor T'an Yen-k'ai into English and somebody else interpreted Russell's. It happened that there was a total eclipse of the moon that night, to which Russell referred in his usual witty manner. But the interpreter left out that best part of his speech and repeated only the usual after-dinner polite words. It was quite a job getting settled in Peking. Having found a house at No. 2 Sui-An Po Hutung in the eastern part of the city, we had to find an English-speaking servant-cook, as I was in no way obliged or qualified to do that sort of interpreting. Mr. Russell and Miss Black used the main northern part of the courtyard and I moved out from Tsing Hua College to join them in the eastern and western apartments. People very easily got used to the idea that Mr. Russell and Miss Black lived in the same apartment, although it was a revolutionary idea of recent origin that a boy and a girl should meet each other at all before they got married. As a matter of fact, I myself was very much concerned with the problem of breaking an engagement with a girl I had never met and was much occupied after my return from America to settle the matter, especially as I began to know and was attracted to a Miss Buwei Yang, who was running a hospital in Peking. This made it all the more attractive to move from the Tsing Hua suburb into the city.

On November 5, 1920, I interpreted an interview with Russell by Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao. This was my first meeting with Liang, whose writings had had a great influence on the young men of our generation. November 7 was the date of Russell's first regular lecture. It was on problems of philosophy, held on the Third Campus of the National Peking University. There was an audience of some 1500 people. I find in my diary I noted that "there is more pleasure to speak as interpreter than as the original speaker, because the former gets the response from the audience."

Other topics Russell lectured on included analysis of mind, idealism, causality, theory of relativity, gravitation, and symbolic logic. As a matter of fact, one reason for getting me to interpret for Russell was my dissertation had been on problems related to logic. The locality

of the lectures alternated between the National University of Peking and the Teachers' College, which had a very large auditorium. Once I spent too much time with my girl friend Dr. Yang and arrived almost ten minutes late, while Russell stood helplessly on the podium. Seeing that I had come in with a girl, he whispered to me, "Bad man, bad man !"

I also interpreted Dora Black's lectures. Although the topics were mostly socio-politically oriented, which was outside my line, I found them fairly easy to translate. Once, before a large audience at the Women's Normal School, Miss Black mentioned something about unmarried men and unmarried women. There being different words in Chinese for "marry" for men and for women, I happened to use the wrong verbs and it came out something like "men who have no husbands and women who have no wives", at which the audience roared with laughter, of course. When the speaker wondered why they were so hilarious, I had to whisper to her, "I'll have to explain it to you later, it'll take too long now."

Besides the regular lectures there were organized small seminars and study groups for Russell's philosophy and a Russell Monthly was published under the editorship of Ch'u Shih-Ying. I myself had of course to attend and join these activities. Add to this my activities in getting disengaged from the girl I didn't know, so that I could get married to the girl I did learn to know and love, plus translating Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and making National Language Records, it was a wonder that I had nothing more than frequent colds from overwork and overexposure during those chilly northern months. Now Russell fared much less well than I did. With all his radicalism in thought, he was a perfect English gentleman in manners down to the last detail in dress, a habit which almost cost him his life. On March 14, I went with him to Paoting, about 100 miles south of Peking, where he lectured at the Yu Te ("cultivate virtue") Middle school on the subject of education. It was still wintry and windy and he lectured as usual without an overcoat while I shivered beside him even with my overcoat on. Three days after his return to Peking, he ran a high fever and was attended by Dr. Dipper of the German Hospital in the Legation Quarters. After being brought into the Hospital, he became worse. March 26 was a black day for me. First, there was news from Dr. Yang, saying that her colleague Dr. Yu had died of the plague on a trip to Manchuria to survey the epidemic there. Then I got word that my maternal grandmother had had a stroke in Soochow, of which she died a few days later. That evening I was called to the hospital. I reported in my diary for that evening:

"Prof. Dewey made out form for Mr. Rus. to sign. He was weak but seemed quite clear what he was doing. He could mutter "power of attorney?" [to Dora Black, that is], then tried to sign. The doctor was afraid "er kann nicht." But he did scribble out B. Russell. He could recognize me and called me in, whispered "Mister Ch'." He called Dewey by name and said "I hope all my friends will stick by me." I stayed for a while talking with Mr. Brandauer of the oxygen administrator."

The next day Dr. Esser said that Mr. Russell was "more worse". But by March 29 Miss Black reported that Russell was better. From then on he improved steadily until he was discharged from the hospital and returned to the house. Meanwhile a garbled Japanese report said that Russell had died. When the report reached Russell himself, he said, "Tell them the news of my death was very much exaggerated." During the weeks of Russell's convalescence, I was busy finishing my translation of Alice in Wonderland, meeting with members of the Committee on Unification of the National Committee, and, what was of greater personal concern, going to Shanghai to conclude the business of breaking my engagement with the girl I had never met and then to marry the girl I did know and love. On June 1, 1921, with my friend Hu Shih and Buwei Yang's friend Miss Chu Cheng to sign as witnesses, we were married just by moving to a house on Hsiao Yapao Hutung. When we asked Russell whether our no-ceremony wedding ceremony was too conservative, he replied, "That was radical enough." July 6 was the last day Russell and Black gave lectures, followed the next day by a farewell party given by Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao, at which Ting Wen-Chiang (better known as V.K. Ting) made a very good send-off speech.

On July 11 we saw John Dewey off in the morning and saw Mr. Russell and Miss Black off in the afternoon. So this is the end of my story of the year with Bertrand Russell in China. After that my wife and I had the opportunity of seeing him once every few years. In 1924 we

saw him at Land's End in Penzance (where Gilbert and Sullivan's Pirates came from and had access to what he called the Inaccessible Beach. In 1939 we saw him briefly at the Claremont Hotel in Berkeley, California. He said that by the time China wins, the sacrifice in having to become more and more totalitarian would not be worth the victory. He ordered, with great disapproval, such strange drink as 7-up for our children. In 1941 Professor Ernest Hocking of Harvard invited me to his departmental lunch, at which Mr. Russell reported on placement surveys, an unusual topic for him to discuss. In 1954 we visited with him in his London home in Richmond and had the pleasure of meeting Edith Russell for the first time. Finally, in 1968, we took a taxi from London to Plas Penrhyn, Penrhyndeudraeth, Merioneth, on the west coast of Wales and had tea with the Russells. On this occasion I thanked him for the gift of a pun. For one of his few popular lectures in Peking had been on "Causes of the Present Chaos in China." When after his return to England I informed him of the birth of our first child, Rulan, he said in reply, "Congratulations I see that you are among the causes of the present Chaos in China." But in his Autobiography he attributed that pun to me. The last view of him was when he and Lady Russell stood at the door, Chinese fashion, and waved to us as we were leaving, until we were out of sight. After his decease we received two letters from two Lady Russells, Dora and Edith, on the same day. [Russ5]

1920-1921

Russell, Bertrand. *Autobiography* [ID D28131]. [Text über Japan wurde ausgelassen. Briefe, die mit China zu tun haben sind chronologisch eingetragen].

We travelled to China from Marseilles in a French boat called 'Portos'. Just before we left London, we learned that, owing to a case of plague on board, the sailing would be delayed for three weeks. We did not feel, however, that we could go through all the business of saying goodbye a second time, so we went to Paris and spent three weeks there. During this time I finished my book on Russia, and decided, after much hesitation, that I would publish it. To say anything against Bolshevism was, of course, to play into the hands of reaction, and most of my friends took the view that one ought not to say what one thought about Russia unless what one thought was favourable. I had, however, been impervious to similar arguments from patriots during the War, and it seemed to me that in the long run no good purpose would be served by holding one's tongue. The matter was, of course, much complicated for me by the question of my personal relations with Dora. One hot summer night, after she had gone to sleep, I got up and sat on the balcony of our room and contemplated the stars. I tried to see the question without the heat of party passion and imagined myself holding a conversation with Cassiopeia. It seemed to me that I should be more in harmony with the stars if I published what I thought about Bolshevism than if I did not. So I went on with the work and finished the book on the night before we started for Marseilles.

The bulk of our time in Paris, however, was spent in a more frivolous manner, buying frocks suitable for the Red Sea, and the rest of the trousseau required for unofficial marriage. After a few days in Paris, all the appearance of estrangement which had existed between us ceased, and we became gay and light-hearted. There were, however, moments on the boat when things were difficult. I was sensitive because of the contempt that Dora had poured on my head for not liking Russia. I suggested to her that we had made a mistake in coming away together, and that the best way out would be to jump into the sea. This mood, however, which was largely induced by the heat, soon passed.

The voyage lasted five or six weeks, so that one got to know one's fellow-passengers pretty well. The French people mostly belonged to the official classes. They were much superior to the English, who were rubber planters and business men. There were rows between the English and the French, in which we had to act as mediators. On one condition the English asked me to give an address about Soviet Russia. In view of the sort of people that they were, I said only favourable things about the Soviet Government, so there was nearly a riot, and when we reached Shanghai our English fellow-passengers sent a telegram to the Consulate General in Peking, urging that we should not be allowed to land. We consoled ourselves with the thought of what had befallen the ring-leader among our enemies at Saigon. There was at Saigon an elephant whose keeper sold bananas which the visitors gave to the elephant. We each gave him a banana, and he made us a very elegant bow, but our enemy refused, whereupon the elephant squirted dirty water all over his immaculate clothes, which also the keeper had taught him to do. Perhaps our amusement at this incident did not increase his love of us.

When we arrived at Shanghai there was at first no one to meet us. I had had from the first a dark suspicion that the invitation might be a practical joke, and in order to test its genuineness I had got the Chinese to pay my passage money before I started. I thought that few people would spend £125 on a joke, but when nobody appeared at Shanghai our fears revived, and we began to think we might have to creep home with our tails between our legs. It turned out, however, that our friends had only made a little mistake as to the time of the boat's arrival. They soon appeared on board and took us to a Chinese hotel, where we passed three of the most bewildering days that I have ever experienced. There was at first some difficulty in explaining about Dora. They got the impression that she was my wife, and when we said that this was not the case, they were afraid that I should be annoyed about their previous misconception. I told them that I wished her treated as my wife, and they published a statement to that effect in the Chinese papers. From the first moment to the last of our stay in China, every Chinese with whom we came in contact treated her with the most complete and perfect courtesy, and with exactly the same deference as would have been paid to her if she had been in fact my wife. There did this in spite of the fact that we insisted upon her always

being called 'Miss Black'.

Our time in Shanghai was spent in seeing endless people, Europeans, Americans, Japanese, and Koreans, as well as Chinese. In general the various people who came to see us were not on speaking terms with each other ; for instance, there could be no social relations between the Japanese and the Korean Christians who had been exiled for bomb-throwing. (In Korea at that a time a Christian was practically synonymous with a bomb-thrower.) So we had to put our guests at separate tables in the public room, and move round from table to table throughout the day. We had also to attend an enormous banquet, at which various Chinese made after-dinner speeches in the best English style, with exactly the type of joke which is demanded of such an occasion. It was our first experience of the Chinese, and we were somewhat surprised by their wit and fluency. I had not realized until then that a civilized Chinese is the most civilized person in the world. Sun Yat-sen invited me to dinner, but to my lasting regret the evening he suggested was after my departure, and I had to refuse. Shortly after this he went to Canton to inaugurate the nationalist movement which afterwards conquered the whole country, and as I was unable to go to Canton, I never met him.

Our Chinese friends took us for two days to Hangchow to see the Western Lane. The first day we went round it by boat, and the second day in chairs. It was marvelously beautiful, with the beauty of ancient civilization, surpassing even that of Italy. From there we went to Hanking, and from Nankin by boat to Hankow. The days on the Yangtse were as delightful as the days on the Volga had been horrible. From Hankow we went to Changsha, where an educational conference was in progress. They wished us to stay there for a week, and give addresses every day, but we were both exhausted and anxious for a chance to rest, which made us eager to reach Peking. So we refused to stay more than twenty-four hours, in spite of the fact that the Governor of Hunan in person held out every imaginable inducement, including a special train in all the way to Wuchang.

However, in order to do my best to conciliate the people of Changsha, I gave four lectures, two after-dinner speeches, and an after-lunch speech, during the twenty-four hours. Changsha was a place without modern hotels, and the missionaries very kindly offered to put us up, but they made it clear that Dora was to stay with one set of missionaries, and I with another. We therefore thought it best to decline their invitation, and stayed at a Chinese hotel. The experience was not altogether pleasant. Armies of bugs walked across the bed all through the night.

The Tuchun (the military Governor of the Province) gave a magnificent banquet, at which we first met the Deweys, who behaved with great kindness, and later, when I became ill, John Dewey treated us both with singular helpfulness. I was told that when he came to see me in the hospital, he was much touched by my saying, 'We must make a plan for peace' at a time when everything else that I said was delirium. We assembled in one vast hall and then moved into another for the feast, which was sumptuous beyond belief. In the middle of it the Tuchun apologized for the extreme simplicity of the fare, saying that he thought we should like to see how they lived in everyday life rather than to be treated with any pomp. To my intense chagrin, I was unable to think of a retort in kind, but I hope the interpreter made up for my lack of wit. We left Changsha in the middle of a lunar eclipse, and saw bonfire being lit and heard gongs beaten to frighten off the Heavenly Dog, according to the traditional ritual of China on such occasions. From Changsha, we travelled straight through to Peking, where we enjoyed our first wash for ten days.

Our first months in Peking were a time of absolute and complete happiness. All the difficulties and disagreements that we had were completely forgotten. Our Chinese friends were delightful. The work was interesting, and Peking itself inconceivably beautiful. We had a house boy, a male cook and a rickshaw boy. The house boy spoke some English and it was through him that we made ourselves intelligible to the others. This process succeeded better than it would have done in England. We engaged the cook sometime before we came to live in our house and told him that the first meal we should want would be dinner some days hence. Sure enough, when the time came, dinner was ready. The house boy knew everything. One day we were in need of change and we had hidden what we believed to be a dollar in an old table. We described its whereabouts to the house boy and asked him to fetch it. He replied

imperturbably, 'No, Madam. He bad'. We also had the occasional services of a sewing woman. We engaged her in the winter and dispensed with her services in the summer. We were amused to observe that while, in winter, she had been very fat, as the weather grew warm, she became gradually very thin, having replaced the thick garments of winter gradually by the elegant garments of summer. We had to furnish our house which we did from the very excellent second-hand furniture shops which abounded in Peking. Our Chinese friends could not understand our preferring old Chinese things to modern furniture from Birmingham. We had an official interpreter assigned to look after us. His English was very good and he was especially proud of his ability to make puns in English. His name was Mr Chao and, when I showed him an article that I had written called 'Causes of the Present Chaos', he remarked, 'Well, I suppose, the causes of the present Chaos are the previous Chaos'. I became a close friend of his in the course of our journeys. He was engaged to a Chinese girl and I was able to remove some difficulties that had impeded his marriage. I still hear from him occasionally and once or twice he and his wife come to see me in England.

I was very busy lecturing, and I also had a seminar of the more advanced students. All of them were Bolsheviks except one, who was the nephew of the Emperor. They used to slip off to Moscow one by one. They were charming youths, ingenuous and intelligent at the same time, eager to know the works and to escape from the trammels of Chinese tradition. Most of them had been betrothed in infancy to old-fashioned girls, and were troubled by the ethical question whether they would be justified in breaking the betrothal to marry some girl of modern education. The gulf between the old China and the new as vast, and family bonds were extraordinarily irksome for the modern-minded young man. Dora used to go to the Girls' Normal School, where those who were to be teachers were being trained. They would put to her every kind of question about marriage, free love, contraception, etc., and she answered all their questions with complete frankness. Nothing of the sort would have been possible in any similar European institution. In spite of their freedom of thought, traditional habits of behavior had a great hold upon them. We occasionally gave parties to the young men of my seminar and the girls at the Normal School. The girls at first would take refuge in a room to which they supposed no men would penetrate, and they had to be fetched out and encouraged to associate with males. It must be said that when once the ice was broken, no further encouragement was needed.

The National University of Peking for which I lectured was a very remarkable institution. The Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor were men passionately devoted to the modernising of China. The Vice-Chancellor was one of the most whole-hearted idealists that I have ever known. The funds which should have gone to pay salaries were always being appropriated by Tutchums, so that the teaching was mainly a labour of love. The students deserved what their professors had to give them. They were ardently desirous of knowledge, and there was no limit to the sacrifices that they were prepared to make for their country. The atmosphere was electric with the hope of a great awakening. After centuries of slumber, China was becoming aware of the modern world, and at that time the sordidnesses and compromises that go with governmental responsibility had not yet descended upon the reformers. The English sneered at the reformers, and said that China would always be China. They assured me that it was silly to listen to the frothy talk of half-baked young men ; yet within a few years those half-baked young men had conquered China and deprived the English of many of their most cherished privileges.

Since the advent of the Communists to power in China, the policy of the British towards that country has been somewhat more enlightened than that of the United States, but until that time the exact opposite was the case. In 1926, on three separate occasions, British troops fired on unarmed crowds of Chinese students, killing and wounding many. I wrote a fierce denunciation of these outrages, which was published first in England and then throughout China. An American missionary in China, with whom I corresponded, came to England shortly after this time, and told me that indignation in China had been such as to endanger the lives of all Englishmen living in that country. He even said – though I found this scarcely credible – that the English in China owed their preservation to me, since I had caused infuriated Chinese to include that not all Englishmen are vile. However that may be, I

incurred the hostility, not only of the English in China, but of the British Government. White men in China were ignorant of many things that were common knowledge among the Chinese. On one occasion my bank (which was American) gave me notes issued by a French bank, and I found that Chinese tradesmen refused to accept them. My bank expressed astonishment, and gave me other notes instead. Three months later, the French bank went bankrupt, to the surprise of all other white banks in China.

The Englishman in the East, as far as I was able to judge of him, is a man completely out of touch with his environment. He plays polo and goes to his club. He derives his ideas of native culture from the works of eighteenth-century missionaries, and he regards intelligence in the East with the same contempt which he feels for intelligence in his own country. Unfortunately for our political sagacity, he overlooks the fact that in the East intelligence is respected, so that enlightened Radicals have an influence upon affairs which is denied to their English counterparts. MacDonald went to Windsor in knee-breeches, but the Chinese reformers showed no such respect to their Emperor, although our monarchy is a mushroom growth of yesterday compared to that of China.

My views as to what should be done in China I put into my book *The problem of China* and so shall not repeat them here.

In spite of the fact that China was in a ferment, it appeared to us, as compared with Europe, to be a country filled with philosophic calm. Once a week the mail would arrive from England, and the letters and newspapers that came from there seemed to breathe upon us a hot blast of insanity like the fiery heat that comes from a furnace door suddenly opened. As we had to work on Sundays, we made a practice of taking a holiday on Mondays, and we usually spent the whole day in the Temple of Heaven, the most beautiful building that it has ever been my good fortune to see. We would sit in the winter sunshine saying little, gradually absorbing peace, and would come away prepared to face the madness and passion of our own distracted continent with poise and calm. At other times, we used to walk on the walls of Peking. I remember with particular vividness a walk one evening starting at sunset and continuing through the rise of the full moon.

The Chinese have (or had) a sense of humour which I found very congenial. Perhaps communism has killed it, but when I was there they constantly reminded me of the people in their ancient books. One hot day two fat middle-aged business men invited me to motor into the country to see a certain very famous half-ruined pagoda. When we reached it, I climbed the spiral staircase, expecting them to follow, but on arriving at the top I saw them still on the ground. I asked why they had not come up, and with portentous gravity they replied : 'We thought of coming up, and debated whether we should do so. Many weighty arguments were advanced on both sides, but at last there was one which decided us. The pagoda might crumble at any moment, and we felt that, if it did, it would be well there should be those who could bear witness as to how the philosopher died.' What they meant was that it was hot and they were fat.

Many Chinese have that refinement of humour which consists in enjoying a joke more when the other person cannot see it. As I was leaving Peking a Chinese friend gave me a long classical passage microscopically engraved by hand on a very small surface ; he also gave me the same passage written out in exquisite calligraphy. When I asked what it said, he replied : 'Ask Professor Giles when you get home'. I took his advice, and found that it was 'The consultation of the Wizard', in which the wizard merely advises his clients to do whatever they like. He was poking fun at me because I always refused to give advice to the Chinese as to their immediate political difficulties.

The climate of Peking in winter is very cold. The wind blows almost always from the north, bringing an icy breath from the Mongolian mountains. I got bronchitis, but paid no attention to it. It seemed to get better, and one day, at the invitation of some Chinese friends, we went to a place about two hours by motorcar from Peking, where there were hot springs. The hotel provided a very good tea, and someone suggested that it was unwise to eat too much tea as it would spoil one's dinner. I objected to such prudence on the ground that the Day of Judgement might intervene. I was right, as it was three months before I ate another square meal. After tea, I suddenly began to shiver, and after I had been shivering for an hour or so,

we decided that we had better get back to Peking at once. On the way home, our car had a puncture, and by the time the puncture was mended, the engine was cold. By this time, I was nearly delirious, but the Chinese servants and Dora pushed the car to the top of a hill, and on the descent the engine gradually began to work. Owing to the delay, the gates of Peking were shut when we reached them, and it took an hour of telephoning to get them open. By the time we finally got home, I was very ill indeed. Before I had time to realize what was happening, I was delirious. I was moved into a German hospital, where Dora nursed me by day, and the only English professional nurse in Peking nursed me by night. For a fortnight the doctors thought every evening that I should be dead before morning. I remember nothing of this time except a few dreams. When I came out of delirium, I did not know where I was, and did not recognise the nurse. Dora told me that I had been very ill and nearly died, to which I replied : 'How interesting', but I was so weak that I forgot it in five minutes, and she had to tell me again. I could not even remember my own name. But although for about a month after my delirium had ceased they kept telling me I might die at any moment. I never believed a word of it. The nurse whom they had found was rather distinguished in her profession, and had been the Sister in charge of a hospital in Serbia during the War. The whole hospital had been captured by the Germans, and the nurses removed to Bulgaria. She was never tired of telling me how intimate she had become with the Queen of Bulgaria. She was a deeply religious woman, and told me when I began to get better that she had seriously considered whether it was not her duty to let me die. Fortunately, professional training was too strong for her moral sense.

All through the time of my convalescence, in spite of weakness and great physical discomfort, I was exceedingly happy. Dora was very devoted, and her devotion made me forget everything unpleasant. At an early stage of my convalescence Dora discovered that she was pregnant, and this was a source of immense happiness to us both. Ever since the moment when I walked on Richmond Green with Alys, the desire for children had been growing stronger and stronger within me, until at last it had become a consuming passion. When I discovered that I was not only to survive myself, but to have a child, I became completely indifferent to the circumstances of convalescence, although, during convalescence, I had a whole series of minor diseases. The main trouble had been double pneumonia, but in addition to that I had heart disease, kidney disease, dysentery, and phlebitis. None of these, however prevented me from feeling perfectly happy, and in spite of all gloomy prognostications, no ill effects whatever remained after my recovery.

Lying in my bed feeling that I was not going to die was surprisingly delightful. I had always imagined until then that I was fundamentally pessimistic and did not greatly value being alive. I discovered that in this I had been completely mistaken, and that life was infinitely sweet to me. Rain in Peking is rare, but during my convalescence there came heavy rains bringing the delicious smell of damp earth through the windows, and I used to think how dreadful it would have been to have never smelt that smell again. I had the same feeling about the light of the sun, and the sound of the wind. Just outside my windows were some very beautiful acacia trees, which came into blossom at the first moment when I was well enough to enjoy them. I have known ever since that at bottom I am glad to be alive. Most people, no doubt, always know this, but I did not.

I was told that the Chinese said that they would bury me by the Western Lake and build a shrine to my memory. I have some slight regret that this did not happen, as I might have become a god, which would have been very chic for an atheist.

There was in Peking at that time a Soviet diplomatic mission, whose members showed great kindness. They had the only good champagne in Peking, and supplied it liberally for my use, champagne being apparently the only proper beverage for pneumonia patients. They used to take first Dora, and later Dora and me, for motor drives in the neighbourhood of Peking. This was a pleasure, but a somewhat exciting one, as they were as bold in driving as they were in revolutions.

I probably owe my life to the Rockefeller Institute in Peking which provided a serum that killed the pneumococci. I owe them the more gratitude on this point, as both before and after I was strongly opposed to them politically, and they regarded me with as much horror as was

felt by my nurse.

The Japanese journalists were continually worrying Dora to give them interviews when she wanted to be nursing me. At last she became a little curt with them, so they caused the Japanese newspapers to say that I was dead. This news was forwarded by mail from Japan to America and from America to England. It appeared in the English newspapers on the same day as the news of my divorce. Fortunately, the Court did not believe it, or the divorce might have been postponed. It provided me with the pleasure of reading my obituary notices, which I had always desired without expecting my wishes to be fulfilled. One missionary paper, I remember, had an obituary notice of one sentence : 'Missionaries may be pardoned for heaving a sigh of relief at the news of Mr Bertrand Russell's death'. I fear they must have heaved a sigh of a different sort when they found that I was not dead after all. The report caused some pain to friends in England. We in Peking knew nothing about it until a telegram came from my brother enquiring whether I was still alive. He had been remarking meanwhile that to die in Peking was not the sort of thing I would do.

The most tedious stage of my convalescence was when I had phlebitis, and had to lie motionless on my back for six weeks. We are very anxious to return home for the confinement, and as time went on it began to seem doubtful whether we should be able to do so. In these circumstances it was difficult not to feel impatience, the more so as the doctors said there was nothing to do but wait. However, the trouble cleared up just in time, and on July 10th we were able to leave Peking, though I was still very weak and could only hobble about with the help of a stick.

Shortly after my return from China, the British Government decided to deal with the question of the Boxer indemnity. When the Boxers had been defeated, the subsequent treaty of peace provided that the Chinese government should pay an annual sum to all those European Powers which had been injured by it. The Americans very wisely decided to forgo any payment on this account. Friends of China in England urged England in vain to do likewise. At last it was decided that, instead of a punitive payment, the Chinese should make some payment which should be profitable to both China and Britain. What form this payment should take was left to be determined by a Committee on which there should be two Chinese members. While MacDonald was Prime Minister he invited Lowes Dickinson and me to be members of the Committee, and consented to our recommendation of V.K. Ting and Hu Shih as the Chinese members. When, shortly afterwards, MacDonald's Government fell, the succeeding Conservative Government informed Lowes Dickinson and myself that our services would not be wanted on the Committee, and they would not accept either V.K. Ting or Hu Shih as Chinese members of it, on the ground that we knew nothing about China. The Chinese government replied that it desired the two Chinese whom I had recommended and would not have anyone else. This put an end to the very feeble efforts at securing Chinese friendship. The only thing that had been secured during the Labour period of friendship was that Shantung should become a golf course for the British Navy and should no longer be open for Chinese trading.

Before I became ill I had undertaken to do a lecture tour in Japan after leaving China. I had to cut this down to one lecture, and visits to various people. We spent twelve hectic days in Japan, days which were far from pleasant, though very interesting. Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese proved to be destitute of good manners, and incapable of avoiding intrusiveness. Owing to my being still very feeble, we were anxious to avoid all unnecessary fatigues, but the journalists proved a very difficult matter. At the first port at which our boat touched, some thirty journalists were lying in wait, although we had done our best to travel secretly, and they only discovered our movements through the police. As the Japanese papers had refused to contradict the news of my death, Dora gave each of them a type-written slip saying that as I was dead I could not be interviewed. They drew in their breath through their teeth and said : 'Ah ! verree funnee !'... [Es folgen Bericht Japan und Briefe]. [Russ9]

1920-1921 Bertrand Russell in China : 8. Okt. 1920-10. Juli 1921 : Allgemein
1982

Suzanne P. Ogden : Chinese students flooded abroad for advanced education, while Chinese educational institutions were remodeled to serve better the goals of modernization. Bertrand Russell's visit produced rapid disillusionment for many Chinese, widespread confusion among others, and a kind of half-hearted admiration on the part of a few, which seemed to spring as much from inertia, embarrassment, or the wish to be polite, as from intellectual or political commitment.

To many Chinese intellectuals, Russell appeared as a man who, because of his intellectual power and because of his commitment to social change, would have unusually valuable insights into the problems besetting the Chinese people at that time. That the Chinese seriously considered Russell's ideas for institutional and societal change in China indicates the inherent problem of assuming that a leader in one field will be equally well qualified to speak on totally unrelated topics. A foreign philosopher, a scientist turned ideologist, met a group of Chinese in search of a theory of social and political change.

Russell arrived at a crucial time in China's intellectual and political evolution. The major split within the leadership of the new culture movement, between the Marxists and the 'liberals', occurred in 1921. While the Lecture Society encompassed a broad range of the 'liberal' Chinese political spectrum, the more radical, would-be Communists and socialists largely remained outside of it. But there were no rigid classifications at that time, only individuals who flowed from one group to another, for the differences were only of degree. On the definition of fundamental issues, there was near accord between the 'liberals' and the socialists-communists. That is, the major segments of Russell's 'political' audience (those interested in his ideas on social reconstruction) were each an assortment of 'progressives' in their attitudes toward change and development, even if later some 'socialists' were to be denounced as 'neo-conservatives'. They wanted to break with the past and 'progress' in a new direction. And both groups were preeminently nationalists, so that in spite of ideological differences, they agreed that China's major problems were economic backwardness, political disunity, and bad government. Still, the ideological perspective became important when each group inquired into the best methods for confronting these problems.

Chinese intellectuals became more receptive to leftist views, including not only Marxism but also guild socialism, syndicalism, and anarchism. Since Russell was known to have spoken on all three ideas, was believed to have been an ardent guild socialist before his arrival in China, his trip generated enthusiasm not only among the 'liberals' who associated him with progressive individualist and libertarian values, but also among the various leftist groups. The Chinese also admired many of Russell's personal qualities : his near-heroic pacifism, his independence of thought and action, his advocacy of the ideal of world unity and his defiance of authority. The last trait was thoroughly compatible with the general Chinese new culture ideal of defiance.

Russell came to China with a view to discovering what China's problems were ; but he also came with many preconceptions of what the best solutions would be. Throughout his life, Russell held two general convictions. The first was that political and economic problems could be solved by choosing and effecting the right economic system and the right political values. The second was that the right solutions would involve fundamental change which would be revolutionary unless action was taken to ensure an evolutionary path. A brief exposure to China's conditions convinced him that although his social ideas were correct in theory, they were inapplicable to China. Once in China, he talked, observed, argued and learned, so that his judgments changed as his information and understanding increased. Having visited Bolshevik Russia immediately prior to his trip to China, Russell was eager to expound on the evils of Bolshevism, but to separate this issue from socialism as a value construct. Russell and the Chinese began with different hopes and drew different conclusions from viewing the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution. The question of revolution's 'humanity' was not a luxury in which the Chinese felt they could indulge. For Russell it became the key issue. What the Chinese socialists saw in the Russian Revolution was the existential possibility of complete and rapid change. Russell saw no need to wonder that

revolution could occur. So he approached it instead from the perspective of morality : the Bolshevik method of industrialization exploited the worker. This increased Russell's skepticism about socialism as a method of industrializing.

While Russell endorsed socialism as 'necessary to the world', his concern for morality caused him to condemn Bolshevik methods of establishing it.

Russell recommended a form of state socialism for China, a system about which he was alternately cynical, hopeful, dubious, critical, and enthusiastic. Instead of a Western-style democracy or a Soviet-style socialism, Russell suggested that China had first to experience a government 'analogous to', but not the same as, the dictatorship of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union. This analogous form of dictatorship, carried out by '10,000 resolute men' would presumably educate the people to recognize the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy, would carry out 'non-capitalistic' industrialization, and would re-invest profits for the benefit of the people.

Russell's vision of the best form of government for China presupposed political reform, but reform was the prerequisite for economic reform : the Chinese had to establish a unified, strong, and honest state capable of governing China before they nationalized, permitting the right people to control the socialist economy. Russell's views on the role of socialism in industrialization provoked much controversy among China's intelligentsia, which was already debating these questions in 1920-21.

Russell asserted that education had to precede socialism in China : power without wisdom was dangerous, as Bolshevik Russia demonstrated. Industrialization would provide the resources for mass education, and education would reveal the incompatibility between capitalism and democracy. If the capitalists kept control, they could preempt discussion of individual freedom, so that the people's awareness of the incompatibility between democracy and capitalism would have no active implications. The only solution then, said Russell, would be revolution. He counseled against foreign control of Chinese education which in the past had made Chinese students 'slavish toward Western education'. China should not depend, for leadership, on 'returned students' who would adopt many foreign perspectives. Finally, Chinese education should preserve the 'courtesy, the candor and the pacific temper' which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and its application to the practical problems of China. Russell's advice to continue the good aspects of Chinese education and culture, but to adopt Western science was difficult to implement, since Western science brought with it values not wholly compatible with traditional Chinese values. The events of the May fourth period indicated that, with China under militarist control, education remained nearly inseparable from politics.

References to Russell's observations, long after his departure from China, are remarkable for two reasons. First, they indicate that while the major periodicals did not continue to publish articles on Russell's social and political ideas, people did continue to think about Russell and to read his books and articles. Second, it is what Russell said about the Chinese people that is remembered by the Chinese, not his solutions or proposals for action to reconstruct China. It was Russell as a traveler and an observer, someone who could, in the Chinese view, convey an accurate impression of China to the outside world, that left a lasting impression on the Chinese.

1987

Kuo Heng-yü : Bertrand Russell hält in China Vorlesungen über seine Philosophie, sowie Reden zu Theorie und Praxis des Bolschewismus und Chinas Weg zur Freiheit. Da er weltweit als Philosoph und Pazifist im Kampf gegen den Weltkrieg bekannt war, wurde er anfangs von fortschrittlichen Intellektuellen sehr begrüßt. Er gibt China den Rat, durch die 'Entwicklung des Erziehungswesens' das Bildungsniveau des Volkes zu heben und erst dann den Sozialismus zu praktizieren : "Hätte man diesen Stand nicht erreicht, und wollte dennoch den Sozialismus einführen, würde die Durchführung des Sozialismus und Kommunismus unvermeidlich scheitern". Zhang Dongsun nahm diese Worte zum Anlass und meinte, die dringendste Aufgabe Chinas läge darin, die Industrie aufzubauen und den Kapitalismus zu entwickeln, statt den Sozialismus zu propagieren und eine sozialistische Bewegung zu organisieren. Er schreibt : "Was den Bolschewismus betrifft, so fürchten wir nicht, dass er

nicht verwirklicht wird, sondern dass er zu früh verwirklicht wird, so wie auch Russell es feststellte".

1994

Raoul Findeisen : The interest in Russell and his work had begun in China some time before the May fourth demonstrations and had risen to such an extent that Russell, upon his arrival in Shanghai Oct. 12 1920, was even celebrated as 'Confucius II'. There were many reasons for such an enthusiastic response, not least of course mutual sympathies. These sympathies had a solid basis : As many of the May fourth intellectuals, Russell had been much attracted by the foundation of the Soviet state in which he first saw, as the Chinese did, the 'utopia' of social equality and democracy realized. On the other hand, Russell's 'will of a system of philosophy' that would re-establish philosophy as a science of sciences fitted in perfectly well with the aim of Chinese students to acquire Western scientific methods. Highlight of this systematic effort are the Principia mathematica (1910-1913) and proposing formal logics as starting point for such a role of philosophy. The shock of World War I had also some similarities on both sides, with and Chinese and with Russell, and it was commonly known in China that Russell's pacifist activities had brought him to jail. Furthermore Russell's ethical commitment had certain common traits with the still effective traditional Chinese image of the 'literatus' and civil servant. Finally Russell's rhetorical and didactic abilities perhaps made him more suitable than any other Western philosopher to quench the Chinese thirst for 'yang xue'. Especially the young generation of May fourth activists, who were interested in formal and logical problems of philosophy. They believed that a more systematic approach, to Western ideas as well as to their own tradition, would make their fight against traditional beliefs more effective and turn philosophy to practice.

2007

Ding Zijiang : Russell's contributions to philosophy were not accepted by Chinese intellectuals because his methods were too technical, too trivial, and totally different from traditional Chinese patterns of thinking.

Russell's educational philosophy was not very influential in China. His 'school' is similar to the traditional Chinese private school. It even mimics the Confucian educational 'mode', which also includes a country estate for its setting, a modest tutorial staff, some servants, and a small group of students whose parents supported the project, where a demonstration of the application of Confucian theory could be carried on. There are three basic distinctions between Russell's school and a Confucian schools : (1) while the former emphasized freethinking, the latter did not ; (2) while the former had no discipline and penalty, the latter did ; and (3) while the former approved liberal sexual education, the latter did not. For Chinese new educators, the most important task was to save and reconstruct China through science, technology, industrialization, and democracy. They wanted to extend and develop a 'popular education' rather than an aristocratic education. For most of them, the urgent task was to enable their motherland to eliminate poverty, weakness, and backwardness. Therefore, for both Nationalists and Communists, nationalism and patriotism are more important than individualism and liberalism.

For many Chinese intellectuals, Russell was a very enthusiastic and revolutionary social transformer. In his lecture at Beijing University, he treated himself as a Communist and stated that there would be real happiness and enjoyment after the realization of Communism. He said that he believed in many social claims made by Marxism. Later, different schools of Chinese intellectuals wanted to ask Russell to join their own 'fronts' or interpreted his theories to suit their own needs and images. The moderate reformers hoped that he would be a moderate reformer ; the anarchists hoped that he would be an anarchist ; the communists hoped that he would be a communist. [Russ3,Russ10,Russ43,Shaw63,KUH7:S. 509-510]

- 1920.03.16 Zhang, Shenfu. *Ji bian zhe*. In : Chen bao ; 16. März (1920). [Letter to the editor about John Dewey].
The night before last, Mr. Dewey talked about Bertrand Russell as a despairing pessimist. In fact, Russell stands for ethical neutrality (lun li zhong li). Russell stands beyond judgement in all categories of thought. Furthermore, Dewey is thoroughly mistaken when he describes Russell's philosophy as elitist. This leads us to think of him as somehow anti-democratic. In fact, Russell is a thorough realist who upholds logical atomism (duo li yuan zi lun) and the principle of absolute pluralism (duo yuan lun). Russell's philosophical method is to dissect all categories of thought, be they political, scientific or philosophical. To make this clear I have translated his piece on Dreams and facts which appeared first in the January issue of *Athenaeum* and was reprinted again in the February, 1920 issue of *Dial*. [Russ8]
- 1920.06.30 On June 30 1920 Bertrand Russell was back in Battersea from his tour through the Soviet Union and found the Invitation to Bertrand Russell to lecture at Beijing University. Sponsored by the Jiang xue hui [Lecture Society], sent under the name of Fu Tong, Zhang Songnian and Liang Qichao. The invitation enclosed a letter from the Government University, Beijing to John Henry Muirhead : "Fu Tong would like Muirhead to ask Bertrand Russell to come to China for a year to give some lectures. Bertrand Russell would be paid 2000 pounds and his travelling expenses".
The invitation seemed to express primary interest in Russell's theory on mathematics and logic and suggested that although the writer did not know precisely what Russell's social and political views were, he would be welcome to lecture on them as well as on his theoretical philosophy. The invitation was being sent primarily in recognition of Russell's achievement as philosopher. But it made explicit at least a secondary interest in Russell's view as a social reformer, and other Chinese connected with the invitation were clearly more concerned with social problems than with logic and epistemology. Russell required to address two different groups in China : 'social' and 'political' intellectuals, and philosophers. He had come prepared with 'purely academic lectures on psychology and the principles of physics'. Thus he was surprised to find upon his arrival in China that those who had invited him 'insisted' that he also lecture on social questions, and especially on Russia's experience with Bolshevism. Liang Qichao was as much interested in Russell's political views as in his theoretical philosophy. He was committed to bringing men such as Russell to China to talk about politics, even though he also hoped that Russell's concept of scientific method would have a beneficial impact on China. [MML,Russ10]

- 1920.10.06 Letter from Johnson Yuan [Yuan Zhenying] 6 Yu Yang Li, Avenue Joffre, Shanghai, to Bertrand Russell ; 6 Oct. 1920. In : Xin qing nian ; 6. Okt. (1920).
Dear Sir, We are very glad to have the greatest social philosopher of world to arrive here in China, so as to salve the Chronic diseases of the thought of Chinese Students. Since 1919, the student's circle seems to be the greatest hope of the future of China ; as they are ready to welcome to have revolutionary era in the society of China. In that year, Dr John Dewey had influenced the intellectual class with great success.
But I dare to represent most of the Chinese Students to say a few words to you :
Although Dr Dewey is successful here, but most of our students are not satisfied with his conservative theory. Because most of us want to acquire the knowledge of Anarchism, Syndicalism, Socialism, etc. ; in a word, we are anxious to get the knowledge of the social revolutionary philosophy. We are the followers of Mr Kropotkin, and our aim is to have anarchical society in China. We hope you, Sir, to give us fundamentally the thorough Social philosophy, base on Anarchism. Moreover, we want you to recorrect the theory of Dr Dewey, the American Philosopher. We hope you have the absolute freedom in China, not the same as in England. So we hope you to have a greater success than Dr Dewey here.
I myself am old member of the Peking Govt. University, and met you in Shanghai many times, the first time is in 'The Great Oriental Hotel', the first time of your reception here, in the evening.
The motto, you often used, of Lao-Tzu ought to be changed in the first word, as 'Creation without Possession...' is better than the former translative ; and it is more correctly according to what you have said 'the creative impulsive and the possessive impulse'. Do you think it is right ?
Your Fraternally Comrade Johnson Yuan (Secretary of the Chinese Anarchist-Communist Association). [Russ9]
- 1920.10.09 Bertrand Russell arrives in Hong Kong. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.11 Letter from The General Educational Association of Hunan, Changsha to Bertrand Russell ; 11.10.1920.
Dear Sir, We beg to inform you that the educational system of our province is just at infancy and is unfortunately further weakened by the fearful disturbances of the civil war of late years, so that the guidance and assistances must be sought to sagacious scholars.
The extent to which your moral and intellectual power has reached is so high that all the people of this country are paying the greatest regard to you. We, Hunanese, eagerly desire to hear your powerful instructions as a compass.
A few days ago, through Mr Lee-Shuh-Tseng, our representative at Shanghai, we requested you to visit Hunan and are very grateful to have your kind acceptance. A general meeting will therefore be summoned on the 25th instant in order to receive your instructive advices. Now we appoint Mr Kun-Chao-Shuh to represent us all to welcome you sincerely. Please come as soon as possible.
We are, Sir Your obedient servants The General Educational Association of Hunan. [Russ9]
- 1920.10.12 Bertrand Russell arrived in Shanghai. Zhang Shenfu was on hand to welcome him to China. Zhang had, by that time, already made plans to go to France on the same boat as Cai Yuanpei. After the public meeting with Russell in Shanghai, Zhang and Russell continued conversation over tea in Beijing in November. [Russ8,Russ6]
- 1920.10.12 Reception for Bertrand Russell by educational associations at Da Dong Hotel in Shanghai. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.15 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social reconstruction" in Shanghai. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.16 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Uses of education" to the Jiangsu Education Society. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.17 Bertrand Russell spends two days in Hangzhou to see the West Lake. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.19 Lecture by Bertrand Russel on "Problems of education" at Zhejiang Normal School in Hangzhou. [Russ6]

- 1920.10.20 Welcome party for Bertrand Russell by the Education Association at the Yipingxiang Restaurant in Shanghai. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.21 Lectures by Bertrand Russell on "Einstein's new theory of gravity" to the Science Society in Nanjing. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.22 Bertrand Russell takes the boat from Nanjing to Hankou. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.25 Lectures by Bertrand Russell in Hankou. [Russ6]
- 1920.10.26-27 Bertrand Russell arrives Changsha at the invitation of the General Education Association of Hunan. He gives four lectures : "The idea of Bolshevism", "Personal incidents in Russia", "The labour failures of Bolshevism", "Necessary elements for a successful communism". [Russ6]
- 1920.10.27 Bertrand Russell attends a governor's banquet in Shanghai and meets John Dewey and his wife Alice Chipman.
Russell departs for Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.10.28 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, 28. Okt. 1920. In : The Nation ; 8 Jan. 1921. I wrote the following account on the Yiangtse : To Ottoline Morrell.

Since landing in China we have had a most curious and interesting time, spent, so far, entirely among Chinese students and journalists, who are more or less Europeanised. I have delivered innumerable lectures – on Einstein, education and social questions. The eagerness for knowledge on the part of students is quite extraordinary. When one begins to speak, their eyes have the look of starving men beginning a feast. Everywhere they treat me with a most embarrassing respect. The day after I landed in Shanghai they gave a vast dinner to us, at which they welcomed me as Confucius the Second. All the Chinese newspapers that day in Shanghai had my photograph. Both Miss Black and I had to speak to innumerable schools, teachers' conferences, congresses, etc. It is a country of curious contrasts. Most of Shanghai is quite European, almost American ; the names of streets, and notices and advertisements are in English (as well as Chinese). The buildings are magnificent offices and banks ; everything looks very opulent. But the side streets are still quite Chinese. It is a vast city about the size of Glasgow. The Europeans almost all look villainous and ill. One of the leading Chinese newspapers invited us to lunch, in a modern building, completed in 1917, with all the latest plant (except linotype, which can't be used for Chinese characters). The editorial staff gave us a Chinese meal at the top of the house with Chinese wine made of rice, and innumerable dishes which we ate with chopsticks. When we had finished eating they remarked that one of their number was fond of old Chinese music, and would like to play to us. So he produced an instrument with seven strings, made by himself on the ancient model, out of black wood two thousand years old, which he had taken from a temple. The instrument is played with the finger, like a guitar, but is laid flat on a table, not held in the hand. They assured us that the music he played was four thousand years old, but that I imagine muse be an overstatement. In any case, it was exquisitely beautiful, very delicate, easier for a European ear than more recent music (of which I have heard a good deal). When the music was over they became again a staff of bustling journalists.

From Shanghai our Chinese friends took us for three nights to Hanchow on the Western Lake, said to be the most beautiful scenery in China. That was merely holiday. The Western Lake is not large – about the size of Grasmere – it is surrounded by wooded hills, on which there are innumerable pagodas and temples. It has been beautified by poets and emperors for thousands of years. (Apparently poets in ancient China were as rich as financiers in modern Europe.) We spent one day in the hills – a twelve hour expedition in Sedan chairs – and the next in seeing country houses, monasteries, etc. on islands in the lake.

Chinese religion is curiously cheerful. When one arrives at a temple, they give one a cigarette and a cup of delicately fragrant tea. Then they show one round. Buddhism, which one thinks of as ascetic, is here quite gay. The saints have fat stomachs, and are depicted as people who thoroughly enjoy life. No one seems to believe the religion, not even the priests. Nevertheless, one sees many rich new temples.

The country houses are equally hospitable – one is shewn round and given tea. They are just like Chinese pictures, with many arbours where one can sit, with everything made for beauty and nothing for comfort – except in the grandest rooms, where there will be a little hideous European furniture.

The most delicious place we saw on the Western Lake was a retreat for scholars, built about eight hundred years ago on the lake. Scholars certainly had a pleasant life in the old China. Apart from the influence of Europeans, China makes the impression of what Europe would have become if the eighteenth century had gone on till now without industrialism or the French Revolution. People seem to be rational hedonists, knowing very well how to obtain happiness, exquisite through intense cultivation of their artistic sensibilities, differing from Europeans through the fact that they prefer enjoyment to power. People laugh a great deal in all classes, even the lowest.

The Chinese cannot pronounce my name, or write it in their characters. They call me 'Luo-Su' which is the nearest they can manage. This, they can both pronounce and print.

From Hanchow we went back to Shanghai, thence by rail to Nanking, an almost deserted city. The wall is twenty-three miles in circumference, but most of what it encloses is country. The

city was destroyed at the end of the Taiping rebellion, and again injured in the Revolution of 1911, but it is an active educational centre, eager for news of Einstein and Bolshevism. From Nanking we went up the Yiangtse to Hangkow, about three days' journey, through very lovely scenery – thence by train to Cheng-Sha, the capital of Hun-Nan, where a great educational conference was taking place. There are about three hundred Europeans in Cheng-Sha, but Europeanisation has not gone at all far. The town is just like a mediaeval town – narrow streets, every house a shop with a gay sign hung out, no traffic possible except Sedan chairs and a few rickshaws. The Europeans have a few factories, a few banks, a few missions and a hospital – the whole gamut of damaging and repairing body and soul by western methods. The Governor of Hun-Nan is the most virtuous of all the Governors of Chinese provinces, and entertained us last night at a magnificent banquet. Professor and Mrs Dewey were present ; it was the first time I had met them. The Governor cannot talk any European language, so, though I sat next to him, I could only exchange compliments through an interpreter. But I got a good impression of him ; he is certainly very anxious to promote education, which seems the most crying need of China. Without it, it is hard to see how better government can be introduced. It must be said that bad government seems somewhat less disastrous in China than it would be in a European nation, but this is perhaps a superficial impression which time may correct.

We are now on our way to Peking, which we hope to reach on October 31st. [Russ9,Russ6]

1920.10.30 Zhang, Shenfu. *Ji bian zhe*. In : Chen bao ; 30. Okt. 1920. [Letter to the Editor about Bertrand Russell].

Mr. Zhang Dongsun's is thoroughly misreading Bertrand Russell when he describes his philosophy with the Chinese words 'shi yong zhu yi'. The English equivalent for this is 'pragmatism' not 'realism'. This is a major, fundamental mistake. Anyone who knows anything about contemporary philosophy and about Russell's work knows that Russell is a firm opponent of pragmatism. His view is very different from Bergson and Dewey, in the same way that his mathematics is fundamentally different from that of Galileo. Since last year, when he began to study modern psychology, Russell has developed a new theory which suggests that there is no difference between mind and matter. They are both part of a continuum of varied perception. In this respect, Russell's theories are quite close to those of William James. Russell's idea that 'truth propositions correspond to actual facts' is nonetheless different from James' notion that 'truth is an assumption we need in order to proceed with the work of philosophy'. The difference in their positions is amply evident in the *Principia mathematica* and in other of Russell's works. So how can one of our so called illustrious commentators make such a fundamental mistake ? [Russ8]

1920.10.31 Bertrand Russell arrives in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.11.03 The *Beijing da xue shu li za zhi* announced on 3 Nov. that Bertrand Russell was to lecture at Beijing University. He lecture weekly on 'Mathematical logic', 'Structure of society', 'The analysis of matter', 'The analysis of mind', 'The problems of philosophy'. Russell agreed to give four lectures in all, the first two at Beijing University, the last two at the Teachers College. [Russ3,Russ42]

1920.11.05 Interview by Bertrand Russell with Liang Qichao and Zhao Yuanren as interpreter. [Russ5]

1920.11.07 Bertrand Russell gives the first lecture about "The problem of philosophy" to an audience of 1000 people at Beijing University He explained the meanings of the different symbols he would use, and then introduced both the calculus and algebra of propositions. [Russ6,Russ42]

1920.11.09 Letter from Zhang Shenfu to Bertrand Russell 9 Nov. 1920.

Probably I will leave Peking for France on the 17th, or later. I am very sorry we would separate so soon. But even I go to France, I will continually study your philosophy and as I always attempt to read anything you write, henceforward when you publish books or articles (even reviews), please kindly make me knowing at once. Thank you in anticipation for the trouble you will take. May you favour me with a copy of your photograph with your autograph ? I only wish this because I worship you. [Russ8]

- 1920.11.09 Welcome party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.11.10 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhang Shenfu. 10. Nov. 1920.
I am very sorry your are going away so soon. I would have made more attempts to see you, but was persuaded you hated me on account of my criticism of Bolshevism.
Letter from Zhang Shenfu to Bertrand Russell.
Many thanks for your reply. I will see you tomorrow at the time requested. I am delighted very much by your so estimable reply. Its last sentence surprises me also very much. Not only I never hated you at all, but I hope eagerly that there would be no hatred at all. Even Mr. Anatole France's saying 'to hate the hatred', for me, is not quite right. Your criticism of Bolshevism are all right, and valuable, I believe. Even if not so, there would be no reason for me to hate only on account of this. You said, 'If I be a Russian, I would defend the socialist gov't' (cited from memory). This attitude, I quite admire. Though I consider Russia as the most advanced country in the world at the present, and though I believe in communism, I am not a Bolshevik. This is of course also your opinion. I believe I agree with you at nearly every point and believe myself I can almost always understand you quite correctly. [Russ8]
- 1920.11.11 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of mind" at Beijing University.
He meets Zhang Shenfu at the Continental Hotel in Shanghai. [Russ5,Russ6]
- 1920.11.14 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" at the Normal School in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.11.18 Banquet for Bertrand Russell in the Beijing Hotel. [Russ6]
- 1920.11.19 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Bolshevik thought" at the Women's Higher Normal School in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.11.27 Bertrand Russell speaks to the Anarchist Mutual Aid Society in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.12.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Industry in undeveloped countries" to the Chinese Social and Political Association in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.12.10 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on Albert Einstein at the Qinghua University in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1920.12.13 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Clifford Allen. 2 Sui an Po Hukung, Peking, 13 Dec. 1920.
Dear Allen... Dora and I have taken a house (address as above) and furnished it in Chinese style. It is very pleasant, built round a courtyard as they all are. Peking treats us as if we were married – the legation calls and asks us to dinner. It makes Dora furious to find herself respectable against her will. But she enjoys furnishing, and she is going to lecture at the University. I find the students lazy and stupid. Most of them are Bolsheviks, but they don't know what that means, and are timid and comfort-loving. The Japs of course are wicked, but I have hopes that their reformers also are vigorous, and therefore better than the Chinese. I enclose a letter from one of them who is arranging for me to lecture there next summer. Please send it to Colette. The Chinese are exceedingly cordial and make a lot of fuss about me, but one remains on terms of politeness – they are hard to get to know well. I find there are very few whom I can like. They say they are socialists but complain of foreigners for over-paying the coolies so that life becomes a little less comfortable for the rich. The Government is corrupt ; usually it takes money from the Japs and is then turned out by a revolution but succeeded by a new Government which is just as bad. I think 50 years of foreign domination is the only hope.
Dora sends her love. We are very happy, though we have fits of home-sickness, but we are too busy to notice them much. [Russ36]

1920.12.16 Russell, Bertrand. *First impressions of China*. In : *The Peking Leader* ; 16. Dez. (1920). He traveller arriving in China from Europe for the first time is struck to begin with by the great artistic beauty of all that is traditional, and the aesthetic ruin wrought by modern industrialism wherever it has penetrated. If he is a man whose main interest is art and beauty, he will probably continue to deplore the influence of Europe : he will observe the decay of Chinese painting and poetry, the substitution of (to him) commonplace Western furniture for the stiff tables and chairs of the old tradition. He will perhaps go even further, and carry his conservatism into the domain of ideas. He will find an old-world charm in Buddhist monasteries and Buddhist thought ; he will rejoice to find that there are men of high education in their own line, whose whole outlook and knowledge is utterly different from that of learned Europeans. And he will wish such peculiarities preserved, in order to increase the interest and diversity of the spectacle which the world offers to studious contemplation.

But if he takes the trouble to consider China in itself, not merely as a spectacle, hi is not likely to remain content with this conservative attitude. He will realize that the old beauty no longer has any vitality, and that it can only be preserved by treating the whole country as a museum. He will find that many of the most vigorous and intelligent of the Chinese are entirely unappreciative of all ancient excellence in China, and distinctly impatient when foreigners praise it. He will quickly discover that progress is only possible by abandoning the old, even when it is really good. Industrialism, democracy, science and modern education do not have the statuesque beauty of traditional and unchanging civilizations ; Europe at the present day lacks the charm which it had four or five centuries ago, yet hardly any European would wish to revert to the Middle Ages. And similarly what is most vital in China wishes to press forward, without too much tenderness for the aesthetic losses that must be involved.

One is struck, on arriving from Europe, by the tremendous eagerness for ideas, for enlightenment, for guidance, which exists among those who have lost faith in the old traditions. Something of the old Confucian's belief in the value of learning and the importance of the sage survives even among the most iconoclastic. China has been governed for many ages very largely by men chosen, at least nominally, on account of their literary eminence. There has come to be a scholarly caste, of whom the younger ones now look to America (or, in some cases, Europe) for intellectual guidance. Their desire is usually not for facts to much as for what may be called wisdom. It is impossible not to be surprised by the general belief that a sage must be able to give moral advice by which a nation's difficulties can be solved. We in the West have lost our belief in Wise Men. This is part of the general diminution of belief in the individual, which has been brought about by organization, by the vast size of our States, our business enterprises, and our political parties. But in China there is still an expectation that a wise man may play the part of Solon or Lycurgus. There is a willingness and desire to follow, but there is, apparently, no correlative ability to lead.

What China has achieved in the last twenty years is quite amazing. I have no doubt that the most important thing for China now is education, not only of the present class, but of the whole people. China is traditionally aristocratic in its social organization, and this tradition is still very dominant. Life in China reminds a European of the eighteenth century ; the cheapness and abundance of labour, the multitude of servants, the survival of handicrafts, produce and economic situation such as Europe experienced before the industrial revolution. And the mental atmosphere, too, is not dissimilar : the skepticism in regard to traditional beliefs, and the eager search after some new gospel, are just what was characteristic of France a hundred and fifty years ago. I do not think any new gospel which is to be of value to China is possible without a more democratic spirit, and I think this spirit will have to be displayed first of all in the provision of education for the working classes. I am of course very conscious of the difficulties and obstacles that stand in the way, but I believe they can be overcome in time by patience and determination.

The problem of relations with other Powers and with Western ideas and methods is obviously a very delicate one. If it were possible, I suppose a patriotic Chinese with a modern outlook would desire to have the greatest possible benefit from Western science and industrial methods, with the least possible political and economic domination by foreign nations. But probably the ideas and the domination are difficult to dissociate. Probably any steps that

might be taken to resist foreign capital and foreign aggression would only be successful, at present, if they were part of a great patriotic campaign, which would inevitably extend also into the region of ideas and economic methods and social organization. Under these circumstances, it seems difficult to obtain the good without the bad. At any rate, a newly-arrived foreigner feels puzzled, and does not know exactly what he should desire. It is clear, in any case, that industrialism must profoundly change China during the next twenty years. One could wish that industrialism might develop here without the bad features which have proved inseparable from its growth everywhere else, but perhaps that is too much to hope. I have no doubt that by foresight and method the transition to industrialism could be effected without any evils of a serious kind ; but no nation hitherto has shown foresight and method in the transition, and there is no reason to suppose that China will prove an exception. The hopeful features in China, on a superficial acquaintance of only a few weeks, seem to me to be the great eagerness for ideas on the part of the educated minority, and the great willingness to accept leadership towards some better political and social system. I fully believe that, given patience and a willingness to traverse the necessary stages, these qualities can lead to a wonderful national awakening if wise leaders can be found. But I do not yet know what likelihood there is of these conditions being fulfilled. One thing, at any rate, I can praise with complete confidence, and that is Chinese hospitality. I have been welcomed with a warmth which has surprised and touched me, and have been treated everywhere with a quite extraordinary kindness. It is natural to wish that I could make some return for this kindness in the form of help in China ; but I am impressed by the complexity and difficulty of these problems, and by the impossibility of understanding them when one is a recent arrival ignorant of the Chinese language. So long as this remains the case, anything that I may find to say must continue to suffer from superficiality and ignorance. [Russ6]

- 1920.12.17 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell. 2 Sui an Po Hutung, 17 Dec. 1920. Dearest O. ... We have settled down to a regular life here, very hard working, and most of the work very futile. A great deal of lecturing (by both of us) to students who are eager and enthusiastic, but ignorant and untrained and lazy, expecting knowledge to be pumped into them without effort on their part. A good deal of writing articles in Chinese and Japanese papers. Less social life than at first, but still too much. The Europeans here are mostly old-fashioned and boring, polite to us because they are afraid of what I may say to the Chinese (the Bolsheviki are in touch with them, not very far from Peking), but of course really hating us and furious at having to condone our flouting of conventions and decencies. It makes an odd situation. The Chinese are infinitely polite and flattering, but one always feels they have secrets, and that they say things to each other of which we get no hint. However, on the whole we live a quiet life. Our house is near the walls, which are immensely broad and go all round the City (14 miles) and are said to have been built under the Ming dynasty. We walk on the walls in the afternoons, and get a wonderful view of the whole town and the Western hills. The news from home in the papers is the worst part of the day... Last night for the first time we had visitors to dinner in our house. One of them a man named Johnston, who writes on Buddhism with praise and on Christianity with censure. He finds that the missionaries still preach that every heathen 'Chinee' must go to hell, and he writes amusing blasphemies on the subject – he is a belated Voltairian. In the middle of dinner, while we were listening to these blasphemies, there was an earthquake ! So we changed the subject. I never was in an earthquake before – it was slight, and at first we each thought we were taken suddenly ill – it felt like sea-sickness. Then we saw the lights swaying about and we realized what had happened... All love. Your B. [Russ36]
- 1920.12.18 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on Russia to the Learned Friends Society in Beijing. [Russ6]

1920.12.24 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Colette O'Neil. 24. Dez. 1920.

Letter from China (1920).

You say you find it difficult to imagine me here, so I will try to describe the world in which I am living. I have a Chinese house, built round a courtyard, with only the ground-floor. The front door opens into a small street ; as one walks along the street, one sees only one continuous wall with an occasional door, because the houses are hidden. Ten minutes' walk from my house are the City Walls, which go all round the City (fourteen miles). They are high and broad, and the best place for an afternoon walk, because one sees the whole of Peking and the Western Hills beyond. The region between Hankow and Peking, when I came through it in the train, seemed to me very like Southern Russia : vastness, unbounded plains, and primaevial peasants. Southern China, from the Yangtse to Hongkong, is utterly different – tropical or sub-tropical, very beautiful in a straightforward fashion, fertile, populous, and gay. But this northern land is tragic. The sand blows over from the desert of Gobi in great yellow storms, and makes moving sand-hills which engulf whole villages. The rivers are cruel, always either dried up or in flood. Owing to drought last summer, twenty million peasants are starving ; they offer their little girls for sale as slaves at three dollars, and if they don't get that price they bury them alive. The Chinese don't care ; whatever is being done for relief is European or American. There are many rich Chinese, but they won't lend to their government, because they know the money would be spent in corruption. The Chinese politicians take Japanese money, while Japan steals Shantung and behaves in Korea even worse than we are behaving in Ireland. Japan and England smuggle opium into the country by corrupting the customs officials. The provincial governors even each his own army, usually unpaid, but making money by looting unoffending towns, bayonetting shopkeepers who try to keep something back. Meanwhile the intellectuals prate of socialism or communism, pretend to be very advanced, and sit with folded hands enjoying inherited wealth, while the Japs, the Russians, the English and the Americans are all trying to get pickings off the corpse. There was until lately a native art which was very beautiful, and a native poetry of exquisite delicacy. But the palseying touch of industrialism has killed all that. The common people are the best ; they are good-natured children, full of laughter, physically tough, and mentally less effete than the people of inherited culture. I feel as if they would be quite good material for education, whereas the pupils I get are incurably lazy and soft. Peking is very beautiful, full of broad open spaces, trees, palaces, streets of water, and temples. The climate is delicious, bright and dry, always freezing in winter, but with almost no snow. Europeans dash about in motor-cars, Chinese men make a more stately progress in carriages with footmen standing behind, humbler folk go in rickshas, and your correspondent on his feet for the sake of exercise. Walking here has the drawback of the beggars : shivering men and women and children in rags which scarcely secure decency, who run after one for long distances repeating 'da la yeh' (great old sire !). Some are fat and evidently make a good living ; others look terribly poor and hungry and cold. There are many dogs in the streets, but they are despised ; some are covered with sores, others one sees dying in the ditch. [Russ6]

1921 Zhao, Yuanren. *Luosu zhe xue de jing shen* [ID D28289].

Zhao Yuanren writes about methodological implications of Bertrand Russell's philosophy. He characterized it as empirical, analytical and specific. The ultimate goal of Russell's empirism was to establish experience as standard of truth, not matter or spirit, as done in the two influential philosophical schools of materialism and idealism, but events being immediately accessible to experience. Zhao conceded similarities with James' empirism, but underlined that Russell's thought integrated the most up-to-date results in modern physics. When calling Russell's philosophy specific, Zhao reminds that it can not be encapsulated in a central hypothesis (as Descartes' or Schopenhauer's ideas). It strove to give 'specific answers to specific questions', i.e. to carefully and analytically inquire about any question or problem before giving any judgement. Since this analysis stemmed from suggesting 'classes of events' Russell's philosophy could, as Zhao thought, also be compared to materialism. [Russ3]

1921

Liang, Shuming. *Dui Luosu zhi bu man* [ID D28357].

To my friend Zhang Shenfu who already loves Russell's theories. Over the past, seven, eight years, he has not stopped talking about and praising Russell's theories. Following Mr. Zhang's urgings, I have also tried to read Russell's works and to like them. And in fact found that some aspects of his theories accord well with my own thought – such as his social psychology. Also his theory of impulsion is quite coherent. I also found Russell's theories of cognition and of the essential continuity of all matter very suggestive. Last year, when Russell passed through Nanjing, he gave a very convincing lecture on the subject using the example of the concept of 'hat' to prove that hats seen by people in the present are nothing more than extensions of hats that they have seen before – though they might not actually be the hats bought originally. So I accept some of Russell's theories. But my dissatisfaction with Russell's thought is more serious. I am full of doubt about its foundation.

What gives me great unease about Russell is the way he criticizes – quite unfairly and ignorantly the theories of Bergson. Although I do not know much about mathematical logic, sill, I have deep reservations about Russell's unscholarly attitude in intellectual debate. It is well known that Russell opposes Bergson. But he has never bothered to understand the other's point of view. In Beijing, he attacked Bergson for 'mythical idealism' without any basis at all. Finally, I also want to warn my readers about the quest for an all encompassing, comprehensive philosophy. Truths attained through such comprehensive philosophies might sound good. Indeed, they appear to be perfect in their claim to certainty. But the real truth is always more complex. It is neither as pleasant nor as fine sounding as Russell likes to claim. A scholar is an expert only in his own field. Outside of it, he is just a commoner. Zhang Shenfu is right in saying that 'Today's philosophy belongs either to the Russell's school or to that of Bergson'. One is a leader in rationalism, the other is a leader in non-rational thought. Russell and Bergson are the two greatest contemporary philosophers. Although they are different, each has claim to truth.

But from Russell's short-sighted words it is evident he is not open to learning. He seeks for truth, but cannot attain it. In this Russell has forsaken the outlook of a true scholar. I write this not only to criticize Russell. There are many people who discuss philosophical issues the same way as Russell does. I have been feeling pity for them for a long time now. The reason that such persons cannot be true scholars is they are not prudent in their outlook. They do not know that only one who is calm, careful and insightful can be a truly great philosopher. [Russ8]

1921

Liang, Qichao. *Jiang xue she huan yi Luosu zhi sheng* [ID D28358].

The liberal attitudes of Bertrand Russell's hosts were indicated in Liang Qichao's speech welcoming Russell to China. Here he undertook an explanation of the role of the Lecture Society within the May Fourth Movement. The Society, he said, was made up of many study groups, each of which could contribute to finding and effecting the right solutions to China's problems, even though no one of them had all the right answers. The Society was in search of theories, 'any theory as long as it has value' for advancing Chinese culture. Liang noted China's willingness to import Western ideas and theoretical systems, even including those which had not yet been successfully implemented in Europe. China, he said, might be the best place to try new theories because it had advanced slowly and, unlike the Western nations, had not committed itself to a number of modern institutions. Thus it was free to experiment without extraordinary sacrifice. As Liang put it, the Society was like a large business firm looking at available patterns and samples and then deciding what to buy for its customers. [Russ10]

- 1921 Russell, Bertrand. *Science of social structure : preface to Five lectures on science of social structure* [ID D28359].
 Before I embark on the detail of this course of lectures, I wish to state in a few words my own position on the questions with which we shall be concerned. I am a Communist. I believe that Communism, combined with developed industry, is capable of bringing to mankind more happiness and well-being, and higher development of the arts and sciences, than have ever hitherto existed in the world. I therefore desire to see the whole world become communistic in its economic structure. I hold also, what was taught by Karl Marx, that there are scientific laws regulating the development of societies, and that any attempt to ignore these laws is bound to end in failure. Marx taught what his nominal disciples have forgotten, that communism was to be the consummation of industrialism, and did not believe it to be possible otherwise. It was in this emphasis upon laws of development that he differed from previous religious and Utopian communists. There have been Christian communists ever since Christianity began, but they have had little effect, because economic structure was not ripe for communism. If, here in China, a government were to decree communism tomorrow, communism would not result from the decree, because there would be resistances and incapacities in the habits of the people, and because the material conditions in the way of machinery etc. do not exist. The power of governments is strictly limited to what is technically and psychologically possible at any moment in a given population. For success in social reconstruction, it is vitally necessary, not merely to understand the ethical purposes at which we should aim, but also to know the scientific laws determining what is possible. Miss Black's lectures (which I shall assume you have all heard) are dealing with these laws as applied to the past ; I shall be dealing with them as applied to the present and the near future. Ethics without science is useless ; we must know not only what is good, but also what is possible and what are the means for achieving it. [Russ7]
- 1921 Liang, Shuming. *Dong xi wen hua ji qi zhe xue* [ID D3086].
 Liang's statement on language indicates why Bertrand Russell's scientific approach to the logic of language was not compatible with the Chinese view : in the West, language seeks clarity of definition, while in the East, language that is suggestive, that 'touches upon something without defining it' is preferred. He also noted the Chinese penchant for intuition over reason, and sentiment over utility, a distinct weakness of Chinese civilization, and yet also its 'redeeming virtue'. [Russ10]
- 1921.01.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" at Beijing University. [Russ6]
- 1921.01.06 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The essence and effect of religion" to the Philosophy Research Group in Beijing. [Russ6]

- 1921.01.06 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Colette O'Neil. Peking, 6. Jan. 1921.
My Darling Love... I don't think I shall write on China – it is a complex country, with an old civilization, very hard to fathom. In many ways I prefer the Chinese to Europeans- they are less fierce – their faults only injure China, not other nations.
I have a busy life – 3 courses of lectures, a Seminar, and odd lectures – for instance today I lecture on Religion. I like the students, though they don't work hard and have not much brains. They are friendly and enthusiastic, and very open-minded. I hate most of the Europeans, because they are mostly diplomats or missionaries, both professionally engaged in trying to deceive the Chinese, with very little success. There is a man named R.F. Johnston whom I like very much – he wrote a delightful book on Buddhist China, which you would love... I get £200 a month from the Chinese, and £100 a month from the Japs for articles – so I am very well off. I try to save, but men come round with lovely Chinese things, and the money goes. Also of course furnishing costs a good deal. One lives in expectation of a revolution here, but it seems that revolutions make very little difference. There is less government in China than there ever was in Europe – it is delightful. All the gloomy things I wrote you the other day are true, but they are only one side of the picture. Chinese soldiers kill a few compatriots, other kill many foreigners, so Chinese soldiers are best. The state of the world at large makes me very unhappy. Ever since I began to hate the Bolsheviks I have felt more than ever a stranger in this planet... Bless you my Heart's Comrade. B. [Russ36]
- 1921.01.09 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The problems of philosophy" in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.01.11 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter".
Meeting for lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.01.12 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "The analysis of matter" in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.02.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Principles of social organization" at the Beijing University. [Russ6]

- 1921.02.16 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Elizabeth Russell ; 16. Febr. 1921.
 My dear Elizabeth
 Your delicious letter of December 19 reached me yesterday, with such a lovely Candide ! Thank you 1,000 times. I am glad you liked the Bolshie book. It has involved being quarreled with by most of my friends, and praised by people I hate – e.g. Winston and Lloyd George. I have no home on this planet – China comes nearer to one than any other place I know, because the people are not ferocious. It is true that the soldiers occasionally run amok, sack a town and bayonet all who do not instantly deliver up their whole wealth. But this is such a trivial matter compared to what is done by 'civilized' nations that it seems not to count. 20 million people are starving in provinces near here, and the Chinese do nothing to relive them. But they are better than we are, because the famine is not caused deliberately by them, whereas we deliberately cause famines for the pleasure of gloating over dying children. You are quite right about the sunshine. Since I came to Peking, we have had rain once and snow 3 times, otherwise continuous sun and frost. I like the climate and am always well, but it doesn't suit Dora, who gets bronchitis. Just at the moment the weather is not at its best – there is a dust-storm from the desert of Gobi. One can't go out, and has to shut every chink of window.
 I am glad you noticed the whisks of my tail. I have been severely reproved by many grave persons for one which occurs on p. 130.
 My students here are charming people, full of fun – we have parties for them with fireworks in the courtyard, and dancing and singing and blindman's buff – young men and girl-students. In ordinary Chinese life a woman sees no men except relations, but we ignore that, and so earn the gratitude of the young. The students are all Bolshies, and think me an amiable old fogey, and hopelessly behind the times.
 We have a very happy existence, reading, writing, and talking endlessly. Lady Clifton lent us 'In the Mountains' which we read with great delight – she wasn't sure who it was by, but I was. I gave her a rude message to you, because you hadn't written to me, and when I got home, there was your letter.
 We shall be home the end of September, unless war between Japan and U.S. delays us. Best of love, dear Elizabeth, and thanks for all the lovely things you say –
 Yours affectionately B.R. [Russ36]
- 1921.02.26 Bertrand Russell has lunch with Vasilyevich Ivanov Razumnik in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.03 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Mathematical logic" at the Beijing University. [Russ6]
- 1921.03.10-11 Bertrand Russell visits the Great Wall. [Russ6]
- 1921.03.14-17 Lecture by Bertrand Russell on "Problems of education" at the Baoding Middle School in Baoding (Hebei).
 He caught a severe cold which led to double pneumonia. Throughout the two weeks Russell suffered of extremely high fever and the physicians lost any hope. On March 27 a Japanese news agency bulletin reporting Russell's death went around the world. A Beijing newspaper wrote : "Missionaries may be pardoned for heaving a sigh of relief at the news of Mr. Bertrand Russell's death". [Russ3,Russ6,Russ9]
- 1921.03.23 Letter from Fu Zhongsun and Zhang Bangming to Bertrand Russell ; 23.3.1921.
 They explained that they were translating "Introduction of mathematical philosophy", based on the second edition of 1920, and that they had both attended his first lecture on mathematical logic and planned to attend the remaining three. They also intended to publish their lecture notes as an appendix to the translation of the book. The main purpose of their letter was to ask Russell to clarify some questions they had while preparing their translation. [Russ42]

1921.05.11 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell, German Hospital, Peking, 11 May 1921. I am now much better, indeed quite well except for a tiresome aftermath in the shape of inflammation of the vein of a leg. It doesn't hurt, but the only cure is to keep the leg absolutely motionless, so I am tied to my bed, which is boring. The Doctors say it is bound to get well soon, but it has now lasted 3 weeks. My lungs are completely healed, which is a comfort, as bad pneumonia generally leaves a weakness. My nurse, who is very religious, says my recovery is literally a miracle, only explicable by the direct interposition of Providence. I suggested to her, in Gibbonian phrase, that Providence works through natural causes, but she rejected this view, rightly feeling that it savours of atheism. Everybody who had to do with me when I was ill is amazed that I am alive. For my part, I am astonished to find how much I love life : when I see the sun I think I might never have seen him again, and I feel 'Ugh ! it is good to be alive'. Out of my window I see great acacia trees in blossom, and think how dreadful it would have been to have never seen the spring again. Oddly enough these things come into my mind more instinctively than human things. I grow more and more like Voltaire – I have been having enemas constantly. (Dora complains that I scream for them, as he did). I have realized one ambition which I almost despaired of. I have read an obituary notice of myself. In Japan I was reported dead, and the 'Japan Chronicle' had a long article on me. My illness has not changed me in the slightest, in fact it has made hardly more impression than a bad toothache. I have missed much by not dying here, as the Chinese were going to have given me a terrific funeral in Central Park, and then bury me on an island in the Western Lake, where the greatest poets and emperors lived, died, and were buried. Probably I should have become a God. What an opportunity missed. Goodbye dearest O. Fondest love. B. [Russ36]

1921.07.01 Russell, Bertrand. *China's road to freedom*. In : The Peking Leader ; 7 July (1921). <http://russell.mcmaster.ca/volume15.htm>.

[This address was published in The Peking Leader, 7 July 1921, p. 3, where it appeared with the subtitle 'Bertrand Russell's Farewell Address in China'. It was delivered at the Board of Education, Beijing, on 6 July 1921. The first thirteen and one-fourth pages of Russell's twenty-page manuscript are written in Dora Black's hand. Presumably they were dictated by Russell as he was still recovering from his illness and tired too easily to write himself, while the remainder is in Russell's hand. Russell wrote on the first page: 'Farewell Address, Peking, 5 July 1921'. The copy-text is a typescript emended by Russell.]

The foreigner who ventures to have an opinion on any Chinese question incurs a great risk of complete folly, particularly if, as in my case, his stay in the country has been short and his knowledge of the language is nil. China has an ancient and complex civilization, the most ancient now existing in the world. The traditions of China are quite different from those of Europe. China has in the past achieved great things in philosophy, in art and in music, but in all these respects, what has been done has been practically independent of European influence and widely different from all that issued out of the Hellenic culture. The mere effort to understand a society whose religion and morals have been framed in independence of Christianity requires for a European no small amount of psychological imagination. When one adds to all this the difficulty of ascertaining the facts concerning modern China, it is evident that any European is likely to go far astray in an attempt to lay down a programme of reform for the Chinese nation. For all these reasons, I am persuaded that those Chinese who have the welfare of their country at heart will have to frame their own programme and not rely too much upon the intellectual assistance of foreigners. Nevertheless, I am venturing to put before you some considerations as to the state of China and the way in which it might be improved considerations which have grown up in me slowly during my stay among you and were by no means present to my mind when I first landed. Two things of a very general nature seem to me evident: the first that it is not to be desired that China should adopt the civilization of Europe in its entirety; the second, that the traditional civilization of China is inadequate to present needs and must give way to something radically new. The evils of European civilization have been made obvious to all thoughtful observers by the great war and its outcome. In the early days of the war most Europeans imagined that these evils were not inherent in our system, but would be eradicated by the victory of one's own side, whichever that might be. This has proved to be a delusion. The basis of our civilization is capitalistic industrialism, a system, which, though in its early stages it brings about immensely rapid technical and material progress, cannot but lead on to increasingly destructive wars, first for markets and then for raw materials. It is by no means improbable that our Western civilization may go under in the course of these wars and of the class conflicts due to the opposition of capital and labour. Even if our civilization should survive, it is to be feared that it will become increasingly mechanical, with a constantly augmenting disregard for the individual and his idiosyncrasies. From such a civilization little that is of value is to be expected. It is, therefore, not by mere imitation of Western ways that the Chinese can do most for the welfare of their own country or of the world. On the other hand, the traditional civilization of China based upon Confucianism tempered by Buddhism has worn itself out, and is no longer capable either of inspiring individual achievement or of solving the internal and external political problems with which China is beset. For the last thousand years or so this civilization has been decaying, slowly losing vigour as the Greco-Roman civilization lost vigour in the centuries preceding the barbarian invasion. I think these evils are inseparable from an ancient tradition which is greatly respected, no matter what that tradition may be. It is necessary for each generation to think and feel for itself, and not to seek wisdom in the utterances of ancestors, however wise their ancestors may have been in their own time. I hear it said by Europeans that China would go to pieces morally if respect for the teaching of Confucius were lost. Perhaps this might be the case if a mere vacuum were left in the mental region from which that teaching had been removed, but it would most certainly not be the case if a newer doctrine, more suited to modern problems, could inspire the same belief and the same enthusiasm as must have been inspired by

Confucianism in its creative period. The Chinese reformer, therefore, if I am not mistaken, will be no more willing to uphold what is traditional in his own country than to seek novelty by slavish imitation of the West. I am convinced that China, in the future as in the past, has a distinctive contribution to make to civilization, and something more than mere quantity to add to the world's mental possessions. Passing from these generalizations to the actual state of your affairs, every reasonable man is convinced of the necessity of putting an end to the present condition of anarchic militarism. This is common ground among all reformers, from the mildest to the most extreme; but the method by which it is to be achieved is a matter of endless controversy. Among Europeans especially there is a tendency to favour restoration of the monarchy, but such a step can hardly be expected to appeal to the progressive Chinese. It is not by restoring old conditions that new problems can be solved. It is clear, of course, that a radical and permanent solution must depend upon education. But education is a somewhat vague word, and any education worthy of the name is difficult to secure under the present political conditions, as the course of the teachers' strike has indicated. The education that China needs must be at once widespread and modern. It must not be, as in the past, the privilege of a favoured minority, nor the mere learning of ancient books and their commentators. It must be universal and must be scientific and the science must not be merely theoretical, but in close touch with modern industry and economics. So long as the bulk of your population is uneducated it will be incapable of supporting an industrial state or of resisting the ambitions of ruthless adventurers. But the building up of such a system of education in a country such as yours is an immense task, requiring a generation for its fulfilment, even with all possible good will on the part of the government. You would not, to begin with, have the necessary supply of teachers, nor would the State be able to support the expense without a much greater development of industrialism than has hitherto taken place in China. And until you have a better government than you have now, you will not be able to secure even the preliminary measures. All that can be done at present in the way of education is to the good, and is, as the mathematicians say, necessary, but not sufficient. Thus the need for education brings us back to economic and political problems as its pre-conditions. I think it must be taken as nearly certain that your industrial resources will lead in the near future to a great development of industrialism. I am by no means convinced that industrialism will be a boon to China, or can ever be anything but a misfortune to any country, but if, as I believe, industrial development is in any case inevitable, it is a mere waste of time to argue whether it is desirable or undesirable. The only problem of practical importance for you is the problem of developing industrialism with the minimum of attendant evils and the maximum of national and cultural advantage. All the Great Powers are anxious to secure a share in the exploitation of your resources, and unless you develop more national strength than you have hitherto shown, you will be unable to withstand aggressions fomented by foreign industrialists. I see that the American ex-Minister, Mr. Crane, has been advocating international control for China on the ground that the Chinese government cannot keep order, a prospect which grows not unnaturally out of the Consortium. There is much to be said for international control, not only in China but also in other countries. If England were subject to it, there would be an end of the reign of rapine and murder in Ireland. In America also Mr. Crane's proposal might be adopted with advantage. In that country there are constantly recurring Boxer risings—against the negroes. Under international control these risings might be put down by contingents of black troops drawn from all parts of Africa, and Fifth Avenue might be enlivened by memorial arches erected to the most prominent victims. International control of all nations must be the ultimate goal of all who wish to further the cessation of war which is only possible by substituting law for the present anarchy in relations between States. But international control, when it comes, must recognize the citizens of different states as equals, and not subject some of them to a despotism exerted by a league of certain others. No doubt the Chinese government is bad, but so are all other governments, and I doubt whether the Chinese government does as much harm as those of the Powers which were victors in the war. International control cannot, I am convinced, be a boon to China until the existence of a national State in China is fully assured, and until this State is strong enough to repel all attempts at exploitation by foreign capitalists backed by armies and warships. I think the most

urgent need of China is the development of active patriotism, especially among those who, by their education, are the natural teachers of public opinion. Japanese aggression has begun to produce a movement of this kind, but something much more active, instinctive, and widespread is necessary if China is to be saved from subjugation. Your Empire subsisted for thousands of years without coming into contact with any really formidable enemies. Even the Tartars and Manchus who acquired dominion were few and made a comparatively small mark upon Chinese civilization. Consequently patriotism, which is chiefly evoked by the need of self-defence, plays little part in Chinese traditional morality. Its place was taken, more or less inadequately, by respect for the Emperor. And this substitute for patriotism has been destroyed since you became a Republic. Unfortunately you now for the first time in your history are faced with the danger of foreign aggression on the part of really formidable nations, and therefore the necessity of patriotism has become urgent. If your independence is to be preserved, it is necessary to transfer to the nation the kind of devotion which has hitherto been given to the family. The family is too narrow a group for modern needs, and a race which upholds the family as strongly as it is upheld in China, cannot develop that integrity and zeal in the public service without which no modern state can prosper. It would of course be absurd to hope that public spirit could in a short time be diffused among the bulk of the population, but this is by no means necessary for the beginning of regeneration. Ten thousand resolute men, inspired by an ideal and willing to risk their lives, could acquire control of the government, regenerate Chinese institutions, and institute an industrial development which should be free from the evils associated with capitalism in the West. Such men would have to be honest, energetic and intelligent, incapable of corruption, unwearying in work, willing to assimilate whatever is good in the West, and yet not the slaves of mechanism like most Europeans and Americans. The powers of evil in China are not strong; they only seem so because the opposition to them is too theoretical. There is one question which I find on the lips of almost all the thoughtful Chinese whom I have met and that is the question: 'How can we develop industry without at the same time developing capitalism and all its evils?' This is a very difficult question, and I do not know whether you will in fact succeed in solving it. When I first came to China I thought it insoluble, but I am now of the opinion that if you could create such a band of resolute men as I have mentioned it would be possible to solve the problem. But it is useless in China to approach the economic problem directly; the political problem must be solved first. Until you have a strong and honest State, with able and incorruptible administration, you cannot institute any form of genuine socialism or communism. Suppose, for example, that your mines were now nominally nationalized; it is as clear as noon day that the profits to be derived from them would go to the Tutchuns and their armies, not to the people. Political reform must precede any desirable economic development in China. Political reform in China cannot for many years to come take the form of democracy after the Western model. Democracy presupposes a population that can read and write and that has some degree of knowledge as to political affairs. These conditions cannot be satisfied in China until at least a generation after the establishment of a government devoted to the public welfare. You will have to pass through a stage analogous to that of the dictatorship of the communist party in Russia, because it is only by some such means that the necessary education of the people can be carried through, and the non-capitalistic development of industry effected. The Russian Bolsheviks, as is natural to pioneers, have made many mistakes, more especially in the measures which antagonized the peasants. They are now, very wisely, repealing these measures, and those who follow them on the same road will be able to profit by their experience. When I was in Russia, I was much concerned with the Bolshevik attempt to introduce their methods and aims into Western countries. I believe this to be a quite useless attempt. Where there is already a developed industry and an educated proletariat, different methods must be adopted, and democracy must be preserved. But where, as in Russia and China, these conditions are absent, where there is a population which is neither educated nor accustomed to industrial processes, the methods adopted by the Russian communists seem, in broad outline, the best possible. Various ways of organizing non-capitalistic industry have been suggested by various schools. There is anarchist communism, where, as in ancient Poland and in the League of Nations, no decision can be taken unless it is

unanimous. There is syndicalism, which is a kind of federation of trade unions; there is State Socialism, which is the system adopted in Russia; and there is Guild Socialism, which is a blend of syndicalism and State Socialism. Anarchist communism, syndicalism, and Guild Socialism all presuppose a developed industry and the habits of industrialism. They are therefore impossible as the first step towards socialism in an undeveloped country. The early developments of industry must—so it seems to me—be either capitalistic or state-socialistic. Accordingly, if I am confronted by the problem: 'How can China develop her industries without capitalism?' I must reply: 'In the first instance only by State Socialism.' State Socialism has grave drawbacks, and in an undeveloped country reproduces many of the evils of capitalism. But I believe it is easier to pass from it to a better system, when industrial and educational progress makes it possible, than it is to eradicate capitalism when once it has acquired the hold it has in England and America. There is much that is not essential in the practice of the Bolsheviks, and in non-essentials I do not desire to see them imitated. The essential thing is the State ownership and exploitation of mines, railways, waterways, and all urban and industrial land. (Theoretically, agricultural land should also belong to the State, but this raises such difficulties with the peasants that in a country of small proprietors it is not politically feasible on any large scale.) If this system is to avoid the inequalities of wealth which are among the evils of capitalism, the officials who direct industry must not use their power, as capitalists do, to extort vast fortunes out of the workers. This requires a degree of self-denial which can only be secured by a great enthusiasm and a great devotion to an ideal. Further, if the system of State Socialism is not to remain a bureaucratic tyranny, those who carry it out must be imbued with the love of democracy and liberty, and must direct their efforts to the realization of these as soon as the people can be sufficiently educated. It is mainly in this that I think the Russian communist party open to criticism: a system which gives all power to the communist party seems to its members quite satisfactory, and they are in no hurry to pave the way for a greater freedom and a wider distribution of power. It is customary among communists to maintain that economic factors are the only ones of importance in the life of a community. This seems to me an entire delusion. I believe that ethical factors are at least as important. Consider the ethical qualities required of the men who are to bring about such an economic revolution in China as I have been suggesting. Such men, in the first place, will have to be intellectuals by training, but largely soldiers by profession. They will have to fight anarchic militarism within, and the whole might of capitalistic Powers without. What this means can be seen from what Russia has had to endure from the hostility of reactionary governments. In the course of the fighting, many will lose their lives, and all will have to endure hardships and the persecution of mankind. Assuming the victory won, the victors will be in a position to secure wealth and a long term of power for themselves; but they will have to forego wealth and prepare for the abolition of their power in favour of a more democratic system at the earliest possible moment. To pursue this course steadfastly to the end requires ethical qualities of the highest order. Especially rare is the willingness to abrogate power secured after a bitter struggle. The great difficulty of the Bolshevik method of introducing Socialism lies in the severity of its ethical demands. The Russian Bolsheviks seem, on the whole, successful in resisting the temptation to wealth, but likely to succumb to the temptation to prolongation of their power. All their talk against democracy and in favour of the dictatorship of what they call the proletariat is, in essence, merely camouflage for their love of power. In China, so far as I have been able to observe the national character, one might expect the opposite failure, because the love of money seems to be stronger than the love of power. The love of money is, I think, the greatest danger you will have to combat if you attempt a non-capitalistic development of industry. The ethical difficulties of the line of action I have been suggesting are so great that I cannot feel any confidence in its practicability. China is ruled at present by a set of Tutchuns whose dominant passion is money. You can only defeat them if you love the welfare of China more passionately and more energetically than they love money. This is a high standard, but what I have seen of Young China makes me not despair of its attainment. If you cannot realize a moral and economic revolution, the alternative is a gradually increasing foreign control, perhaps leaving China's nominal sovereignty intact, but securing all real power to foreigners through

possession of economic resources. Such a system would produce a growth of industrial capitalism, and the training of a population accustomed to industrial work—at first only in its lower grades, but later on probably in higher grades also. This process might lead after about a century to a movement for national liberation. But the movement would find success just as difficult then as now, and a century would have been wasted. Meanwhile the habits of capitalism would have been acquired, and would probably prevent the establishment of socialism even if national independence were achieved. From every point of view, therefore, a vigorous movement in the near future is infinitely preferable to the policy of drifting while foreign nations act. Industry and the economic side of life have been thought of in the West too much as the ends of existence. They are not ends, but mere means to a good life. The ideal to be aimed at is a community where industry is the servant of man, not his master; where there is sufficiency and leisure for all; where economic aims are not dominant; where leisure is used for art and science and friendship, instead of being sacrificed to the production of an excess of commodities. China has many of the qualities required for realizing this ideal, particularly the artistic sense and the capacity for civilized enjoyment without which leisure has little value. These qualities make it possible to hope that China may lead the world in the next stage of development, and give back to the restless West something of that inner calm without which we must perish in frantic madness. In this way not only China, but the whole world, may be regenerated by your achievements. [Russ6]

- 1921.07.06 Bertrand Russell and Dora Black gave the last lectures in Beijing. [Russ5]
- 1921.07.07 Farewell party for Bertrand Russell in Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.07.11 Bertrand Russell and Dora Black Russell left Beijing. [Russ6]
- 1921.07.24 Russell, Bertrand. *To the Editor of The Japan Chronicle*, Tokyo, 24. July (1921). In : *The Japan Chronicle* ; 26. July (1921).
 Sir, In your issue of July 24th there is a leaderette with whose general scope I am in agreement, but ending in a suggestion which seems to me misleading and not wholly just, to the effect that 'Professor Dewey... is not a good authority or an unprejudiced witness'. I do not know that any one of us could claim to be an unprejudiced witness where national bias enters in. I have myself struggled against the distorting influence of nationalism on my own thoughts for many years, yet I am still conscious of being by no means unprejudiced in an issue between Britain and a foreign country. Doubtless Professor Dewey also may be described – along with the rest of the human race – as a prejudiced witness in this sense, but in this sense only. He favours the Consortium. I do not. He sees in the extension of America's influence on China the best hope of China's regeneration. I do not. But these are very difficult questions in regard to which either opinion may be held rationally.
 As to the statement that Professor Dewey 'is not a good authority', he has been in Canton and seen the leading men, and is, no doubt, repeating what they told him. Nor is he the only authority for the statement in question, which is repeated with more detail by Mr. Philip Haddon in the 'Review of the Far East' for July 16th. And certainly some explanation has to be sought for the extreme hostility of Hongkong to the Government of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The favour shown to that Government by the Americans also needs explanation, which, I hope, will be provided by some American as 'unpatriotic' as myself. [Russ6]
- 1921.08.05 Ting, V.K. [Ding Wenjiang]. Letter to Peking Leader ; 5. Aug, 1921.
 Ting wrote that Bertrand Russell had made a 'profound' impression on those who heard his lectures on psychology, mathematics, and physics, 'for they realized for the first time that philosophy is nothing but the synthetic results of all the sciences and Mr. Russell's ideas of social reconstruction were the outcome of mature thinking. Ting implied that 'superficial' men, such as journalists, who were not prepared for, nor interested in, such technical lectures, erroneously concluded that others could not have found Russell of interest. He interpreted Russell's 'Farwell speech' as a clear mandate to the Chinese intellectual minority to be responsible for the reconstruction of China. [Russ10]

- 1921.08.07 Zhao, Yuanren. Letter to Peking Leader ; 7. Aug. 1921.
"The Lecture Association would have found it worthwhile to invite Bertrand Russell if he had merely come to mingle with the present and future leaders of China to acquaint them with fair ways of thinking. His presence made dry as cotton books on abstract subjects sell like novels."
Zhang noted that Russell's lectures were to be published for profit by several commercial presses, and that discussion circles 'were formed with a zeal as has rarely been shown on any occasions'. Russell's close contact with the 'returned students' led them to 'constructive thinking and doing'. Zhao contended that even Russell's 'opponents' (reactionaries) were unable to ignore Russell and had to be content with alleging that others 'ignored' him. Zhao noted the young Chinese leaders' disappointment that Russell could not completely deliver 'his more directly practical lectures', but his opponents were 'joyful' over it. [Russ10]
- 1921.10.18 Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 18.10.1921.
Xu Zhimo obtained the London address of Russell from his Cambridge friend C[harles] K[ay] Ogden. He wrote : "Indeed I have been longing for an occasion to be with you since I came to England." Through this self-introduction, Xu became a friend of the Russells and commuted frequently between Cambridge and London in order to attend the lecture meetings given by Russell. [Russ45]

- 1921.11.03 Russell, Bertrand. *China and the powers*. In : Foreign affairs ; 3. Nov. (1921).
 China is by far the most important part of the earth's surface still unexploited and subject to a weak government. The Great Powers are determined to develop China, and the Washington Conference, if it succeeds, is to decide how the proceeds are to be shared. China has an ancient and valuable civilization, with a way of life far more humane than that of the white man ; this is to be destroyed. China wishes to develop her own industry, but not on the lines of private capitalism ; this must be prevented.
- Four Powers are specially concerned with Chinese affairs : Japan, Great Britain, the United States, and Russia. Let us leave Russia on one side for the moment. Japan is more hated in China than any other Power ; we come next, as the allies of Japan, the possessors of Hongkong and Wei-hai-wei (the latter in explicit contravention of our treaty rights), and the aggressors in China's first wars with modern nations. The interests of the English and Americans in China are, however, more capable of adjustment than either with the Japanese, because both desire commercial, financial, and industrial advantages, while the Japanese desire territory to live in. The Japanese therefore, wherever they acquire a secure hold, will keep the exploitation to themselves, even if the open door is nominally safeguarded by treaty. There are two ways of sharing Chinese loot ; one is that of spheres of influence, the other that of the Consortium, according to which the whole of China is to be exploited jointly. The Americans, who claim a monopoly of high moral sentiment, consider the latter method morally preferable, presumably because it gives a prospect of opening to their enterprise regions now monopolized by the Japanese. Wherever the can, however, the Americans secure monopolies for themselves. They negotiated in Peking a wireless monopoly, and were indignant when they discovered that the Chinese (with their usual sly fun) had granted the same monopoly simultaneously to the Japanese. Liberal Americans, from Professor Dewey downward, have denounced us, very justly, for the iniquitous Cassel agreement with the former Canton Government ; but not one of them, so far as I know, has so much as mentioned the at least equally iniquitous Shank Agreement [negotiated by George H. Shank, gives a twenty years' monopoly to America of all the industrial resources of Guangdong] concluded by the Americans with the present Canton Government. American Liberalism is in the Palmerstonian phase, able to see the faults of all other nations, but blind to its own, at any rate in international affairs. The fact is, of course, that all capitalist nations are equally vile in their dealings with China. The notion that some are better and others worse is merely a nationalist delusion.
- The situation to be dealt with by the Washington Conference may be regarded from two points of view : first, that of China's welfare ; secondly, that of the preservation of peace among the Great Powers. I do not know whether the Americans desire the latter, or trust to Japanese mistakes to give them a moral pretext for war while securing our neutrality. Japan is in a mood like that of Germany before the war, and America is in a mood very like that of England before the war. The Japanese are hysterical and terrified, not realizing how imperialistic they are, feeling that nothing they can do will enable them to escape war with America, that when that happens we shall desert them, and that only vigorous military and naval preparation can preserve their independence. The Americans, on the other hand, believe that their own intentions are wholly virtuous, and that Japan's fears must be hypocritical. A little self-knowledge on both sides would solve the difficulty, but neither side has any. Japan has a surplus population and wants territory for emigration. America and the British dominions being closed, it is natural to turn to the mainland of Asia. There is room for a great increase of population in Manchuria, but hitherto the immigration there has been almost wholly Chinese. And this Chinese immigration must be restricted if there is to be room for the Japanese, which is impossible by any measures which America is likely to tolerate.
- Meanwhile there is the Far Eastern Republic which, being in effect Bolshevik, is the enemy of mankind, i.e. of big finance everywhere. Neither it nor Russia is to be represented at Washington ; therefore we may presume that the Japanese are to be bought off, if possible, by permission to wage a holy war in Eastern Siberia. Clearly the easiest way to secure peace among the imperialist Powers is at the expense of Russia. Meanwhile Russia has her own new-style imperialism on the borders of China, having recently conquered and Bolshevized

Mongolia, formerly part of the Chinese empire. Russia has, of course, the ardent sympathy of all the young advanced people in China, and is the only Great Power having access to China by land. The Japanese in Vladivostok (which is part of the Far Eastern Republic) are perpetually intriguing against the Chita Government, and war between the two has often seemed imminent. But for American hatred of Bolshevism, it would be natural for America to support Chita [capital of Far Eastern Republic] against Tokyo, but self-determination has its limits, and does not operate in favour of people who determine to be Communists. Therefore it is probable that, if the Washington Conference succeeds in reaching an agreement, America will allow Japan a free hand against the Far Eastern Republic, which, of course, involves a war between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Thus from the point of view of the interests of China, the Far Eastern Republic, and Soviet Russia, it is to be hoped that the Washington Conference will fail. But if it fails, there is the certainty of a great increase in naval armaments, the probability of a long war between American and Japan, leading to the complete destruction of the Japanese civilization, and the by no means remote probability of a war between America and Great Britain, involving our downfall and the death by starvation of half our population. Whether the brigands agree or disagree when they assemble at Washington, the outlook is equally gloomy for the world. It is possible that before all these evils are realized some spark of humanity, justice, or even common prudence may enter into the policies of great nations ? I doubt is ; yet there seems no other hope for humanity during the next few centuries. [Russ6]

1921.11.07 Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 7.11.1921.

C[harles] K[ay] Ogden planed to publish a World philosophy series, in which Hu Shi's Zhongguo zhe xue shi da gang 中國哲學史大綱 [Outlines of the history of Chinese philosophy] was to be included upon Russell's proposal. The project of Ogden did not materialize.

Xu did not agree with Russell :

"The author [Hu Shi] is too much concerned with combatting his predecessors on points which are not likely to interest the Western readers not well-informed in this field ; in the second place, it is too bulky, the first volume alone amounting to four hundred pages. It occurs to me [that] the best man for our purpose is Mr. Liang Qichao (the man who gave you that piece of painting) who, as you probably know, is one of the very most learned scholars and probably the most powerful and lucid writer China has ever produced. His continual effort of emancipating Chinese thought and introducing and popularizing Western ideas is worthy of our great admiration. His power of assimilating and discriminating learning has never been equaled. So it would be simply ideal if we could get him to do the job, and that I think more than possible. If you would just kindly write to him, urging him to produce a standard book on Chinese thought and indicating the general character of the Series, it would be, I have no doubt, a tremendous spur to his amazing creative energy and he would be more than pleased to comply with the request. There could be no better arrangement than this." [Russ45]

- 1921.11.10 Russell, Bertrand. *The future of China*. In : The Labour News ; 10. Nov. (1921).
 Progressive China undoubtedly has great hopes of the Washington Conference. Hitherto, in all dealings with foreign Powers, America alone has been found friendly. As everyone knows, the American share of the Boxer indemnity has been spent in education Chinese students, both in China and in America. This was in itself a friendly act, and had the result that a large majority of young educated Chinese have an American outlook. Our Government, very shortsightedly, has not yet seen its way to a similar restitution.
- Another great cause of Chinese friendship for America is the fact that America has always opposed Japanese aggression, and has, alone among Great Powers, shown no desire to acquire territory on the mainland of Asia, or even concessions in the Treaty Ports. American ambitions in China are commercial and industrial, not territorial. And in addition to education, the Americans have done much good work in the way of hospitals, famine relief, etc.
- The ambitions of the Japanese are not merely capitalistic, they are also militaristic and imperial. It is true that the Japanese desire raw materials for their industry, which are to be had in China but not in Japan. This desire, however, if it stood alone, would be capable of gratification without infringing the principle of the Open Door. What makes the Japanese desire more than the Americans claim in China is the love of empire, the desire for might based on armaments which led Germany to disaster. The Japanese expected Germany to win the war, and are still inclined to adopt pre-war Germany as their model.
- There is in Japan a Socialist and Labour Party on European lines, and among its leaders are some of the finest men I have ever met. But they have no influence on Japanese policy, and cannot hope to have while only about four per cent of the population are industrial. Even moderate Liberalism has little practical influence, because the Army and Navy are directly responsible to the Mikado, and not in any degree subject to Parliament or the Cabinet, or even the Prime Minister. Thus the extreme militarists have a free hand.
- During the last quarter of a century, the Japanese have acquired Korea, Manchuria, and Shantung, in each case with the help of Great Britain. Korea was only loosely connected with China by a traditional protectorate, and although the sufferings of Koreans at the hands of Japan have been very great, Korea is hardly a Chinese question. Manchuria, on the other hand, concerns China vitally.
- The Manchu conquerors came from there in the seventeenth century, and from there it is easy still to exercise military domination over Peking. There is in Manchuria, under Japanese protection and influence, a Chinese reactionary viceroy, who is often able to overawe the Peking politicians and compel them to adopt a pro-Japanese policy. In this way all China north of the Yangtse is more or less terrorized.
- And civil discord is kept alive by skilful loans from the Japanese to all parties in the strife of rival generals. So long as Manchuria and the Chinese Eastern Railway remain subject to Japanese military control, it is not easy to see how this situation can be altered except for the worse.
- The question of Shantung is, however, of still greater importance if China is to be saved from foreign domination. Shantung is as intimately Chinese as Kent is English ; the situation now is about what ours would have been if the Germans had held Dover and Folkestone and the South-Eastern Railway up to Sevenoaks.
- Shantung interests the Chinese sentimentally, because it contains the birth-place of Confucius, and materially, because it has considerable wealth, which the Japanese are using for the subjugation of China. The Japanese announced in 1914 that they were attacking the Germans in Shantung with a view to restoring Germany's possessions to China, but they concluded secret treaties with England and France stipulating that they were to retain all they conquered from Germany.
- These secret treaties were used to defeat President Wilson at Versailles. We forced China into the war as our ally, and rewarded her by robbing her of one of her richest provinces. And on account of the secret treaties, our emissaries at Washington will probably feel bound to support Japan in any resistance to restitution.
- Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the Shantung question may be satisfactorily dealt with at Washington, if the Powers succeed in reaching any agreement. America is not bound

by the Treaty of Versailles, owing to the Senate's refusal to ratify ; and unless our support of Japan is more vigorous than it seems likely to be, fear of America may make the Japanese conciliatory to China, as it has made us to Sinn Fein.

If this should happen, however, it is by no means improbable that the Japanese will demand and obtain compensation in Siberia at the expense of the semi-Bolshevik Far-Eastern Republic.

It is not only by support of the Japanese that British diplomacy in China has been harmful. It has been almost invariably reactionary, supporting everything conservative against Young China, showing no understanding of the country's needs or desire for its regeneration.

A mere change of alliances without a change of outlook would not remedy our defects as regards China. So long as our diplomatic service remains what it is, every question not in the forefront of public interest will be decided by our diplomatists in an anti-progressive fashion.

For example, when Yuan-shi-kai, in the early days of the Chinese Republic, was endeavouring to acquire arbitrary power without control from the newly-constituted Parliament, we hastened to conclude a loan which rendered him financially independent.

For the moment, America may prove useful to China, and Japan is certainly harmful. But in the long run China cannot be saved except by the Chinese. American imperialism is economic, not territorial ; but if it were firmly established it would involve a terrible suppression of liberty. It would soon be found, for example, that educated Chinese inclined to Socialism (as most of them are) would be unable to get employment.

The Chinese civilization, which is pacific and non-industrial, which cares more about beauty and truth than about railways or dividends, would be ruthlessly destroyed by apostles of 'pep'. The weakness of China in international affairs is due quite as much to Chinese virtues as to Chinese vices.

The Chinese have not that insane thirst for power and ruthless activity which characterizes the West, and especially America ; they were horrified by the war, far more than any European neutral. It is useless to hope that we shall acquire the Chinese virtues ; therefore, very patriotic Chinaman must endeavor to acquire our vices. [Russ6]

1921.11.24 Russell, Bertrand. *A plea for China : her independence chief question*. In : The Sun ; 24. Nov. (1921).

The great thing to be desired is the independence of China with help from friendly powers in quelling anarchy. I should rejoice greatly if Great Britain led the way in restitution by resoring Hongkong and Wei-Hai Wei. The latter is possible, the former I fear is not.

The Japanese must evacuate Shantung unconditionally. There can be no question about that.

If this is not brought about the Washington Conference will fail as regards China.

China joined us in war and was rewarded by the loss of one of her best provinces. The former German position in Shantung was absolutely indefensible, but the Japanese claim even more than the Germans had. My sincere hope is that Britain will not support Japan at Washington in her Chinese contentions.

The proposed joint control of the Shantung railroads is not sound. It means, in practice, Japanese control. There is no doubt of that. It is vital that there should be exclusive Chinese control.

There is nothing in the Japanese pretence of a Pan-Asiatic movement. The feeling of antagonism upon the part of the Chinese is much more against the Japanese than any other foreigner. The Japanese position in Manchuria is a menace to Peking and prevents any genuine independence of the Chinese Government. The Chinese forces in Manchuria are compelled to serve Japan.

The Japanese control of the Chinese Eastern Railway prevents through traffic to the Siberian Railway which the Far East republic desires. This makes the journey to Europe six weeks in length, instead of fourteen days. Chinese independence requires control of all its railways. It also means autonomy as regards tariff, which now is fixed by treaties with thirteen States and requires unanimous consent of the thirteen before any alteration can be made.

One difficulty that faces China is honest administration. That has been solved in the customs service by employing foreigners appointed by China. This system is good in time of transition and might be extended with a time limit.

Military anarchy must be stopped, the Canton Government should be recognized on the condition of federal union with North China, provincial autonomy is necessary, private armies should be disbanded and private occupations found for the soldiers. All this should be offered China with a reconstruction loan and a restitution of stolen territory and abandonment of monopoly rights.

The reconstruction scheme could be drawn up in consultation with leading Chinese, excluding the military. The adoption of general principles only is possible at the Washington Conference. The details will require time.

The dangers to this programme are, of course, certain Japanese opposition. America wants Japan's consent to the naval programme. Perhaps Japan will consent only if allowed to keep all she has in China. The Washington Conference might easily lead to war if Japan is obstinate. I earnestly hope she will not be, both for the sake of Japan as well as of China. It is vitally important that England should not encourage Japan, first, because American friendship is necessary to us ; second, because the American policy in China is better than ours and better than Japan's ; third, because this is the last moment when Japan can avoid disaster my moderation.

If Japan does not moderate her demands she will sooner or later be smashed by America. I do not desire this. I hate war and wish the peaceful development of Japan.

The open door consortium and so forth are not enough for China. They only give the foreign nations equality in exploitation and do not give freedom to China. China should be allowed freedom for development even if it is slow.

The progress of modern education will make China a different country twenty years hence.

China ultimately will be invincible and it will be disastrous if foreigners take temporary advantage of her present weakness. The Chinese civilization is quite as good as ours. We must not imagine ourselves as missionaries of a higher culture. The Chinese are more patient, philosophic, pacific, artistic and are only less efficient in killing. Why force them to learn this from us ?

It is a pity Russia is not represented at Washington. She has been and will be a great pacific

power. She can dominate China from the north and already holds outer Mongolia. There is likely to be a conflict between Russia and Japan before long. I hope Japan will not be compensated in Eastern Siberia without Russian participation, as no such agreement will give China security.

Japan will not voluntarily adopt a generous policy towards China. She must be coerced. If England supports America diplomatic pressure will suffice. If not, there is a great danger of war between American and Japan soon or late. The British in the Far East are almost unanimous against the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The time for its usefulness is gone. A generous policy towards China is best for our interests as well as theirs. China's immense potential market requires a better government and foreign friendship for development. Japan wants raw material for her industries and could get them with the 'open door'. She also wants territory for the glory of the empire. She must be thwarted in this. She does not want more territory for colonizing, as few go to Manchuria, Korea or Formosa. In Manchuria there are 100 Chinese immigrants to one Japanese. The Chinese are stronger in the long run because they are more patient, more populous, less ambitious and also are more genuinely civilized in their mental outlook.

The limitation of naval armament also is very important. I rejoice at the prospect of the Hughes plan being adopted. But the freedom of China is even important. The Chinese are one-fourth of the human race and the most ancient civilization now existing. It is different from ours, but it makes the Chinese happy. They are one of the happiest peoples on earth. All advanced nations are greedy for China's industrial resources. American capitalists are like the others, although the American Government is blameless. The Chinese mentality is not yet adapted to modern industrial methods, but perhaps in time they will develop better methods than ours.

The Chinese want to learn our science, which they think is good, but not our ruthlessness, our purposeless bustle or our indifference to individuals. Their civilization is gentler than ours, less persecuting and will remain so if they are not too much bullied. If forced to adopt our vices, they will become the strongest nation in the world, but lose those qualities which make them worth preserving.

The Washington Conference is the turning point in the world's history. If China is liberated she will develop freely and do great things towards founding a new civilization better than ours. If coerced, she ultimately will achieve freedom through war, then become imperialistic and be as bad as her present oppressors. All that is liberal in the world looks to America at this moment. Can America save other powers from their own egoistic follies? And if so, will America in the long run escape similar follies on her own account? The future of civilization depends upon the answer to these questions. [Russ6]

1921.11.29 Russell, Bertrand. *China and Chinese influence*. In : The Manchester Guardian ; 29. Nov. (1921).

There are many Europeans who view China simply as a diplomatic question, which the Powers must settle if they are not to fight. To such people, China seems analogous in this generation to Africa thirty or forty years ago. This analogy is profoundly misleading to all whom it influences. Africa is a continent of many races and many religions, with no indigenous civilization except to some slight extent along the Mediterranean. China is homogeneous (broadly speaking) in race and culture ; a great empire which has subsisted for thousands of years, and which is a definitely a civilizing influence in the Far East as ancient Greece was in Europe. The nearest analogue to present-day China is Rome at the time of the barbarian invasion. The Chinese Empire has been, until very recently, much greater in extent than the Roman Empire, and is still much greater in population. Its first philosopher, Lâo-tsze, who lived in the sixth century B.C., laments the hurry of modern life and the loss of that simplicity which was practiced by 'the pure men of old'. From his day to our own, China has been a highly civilized country in all that concerns art and literature, manners and government. For 2'000 years, officials have been chosen by competitive examination, and have had all the characteristics which that method of selection would lead one to expect. Those who would see in its true perspective what is happening in China must learn to regard themselves as the analogues of the Chilperics, Theodorics, and Attilas who swooped down upon the Roman Empire when it had grown too civilized to fight. Where we differ from these worthies, we differ for the worse, since they at least revered the majesty of Rome even in decay, while we have no sense of the historical greatness of China, because our conventional culture still considers that no country is spiritually important unless it is near the Mediterranean. Those who destroyed Rome politically nevertheless allowed something of Roman culture to be transmitted to future ages ; but the armies which attack China from without and the missionaries and merchants who undermine Chinese civilization from within have no idea that there is anything of value to be preserved in a country which is bad at making munitions and a bit too provident in the use of soap. So long as this ignorance persists, it is impossible to understand the Chinese question.

The question 'What is China ?' which is being asked in bewilderment by those who would wish to help the Chinese, can be answered only by some understanding of the historical position of the Celestial Empire. The Chinese first appear in history along the banks of the Yellow River, a fierce unnavigable stream, constantly in flood and occasionally changing its course, spreading fertility and devastation by turns, tempting men to cultivation of the alluvial soil, and then drowning them by the hundred thousand. The earliest annals of China are concerned with attempts to curb the inundations of the Yellow River. In the time of Confucius, China was still confined to this region, embracing roughly the provinces of Shansi, Chili, and part of Shantung. The so-called First Emperor (ca. 200 B.C.) extended the empire to the Yangtze, while his successors of the Han dynasty conquered the south almost up to the boundaries of present-day China before the beginning of the Christian era. The empire of the Han dynasty, with a few additions, constitutes China proper in the narrowest sense, excluding Manchuria, consists of eighteen provinces, extending from Peichi-li (containing Peking) in the north of Kwang-tung (containing Canton) in the south, and from Shantung (containing the birthplace of Confucius) in the east to Sze-chwan on the borders of Tibet in the west.

The four hundred millions who are said to constitute the population of China are mainly concentrated in China proper, which is densely populated while its dependencies are but sparsely settled. There has never been an accurate census in China, but it is probably safe to assume that the number of inhabitants of China proper is between three and four hundred millions. Almost the whole of this area has had for 2'000 years a uniform administration, a uniform culture, a uniform written language, education, literature, and art. The spoken language differs greatly in different places – about as much as French differs from Italian – but owing to the non-phonetic character of the Chinese script, there is no corresponding difference in the written language. Educated people speak what is called the 'Mandarin language', which is approximately the dialect of Peking ; but knowledge of the Mandarin is by no means universal even among the most cultivated. There is strong provincial patriotism,

sufficiently strong to make a federal constitution desirable ; but as against the foreigner the Chinese feel themselves very definitely one nation.

Outside China proper there are vast areas loosely connected with China. Burma, Annam, Korea and Japan all at one time or another acknowledged the suzerainty of China. (As regards Japan, the facts are briefly set forth in Putnam Weale's 'The truth about China and Japan', pp. 16-19.) From China the Japanese adopted their writing, art, and religion, and, broadly speaking, whatever civilization they had before 1868. Political relations with these countries, however, were at most times slight. Much closer and more interesting were the relations with Tibet and Mongolia. Buddhism, the one important foreign element in Chinese civilization, has, as everyone knows, a northern and a southern form, with Lhasa as the religious headquarters of the northern branch. Tibet and Mongolia are almost identical in matters of religion ; they both have Lamas, who hold all the power in Tibet and most of it in Mongolia. Both are fanatically religious. At times when the belief in Buddhism was increasing in China, the Lamas acquired considerable favour ; thus Lamaism has been an influence on China, as well as China on Lamaism. But the usual temperament of the Chinese educated classes is skeptical, polished and literary, more inclined to make epigrams about a religion than to believe it. The Mongolians are at a very much lower level of culture than the Chinese, being largely nomads and almost all sunk in superstition. There is in Peking a Lama temple, where Tibetan and Mongolian religious pictures and statues can be seen. They are dark and terrible, altogether unlike the gay, cheerful art of Chinese temples. One feels at once the hot breath of barbarian fierceness, the sort of spirit that one associates with the name of Attila. Moreover, the Mongolians have a strong though intermitted anti-Chinese nationalism ; they remember that Jenghis Khan was of their race, and they cherish the hope that some day they will repeat his conquest of China. They are described with affectionate humour by the Jesuit missionary M. Huc, whose 'Souvenirs d'un voyage dans la Tartarie et le Thibet pendant les années 1844, 1845, et 1846' is one of the most delightful books with which I am acquainted.

Mongolia is not really part of China, and in losing it the Chinese lose what they have always held by conquest only. It is divided into two parts, inner and outer, of which the former is more or less under Japanese control, while the latter has had, during the last twelve months, a series of adventures typical of the confusions existing in that part of the world. I must beg the reader not to disbelieve in these adventures merely because they sound romantic.

Soon after I arrived in Peking, the newspapers there were full of the news that Urga, an important town of Outer Mongolia, had been attacked by a certain leader of Russian White troops named Baron Ungern. The Chinese garrison resisted, but was overpowered. The Japanese were understood to be, as usual, supporting the Russian reactionaries. The Chinese refugees appealed to Peking, which paid Chang-tso-lin, Viceroy of Manchuria, several million taels to undertake the reconquest of Mongolia. Unfortunately, however, he lost the whole sum within a few days by gambling, and was forced to retire in Mukden to economize. Meanwhile the Mongolians, in alliance with the reactionary Russians, had started a religious and nationalistic revival, under the leadership of the Chief Lama of Urga, a living Buddha commonly known as the Hu-tuk-tu, although in fact are many other Hu-tuk-tus. The Government of the Far Eastern Republic (which is in effect Bolshevik) made many offers to the Chinese to help in expelling Ungern from Chinese territory, but Peking refused their help, from fear of offending the Powers, especially the Japanese.

Unfortunately for the Hu-tuk-tu, however, he had a wife. Living Buddhas used to be vowed to celibacy, but the Chinese Government, on rationalist grounds, issued orders, many years ago, that they were all to marry. They obeyed ; like the curate in the 'Bab Ballads', they 'did it on compulsion'. The Hu-tuk-tu was therefore married, and, what was more, his wife was (if report spoke true) a Bolshevik. As he was invariably drunk, she acquired control of policy. Accordingly – so at least the correspondent of the 'Times' in Peking reports – the Bolsheviks descended on Urga, captured Baron Ungern, sent him to Moscow, exhibiting him at every station as a monster, plied the Hu-tuk-tu with all the liquor he desired, declaring that when he dies of 'delirium tremens' he is to have no successors, and explained to the nomads and bandits that they were permitted by the doctrines of communism to take to themselves the flocks and herds hitherto belonging to the Mongolian Princes. Consequently Outer Mongolia,

which is about half the size of India, is now part of the Bolshevik Empire and a firm believer in the religion of Karl Marx. [Russ6]

1921.11.30 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China*. In : The Manchester Guardian ; 30. Nov. (1921). With the exception of America, all the Powers have a thoroughly discreditable record in China. But although the first and worst crime was ours (the Opium War of 1840), the chief offender at the present day is Japan, not because of any special depravity (Japan has merely been copying Christian morals), but because of propinquity and freedom from preoccupation with the war. It is a mistake to suppose that one nation is better or worse than another ; they merely differ as to the direction taken by their criminal tendencies. Americans vent their brutality on negroes and socialists, and their subtlety on business rivals, while the Japanese are brutal to the Koreans and subtle in their diplomacy ; neither side has any ethical superiority. I wish to emphasize this point, because I am firmly convinced that the belief in the moral superiority or inferiority of one nation to another is thoroughly mischievous, and a source of much futility in the efforts of reformers.

The two regions which the Japanese are specially engaged in absorbing are Manchuria and Shantung. Manchuria is not part of China proper, but is much more intimately related to China than Mongolia is. One might compare Manchuria to the Highlands of Scotland and Mongolia to Ireland ; the analogy must not be pressed, but will serve to give a rough idea. As everyone knows, the Manchus differ from the Chinese in race, and originally in language ; they were a warlike northern tribe who conquered the Chinese throne in 1644, and retained it until the revolution of 1911. But in the meantime they had adopted the Chinese language and many Chinese customs ; immense numbers of Chinese settled in Manchuria, and are continuing to do so. Ever since 1644, Manchuria has been administered as an integral part of China, except in so far as foreigners have interfered. From the point of view of sentiment, language, customs, and even population (on account of immigration), Manchuria must now be reckoned as thoroughly Chinese. The Russians acquired Port Arthur and the railway rights as a reward for befriending China after the Sin-Japanese war of 1894-95 ; the Japanese acquired Port Arthur and the Russian rights in South Manchuria by their war against Russia in 1904-05, while they replaced Russia throughout the rest of Manchuria after the Bolshevik revolution – of course with the tacit approval of the Powers, as the champions of civilization against the Red Spectre. The Chinese still have the nominal sovereignty and the civil administration, but the Japanese have Port Arthur, the railway, control of all the industrial undertakings, the right to military occupation, and in short everything worth having. Chang-tso-lin, the Chinese viceroy, has a Chinese army, and is nominally subject to Peking. But in fact whatever energy he can spare from serving his own ends has to be devoted to the interests of the Japanese, upon whom he is utterly dependent. He and his army are a constant menace to the Peking Government, upon which he descends from time to time to levy blackmail. (He was originally a bandit, and is now a government servant.) If the Peking Government did anything annoying to Japan, Chang-tso-lin's army could be used to cause repentance, without Japan's appearing in the business. So long as Japan retains her exclusive position in Manchuria, this situation is difficult to avoid unless the Chinese develop a strong patriotic army. It may be said : How can Chang-tso-lin get an army of Chinese to work against China ? One might as well ask : How can governments get armies of proletarians to shoot down strikers ? The answer is the same in both cases : ignorance. But there is a further factor in China. The immense majority of Chinese are peaceful and law-abiding ; the armies are a very small proportion of the population. Soldiers are despised, and are largely criminals and bandits. Does anyone doubt that if we went round the German prisons we should find men willing to 'maintain order' in return for liberty and pay ?

The question of Manchuria must be dealt with if China is to have any real independence. Except in the southern corner, the claims of Japan have never, so far as I know, been formally recognized by the Powers. Certainly America has never assented to them. It would probably be impossible to get the Japanese out of Port Arthur without a first-class war, which I fear is in any case very probable sooner or later. But outside Port Arthur and its neighbourhood, perhaps the Open Door and the rights of China could be insisted upon, and Japanese military occupation could be prevented. I doubt, however, whether, short of war, a virtual Japanese protectorate over Manchuria is now avoidable, until China becomes strong enough to fight her own battles. And the question of Manchuria, important as it is, is certainly not worth a

first-class war.

Shantung is at once a more vital and a more hopeful question. The Washington Conference will have failed hopelessly as regards China if it does not secure the complete evacuation of Shantung by the Japanese and of Wei-hai-wei by ourselves. To begin with the latter : The lease of Wei-hai-wei to the British provides that we are to hold it as long as the Russians hold Port Arthur. The Russians lost Port Arthur sixteen years ago, but we still hold Wei-hai-wei. To all Chinese protests, we reply that the Japanese are just as bad as the Russians, implying that, in spite of the alliance, we regard a war with Japan as by no means improbable. We thus simultaneously display bad faith to the Chinese and show the Japanese how little we believe in the alliance. Our delegation at Washington ought at once to announce the unconditional return of Wei-hai-wei to the Chinese. We should then be in a better position to join America in insisting upon the Japanese restitution of Kiao-chow.

The history of Kiao-chow is briefly as follows : In 1897 two German missionaries were murdered in Shantung, and the Germans made this an excuse for seizing the port of Tsingtau, and extracting by force from the Chinese a treaty which gave them (1) the right to use Tsingtau as a naval base ; (2) a lease of Kiao-chow for ninety-nine years ; (3) the right to construct certain railways and have a controlling interest in them ; (4) preference for German firms as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. (Shantung is a province, Kia-cho Bay a district in Shantung, and Tsingtau a harbor in Kiao-chow Bay. The text of the Sino-German Treaty of 1898 is given in George Gleason's 'What shall I think of Japan ? Appendix to Chap. IV). In 1914, the Chinese were willing to join the Allies and undertake, with Allied help, the reconquest of Kiao-chow ; but this did not suit the Japanese, who kept China neutral (till 1917), and themselves presented an ultimatum to Germany, demanding the cession of all that the Germans possessed in Kiao-chow 'with a view of eventual restoration of the same to China'. In 1915, after the Japanese had succeeded, Notes were interchanged between China and Japan, stipulating that 'when, after the termination of the present war, the leased territory of Kiao-chow Bay is completely left to the free disposal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said leased territory to China' under certain conditions. In 1917, secret agreements were concluded by Japan with France and England, whereby those Powers undertook to support Japan's claims in Shantung at the Peace Conference. By the Versailles Treaty, 'Germany renounces in favour of Japan all her rights, title and privileges' acquired by the treaty of 1898. This might be taken as an epitome of the Versailles Treaty : whatever iniquity Germany had committed in the past is henceforth to be committed by the Allies. Fortunately, America is not a signatory of the Versailles Treaty, and is free to raise the Shantung question at Washington. The Japanese have lately been making efforts to secure a direct settlement with China, so as to prevent the raising of the question at Washington ; but the Chinese, very wisely, have rejected the Japanese proposals as containing merely illusory concessions, and have firmly demanded the unconditional retrocession of all the rights acquired by Germany in 1898, as well as those extensions subsequently acquired by Japan. In this America will no doubt support them, and I earnestly hope that we shall not support Japan. [Russ6]

1921.12.01 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Gilbert Seldes, editor of The Dial. In : vol. 71, no 6 (Dec. 1921).

Your letter of October 6 reached me in Peking, and before I had time to answer it I began to die. I have now finished with this occupation, although the Japanese journalists first announced my death and then tried to make the announcement true by mobbing me as I passed through Japan when I was convalescent. [Russ6]

1921.12.02 Russell, Bertrand. *Is Chinese independence possible ?* In : The Manchester Guardian ; 2. Dez. (1921).

It is common form for every Power to profess a desire for the integrity and independence of China. To preserve these is one of the purposes of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as regards this purpose the Alliance has succeeded admirably, having enabled Japan to absorb Manchuria and Shantung and establish a virtual protectorate over North China as a result of the twenty-one demands presented by Japan to China in 1915. (For the text of these demands, in their original and revised forms, see George Gleason, 'What shall I think of Japan' p. 80ff.) The uninitiated require a dictionary in reading diplomatic documents. When A and B guarantee the independence and integrity of C, that means that they have agreed how C is to be partitioned. For example, England and France made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Morocco, with secret articles specifying the parts of Morocco which were to belong to France and Spain respectively. Ignorant people regarded the published articles as deceitful when the secret articles became known ; but those who understand the language of diplomacy could have inferred the secret articles from those which were published.

Accordingly the Chinese were justly alarmed when they learned that the Preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance mentions 'the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China' as one of the objects which the Alliance had in view. One of the most obviously legitimate of China's demands at Washington is that no treaties mentioning China shall be concluded without Chinese participation. We should certainly be surprised if we found that France and Italy had agreed to preserve the independence and integrity of Great Britain, especially if we had reason to think that France was going to preserve them in England and Italy in Scotland. Such agreements are an infringement of sovereignty, and are never concluded except as a prelude to interference.

I have considered the integrity of China in connection with Manchuria and Shantung ; I wish now to consider its independence. Apart from the military influence of Japan, all the powers except America have acquired rights which gravely limit the autonomy of China, and it is not easy to see how these rights are to be abrogated.

We may take as typical the question of the Chinese Customs. On this subject there is in 'The Times' of November 26 a leading article which is amazingly misleading, the writer of which (for the sake of his moral character) I presume to be profoundly ignorant. The facts are as follows : By the treaty of 1842, we stipulated with the Chinese that they were to impose a uniform duty of five per cent on all imports. By the treaty of 1858, it was agreed that this duty should be reckoned on a schedule of prices to be revised every ten years. It was, however, only revised twice, in 1901 and 1918, and on the latter occasion current prices were rejected as being inflated by the war, and the average prices of 1913-1916 were taken as the basis of the new schedule. In virtue of commercial treaties involving most-favoured-clauses, no alteration in tariff or schedule is possible without the unanimous consent of thirteen foreign Powers. Meanwhile the Customs receipts, while remaining essential for China's revenue, have become the security for the Boxer indemnity and for many loans. China is allowed by treaty to levy an export duty of not more than five per cent, and is compelled to do so, in spite of the bad effect on Chinese trade, because otherwise it would be impossible to raise sufficient revenue. It is obvious that this system constitutes at once a grave interference with Chinese independence and a serious drawback to Chinese industry, because all imports are charged at the same rate, whether they are raw materials or finished articles, necessities or luxuries.

Quite distinct from this system, though also regulated by treaty, is the administration of the Customs. Ever since 1842, the collection of the duties has been under the control of foreigners. The system now in force for many years is that there is an Inspector-General, appointed by the Chinese Government, but bound by treaty to be British so long as the British Empire has a greater share of Chinese trade than any other Power. The Inspector-General has the appointment of his subordinates, and gives the higher posts to foreigners. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have figures) there were in the Customs administration 2'000 foreigners and 5'000 Chinese. The foreigners, from the inspector-General downwards, are responsible to

China, not to their own governments. Sir Robert Hart, for many years Inspector-General, won universal admiration, and the Chinese themselves are quite content with the system for the present, since it affords a training-ground for more honest and efficient officials than those produced by traditional Chinese methods. Mr. Sih-Gung Cheng, M.A., B.Sc., in his book on 'Modern China' (an admirable work, published by the Clarendon Press), says : 'The foreign members of the staff have served China loyally, and have never shown any prejudice in favour of their own countries. They have maintained the standard of efficiency and vigilance set up by Sir Robert Hart, and have won the admiration of foreigners and the Chinese alike... So long as the loans and indemnities mortgaged on Customs receipts are not redeemed by China, it will be difficult to get the foreign Powers, who are distrustful of the Chinese on monetary matters, to consent to a restoration of the Customs Administration to the Chinese themselves. (Pp. 206-6).'

Reforming and patriotic Chinese desire fiscal autonomy for their country as regards the tariff, but are in no hurry to see a change as regards the administration of the Customs. Mr.

Wellington Koo, at Washington, has issued a statement setting forth this point of view. 'The Times', in the leader mentioned above, assumes that it is the administration that he wishes to see in Chinese hands, and insinuates that the motive for this desire is the hope of corrupt pickings out of dishonest dealings with traders. The last two sentences deserve to be quoted : 'That the Mandarins would like to have the handling of the large sums receivable by the Customs is undoubted ; that the people would care to see it in their hands is very doubtful indeed. The eloquence of the Chinese delegates may delude the uninformed ; it can only serve to remind those who know Asiatics that the more an Oriental diplomatist is Westernized the less confidence does he command in the East.'

Was ever such an amazing insult of the Minister of a friendly Power ? Mr. Koo speaks throughout of the tariff, not of the administration. I do not know how long the writer of this tactful and polite article has spent in China, or how intimately he is acquainted with modern-minded reforming Chinese. Probably he only knows China through the reports of business men whom he has met in his club. I can assure him that 'those who know Asiatics', at any rate those who know them in China, do not take the view which he attributes to them. My own experience of the Chinese who have had a modern education was that they are as upright, as intelligent, as delicately considerate, and as free from national prejudice, as any set of men it has ever been my good fortune to meet. They have to contend against a mass of bad tradition in their own country, and they are intensely grateful for Western help in this struggle. But those who pretend that they are not to be trusted, and are only seeking to deceive the guileless Westerners, must be either very ignorant or very depraved. One is often tempted to think that Europeans wish China to remain weak and corrupt, in order that they may obtain such pickings as 'The Times' supposes Mr. Wellington Koo to hanker after. America has adopted a more enlightened policy, and there are signs that our Government intends to follow America's lead. Even Lord Northcliffe, since he visited Peking, has become a champion of China. But he has apparently not yet succeeded in impressing his new knowledge upon his organs at home.

I have no space to deal with various other issues, analogous to the tariff, involving China's legitimate claims to independence. In all these issues, men with financial motives which they dare not avow will mislead journalists and public opinion at home, if they can. It is therefore necessary to be very wary, and above all the remember that the Chinese are not an inferior race, but a great nation with a civilization at least as good as our own. Their only serious inferiority is in scientific homicide. [Russ6]

1921.12.03-1921.12.17 Russell Bertrand. *Sketches of modern China*. In : *The Nation and the Athenaeum* ; vol. 30, 3, 10, 17. Dez (1921).

I. The East and the eclipse.

China is traditionally a land of leisure, but the visiting foreigner must not hope for much personal experience of this side of Chinese life. The busiest thirty hours I ever spent in my life were spent in Chang-sha, a city which is reached by travelling up the Yangtze for three or four days from Shanghai to Hankow, and then going south for another day across a vast lake. (In spite of its remoteness it is a Treaty Port.) When I arrived in Chang-sha, there was an educational Congress in session, at which all kinds of people lectured on all kinds of subjects. During my thirty hours, I gave four lectures and two after-dinner speeches, and attended a great reception at the American hospital. My lectures, which were on Russia, displeased the student by being somewhat critical of the Bolsheviks, whom almost all Chinese students passionately admire. I spent the night (in a Chinese hotel), as Saint Paul spent his time in Ephesus, fighting with wild beasts. So on the whole my impression of Chang-sha was lacking in Oriental calm.

The proceedings ended with a great feast given by the Tuchun, the military governor of the Province of Hunan. Most Tuchuns are wicked ; indeed they are the chief internal source of trouble in China. They intercept the provincial revenue and spend it on raising private armies ; they indulge in war, one against another ; and they practice depredations in the style of Verres. A British missionary for many years resident at Chang-sha assured me that the predecessor ou our host had, in two years, amassed a fortune of thirty million dollars, partly by downright robbery and partly by debasing the currency in his province. At the end of that time he had fled from popular vengeance, with his plunder, to Japan, where, I gathered, he is living happily ever afterwards. An Englishman not accustomed to China might expect to find, in consequence of this worthy's activities, such scenes of desolation as are now to be seen in Eastern Europe, but he would be agreeably disappointed. Chinese scoundrels have sill much to learn from the West as regards efficiency in evil, and it was clear that the absconding Tuchun had done far less harm than is done by the 'honest' governments of the Great Powers. The Chinese government does some harm to its own people, but none to anybody else ; from an international point of view, it is the best government in the world, because it is the most inefficient.

However, the Tuchun who was our host was an exception to the general rule, being perfectly virtuous and a great friend of education. (He fell a few weeks after my visit.) The guests were received in one vast hall, and banqueted in another. The food was European ; there was an endless succession of courses and an infinite variety of wines. Our host, through an interpreter, apologized to me for the frugal fare he was offering in his humble abode, but said he thought we would rather have a glimpse of every-day Chinese life than be treated to a display of pomp and splendor. I tried to remember quickly all I had read of Chinese etiquette, and mumbled something about my pigship being honoured that His Magnificence should deign to notice me ; but I fear I was not very adequate.

If the Tuchun displayed something of traditional Chinese manners, the after-dinner speeches differed from those of Europe in the opposite direction, by being free from make-believe and humour, very serious and very businesslike. Professor Dewey spoke of Chinese education and of the lines along which it should progress ; Mrs. Dewey informed the dignitaries of Chang-sha that in some provinces co-education had been adopted, and that Hunan ought to do likewise. To this the Tuchun made a statesmanlike reply, promising that the matter should receive his best consideration, and that action should be taken when the time was ripe.

Various Chinese educationists, whose speeches were interpreted into English by Chinese interpreters, spoke of their aims and their efforts, and of what they hoped from their European and American guests. Reverence for sages is traditional in China, and many modern Chinese transfer this attitude to the educationists who come from foreign countries. Their expectations are so far beyond one's powers as to be often embarrassing ; it is very difficult to explain that one is not a sage without feeling that one is rather a fool.

The educationists and the students in China are extraordinarily keen, and there is no doubt that the movement for modern education represents the most solid advance that is being

made. Chinese who have been at foreign universities do not become unbalanced, or unable to see what is good in China (except in art). Their native civilization is sufficiently strong and solid to enable them to assimilate what the West has to teach without becoming simply Europeans ; and, strange to say, they like our best better than our worst. They are, as a rule, less learned than Japanese professors, but more genuinely cultivated, more open-minded, more capable of a scientifically skeptical outlook. Nationalism and religion, the two great enemies of honest thought in the West, are absent from the educated classes in China ; respect for Confucius is not excessive among those who have assimilated Western culture. I was never conscious in China, as one almost always is in Japan, of a barrier to mutual comprehension. The Oriental is said to be inscrutable and remote, but this is certainly not true in China. I found the Chinese just as easy to talk to as the English, and just as easy (or as difficult) to understand psychologically.

But Young China has to contend against a terrible dead-weight of ignorance and superstition in the mass of the people. When I left the banquet to go on board the boat on which I was leaving Chang-sha, it happened that an eclipse of the moon was in progress. As in the earliest annals of Chinese history, the streets were full of people beating gongs to frighten away the Heavenly Dog who was supposed to be trying to eat up the moon ; little bonfires were being lit everywhere to rekindle the moon's light by sympathetic magic. The missionary whom I mentioned earlier told me that often, as he walked about, he had heard passers-by express astonishment that he could bend the knee, because he was a 'foreign devil', and devils have to keep their knees always straight. They also can only travel in straight lines, and therefore every Chinese house has the front door opening onto a blank wall, with the courtyard round the corner. Even within the courtyard, a screen provides other corners, so that at worst the evil spirits cannot get beyond the servants' quarters. Great care has to be taken in putting up telegraph wires to prevent them from pointing straight at any man's house, because if they did they would help devils to get at him. There are innumerable superstitions of this kind, some merely picturesque, others very inconvenient. Educated people do not believe them, but they have to be respected in any public undertaking. Until recently, no house could be built of more than one story, for fear of disturbing the spirits of the wind and the air.

The only cure for these superstitions is universal education, and for that, at present, there are not enough funds or enough modern teachers. But the love of education and respect for it are so great that one may hope to see it rapidly extended, provided political troubles can be sufficiently settled for the money to be forthcoming. I hope that, when education becomes more widespread, it will be in the hands of the Chinese themselves, not in those of missionaries, clerical or lay, who want to spread our civilization as the finest thing on earth. China has shortcomings, which to us are very obvious, but it also has merits in which we are deficient. What is to be hoped is not that China should become like ourselves, reproducing our Napoleons and Bismarcks and Eminent Victorians, but that a new civilization should be developed, combining our knowledge with Chinese culture. The Chinese are capable of this, if they are encouraged but not coerced. The methods of Europe and Japan would force them in time to become like Japan, militaristic, imperialist and brutal ; the methods of America would persuade them to become like America. But if their development can be left free, I think they can give the world a new civilization, to carry on the arts and sciences after Europe has perished in a sea of blood.

II. Chinese ethics.

The Chinese are more fond of laughter than any other nation with which I am acquainted. Every little incident amuses them, and their talk is almost always humorous. They have neither the grim determination to succeed which characterizes the Anglo-Saxon, nor the tragic self-importance of the Slav ; Samuel Smiles and Dostoevsky, the typical prophets of these two races, are both equally remote from the Chinese spirit. A Slav of Teuton believes instinctively that he alone is truly real, and that the apparently external world is merely a product of his imagination ; hence the vogue of idealistic philosophies. It follows that one's own death is a tremendous event, since it makes the universe collapse ; nothing short of personal immortality can avert this awful cataclysm. To the Anglo-Saxon, it is his own purposes rather than his own imaginings that are sacred, because he cares more for action than for thought ; but to him, as to the Slav, the ego is all-important, because the immutable principles of morality demand the victory of his volitions. And so he snatches a moral victory out of the very jaws of death by alliance with a Heavenly Will.

These solemnities are not for the Chinese. Their instinctive outlook is social rather than individual ; the family takes the place which for us is taken by the single personality. To us, self-development or self-realization is not a palpably absurd basis for ethics ; to the Chinaman, the development of the family is not a palpably absurd basis. Accordingly, when a Chinaman finds that he is dying, he does not take the event tragically, as we do ; he merely follows the rites. He assembles his sorrowing family (their sorrow is part of the rites) ; he makes an appropriate farewell speech to them ; he sees to it that his coffin is duly prepared, and that his funeral will be worthy of so important a family. When these duties are accomplished, his death is an occurrence to which he resigns himself without any particular interest or emotion.

This absence of self-feeling produces an absence of pomposity ; Meredith's Egoist would be impossible in China. The Chinese, of course, are selfish, like other people, but their selfishness is instinctive, as in children and animals, not clothed in fine phrases as ours is. I doubt whether psycho-analysis would find much material among them. There is in Chinese no word for 'persecution' ; I forgot to ask whether there was any word for 'prig', but I doubt it. Barring Confucius himself, I cannot think of any Chinaman, either in history or among my acquaintance who could be described as a prig. The result of all this is a liberation of the impulses to play and enjoyment which makes Chinese life unbelievably restful and delightful after the solemn cruelties of the West.

It would, however, be misleading to suggest that Chinese conventional morality is less absurd, or demands less self-sacrifice, than that of Christian countries. While I was in Peking an old woman of no particular importance died, and her daughter died of grief immediately afterwards. (I heard of the case from the European doctor who was attending them, and who assured me that no ordinary cause of death could be found in the daughter.) To die of grief on the death of a parent is a supreme victory of filial piety, conferring great lustre upon the individual and the family. It is customary to put up memorial arches, nominally at the public expense, in some public place, to hand down to posterity the knowledge of such signal virtue. So far, so good ; but the sequel is not so pleasant. In the case in question, public opinion demanded that the family should provide a specially magnificent funeral for the mother and daughter, and in order to defray the expenses, the sons, who were moderately well-to-do, had to sell all they possessed and become rickshaw coolies. This is one concrete example of the harm done by making the family the basis of ethics.

The family is the source of a great deal of the corruption that vitiates Chinese public life. When a man is appointed to a post, filial piety demands that he should use his position to enrich his relations. As his legitimate salary does not admit of much being done in this way, he is compelled to eke it out by methods which we should consider dishonest ; if he does not, he is condemned by public opinion as an unnatural son or brother. Many returned students who begin with Western ideals find themselves caught in this net and unable to escape from its meshes.

The subjection of women is, of course, essential to a strong family system, and is carried very far by Chinese conventional morality, though not so far as in Japan. Old-fashioned Chinese

women are not allowed to see any men except their husbands' relations, though they may go out (with a female attendant) for shopping or visiting other women. When a man marries, he takes his wife to live in his father's house, and she becomes, usually, the slave of her mother-in-law, who believes any slanders brought by the servants, and uses them to keep her daughter-in-law in subjection. The wife is not considered to have any ground of complaint if her husband takes a concubine, and she is censured if she marries again after his death. Betrothals are arranged by the parents of the young people, who do not meet until the wedding ceremony. Betrothals are often entered into in infancy, and are more binding even than marriage. There are recognized grounds for divorce, but there is no recognized way of escaping from a betrothal.

All this is, of course, very bad, and Young China reacts against it vigorously. I became acquainted with various married couples living in houses of their own, where the wife enjoyed all the liberties that an English wife would have. Many girls nowadays are well educated on Western lines in normal schools and afterwards in colleges or universities. They are admitted to Peking Government University, where quite a number attended my lectures. These girls, naturally, are not willing to enter upon the old-fashioned kind of marriage, and the men students whom I came across were quite at one with them on this point.

When I arrived in Peking, I said that I wished to have a seminar for the better students. Accordingly they organized what they called a 'Society for studying Russell's philosophy', which met one a week under the presidency of an Oxford philosopher, Professor Fu, who usually acted as interpreter. We met in the 'Returned Students' Club', the pupils seated at a long table and the professors at a smaller table with tea and cakes. The pupils asked questions and discussed our answers with great keenness and perfect candour. After spending some time on problems of pure philosophy, we began to consider social questions, which interested them far more. We had lively debates on communism and Bolshevism, most of the students taking the view that China could and ought to become communist tomorrow. But the liveliest evening of all was devoted to the family system. Afterwards I discovered that these youths, to whom a new intellectual and moral world was just opening, were most of them already married or betrothed, without their participation, to girls whom they did not know and who were presumably full of traditional prejudices. This presented an acute moral problem, upon which it was difficult for an outsider to offer an opinion.

It is clear that worship of the family in China is an evil comparable in magnitude to worship of the State or the nation among ourselves, though the nature of its bad effects is quite different. Most Europeans in China are ultra-conservative as regards Chinese institutions, and assert that without the family ethic all Chinese morality would crumble. I believe this to be a profound mistake. All progressive Chinese take the opposite view, and I am firmly convinced that they are right. All that is worst in Old China is connected with the family system. In old days, some degree of public duty was deduced from the system by the fiction that filial piety demanded service of the Emperor. But since the establishment of the Republic this fiction no longer serves, and a new morality is needed to inculcate public spirit and honesty in government. Young China fully understands this need, and will, given time, provide the new teaching that is required. But whether the Powers will allow enough time is very doubtful. Chinese problems are not capable of being satisfactorily settled by a mechanical imposition of order and what we consider good government. Adjustment to new ideas demands a period of chaos, and it is not for the ultimate good of China to shorten this period artificially. But I doubt whether this view will commend itself to the foreigners who think they know how to save China.

III. Chinese amusements.

One of the most obvious characteristics of the Chinese is their love of fireworks. On arriving at a Chinese temple, the worshipper is given a set of Chinese crackers to explode on the temple steps, so as to put him in a good humour. When I invited the most intellectual of my students to an evening party, they sent several days ahead extraordinarily elaborate 'feux d'artifice' to be let off in my courtyard. On the night of the Chinese New Year (which is different from ours) it is impossible to sleep a wink, because every household north, south, east, and west, spends the whole night sending off rockets and golden rain and very imaginable noisy display. I did not find any Chinaman, however grave, who failed to enjoy these occasions.

Chinese New Year is like our Christmas, or rather, what our Christmas would be if no one in the country were over ten years old, except the shopkeepers and confectioners. Everybody buys toys of one sort or another : paper windmills which go round and round in the wind as they are held in the hands of fat old gentlemen in rickshas ; rattles more rattling than any European baby enjoys ; gaudy paper pictures of all kinds ; Chinese lanterns with horsemen on the outside who begin to gallop round as soon as the lantern is lit. All these things are sold in the courtyards of temples, which take the place of Hampstead Heath on a Bank Holiday. I went on their New Year's Day to the 'Temple of the Eighteen Hells', where the posthumous tortures of eighteen kinds of sinners are depicted in the spirit of 'Ruthless Rhymes'. A vast crowd was going round, shouting with laughter at the various horrors, none of which were portrayed in any but a comic spirit. In the largest, gayest and most crowded temple, in the inmost court, I found the Salvation Army singing hymns to a brass band and preaching through an interpreter, assuring the Bank Holiday crowd that its amusements were idolatrous and must infallibly bring eternal damnation. The crowd enjoyed this even more than the eighteen native hells, laughed more vociferously, and applauded with vast good humour. I do not think it occurred to any of them that the Salvationists were in earnest, for if it had, good manners (never deficient in any class in China) would have demanded a different reception. I alone was left somewhat pensive, reflecting upon the benefits of the civilization we are bringing to the poor benighted heathen.

The educated classes, though they do not lose the capacity for childish pleasures, have also others of a more refined kind ; in fact the art of exquisite enjoyment has probably been carried to greater perfection than anywhere else in the world. In all the most beautiful places are Buddhist monasteries, to which scholars go when they desire a studious retreat. At any specially admirable point of view, one finds a pavilion, put up, not by a tourist agency, but by some Emperor or poet with a perfect appreciation of what the landscape needs. No sooner has one sat down in this astonishing summer-house than some kind person, like a genie in 'The Arabian Nights', brings tea in little cups – not the gross liquid that we call tea, but an amber-coloured nectar with an intoxicating fragrance, half aromatic, half like the meadows in June, combining the freshness of spring with the beauty of summer sunshine robbed of its dust and heat. One's Chinese hosts begin immediately to discuss some ancient philosophic theme : whether progress is rectilinear or cyclic; whether the perfect sage must be always self-sacrificing, or may on occasion consider his own interest; whether it is better to meditate on death or to ignore it. These subjects will be argued with a wealth of classical quotation and anecdotes of ancient philosophers. But presently some one will mention Japanese aggression in Shantung, or missionary education, or labour conditions in the cotton mills on the Yangtze. At once the delicate spell is broken, and one realizes that, willingly or unwillingly, one is part of the force that must inevitably destroy this beauty and peace inherited from a happier age. The Chinese have a great aptitude for games of skill. They play a kind of chess which is far more complicated than ours, and needs a board of 256 squares. Those who subsequently learn our variety of the game find it exceedingly simple, and can soon beat quite good European players. They are also much addicted to various easier games, which they play for money. Gambling has always been a national vice, and is their principal vice now that the smoking of opium has been nearly stamped out except where Japanese pedlars can smuggle it in. One of the less agreeable sides of Peking life is the enormous number of beggars. Even in the severest winter frosts, they are dressed in rags which let die air through; sometimes they have

wounds or sores at which they point like the Saints in medieval pictures. As one goes through the streets in a ricksha, beggars run after one, calling out in a piteous voice: 'Da lao yeh!' which means 'Great old sire'. If one is on foot, they sometimes perform the kow-tow to one in the middle of the street. All this is embarrassing and painful, and at first one reacts with a C.O.S. emotion. But gradually one discovers that they have their beats and their office hours ; that well-to-do Chinese like giving to them, and that many of them are fat. When they are not at work, they congregate together under a sunny wall and smoke cigarettes. At these times they take a holiday from the pretence of misery, and talk and laugh with the utmost gaiety. I do not think any European tramp could endure the hardships they put up with, and live ; but there is no doubt that they preserve to the full that capacity for enjoying every pleasant moment which is the gift of the gods to the Chinese nation.

Educated Chinese derive considerable pleasure from gently pulling the foreigner's leg—but with such delicacy that no one could possibly be annoyed. I was taken one day by two Chinese friends to see a famous old pagoda, which was in a slightly ruinous condition. I went up the winding stairs to the top, and thought they were following; but when I emerged I saw them below me engaged in earnest conversation. On reaching the bottom again, I asked why they had not come up. Their reply was characteristic : 'We debated for a long time, with many weighty arguments pro and con, whether we should follow you or not. But at last we decided that if the pagoda should crumble while you were on it, it would be as well that there should be some one to bear witness as to how the philosopher died, so we stayed below.' The fact was that the weather was warm and one of them was fat.

The modernized Chinese, unfortunately, have mostly lost the power to appreciate native art; when I praised Chinese pictures, they invariably retorted that the perspective is wrong. I was assured by Europeans that good pictures in the old style are still being produced, but I saw none of them myself ; I was shown the imitations of our painting produced in the up-to-date art schools, but it was a devastating and horrible experience. The older Chinese still appreciate the old pictures, many of which are inconceivably beautiful. There is in China a much closer connection than in Europe between painting and poetry, perhaps because the same instrument, the brush, is used for both. The Chinese value a good piece of calligraphy just as much as a good picture; often the painter will write a poem or sentiment on the margin of his picture, and the beauty of the writing will be as much admired as that of the painting. Pictures are not hung on walls, as with us, but kept rolled up, and treated like books, to be read one at a time. Some of them are so long that they cannot be seen all at once ; they represent, perhaps, all the scenery that you might see successively during a long day's walk in the mountains. At the beginning of the picture you see two figures starting up a footpath from the plain, probably with a willow-pattern bridge in the foreground; presently you find the same figures ascending through strange gorges and forests, which are realistic though no one unacquainted with China would think so ; just as your legs begin to ache in sympathy, the friends arrive at some exquisite temple and enjoy tea with philosophic converse in a pavilion. From there the mountains rise vaster and more inaccessible, into dim regions where their shapes seem like misty epiphanies of something divine, and the spectator cannot tell where solid ground has passed into the cloud-shapes of mystical imagination. This is only one style of picture; there are many others, just as admirable. For my part, I derive far more pleasure from them than from even the best of European pictures; but in this I am willing to suppose that my taste is bad. I wish I could believe that something of the Chinese capacity for creating beauty could survive, but at the devastating approach of the white man beauty flies like a shy ghost. For us, beauty belongs to museums or to the final self-glorification of blatant millionaires ; we cannot regard it as a thing for every day, or as equal in importance to health or cleanliness or money. Chinese dealers, with whom avarice is a passion, will sacrifice large sums sooner than sell a beautiful thing to a person of no taste. But neither they nor anyone else can keep alive the ancient loveliness of China, or the instinctive happiness which makes China a paradise after the fierce weariness of our distracted and trivial civilization. [Russ6]

1921.12.06 Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 6. Dez.1921. [Birth of Kate Russell].
Do let me congratulate Mrs. Russell and yourself most heartily upon the advent of your beautiful baby as I learnt from Miss Power whom I met the other day in Cambridge. We should expect dyed eggs and stewed noodles as is the custom with us in China on this occasion. We expect Mrs. Russell shall be able to come with you on the 10th. [Russ45]

- 1921.12.16 Russell, Bertrand. *How Washington could help China*. In : The Daily Herald ; 16 Dez. (1921). In international dealings it is useless to expect any nation to pursue any end which it does not believe to be in its own interest. No good to China could be expected to come out of the Washington Conference but for the fact that the interests of both England and America are, for the present, identical with those of China, except in a few points, such as our possession of Hong Kong. The immediate and pressing aims of any Chinese patriot must be two: to end the internal anarchy and to recover the independence and integrity of China. The aims of English and American statesmanship in China, from a purely selfish point of view, may be taken to be the extension of trade and the opportunity to exploit Chinese natural resources. Territorial ambitions have no place in America's programme, and ought to have none in ours; I believe that, in fact, our ambitions in that respect are limited (in China) to the retention of what we already possess, or rather part of it, for our Government seems to have realized that our true national interest would be furthered by the restitution of Wei-Hai-Wei. What both English and American interests most urgently require in China is stable government and the open door: that is to say, the ending of anarchy and of Japanese territorial aggression. Our interests are, therefore, for the present, almost completely identical with those of China.
- The interests of Japan, at any rate as conceived by the militarists who control policy, are different from ours, and not compatible with the welfare of China. Japan wishes to be a Great Power, in territory, population, and industrial resources. Japan has not much of the raw materials of industry, whereas China has them in abundance. If Japan is to be able to conduct a long war successfully, control of mines in some portion of China is essential. Moreover, Japanese statesmen have not merely economic aims, but also the desire for dynastic grandeur and a vast empire. Psychologically, one of the fundamental causes of the whole situation is the Japanese inferiority-complex. At every moment they are afraid that they are being insulted or cold-shouldered on account of not being white, and this makes them aggressive and ill-mannered. This is by far the strongest part of the Japanese case. Europeans do not beat Japanese ricksha-drivers to make them hurry, nor do their chauffeurs dismount to cuff pedestrians who are slow in getting out of the way, as I have seen the chauffeur of an American do in Peking. The Japanese are not liked by either Europeans or Americans, but they are treated with a respect which few white men show to the Chinese. The reason is simply that Japan has a strong army and navy. White men, as a rule, only respect those who have power to kill them or deprive them of their means of livelihood ; and as wealth depends upon success in war, skill in homicide is, in the last analysis, the only thing that secures tolerable courtesy from a white man. If the Japanese are defeated in war by the Americans or by an Anglo-American alliance there will be a setback for the coloured races all over the world, and an intensification of the intolerable insolence displayed towards them by white men. There will be an immediate catastrophic destruction of the Japanese civilization, which still has many merits that our civilization lacks. And following upon this there will be a slow destruction of the civilization of China, not by war, but by Americanization. The big towns will become like Chicago, and the small towns like 'Main Street'. Americans would feel that they were conferring a boon in effecting this transformation, but no person with any receptivity or aesthetic sense would share their view.
- We may, therefore, diagnose the situation as follows: Japan is in a bad mood, and is more immediately dangerous to China than any other nation; but England and America—especially the latter—are, by the very nature of their civilization and outlook, destructive of all that is best in the Far East, and doomed, nolens volens, to be oppressors if they have the power. Under these circumstances the worst thing that could happen would be a Japanese-American war, leading to the destruction of everything distinctive in the civilization of the yellow races, the increase of white tyranny, and the launching of America upon a career of militarist Imperialism. On the other hand, the best thing that could happen would be a diplomatic humiliation of the Japanese military party, causing Japan itself to become less aggressive and less anxious to subjugate the adjoining mainland. The difficulty is that Japan will not yield except to the threat of war. If England and America, at Washington, join in insisting upon acceptance of the naval ratio and evacuation of Shantung, one may presume that Japan will give way sooner than face a war against both combined. If America alone threatens, Japan

will probably choose war, and be destroyed.

What is, of course, to be expected is that America will give way, in substance though not in form, about Shantung, in return for Japanese acceptance of the naval ratio; that after a few years American spies will report (truly or falsely) that Japan is building secretly; that in the meantime America will have fortified naval bases in the neighbourhood of Japan; and that then America will proceed to destroy Japan with a good conscience. I do not see any issue from this cycle of disaster except a change of heart in Japan. Of course, a change of heart in America would be just as good, but nothing will convince Americans that they need a change of heart.

China, unfortunately, cannot escape being industrialized. It would be far better for China to develop her industries slowly with native capital; but they will, in fact, be developed quickly with foreign capital. So much, I fear, is independent of the issue at Washington. For the immediate interests of China it would be well if America and England combined to force Japan by diplomatic pressure, not by war, both to accept the naval ratio and to evacuate Shantung. This would also be good for Japan, since it would be a blow to the military party, and perhaps introduce a much more liberal régime. (Evacuation of Vladivostok and friendly relations with the Far Eastern Republic should also be insisted upon.) But in the long run it is not in the interests of Asia that the one genuinely independent Asiatic Power should be crushed. England and America can, if they choose, exercise despotic sway over the world. There is much good that they might do in that case. They might curb the ambitions of France and Japan, make all nations except themselves disarm, undertake the economic rehabilitation of Germany and Russia for the sake of their own trade, and liberate China from the fear of Japan. But if they were able to accomplish all this they would also acquire the habit of bullying, and become confirmed in the ruthless certainty of their own moral superiority. They would soon come to display an economic and cultural despotism such as the world has never known—always, of course, in a missionary spirit. From such a tyranny the world could only escape by a universal rebellion, possibly with Great Britain at the head of the rebels.

From the alternative of tyranny or war there is, so far as I can see, no escape while the industrial nations continue their system of capitalist exploitation. Nothing offers any real escape except Socialism—i.e., in this connection, production for use instead of production for commercial profit. America is still in the phase of Liberalism which more experienced nations have outgrown since the war. President Wilson attempted to save the world by Liberal ideas, and failed; President Harding is making a second attempt, and will fail even if he seems to have succeeded. He will fail, I mean, as a humanitarian, not as the champion of American capital. The existing capitalist system is in its very nature predatory, and cannot be made the basis of just dealing between nations. So long as America draws nearly all the dividends derived from Capitalism, she will continue to think the present system heaven-sent, and will employ Liberal futilities which will delude fools into supporting knaves.

But in all this I am speaking of the future, not of the immediate situation. For the moment, Anglo-American cooperation at Washington can secure two important things: (1) the naval ratio, (2) a breathing space for China by a curbing of Japanese ambitions. If these ends are achieved the Washington Conference will have been useful. If it leaves Japan's activities in China unchecked, it will have been futile; but if it leads to war with Japan it will have been immeasurably harmful. [Russ6]

1922

[Russell, Bertrand]. *Suan li zhe xue*. Luosu zhu; Fu Zhongsun, Zhang Bangming yi [ID D28283].

Fu and Zhang's translation of *Introduction to mathematical philosophy* was initially a success, but as time passed, the literary style they had used, which was very much influenced by the movement for the reform of writing, was regarded as awkward by the new generation. In addition, certain terminologies were not translated as accurately as they should have been. [Russ42]

1922.01.01 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (1)

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The Ruler of the Southern Ocean was Shû (Heedless), the Ruler of the Northern Ocean was Hû (Sudden), and the Ruler of the Centre was Chaos. Shû and Hû were continually meeting in the land of Chaos, who treated them very well. They consulted together how they might repay his kindness, and said, "Men all have seven orifices for the purpose of seeing, hearing, eating, and breathing, while this poor Ruler alone has not one. Let us try and make them for him." Accordingly they dug one orifice in him every day; and at the end of seven days Chaos died.—[Chuang Tze, Legge's translation.]

Chapter I

Questions

A European lately arrived in China, if he is of a receptive and reflective disposition, finds himself confronted with a number of very puzzling questions, for many of which the problems of Western Europe will not have prepared him. Russian problems, it is true, have important affinities with those of China, but they have also important differences; moreover they are decidedly less complex. Chinese problems, even if they affected no one outside China, would be of vast importance, since the Chinese are estimated to constitute about a quarter of the human race. In fact, however, all the world will be vitally affected by the development of Chinese affairs, which may well prove a decisive factor, for good or evil, during the next two centuries. This makes it important, to Europe and America almost as much as to Asia, that there should be an intelligent understanding of the questions raised by China, even if, as yet, definite answers are difficult to give.

The questions raised by the present condition of China fall naturally into three groups, economic, political, and cultural. No one of these groups, however, can be considered in isolation, because each is intimately bound up with the other two. For my part, I think the cultural questions are the most important, both for China and for mankind; if these could be solved, I would accept, with more or less equanimity, any political or economic system which ministered to that end. Unfortunately, however, cultural questions have little interest for practical men, who regard money and power as the proper ends for nations as for individuals. The helplessness of the artist in a hard-headed business community has long been a commonplace of novelists and moralizers, and has made collectors feel virtuous when they bought up the pictures of painters who had died in penury. China may be regarded as an artist nation, with the virtues and vices to be expected of the artist: virtues chiefly useful to others, and vices chiefly harmful to oneself. Can Chinese virtues be preserved? Or must China, in order to survive, acquire, instead, the vices which make for success and cause misery to others only? And if China does copy the model set by all foreign nations with which she has dealings, what will become of all of us?

China has an ancient civilization which is now undergoing a very rapid process of change. The traditional civilization of China had developed in almost complete independence of Europe, and had merits and demerits quite different from those of the West. It would be futile to attempt to strike a balance; whether our present culture is better or worse, on the whole, than that which seventeenth-century missionaries found in the Celestial Empire is a question as to which no prudent person would venture to pronounce. But it is easy to point to certain respects in which we are better than old China, and to other respects in which we are worse. If intercourse between Western nations and China is to be fruitful, we must cease to regard ourselves as missionaries of a superior civilization, or, worse still, as men who have a right to exploit, oppress, and swindle the Chinese because they are an "inferior" race. I do not see any reason to believe that the Chinese are inferior to ourselves; and I think most Europeans, who have any intimate knowledge of China, would take the same view.

In comparing an alien culture with one's own, one is forced to ask oneself questions more fundamental than any that usually arise in regard to home affairs. One is forced to ask: What are the things that I ultimately value? What would make me judge one sort of society more desirable than another sort? What sort of ends should I most wish to see realized in the world? Different people will answer these questions differently, and I do not know of any argument by which I could persuade a man who gave an answer different from my own. I must therefore be content merely to state the answer which appeals to me, in the hope that the reader may feel likewise.

The main things which seem to me important on their own account, and not merely as means to other things, are: knowledge, art, instinctive happiness, and relations of friendship or affection. When I speak of knowledge, I do not mean all knowledge; there is much in the way of dry lists of facts that is merely useful, and still more that has no appreciable value of any kind. But the understanding of Nature, incomplete as it is, which is to be derived from science, I hold to be a thing which is good and delightful on its own account. The same may be said, I think, of some biographies and parts of history. To enlarge on this topic would,

however, take me too far from my theme. When I speak of art as one of the things that have value on their own account, I do not mean only the deliberate productions of trained artists, though of course these, at their best, deserve the highest place. I mean also the almost unconscious effort after beauty which one finds among Russian peasants and Chinese coolies, the sort of impulse that creates folk-songs, that existed among ourselves before the time of the Puritans, and survives in cottage gardens. Instinctive happiness, or joy of life, is one of the most important widespread popular goods that we have lost through industrialism and the high pressure at which most of us live; its commonness in China is a strong reason for thinking well of Chinese civilization.

In judging of a community, we have to consider, not only how much of good or evil there is within the community, but also what effects it has in promoting good or evil in other communities, and how far the good things which it enjoys depend upon evils elsewhere. In this respect, also, China is better than we are. Our prosperity, and most of what we endeavour to secure for ourselves, can only be obtained by widespread oppression and exploitation of weaker nations, while the Chinese are not strong enough to injure other countries, and secure whatever they enjoy by means of their own merits and exertions alone.

These general ethical considerations are by no means irrelevant in considering the practical problems of China. Our industrial and commercial civilization has been both the effect and the cause of certain more or less unconscious beliefs as to what is worth while; in China one becomes conscious of these beliefs through the spectacle of a society which challenges them by being built, just as unconsciously, upon a different standard of values. Progress and efficiency, for example, make no appeal to the Chinese, except to those who have come under Western influence. By valuing progress and efficiency, we have secured power and wealth; by ignoring them, the Chinese, until we brought disturbance, secured on the whole a peaceable existence and a life full of enjoyment. It is difficult to compare these opposite achievements unless we have some standard of values in our minds; and unless it is a more or less conscious standard, we shall undervalue the less familiar civilization, because evils to which we are not accustomed always make a stronger impression than those that we have learned to take as a matter of course.

The culture of China is changing rapidly, and undoubtedly rapid change is needed. The change that has hitherto taken place is traceable ultimately to the military superiority of the West; but in future our economic superiority is likely to be quite as potent. I believe that, if the Chinese are left free to assimilate what they want of our civilization, and to reject what strikes them as bad, they will be able to achieve an organic growth from their own tradition, and to produce a very splendid result, combining our merits with theirs. There are, however, two opposite dangers to be avoided if this is to happen. The first danger is that they may become completely Westernized, retaining nothing of what has hitherto distinguished them, adding merely one more to the restless, intelligent, industrial, and militaristic nations which now afflict this unfortunate planet. The second danger is that they may be driven, in the course of resistance to foreign aggression, into an intense anti-foreign conservatism as regards everything except armaments. This has happened in Japan, and it may easily happen in China. The future of Chinese culture is intimately bound up with political and economic questions; and it is through their influence that dangers arise.

China is confronted with two very different groups of foreign Powers, on the one hand the white nations, on the other hand Japan. In considering the effect of the white races on the Far East as a whole, modern Japan must count as a Western product; therefore the responsibility for Japan's doings in China rests ultimately with her white teachers. Nevertheless, Japan remains very unlike Europe and America, and has ambitions different from theirs as regards China. We must therefore distinguish three possibilities: (1) China may become enslaved to one or more white nations; (2) China may become enslaved to Japan; (3) China may recover and retain her liberty. Temporarily there is a fourth possibility, namely that a consortium of Japan and the White Powers may control China; but I do not believe that, in the long run, the Japanese will be able to co-operate with England and America. In the long run, I believe that Japan must dominate the Far East or go under. If the Japanese had a different character this would not be the case; but the nature of their ambitions makes them exclusive and

unneighbourly. I shall give the reasons for this view when I come to deal with the relations of China and Japan.

To understand the problem of China, we must first know something of Chinese history and culture before the irruption of the white man, then something of modern Chinese culture and its inherent tendencies; next, it is necessary to deal in outline with the military and diplomatic relations of the Western Powers with China, beginning with our war of 1840 and ending with the treaty concluded after the Boxer rising of 1900. Although the Sino-Japanese war comes in this period, it is possible to separate, more or less, the actions of Japan in that war, and to see what system the White Powers would have established if Japan had not existed. Since that time, however, Japan has been the dominant foreign influence in Chinese affairs. It is therefore necessary to understand how the Japanese became what they are: what sort of nation they were before the West destroyed their isolation, and what influence the West has had upon them. Lack of understanding of Japan has made people in England blind to Japan's aims in China, and unable to apprehend the meaning of what Japan has done.

Political considerations alone, however, will not suffice to explain what is going on in relation to China; economic questions are almost more important. China is as yet hardly industrialized, and is certainly the most important undeveloped area left in the world. Whether the resources of China are to be developed by China, by Japan, or by the white races, is a question of enormous importance, affecting not only the whole development of Chinese civilization, but the balance of power in the world, the prospects of peace, the destiny of Russia, and the chances of development towards a better economic system in the advanced nations.

The Washington Conference has partly exhibited and partly concealed the conflict for the possession of China between nations all of which have guaranteed China's independence and integrity. Its outcome has made it far more difficult than before to give a hopeful answer as regards Far Eastern problems, and in particular as regards the question: Can China preserve any shadow of independence without a great development of nationalism and militarism? I cannot bring myself to advocate nationalism and militarism, yet it is difficult to know what to say to patriotic Chinese who ask how they can be avoided. So far, I have found only one answer. The Chinese nation, is the most, patient in the world; it thinks of centuries as other nations think of decades. It is essentially indestructible, and can afford to wait. The "civilized" nations of the world, with their blockades, their poison gases, their bombs, submarines, and negro armies, will probably destroy each other within the next hundred years, leaving the stage to those whose pacifism has kept them alive, though poor and powerless. If China can avoid being goaded into war, her oppressors may wear themselves out in the end, and leave the Chinese free to pursue humane ends, instead of the war and rapine and destruction which all white nations love. It is perhaps a slender hope for China, and for ourselves it is little better than despair. But unless the Great Powers learn some moderation and some tolerance, I do not see any better possibility, though I see many that are worse.

Our Western civilization is built upon assumptions, which, to a psychologist, are rationalizings of excessive energy. Our industrialism, our militarism, our love of progress, our missionary zeal, our imperialism, our passion for dominating and organizing, all spring from a superflux of the itch for activity. The creed of efficiency for its own sake, without regard for the ends to which it is directed, has become somewhat discredited in Europe since the war, which would have never taken place if the Western nations had been slightly more indolent. But in America this creed is still almost universally accepted; so it is in Japan, and so it is by the Bolsheviks, who have been aiming fundamentally at the Americanization of Russia. Russia, like China, may be described as an artist nation; but unlike China it has been governed, since the time of Peter the Great, by men who wished to introduce all the good and evil of the West. In former days, I might have had no doubt that such men were in the right. Some (though not many) of the Chinese returned students resemble them in the belief that Western push and hustle are the most desirable things on earth. I cannot now take this view. The evils produced in China by indolence seem to me far less disastrous, from the point of view of mankind at large, than those produced throughout the world by the domineering cocksureness of Europe and America. The Great War showed that something is wrong with

our civilization; experience of Russia and China has made me believe that those countries can help to show us what it is that is wrong. The Chinese have discovered, and have practised for many centuries, a way of life which, if it could be adopted by all the world, would make all the world happy. We Europeans have not. Our way of life demands strife, exploitation, restless change, discontent and destruction. Efficiency directed to destruction can only end in annihilation, and it is to this consummation that our civilization is tending, if it cannot learn some of that wisdom for which it despises the East.

It was on the Volga, in the summer of 1920, that I first realized how profound is the disease in our Western mentality, which the Bolsheviks are attempting to force upon an essentially Asiatic population, just as Japan and the West are doing in China. Our boat travelled on, day after day, through an unknown and mysterious land. Our company were noisy, gay, quarrelsome, full of facile theories, with glib explanations of everything, persuaded that there is nothing they could not understand and no human destiny outside the purview of their system. One of us lay at death's door, fighting a grim battle with weakness and terror and the indifference of the strong, assailed day and night by the sounds of loud-voiced love-making and trivial laughter. And all around us lay a great silence, strong as death, unfathomable as the heavens. It seemed that none had leisure to hear the silence, yet it called to me so insistently that I grew deaf to the harangues of propagandists and the endless information of the well-informed.

One night, very late, our boat stopped in a desolate spot where there were no houses, but only a great sandbank, and beyond it a row of poplars with the rising moon behind them. In silence I went ashore, and found on the sand a strange assemblage of human beings, half-nomads, wandering from some remote region of famine, each family huddled together surrounded by all its belongings, some sleeping, others silently making small fires of twigs. The flickering flames lighted up gnarled, bearded faces of wild men, strong, patient, primitive women, and children as sedate and slow as their parents. Human beings they undoubtedly were, and yet it would have been far easier for me to grow intimate with a dog or a cat or a horse than with one of them. I knew that they would wait there day after day, perhaps for weeks, until a boat came in which they could go to some distant place in which they had heard—falsely perhaps—that the earth was more generous than in the country they had left. Some would die by the way, all would suffer hunger and thirst and the scorching mid-day sun, but their sufferings would be dumb. To me they seemed to typify the very soul of Russia, unexpressive, inactive from despair, unheeded by the little set of Westernizers who make up all the parties of progress or reaction. Russia is so vast that the articulate few are lost in it as man and his planet are lost in interstellar space. It is possible, I thought, that the theorists may increase the misery of the many by trying to force them into actions contrary to their primeval instincts, but I could not believe that happiness was to be brought to them by a gospel of industrialism and forced labour.

Nevertheless, when morning came I resumed the interminable discussions of the materialistic conception of history and the merits of a truly popular government. Those with whom I discussed had not seen the sleeping wanderers, and would not have been interested if they had seen them, since they were not material for propaganda. But something of that patient silence had communicated itself to me, something lonely and unspoken remained in my heart throughout all the comfortable familiar intellectual talk. And at last I began to feel that all politics are inspired by a grinning devil, teaching the energetic and quickwitted to torture submissive populations for the profit of pocket or power or theory. As we journeyed on, fed by food extracted from the peasants, protected by an army recruited from among their sons, I wondered what we had to give them in return. But I found no answer. From time to time I heard their sad songs or the haunting music of the balalaika; but the sound mingled with the great silence of the steppes, and left me with a terrible questioning pain in which Occidental hopefulness grew pale.

It was in this mood that I set out for China to seek a new hope. [Russ2]

1922.01.02 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (2)

Chapter II

China before the nineteenth century

Where the Chinese came from is a matter of conjecture. Their early history is known only from their own annals, which throw no light upon the question. The *Shu-King*, one of the Confucian classics (edited, not composed, by Confucius), begins, like Livy, with legendary accounts of princes whose virtues and vices are intended to supply edification or warning to subsequent rulers. Yao and Shun were two model Emperors, whose date (if any) was somewhere in the third millennium B.C. "The age of Yao and Shun," in Chinese literature, means what "the Golden Age" mean with us. It seems certain that, when Chinese history begins, the Chinese occupied only a small part of what is now China, along the banks of the Yellow River. They were agricultural, and had already reached a fairly high level of civilization—much higher than that of any other part of Eastern Asia. The Yellow River is a fierce and terrible stream, too swift for navigation, turgid, and full of mud, depositing silt upon its bed until it rises above the surrounding country, when it suddenly alters its course, sweeping away villages and towns in a destructive torrent. Among most early agricultural nations, such a river would have inspired superstitious awe, and floods would have been averted by human sacrifice; in the *Shu-King*, however, there is little trace of superstition. Yao and Shun, and Yü (the latter's successor), were all occupied in combating the inundations, but their methods were those of the engineer, not of the miracle-worker. This shows, at least, the state of belief in the time of Confucius. The character ascribed to Yao shows what was expected of an Emperor:—

He was reverential, intelligent, accomplished, and thoughtful—naturally and without effort. He was sincerely courteous, and capable of all complaisance. The display of these qualities reached to the four extremities of the empire, and extended from earth to heaven. He was able to make the able and virtuous distinguished, and thence proceeded to the love of the nine classes of his kindred, who all became harmonious. He also regulated and polished the people of his domain, who all became brightly intelligent. Finally, he united and harmonized the myriad States of the empire; and lo! the black-haired people were transformed. The result was universal concord.[1]

The first date which can be assigned with precision in Chinese history is that of an eclipse of the sun in 776 B.C.[2] There is no reason to doubt the general correctness of the records for considerably earlier times, but their exact chronology cannot be fixed. At this period, the Chou dynasty, which fell in 249 B.C. and is supposed to have begun in 1122 B.C., was already declining in power as compared with a number of nominally subordinate feudal States. The position of the Emperor at this time, and for the next 500 years, was similar to that of the King of France during those parts of the Middle Ages when his authority was at its lowest ebb. Chinese history consists of a series of dynasties, each strong at first and weak afterwards, each gradually losing control over subordinates, each followed by a period of anarchy (sometimes lasting for centuries), and ultimately succeeded by a new dynasty which temporarily re-establishes a strong Central Government. Historians always attribute the fall of a dynasty to the excessive power of eunuchs, but perhaps this is, in part, a literary convention. What distinguishes the Emperor is not so much his political power, which fluctuates with the strength of his personality, as certain religious prerogatives. The Emperor is the Son of Heaven; he sacrifices to Heaven at the winter solstice. The early Chinese used "Heaven" as synonymous with "The Supreme Ruler," a monotheistic God;[3] indeed Professor Giles maintains, by arguments which seem conclusive, that the correct translation of the Emperor's title would be "Son of God." The word "Tien," in Chinese, is used both for the sky and for God, though the latter sense has become rare. The expression "Shang Ti," which means "Supreme Ruler," belongs in the main to pre-Confucian times, but both terms originally represented a God as definitely anthropomorphic as the God of the Old Testament.[4]

As time went by the Supreme Ruler became more shadowy, while "Heaven" remained, on account of the Imperial rites connected with it. The Emperor alone had the privilege of worshipping "Heaven," and the rites continued practically unchanged until the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. In modern times they were performed in the Temple of Heaven in

Peking, one of the most beautiful places in the world. The annual sacrifice in the Temple of Heaven represented almost the sole official survival of pre-Confucian religion, or indeed of anything that could be called religion in the strict sense; for Buddhism and Taoism have never had any connection with the State.

The history of China is known in some detail from the year 722 B.C., because with this year begins Confucius' *Springs and Autumns*, which is a chronicle of the State of Lu, in which Confucius was an official.

One of the odd things about the history of China is that after the Emperors have been succeeding each other for more than 2,000 years, one comes to a ruler who is known as the "First Emperor," Shih Huang Ti. He acquired control over the whole Empire, after a series of wars, in 221 B.C., and died in 210 B.C. Apart from his conquests, he is remarkable for three achievements: the building of the Great Wall against the Huns, the destruction of feudalism, and the burning of the books. The destruction of feudalism, it must be confessed, had to be repeated by many subsequent rulers; for a long time, feudalism tended to grow up again whenever the Central Government was in weak hands. But Shih Huang Ti was the first ruler who made his authority really effective over all China in historical times. Although his dynasty came to an end with his son, the impression he made is shown by the fact that our word "China" is probably derived from his family name, Tsin or Chin[5]. (The Chinese put the family name first.) His Empire was roughly co-extensive with what is now China proper. The destruction of the books was a curious incident. Shih Huang Ti, as appears from his calling himself "First Emperor," disliked being reminded of the fact that China had existed before his time; therefore history was anathema to him. Moreover the literati were already a strong force in the country, and were always (following Confucius) in favour of the preservation of ancient customs, whereas Shih Huang Ti was a vigorous innovator. Moreover, he appears to have been uneducated and not of pure Chinese race. Moved by the combined motives of vanity and radicalism, he issued an edict decreeing that—

All official histories, except the memoirs of Tsin (his own family), shall be burned; except the persons who have the office of literati of the great learning, those who in the Empire permit themselves to hide the *Shi-King*, the *Shu-King* (Confucian classics), or the discourses of the hundred schools, must all go before the local civil and military authorities so that they may be burned. Those who shall dare to discuss among themselves the *Shi-King* and the *Shu-King* shall be put to death and their corpses exposed in a public place; those who shall make use of antiquity to belittle modern times shall be put to death with their relations.... Thirty days after the publication of this edict, those who have not burned their books shall be branded and sent to forced labour. The books which shall not be proscribed are those of medicine and pharmacy, of divination ..., of agriculture and of arboriculture. As for those who desire to study the laws and ordinances, let them take the officials as masters. (Cordier, *op. cit.* i. p. 203.)

It will be seen that the First Emperor was something of a Bolshevik. The Chinese literati, naturally, have blackened his memory. On the other hand, modern Chinese reformers, who have experienced the opposition of old-fashioned scholars, have a certain sympathy with his attempt to destroy the innate conservatism of his subjects. Thus Li Ung Bing[6] says:— No radical change can take place in China without encountering the opposition of the literati. This was no less the case then than it is now. To abolish feudalism by one stroke was a radical change indeed. Whether the change was for the better or the worse, the men of letters took no time to inquire; whatever was good enough for their fathers was good enough for them and their children. They found numerous authorities in the classics to support their contention and these they freely quoted to show that Shih Huang Ti was wrong. They continued to criticize the government to such an extent that something had to be done to silence the voice of antiquity ... As to how far this decree (on the burning of the books) was enforced, it is hard to say. At any rate, it exempted all libraries of the government, or such as were in possession of a class of officials called *Po Szu* or *Learned Men*. If any real damage was done to Chinese literature under the decree in question, it is safe to say that it was not of such a nature as later writers would have us believe. Still, this extreme measure failed to secure the desired end, and a number of the men of letters in Han Yang, the capital, was subsequently buried alive.

This passage is written from the point of view of Young China, which is anxious to assimilate Western learning in place of the dead scholarship of the Chinese classics. China, like every other civilized country, has a tradition which stands in the way of progress. The Chinese have excelled in stability rather than in progress; therefore Young China, which perceives that the advent of industrial civilization has made progress essential to continued national existence, naturally looks with a favourable eye upon Shih Huang Ti's struggle with the reactionary pedants of his age. The very considerable literature which has come down to us from before his time shows, in any case, that his edict was somewhat ineffective; and in fact it was repealed after twenty-two years, in 191. B.C.

After a brief reign by the son of the First Emperor, who did not inherit his capacity, we come to the great Han dynasty, which reigned from 206 B.C. to A.D. 220. This was the great age of Chinese imperialism—exactly coeval with the great age of Rome. In the course of their campaigns in Northern India and Central Asia, the Chinese were brought into contact with India, with Persia, and even with the Roman Empire.[7] Their relations with India had a profound effect upon their religion, as well as upon that of Japan, since they led to the introduction of Buddhism. Relations with Rome were chiefly promoted by the Roman desire for silk, and continued until the rise of Mohammedanism. They had little importance for China, though we learn, for example, that about A.D. 164 a treatise on astronomy was brought to China from the Roman Empire.[8] Marcus Aurelius appears in Chinese history under the name An Tun, which stands for Antoninus.

It was during this period that the Chinese acquired that immense prestige in the Far East which lasted until the arrival of European armies and navies in the nineteenth century. One is sometimes tempted to think that the irruption of the white man into China may prove almost as ephemeral as the raids of Huns and Tartars into Europe. The military superiority of Europe to Asia is not an eternal law of nature, as we are tempted to think; and our superiority in civilization is a mere delusion. Our histories, which treat the Mediterranean as the centre of the universe, give quite a wrong perspective. Cordier,[9] dealing with the campaigns and voyages of discovery which took place under the Han dynasty, says:—

The Occidentals have singularly contracted the field of the history of the world when they have grouped around the people of Israel, Greece, and Rome the little that they knew of the expansion of the human race, being completely ignorant of these voyagers who ploughed the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, of these cavalcades across the immensities of Central Asia up to the Persian Gulf. The greatest part of the universe, and at the same time a civilization different but certainly as developed as that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, remained unknown to those who wrote the history of their little world while they believed that they, were setting forth the history of the world as a whole.

In our day, this provincialism, which impregnates all our culture, is liable to have disastrous consequences politically, as well as for the civilization of mankind. We must make room for Asia in our thoughts, if we are not to rouse Asia to a fury of self-assertion.

After the Han dynasty there are various short dynasties and periods of disorder, until we come to the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). Under this dynasty, in its prosperous days, the Empire acquired its greatest extent, and art and poetry reached their highest point.[10] The Empire of Jenghis Khan (died 1227) was considerably greater, and contained a great part of China; but Jenghis Khan was a foreign conqueror. Jenghis and his generals, starting from Mongolia, appeared as conquerors in China, India, Persia, and Russia. Throughout Central Asia, Jenghis destroyed every man, woman, and child in the cities he captured. When Merv was captured, it was transformed into a desert and 700,000 people were killed. But it was said that many had escaped by lying among the corpses and pretending to be dead; therefore at the capture of Nishapur, shortly afterwards, it was ordered that all the inhabitants should have their heads cut off. Three pyramids of heads were made, one of men, one of women, and one of children. As it was feared that some might have escaped by hiding underground, a detachment of soldiers was left to kill any that might emerge.[11] Similar horrors were enacted at Moscow and Kieff, in Hungary and Poland. Yet the man responsible for these massacres was sought in alliance by St. Louis and the Pope. The times of Jenghis Khan remind one of the present day, except that his methods of causing death were more merciful than those that have been

employed since the Armistice.

Kublai Khan (died 1294), who is familiar, at least by name, through Marco Polo and Coleridge; was the grandson of Jenghis Khan, and the first Mongol who was acknowledged Emperor of China, where he ousted the Sung dynasty (960-1277). By this time, contact with China had somewhat abated the savagery of the first conquerors. Kublai removed his capital from Kara Korom in Mongolia to Peking. He built walls like those which still surround the city, and established on the walls an observatory which is preserved to this day. Until 1900, two of the astronomical instruments constructed by Kublai were still to be seen in this observatory, but the Germans removed them to Potsdam after the suppression of the Boxers.[12] I understand they have been restored in accordance with one of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. If so, this was probably the most important benefit which that treaty secured to the world.

Kublai plays the same part in Japanese history that Philip II plays in the history of England. He prepared an Invincible Armada, or rather two successive armadas, to conquer Japan, but they were defeated, partly by storms, and partly by Japanese valour.

After Kublai, the Mongol Emperors more and more adopted Chinese ways, and lost their tyrannical vigour. Their dynasty came to an end in 1370, and was succeeded by the pure Chinese Ming dynasty, which lasted until the Manchu conquest of 1644. The Manchus in turn adopted Chinese ways, and were overthrown by a patriotic revolution in 1911, having contributed nothing notable to the native culture of China except the pigtail, officially abandoned at the Revolution.

The persistence of the Chinese Empire down to our own day is not to be attributed to any military skill; on the contrary, considering its extent and resources, it has at most times shown itself weak and incompetent in war. Its southern neighbours were even less warlike, and were less in extent. Its northern and western neighbours inhabited a barren country, largely desert, which was only capable of supporting a very sparse population. The Huns were defeated by the Chinese after centuries of warfare; the Tartars and Manchus, on the contrary, conquered China. But they were too few and too uncivilized to impose their ideas or their way of life upon China, which absorbed them and went on its way as if they had never existed. Rome could have survived the Goths, if they had come alone, but the successive waves of barbarians came too quickly to be all civilized in turn. China was saved from this fate by the Gobi Desert and the Tibetan uplands. Since the white men have taken to coming by sea, the old geographical immunity is lost, and greater energy will be required to preserve the national independence.

In spite of geographical advantages, however, the persistence of Chinese civilization, fundamentally unchanged since the introduction of Buddhism, is a remarkable phenomenon. Egypt and Babylonia persisted as long, but since they fell there has been nothing comparable in the world. Perhaps the main cause is the immense population of China, with an almost complete identity of culture throughout. In the middle of the eighth century, the population of China is estimated at over 50 millions, though ten years later, as a result of devastating wars, it is said to have sunk to about 17 millions.[13] A census has been taken at various times in Chinese history, but usually a census of houses, not of individuals. From the number of houses the population is computed by a more or less doubtful calculation. It is probable, also, that different methods were adopted on different occasions, and that comparisons between different enumerations are therefore rather unsafe. Putnam Weale[14] says:—

The first census taken by the Manchus in 1651, after the restoration of order, returned China's population at 55 million persons, which is less than the number given in the first census of the Han dynasty, A.D. 1, and about the same as when Kublai Khan established the Mongol dynasty in 1295. (This is presumably a misprint, as Kublai died in 1294.) Thus we are faced by the amazing fact that, from the beginning of the Christian era, the toll of life taken by internecine and frontier wars in China was so great that in spite of all territorial expansion the population for upwards of sixteen centuries remained more or less stationary. There is in all history no similar record. Now, however, came a vast change. Thus three years after the death of the celebrated Manchu Emperor Kang Hsi, in 1720, the population had risen to 125 millions. At the beginning of the reign of the no less illustrious Ch'ien Lung (1743) it was

returned at 145 millions; towards the end of his reign, in 1783, it had doubled, and was given as 283 millions. In the reign of Chia Ch'ing (1812) it had risen to 360 millions; before the Taiping rebellion (1842) it had grown to 413 millions; after that terrible rising it sunk to 261 millions.

I do not think such definite statements are warranted. The China Year Book for 1919 (the latest I have seen) says (p. 1):—

The taking of a census by the methods adopted in Western nations has never yet been attempted in China, and consequently estimates of the total population have varied to an extraordinary degree. The nearest approach to a reliable estimate is, probably, the census taken by the Minchengpu (Ministry of Interior) in 1910, the results of which are embodied in a report submitted to the Department of State at Washington by Mr. Raymond P. Tenney, a Student Interpreter at the U.S. Legation, Peking.... It is pointed out that even this census can only be regarded as approximate, as, with few exceptions, households and not individuals were counted.

The estimated population of the Chinese Empire (exclusive of Tibet) is given, on the basis of this census, as 329,542,000, while the population of Tibet is estimated at 1,500,000. Estimates which have been made at various other dates are given as follows (p. 2):

Year A.D. Population Year A.D. Population

1381	59,850,000	1761	205,293,053	
1412	66,377,000	1762	198,214,553	
1580	60,692,000	1790	155,249,897	
1662	21,068,000	1792	307,467,200	
	333,000,000			
1668	25,386,209	1812	362,467,183	
	360,440,000			
1710	23,312,200			
	27,241,129	1842	413,021,000	
1711	28,241,129	1868	404,946,514	
1736	125,046,245	1881	380,000,000	
1743	157,343,975			
	149,332,730			
	150,265,475	1882	381,309,000	
	1753	103,050,600	1885	377,636,000
	1760	143,125,225		
		203,916,477		

These figures suffice to show how little is known about the population of China. Not only are widely divergent estimates made in the same year (e.g. 1760), but in other respects the figures are incredible. Mr. Putnam Weale might contend that the drop from 60 millions in 1580 to 21 millions in 1662 was due to the wars leading to the Manchu conquest. But no one can believe that between 1711 and 1736 the population increased from 28 millions to 125 millions, or that it doubled between 1790 and 1792. No one knows whether the population of China is increasing or diminishing, whether people in general have large or small families, or any of the other facts that vital statistics are designed to elucidate. What is said on these subjects, however dogmatic, is no more than guess-work. Even the population of Peking is unknown. It is said to be about 900,000, but it may be anywhere between 800,000 and a million. As for the population of the Chinese Empire, it is probably safe to assume that it is between three and four hundred millions, and somewhat likely that it is below three hundred and fifty millions. Very little indeed can be said with confidence as to the population of China in former times; so little that, on the whole, authors who give statistics are to be distrusted.

There are certain broad features of the traditional Chinese civilization which give it its distinctive character. I should be inclined to select as the most important: (1) The use of ideograms instead of an alphabet in writing; (2) The substitution of the Confucian ethic for religion among the educated classes; (3) government by literati chosen by examination instead of by a hereditary aristocracy. The family system distinguishes traditional China from modern Europe, but represents a stage which most other civilizations have passed through, and which

is therefore not distinctively Chinese; the three characteristics which I have enumerated, on the other hand, distinguish China from all other countries of past times. Something must be said at this stage about each of the three.

1. As everyone knows, the Chinese do not have letters, as we do, but symbols for whole words. This has, of course, many inconveniences: it means that, in learning to write, there are an immense number of different signs to be learnt, not only 26 as with us; that there is no such thing as alphabetical order, so that dictionaries, files, catalogues, etc., are difficult to arrange and linotype is impossible; that foreign words, such as proper names and scientific terms, cannot be written down by sound, as in European languages, but have to be represented by some elaborate device.[15] For these reasons, there is a movement for phonetic writing among the more advanced Chinese reformers; and I think the success of this movement is essential if China is to take her place among the bustling hustling nations which consider that they have a monopoly of all excellence. Even if there were no other argument for the change, the difficulty of elementary education, where reading and writing take so long to learn, would be alone sufficient to decide any believer in democracy. For practical purposes, therefore, the movement for phonetic writing deserves support.

There are, however, many considerations, less obvious to a European, which can be adduced in favour of the ideographic system, to which something of the solid stability of the Chinese civilization is probably traceable. To us, it seems obvious that a written word must represent a sound, whereas to the Chinese it represents an idea. We have adopted the Chinese system ourselves as regards numerals; "1922," for example, can be read in English, French, or any other language, with quite different sounds, but with the same meaning. Similarly what is written in Chinese characters can be read throughout China, in spite of the difference of dialects which are mutually unintelligible when spoken. Even a Japanese, without knowing a word of spoken Chinese, can read out Chinese script in Japanese, just as he could read a row of numerals written by an Englishman. And the Chinese can still read their classics, although the spoken language must have changed as much as French has changed from Latin.

The advantage of writing over speech is its greater permanence, which enables it to be a means of communication between different places and different times. But since the spoken language changes from place to place and from time to time, the characteristic advantage of writing is more fully attained by a script which does not aim at representing spoken sounds than by one which does.

Speaking historically, there is nothing peculiar in the Chinese method of writing, which represents a stage through which all writing probably passed. Writing everywhere seems to have begun as pictures, not as a symbolic representation of sounds. I understand that in Egyptian hieroglyphics the course of development from ideograms to phonetic writing can be studied. What is peculiar in China is the preservation of the ideographic system throughout thousands of years of advanced civilization—a preservation probably due, at least in part, to the fact that the spoken language is monosyllabic, uninflected and full of homonyms.

As to the way in which the Chinese system of writing has affected the mentality of those who employ it, I find some suggestive reflections in an article published in the *Chinese Students' Monthly* (Baltimore), for February 1922, by Mr. Chi Li, in an article on "Some Anthropological Problems of China." He says (p. 327):—

Language has been traditionally treated by European scientists as a collection of sounds instead of an expression of something inner and deeper than the vocal apparatus as it should be. The accumulative effect of language-symbols upon one's mental formulation is still an unexploited field. Dividing the world culture of the living races on this basis, one perceives a fundamental difference of its types between the alphabetical users and the hieroglyphic users, each of which has its own virtues and vices. Now, with all respects to alphabetical civilization, it must be frankly stated that it has a grave and inherent defect in its lack of solidity. The most civilized portion under the alphabetical culture is also inhabited by the most fickle people. The history of the Western land repeats the same story over and over again. Thus up and down with the Greeks; up and down with Rome; up and down with the Arabs. The ancient Semitic and Hametic peoples are essentially alphabetic users, and their civilizations show the same lack of solidity as the Greeks and the Romans. Certainly this

phenomenon can be partially explained by the extra-fluidity of the alphabetical language which cannot be depended upon as a suitable organ to conserve any solid idea. Intellectual contents of these people may be likened to waterfalls and cataracts, rather than seas and oceans. No other people is richer in ideas than they; but no people would give up their valuable ideas as quickly as they do....

The Chinese language is by all means the counterpart of the alphabetic stock. It lacks most of the virtues that are found in the alphabetic language; but as an embodiment of simple and final truth, it is invulnerable to storm and stress. It has already protected the Chinese civilization for more than forty centuries. It is solid, square, and beautiful, exactly as the spirit of it represents. Whether it is the spirit that has produced this language or whether this language has in turn accentuated the spirit remains to be determined.

Without committing ourselves wholly to the theory here set forth, which is impregnated with Chinese patriotism, we must nevertheless admit that the Westerner is unaccustomed to the idea of "alphabetical civilization" as merely one kind, to which he happens to belong. I am not competent to judge as to the importance of the ideographic script in producing the distinctive characteristics of Chinese civilization, but I have no doubt that this importance is very great, and is more or less of the kind indicated in the above quotation.

2. Confucius (B.C. 551-479) must be reckoned, as regards his social influence, with the founders of religions. His effect on institutions and on men's thoughts has been of the same kind of magnitude as that of Buddha, Christ, or Mahomet, but curiously different in its nature. Unlike Buddha and Christ, he is a completely historical character, about whose life a great deal is known, and with whom legend and myth have been less busy than with most men of his kind. What most distinguishes him from other founders is that he inculcated a strict code of ethics, which has been respected ever since, but associated it with very little religious dogma, which gave place to complete theological scepticism in the countless generations of Chinese literati who revered his memory and administered the Empire.

Confucius himself belongs rather to the type of Lycurgus and Solon than to that of the great founders of religions. He was a practical statesman, concerned with the administration of the State; the virtues he sought to inculcate were not those of personal holiness, or designed to secure salvation in a future life, but rather those which lead to a peaceful and prosperous community here on earth. His outlook was essentially conservative, and aimed at preserving the virtues of former ages. He accepted the existing religion—a rather unemphatic monotheism, combined with belief that the spirits of the dead preserved a shadowy existence, which it was the duty of their descendants to render as comfortable as possible. He did not, however, lay any stress upon supernatural matters. In answer to a question, he gave the following definition of wisdom: "To cultivate earnestly our duty towards our neighbour, and to reverence spiritual beings while maintaining always a due reserve." [16] But reverence for spiritual beings was not an active part of Confucianism, except in the form of ancestor-worship, which was part of filial piety, and thus merged in duty towards one's neighbour. Filial piety included obedience to the Emperor, except when he was so wicked as to forfeit his divine right—for the Chinese, unlike the Japanese, have always held that resistance to the Emperor was justified if he governed very badly. The following passage from Professor Giles [17] illustrates this point:—

The Emperor has been uniformly regarded as the son of God by adoption only, and liable to be displaced from that position as a punishment for the offence of misrule.... If the ruler failed in his duties, the obligation of the people was at an end, and his divine right disappeared simultaneously. Of this we have an example in a portion of the Canon to be examined by and by. Under the year 558 B.C. we find the following narrative. One of the feudal princes asked an official, saying, "Have not the people of the Wei State done very wrong in expelling their ruler?" "Perhaps the ruler himself," was the reply, "may have done very wrong.... If the life of the people is impoverished, and if the spirits are deprived of their sacrifices, of what use is the ruler, and what can the people do but get rid of him?"

This very sensible doctrine has been accepted at all times throughout Chinese history, and has made rebellions only too frequent.

Filial piety, and the strength of the family generally, are perhaps the weakest point in

Confucian ethics, the only point where the system departs seriously from common sense. Family feeling has militated against public spirit, and the authority of the old has increased the tyranny of ancient custom. In the present day, when China is confronted with problems requiring a radically new outlook, these features of the Confucian system have made it a barrier to necessary reconstruction, and accordingly we find all those foreigners who wish to exploit China praising the old tradition and deriding the efforts of Young China to construct something more suited to modern needs. The way in which Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit is illustrated by the following story:[18]

One of the feudal princes was boasting to Confucius of the high level of morality which prevailed in his own State. "Among us here," he said, "you will find upright men. If a father has stolen a sheep, his son will give evidence against him." "In my part of the country," replied Confucius, "there is a different standard from this. A father will shield his son, a son will shield his father. It is thus that uprightness will be found."

It is interesting to contrast this story with that of the elder Brutus and his sons, upon which we in the West were all brought up.

Chao Ki, expounding the Confucian doctrine, says it is contrary to filial piety to refuse a lucrative post by which to relieve the indigence of one's aged parents.[19] This form of sin, however, is rare in China as in other countries.

The worst failure of filial piety, however, is to remain without children, since ancestors are supposed to suffer if they have no descendants to keep up their cult. It is probable that this doctrine has made the Chinese more prolific, in which case it has had great biological importance. Filial piety is, of course, in no way peculiar to China, but has been universal at a certain stage of culture. In this respect, as in certain others, what is peculiar to China is the preservation of the old custom after a very high level of civilization had been attained. The early Greeks and Romans did not differ from the Chinese in this respect, but as their civilization advanced the family became less and less important. In China, this did not begin to happen until our own day.

Whatever may be said against filial piety carried to excess, it is certainly less harmful than its Western counterpart, patriotism. Both, of course, err in inculcating duties to a certain portion of mankind to the practical exclusion of the rest. But patriotism directs one's loyalty to a fighting unit, which filial piety does not (except in a very primitive society). Therefore patriotism leads much more easily to militarism and imperialism. The principal method of advancing the interests of one's nation is homicide; the principal method of advancing the interest of one's family is corruption and intrigue. Therefore family feeling is less harmful than patriotism. This view is borne out by the history and present condition of China as compared to Europe.

Apart from filial piety, Confucianism was, in practice, mainly a code of civilized behaviour, degenerating at times into an etiquette book. It taught self-restraint, moderation, and above all courtesy. Its moral code was not, like those of Buddhism and Christianity, so severe that only a few saints could hope to live up to it, or so much concerned with personal salvation as to be incompatible with political institutions. It was not difficult for a man of the world to live up to the more imperative parts of the Confucian teaching. But in order to do this he must exercise at all times a certain kind of self-control—an extension of the kind which children learn when they are taught to "behave." He must not break into violent passions; he must not be arrogant; he must "save face," and never inflict humiliations upon defeated adversaries; he must be moderate in all things, never carried away by excessive love or hate; in a word, he must keep calm reason always in control of all his actions. This attitude existed in Europe in the eighteenth century, but perished in the French Revolution: romanticism, Rousseau, and the guillotine put an end to it. In China, though wars and revolutions have occurred constantly, Confucian calm has survived them all, making them less terrible for the participants, and making all who were not immediately involved hold aloof. It is bad manners in China to attack your adversary in wet weather. Wu-Pei-Fu, I am told, once did it, and won a victory; the beaten general complained of the breach of etiquette; so Wu-Pei-Fu went back to the position he held before the battle, and fought all over again on a fine day. (It should be said that battles in China are seldom bloody.) In such a country, militarism is not the scourge it is

with us; and the difference is due to the Confucian ethics.[20]

Confucianism did not assume its present form until the twelfth century A.D., when the personal God in whom Confucius had believed was thrust aside by the philosopher Chu Fu Tze,[21] whose interpretation of Confucianism has ever since been recognized as orthodox. Since the fall of the Mongols (1370), the Government has uniformly favoured Confucianism as the teaching of the State; before that, there were struggles with Buddhism and Taoism, which were connected with magic, and appealed to superstitious Emperors, quite a number of whom died of drinking the Taoist elixir of life. The Mongol Emperors were Buddhists of the Lama religion, which still prevails in Tibet and Mongolia; but the Manchu Emperors, though also northern conquerors, were ultra-orthodox Confucians. It has been customary in China, for many centuries, for the literati to be pure Confucians, sceptical in religion but not in morals, while the rest of the population believed and practised all three religions simultaneously. The Chinese have not the belief, which we owe to the Jews, that if one religion is true, all others must be false. At the present day, however, there appears to be very little in the way of religion in China, though the belief in magic lingers on among the uneducated. At all times, even when there was religion, its intensity was far less than in Europe. It is remarkable that religious scepticism has not led, in China, to any corresponding ethical scepticism, as it has done repeatedly in Europe.

3. I come now to the system of selecting officials by competitive examination, without which it is hardly likely that so literary and unsuperstitious a system as that of Confucius could have maintained its hold. The view of the modern Chinese on this subject is set forth by the present President of the Republic of China, Hsu Shi-chang, in his book on China after the War, pp. 59-60.[22] After considering the educational system under the Chou dynasty, he continues: In later periods, in spite of minor changes, the importance of moral virtues continued to be stressed upon. For instance, during the most flourishing period of Tang Dynasty (627-650 A.D.), the Imperial Academy of Learning, known as Kuo-tzu-chien, was composed of four collegiate departments, in which ethics was considered as the most important of all studies. It was said that in the Academy there were more than three thousand students who were able and virtuous in nearly all respects, while the total enrolment, including aspirants from Korea and Japan, was as high as eight thousand. At the same time, there was a system of "elections" through which able and virtuous men were recommended by different districts to the Emperor for appointment to public offices. College training and local elections supplemented each other, but in both moral virtues were given the greatest emphasis.

Although the Imperial Academy exists till this day, it has never been as nourishing as during that period. For this change the introduction of the competitive examination or Ko-chü system, must be held responsible. The "election" system furnished no fixed standard for the recommendation of public service candidates, and, as a result, tended to create an aristocratic class from which alone were to be found eligible men. Consequently, the Sung Emperors (960-1277 A.D.) abolished the elections, set aside the Imperial Academy, and inaugurated the competitive examination system in their place. The examinations were to supply both scholars and practical statesmen, and they were periodically held throughout the later dynasties until the introduction of the modern educational regime. Useless and stereotyped as they were in later days, they once served some useful purpose. Besides, the ethical background of Chinese education had already been so firmly established, that, in spite of the emphasis laid by these examinations on pure literary attainments, moral teachings have survived till this day in family education and in private schools.

Although the system of awarding Government posts for proficiency in examinations is much better than most other systems that have prevailed, such as nepotism, bribery, threats of insurrection, etc., yet the Chinese system, at any rate after it assumed its final form, was harmful through the fact that it was based solely on the classics, that it was purely literary, and that it allowed no scope whatever for originality. The system was established in its final form by the Emperor Hung Wu (1368-1398), and remained unchanged until 1905. One of the first objects of modern Chinese reformers was to get it swept away. Li Ung Bing[23] says: In spite of the many good things that may be said to the credit of Hung Wu, he will ever be remembered in connection with a form of evil which has eaten into the very heart of the

nation. This was the system of triennial examinations, or rather the form of Chinese composition, called the "Essay," or the "Eight Legs," which, for the first time in the history of Chinese literature, was made the basis of all literary contests. It was so-named, because after the introduction of the theme the writer was required to treat it in four paragraphs, each consisting of two members, made up of an equal number of sentences and words. The theme was always chosen from either the Four Books, or the Five Classics. The writer could not express any opinion of his own, or any views at variance with those expressed by Chu Hsi and his school. All he was required to do was to put the few words of Confucius, or whomsoever it might be, into an essay in conformity with the prescribed rules. Degrees, which were to serve as passports to Government positions, were awarded the best writers. To say that the training afforded by the time required to make a man efficient in the art of such writing, would at the same time qualify him to hold the various offices under the Government, was absurd. But absurd as the whole system was, it was handed down to recent times from the third year of the reign of Hung Wu, and was not abolished until a few years ago. No system was more perfect or effective in retarding the intellectual and literary development of a nation. With her "Eight Legs," China long ago reached the lowest point on her downhill journey. It is largely on account of the long lease of life that was granted to this rotten system that the teachings of the Sung philosophers have been so long venerated.

These are the words of a Chinese patriot of the present day, and no doubt, as a modern system, the "Eight Legs" deserve all the hard things that he says about them. But in the fourteenth century, when one considers the practicable alternatives, one can see that there was probably much to be said for such a plan. At any rate, for good or evil, the examination system profoundly affected the civilization of China. Among its good effects were: A widely-diffused respect for learning; the possibility of doing without a hereditary aristocracy; the selection of administrators who must at least have been capable of industry; and the preservation of Chinese civilization in spite of barbarian conquest. But, like so much else in traditional China, it has had to be swept away to meet modern needs. I hope nothing of greater value will have to perish in the struggle to repel the foreign exploiters and the fierce and cruel system which they miscall civilization.

FOOTNOTES:

[1]

Legge's *Shu-King*, p. 15. Quoted in Hirth, *Ancient History of China*, Columbia University Press, 1911—a book which gives much useful critical information about early China.

[2]

Hirth, *op. cit.* p. 174. 775 is often wrongly given.

[3]

See Hirth, *op. cit.*, p. 100 ff.

[4]

On this subject, see Professor Giles's *Confucianism and its Rivals*, Williams & Norgate, 1915, Lecture I, especially p. 9.

[5]

Cf. Henri Cordier, *Histoire Générale de la Chine*, Paris, 1920, vol. i. p. 213.

[6]

Outlines of Chinese History (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1914), p. 61.

[7]

See Hirth, *China and the Roman Orient* (Leipzig and Shanghai, 1885), an admirable and fascinating monograph. There are allusions to the Chinese in Virgil and Horace; cf. Cordier, *op. cit.*, i. p. 271.

[8]

Cordier, *op. cit.* i. p. 281.

[9]

Cordier, *op. cit.* i. p. 237.

[10]

Murdoch, in his *History of Japan* (vol. i. p. 146), thus describes the greatness of the early Tang Empire:

"In the following year (618) Li Yuen, Prince of T'ang, established the illustrious dynasty of that name, which continued to sway the fortunes of China for nearly three centuries (618-908). After a brilliant reign of ten years he handed over the imperial dignity to his son, Tai-tsung (627-650), perhaps the greatest monarch the Middle Kingdom has ever seen. At this time China undoubtedly stood in the very forefront of civilization. She was then the most powerful, the most enlightened, the most progressive, and the best governed empire, not only in Asia, but on the face of the globe. Tai-tsung's frontiers reached from the confines of Persia, the Caspian Sea, and the Altai of the Kirghis steppe, along these mountains to the north side of the Gobi desert eastward to the inner Hing-an, while Sogdiana, Khorassan, and the regions around the Hindu Kush also acknowledged his suzerainty. The sovereign of Nepal and Magadha in India sent envoys; and in 643 envoys appeared from the Byzantine Empire and the Court of Persia."

[11]

Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 212.

[12]

Cordier, op. cit. ii. p. 339.

[13]

Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 484.

[14]

The Truth About China and Japan. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., pp. 13, 14.

[15]

For example, the nearest approach that could be made in Chinese to my own name was "Lo-Su." There is a word "Lo," and a word "Su," for both of which there are characters; but no combination of characters gives a better approximation to the sound of my name.

[16]

Giles, op. cit., p. 74. Professor Giles adds, à propos of the phrase "maintaining always a due reserve," the following footnote: "Dr. Legge has 'to keep aloof from them,' which would be equivalent to 'have nothing to do with them.' Confucius seems rather to have meant 'no familiarity.'"

[17]

Op. cit., p. 21.

[18]

Giles, op. cit. p. 86.

[19]

Cordier, op. cit. i. p. 167.

[20]

As far as anti-militarism is concerned, Taoism is even more emphatic. "The best soldiers," says Lao-Tze, "do not fight." (Giles, op. cit. p. 150.) Chinese armies contain many good soldiers.

[21]

Giles, op. cit., Lecture VIII. When Chu Fu Tze was dead, and his son-in-law was watching beside his coffin, a singular incident occurred. Although the sage had spent his life teaching that miracles are impossible, the coffin rose and remained suspended three feet above the ground. The pious son-in-law was horrified. "O my revered father-in-law," he prayed, "do not destroy my faith that miracles are impossible." Whereupon the coffin slowly descended to earth again, and the son-in-law's faith revived.

[22]

Translated by the Bureau of Economic Information, Peking, 1920.

[23]

Op. cit. p. 233. [Russ2]

1922.01.03 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (3)

Chapter III

China and the Western powers

In order to understand the international position of China, some facts concerning its nineteenth-century history are indispensable. China was for many ages the supreme empire of the Far East, embracing a vast and fertile area, inhabited by an industrious and civilized people. Aristocracy, in our sense of the word, came to an end before the beginning of the Christian era, and government was in the hands of officials chosen for their proficiency in writing in a dead language, as in England. Intercourse with the West was spasmodic and chiefly religious. In the early centuries of the Christian era, Buddhism was imported from India, and some Chinese scholars penetrated to that country to master the theology of the new religion in its native home, but in later times the intervening barbarians made the journey practically impossible. Nestorian Christianity reached China in the seventh century, and had a good deal of influence, but died out again. (What is known on this subject is chiefly from the Nestorian monument discovered in Hsianfu in 1625.) In the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Roman Catholic missionaries acquired considerable favour at Court, because of their astronomical knowledge and their help in rectifying the irregularities and confusions of the Chinese calendar.[24] Their globes and astrolabes are still to be seen on the walls of Peking. But in the long run they could not resist quarrels between different orders, and were almost completely excluded from both China and Japan.

In the year 1793, a British ambassador, Lord Macartney, arrived in China, to request further trade facilities and the establishment of a permanent British diplomatic representative. The Emperor at this time was Chien Lung, the best of the Manchu dynasty, a cultivated man, a patron of the arts, and an exquisite calligraphist. (One finds specimens of his writing in all sorts of places in China.) His reply to King George III is given by Backhouse and Bland.[25] I wish I could quote it all, but some extracts must suffice. It begins:

You, O King, live beyond the confines of many seas, nevertheless, impelled by your humble desire to partake of the benefits of our civilization, you have despatched a mission respectfully bearing your memorial.... To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce. I have read your memorial: the earnest terms in which it is cast reveal a respectful humility on your part, which is highly praiseworthy.

He goes on to explain, with the patient manner appropriate in dealing with an importunate child, why George III's desires cannot possibly be gratified. An ambassador, he assures him, would be useless, for:

If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial Dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization, our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. Therefore, however adept the Envoy might become, nothing would be gained thereby.

Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely, to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfil the duties of the State; strange and costly objects do not interest me. I ... have no use for your country's manufactures. ...It behoves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our Throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter.

He can understand the English desiring the produce of China, but feels that they have nothing worth having to offer in exchange:

"Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its own borders. There was therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce. But as the tea, silk and porcelain which the Celestial Empire produces are absolute necessities to European nations and to yourselves," the limited trade hitherto permitted at Canton is to continue.

He would have shown less favour to Lord Macartney, but "I do not forget the lonely remoteness of your island, cut off from the world by intervening wastes of sea, nor do I overlook your excusable ignorance of the usages of our Celestial Empire." He concludes with the injunction: "Tremblingly obey and show no negligence!"

What I want to suggest is that no one understands China until this document has ceased to seem absurd. The Romans claimed to rule the world, and what lay outside their Empire was to them of no account. The Empire of Chien Lung was more extensive, with probably a larger population; it had risen to greatness at the same time as Rome, and had not fallen, but invariably defeated all its enemies, either by war or by absorption. Its neighbours were comparatively barbarous, except the Japanese, who acquired their civilization by slavish imitation of China. The view of Chien Lung was no more absurd than that of Alexander the Great, sighing for new worlds to conquer when he had never even heard of China, where Confucius had been dead already for a hundred and fifty years. Nor was he mistaken as regards trade: China produces everything needed for the happiness of its inhabitants, and we have forced trade upon them solely for our benefit, giving them in exchange only things which they would do better without.

Unfortunately for China, its culture was deficient in one respect, namely science. In art and literature, in manners and customs, it was at least the equal of Europe; at the time of the Renaissance, Europe would not have been in any way the superior of the Celestial Empire. There is a museum in Peking where, side by side with good Chinese art, may be seen the presents which Louis XIV made to the Emperor when he wished to impress him with the splendour of *Le Roi Soleil*. Compared to the Chinese things surrounding them, they were tawdry and barbaric. The fact that Britain has produced Shakespeare and Milton, Locke and Hume, and all the other men who have adorned literature and the arts, does not make us superior to the Chinese. What makes us superior is Newton and Robert Boyle and their scientific successors. They make us superior by giving us greater proficiency in the art of killing. It is easier for an Englishman to kill a Chinaman than for a Chinaman to kill an Englishman. Therefore our civilization is superior to that of China, and Chien Lung is absurd. When we had finished with Napoleon, we soon set to work to demonstrate this proposition. Our first war with China was in 1840, and was fought because the Chinese Government endeavoured to stop the importation of opium. It ended with the cession of Hong-Kong and the opening of five ports to British trade, as well as (soon afterwards) to the trade of France, America and Scandinavia. In 1856-60, the English and French jointly made war on China, and destroyed the Summer Palace near Peking,[26] a building whose artistic value, on account of the treasures it contained, must have been about equal to that of Saint Mark's in Venice and much greater than that of Rheims Cathedral. This act did much to persuade the Chinese of the superiority of our civilization so they opened seven more ports and the river Yangtze, paid an indemnity and granted us more territory at Hong-Kong. In 1870, the Chinese were rash enough to murder a British diplomat, so the remaining British diplomats demanded and obtained an indemnity, five more ports, and a fixed tariff for opium. Next, the French took Annam and the British took Burma, both formerly under Chinese suzerainty. Then came the war with Japan in 1894-5, leading to Japan's complete victory and conquest of Korea. Japan's acquisitions would have been much greater but for the intervention of France, Germany and Russia, England holding aloof. This was the beginning of our support of Japan, inspired by fear of Russia. It also led to an alliance between China and Russia, as a reward for which Russia acquired all the important rights in Manchuria, which passed to Japan, partly after the Russo-Japanese war, and partly after the Bolshevik revolution.

The next incident begins with the murder of two German missionaries in Shantung in 1897. Nothing in their life became them like the leaving of it; for if they had lived they would probably have made very few converts, whereas by dying they afforded the world an object-lesson in Christian ethics. The Germans seized Kiaochow Bay and created a naval base there; they also acquired railway and mining rights in Shantung, which, by the Treaty of Versailles, passed to Japan in accordance with the Fourteen Points. Shantung therefore became virtually a Japanese possession, though America at Washington has insisted upon its restitution. The services of the two missionaries to civilization did not, however, end in China, for their death was constantly used in the German Reichstag during the first debates on the German Big Navy Bills, since it was held that warships would make Germany respected in China. Thus they helped to exacerbate the relations of England and Germany and to hasten the advent of the Great War. They also helped to bring on the Boxer rising, which is said to

have begun as a movement against the Germans in Shantung, though the other Powers emulated the Germans in every respect, the Russians by creating a naval base at Port Arthur, the British by acquiring Wei-hai-wei and a sphere of influence in the Yangtze, and so on. The Americans alone held aloof, proclaiming the policy of Chinese integrity and the Open Door. The Boxer rising is one of the few Chinese events that all Europeans know about. After we had demonstrated our superior virtue by the sack of Peking, we exacted a huge indemnity, and turned the Legation Quarter of Peking into a fortified city. To this day, it is enclosed by a wall, filled with European, American, and Japanese troops, and surrounded by a bare space on which the Chinese are not allowed to build. It is administered by the diplomatic body, and the Chinese authorities have no powers over anyone within its gates. When some unusually corrupt and traitorous Government is overthrown, its members take refuge in the Japanese (or other) Legation and so escape the punishment of their crimes, while within the sacred precincts of the Legation Quarter the Americans erect a vast wireless station said to be capable of communicating directly with the United States. And so the refutation of Chien Lung is completed.

Out of the Boxer indemnity, however, one good thing has come. The Americans found that, after paying all just claims for damages, they still had a large surplus. This they returned to China to be spent on higher education, partly in colleges in China under American control, partly by sending advanced Chinese students to American universities. The gain to China has been enormous, and the benefit to America from the friendship of the Chinese (especially the most educated of them) is incalculable. This is obvious to everyone, yet England shows hardly any signs of following suit.

To understand the difficulties with which the Chinese Government is faced, it is necessary to realize the loss of fiscal independence which, China has suffered as the result of the various wars and treaties which have been forced upon her. In the early days, the Chinese had no experience of European diplomacy, and did not know what to avoid; in later days, they have not been allowed to treat old treaties as scraps of paper, since that is the prerogative of the Great Powers—a prerogative which every single one of them exercises.

The best example of this state of affairs is the Customs tariff.[27] At the end of our first war with China, in 1842, we concluded a treaty which provided for a duty at treaty ports of 5 per cent. on all imports and not more than 5 per cent on exports. This treaty is the basis of the whole Customs system. At the end of our next war, in 1858, we drew up a schedule of conventional prices on which the 5 per cent. was to be calculated. This was to be revised every ten years, but has in fact only been revised twice, once in 1902 and once in 1918.[28] Revision of the schedule is merely a change in the conventional prices, not a change in the tariff, which remains fixed at 5 per cent. Change in the tariff is practically impossible, since China has concluded commercial treaties involving a most-favoured-nation clause, and the same tariff, with twelve States besides Great Britain, and therefore any change in the tariff requires the unanimous consent of thirteen Powers.

When foreign Powers speak of the Open Door as a panacea for China, it must be remembered that the Open Door does nothing to give the Chinese the usual autonomy as regards Customs that is enjoyed by other sovereign States.[29] The treaty of 1842 on which the system rests, has no time-limit of provision for denunciation by either party, such as other commercial treaties contain. A low tariff suits the Powers that wish to find a market for their goods in China, and they have therefore no motive for consenting to any alteration. In the past, when we practised free trade, we could defend ourselves by saying that the policy we forced upon China was the same as that which we adopted ourselves. But no other nation could make this excuse, nor can we now that we have abandoned free trade by the Safeguarding of Industries Act.

The import tariff being so low, the Chinese Government is compelled, for the sake of revenue, to charge the maximum of 5 per cent, on all exports. This, of course, hinders the development of Chinese commerce, and is probably a mistake. But the need of sources of revenue is desperate, and it is not surprising that the Chinese authorities should consider the tax indispensable.

There is also another system in China, chiefly inherited from the time of the Taiping

rebellion, namely the erection of internal customs barriers at various important points. This plan is still adopted with the internal trade. But merchants dealing with the interior and sending goods to or from a Treaty Port can escape internal customs by the payment of half the duty charged under the external tariff. As this is generally less than the internal tariff charges, this provision favours foreign produce at the expense of that of China. Of course the system of internal customs is bad, but it is traditional, and is defended on the ground that revenue is indispensable. China offered to abolish internal customs in return for certain uniform increases in the import and export tariff, and Great Britain, Japan, and the United States consented. But there were ten other Powers whose consent was necessary, and not all could be induced to agree. So the old system remains in force, not chiefly through the fault of the Chinese central government. It should be added that internal customs are collected by the provincial authorities, who usually intercept them and use them for private armies and civil war. At the present time, the Central Government is not strong enough to stop these abuses. The administration of the Customs is only partially in the hands of the Chinese. By treaty, the Inspector-General, who is at the head of the service, must be British so long as our trade with China exceeds that of any other treaty State; and the appointment of all subordinate officials is in his hands. In 1918 (the latest year for which I have the figures) there were 7,500 persons employed in the Customs, and of these 2,000 were non-Chinese. The first Inspector-General was Sir Robert Hart, who, by the unanimous testimony of all parties, fulfilled his duties exceedingly well. For the time being, there is much to be said for the present system. The Chinese have the appointment of the Inspector-General, and can therefore choose a man who is sympathetic to their country. Chinese officials are, as a rule, corrupt and indolent, so that control by foreigners is necessary in creating a modern bureaucracy. So long as the foreign officials are responsible to the Chinese Government, not to foreign States, they fulfil a useful educative function, and help to prepare the way for the creation of an efficient Chinese State. The problem for China is to secure practical and intellectual training from the white nations without becoming their slaves. In dealing with this problem, the system adopted in the Customs has much to recommend it during the early stages.[30]

At the same time, there are grave infringements of Chinese independence in the present position of the Customs, apart altogether from the fact that the tariff is fixed by treaty for ever. Much of the revenue derivable from customs is mortgaged for various loans and indemnities, so that the Customs cannot be dealt with from the point of view of Chinese interests alone. Moreover, in the present state of anarchy, the Customs administration can exercise considerable control over Chinese politics by recognizing or not recognizing a given *de facto* Government. (There is no Government *de jure*, at any rate in the North.) At present, the Customs Revenue is withheld in the South, and an artificial bankruptcy is being engineered. In view of the reactionary instincts of diplomats, this constitutes a terrible obstacle to internal reform. It means that no Government which is in earnest in attempting to introduce radical improvements can hope to enjoy the Customs revenue, which interposes a formidable fiscal barrier in the way of reconstruction.

There is a similar situation as regards the salt tax. This also was accepted as security for various foreign loans, and in order to make the security acceptable the foreign Powers concerned insisted upon the employment of foreigners in the principal posts. As in the case of the Customs, the foreign inspectors are appointed by the Chinese Government, and the situation is in all respects similar to that existing as regards the Customs.

The Customs and the salt tax form the security for various loans to China. This, together with foreign administration, gives opportunities of interference by the Powers which they show no inclination to neglect. The way in which the situation is utilized may be illustrated by three telegrams in *The Times* which appeared during January of this year.

On January 14, 1922, *The Times* published the following in a telegram from its Peking correspondent:

It is curious to reflect that this country (China) could be rendered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy, pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs revenue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all

records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Nor is there any visible prospect of the removal of this difficulty.

I venture to think The Times would regard the difficulty as removed if the Manchu Empire were restored.

As to the "splendid salt surplus," there are two telegrams from the Peking correspondent to The Times (of January 12th and 23rd, respectively) showing what we gain by making the Peking Government artificially bankrupt. The first telegram (sent on January 10th) is as follows:—

Present conditions in China are aptly illustrated by what is happening in one of the great salt revenue stations on the Yangtze, near Chinkiang. That portion of the Chinese fleet faithful to the Central Government—the better half went over to the Canton Government long ago—has dispatched a squadron of gunboats to the salt station and notified Peking that if \$3,000,000 (about £400,000) arrears of pay were not immediately forthcoming the amount would be forcibly recovered from the revenue. Meanwhile the immense salt traffic on the Yangtze has been suspended. The Legations concerned have now sent an Identical Note to the Government warning it of the necessity for immediately securing the removal of the obstruction to the traffic and to the operations of the foreign collectorate.

The second telegram is equally interesting. It is as follows:—

The question of interference with the Salt Gabelle is assuming a serious aspect. The Chinese squadron of gunboats referred to in my message of the 10th is still blocking the salt traffic near Chingkiang, while a new intruder in the shape of an agent of Wu-Pei-Fu [the Liberal military leader] has installed himself in the collectorate at Hankow, and is endeavouring to appropriate the receipts for his powerful master. The British, French, and Japanese Ministers accordingly have again addressed the Government, giving notice that if these irregular proceedings do not cease they will be compelled to take independent action. The Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000 is secured on the salt revenues, and interference with the foreign control of the department constitutes an infringement of the loan agreement. In various parts of China, some independent of Peking, others not, the local Tuchuns (military governors) impound the collections and materially diminish the total coming under the control of the foreign inspectorate, but the balance remaining has been so large, and protest so useless, that hitherto all concerned have considered it expedient to acquiesce. But interference at points on the Yangtze, where naval force can be brought to bear, is another matter. The situation is interesting in view of the amiable resolutions adopted at Washington, by which the Powers would seem to have debarred themselves, in the future, from any active form of intervention in this country. In view of the extensive opposition to the Liang Shih-yi Cabinet and the present interference with the salt negotiations, the \$90,000,000 (£11,000,000) loan to be secured on the salt surplus has been dropped. The problem of how to weather the new year settlement on January 28th remains unsolved.

It is a pretty game: creating artificial bankruptcy, and then inflicting punishment for the resulting anarchy. How regrettable that the Washington Conference should attempt to interfere!

It is useless to deny that the Chinese have brought these troubles upon themselves, by their inability to produce capable and honest officials. This inability has its roots in Chinese ethics, which lay stress upon a man's duty to his family rather than to the public. An official is expected to keep all his relations supplied with funds, and therefore can only be honest at the expense of filial piety. The decay of the family system is a vital condition of progress in China. All Young China realizes this, and one may hope that twenty years hence the level of honesty among officials may be not lower in China than in Europe—no very extravagant hope. But for this purpose friendly contact with Western nations is essential. If we insist upon rousing Chinese nationalism as we have roused that of India and Japan, the Chinese will begin to think that wherever they differ from Europe, they differ for the better. There is more truth in this than Europeans like to think, but it is not wholly true, and if it comes to be believed our

power for good in China will be at an end.

I have described briefly in this chapter what the Christian Powers did to China while they were able to act independently of Japan. But in modern China it is Japanese aggression that is the most urgent problem. Before considering this, however, we must deal briefly with the rise of modern Japan—a quite peculiar blend of East and West, which I hope is not prophetic of the blend to be ultimately achieved in China. But before passing to Japan, I will give a brief description of the social and political condition of modern China, without which Japan's action in China would be unintelligible.

FOOTNOTES:

[24]

In 1691 the Emperor Kang Hsi issued an edict explaining his attitude towards various religions. Of Roman Catholicism he says: "As to the western doctrine which glorifies Tien Chu, the Lord of the Sky, that, too, is heterodox; but because its priests are thoroughly conversant with mathematics, the Government makes use of them—a point which you soldiers and people should understand." (Giles, op. cit. p. 252.)

[25]

Annals and Memoirs of the Court of Peking, pp. 322 ff.

[26]

The Summer Palace now shown to tourists is modern, chiefly built by the Empress Dowager.

[27]

There is an admirable account of this question in Chap. vii. of Sih-Gung Cheng's *Modern China*, Clarendon Press, 1919.

[28]

A new revision has been decided upon by the Washington Conference.

[29]

If you lived in a town where the burglars had obtained possession of the Town Council, they would very likely insist upon the policy of the Open Door, but you might not consider it wholly satisfactory. Such is China's situation among the Great Powers.

[30]

The Times of November 26, 1921, had a leading article on Mr. Wellington Koo's suggestion, at Washington, that China ought to be allowed to recover fiscal autonomy as regards the tariff. Mr. Koo did not deal with the Customs administration, nevertheless The Times assumed that his purpose was to get the administration into the hands of the Chinese on account of the opportunities of lucrative corruption which it would afford. I wrote to The Times pointing out that they had confused the administration with the tariff, and that Mr. Koo was dealing only with the tariff. In view of the fact that they did not print either my letter or any other to the same effect, are we to conclude that their misrepresentation was deliberate and intentional? [Russ2]

1922.01.04 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (4)

Chapter IV

Modern China

The position of China among the nations of the world is quite peculiar, because in population and potential strength China is the greatest nation in the world, while in actual strength at the moment it is one of the least. The international problems raised by this situation have been brought into the forefront of world-politics by the Washington Conference. What settlement, if any, will ultimately be arrived at, it is as yet impossible to foresee. There are, however, certain broad facts and principles which no wise solution can ignore, for which I shall try to give the evidence in the course of the following chapters, but which it may be as well to state briefly at the outset. First, the Chinese, though as yet incompetent in politics and backward in economic development, have, in other respects, a civilization at least as good as our own, containing elements which the world greatly needs, and which we shall destroy at our peril. Secondly, the Powers have inflicted upon China a multitude of humiliations and disabilities, for which excuses have been found in China's misdeeds, but for which the sole real reason has been China's military and naval weakness. Thirdly, the best of the Great Powers at present, in relation to China, is America, and the worst is Japan; in the interests of China, as well as in our own larger interests, it is an immense advance that we have ceased to support Japan and have ranged ourselves on the side of America, in so far as America stands for Chinese freedom, but not when Japanese freedom is threatened. Fourthly, in the long run, the Chinese cannot escape economic domination by foreign Powers unless China becomes military or the foreign Powers become Socialistic, because the capitalist system involves in its very essence a predatory relation of the strong towards the weak, internationally as well as nationally. A strong military China would be a disaster; therefore Socialism in Europe and America affords the only ultimate solution.

After these preliminary remarks, I come to the theme of this chapter, namely, the present internal condition of China.

As everyone knows, China, after having an Emperor for forty centuries, decided, eleven years ago, to become a modern democratic republic. Many causes led up to this result. Passing over the first 3,700 years of Chinese history, we arrive at the Manchu conquest in 1644, when a warlike invader from the north succeeded in establishing himself upon the Dragon Throne. He set to work to induce Chinese men to wear pigtails and Chinese women to have big feet. After a time a statesmanlike compromise was arranged: pigtails were adopted but big feet were rejected; the new absurdity was accepted and the old one retained. This characteristic compromise shows how much England and China have in common.

The Manchu Emperors soon became almost completely Chinese, but differences of dress and manners kept the Manchus distinct from the more civilized people whom they had conquered, and the Chinese remained inwardly hostile to them. From 1840 to 1900, a series of disastrous foreign wars, culminating in the humiliation of the Boxer time, destroyed the prestige of the Imperial Family and showed all thoughtful people the need of learning from Europeans. The Taiping rebellion, which lasted for 15 years (1849-64), is thought by Putnam Weale to have diminished the population by 150 millions,[31] and was almost as terrible a business as the Great War. For a long time it seemed doubtful whether the Manchus could suppress it, and when at last they succeeded (by the help of Gordon) their energy was exhausted. The defeat of China by Japan (1894-5) and the vengeance of the Powers after the Boxer rising (1900) finally opened the eyes of all thoughtful Chinese to the need for a better and more modern government than that of the Imperial Family. But things move slowly in China, and it was not till eleven years after the Boxer movement that the revolution broke out.

The revolution of 1911, in China, was a moderate one, similar in spirit to ours of 1688. Its chief promoter, Sun Yat Sen, now at the head of the Canton Government, was supported by the Republicans, and was elected provisional President. But the Northern Army remained faithful to the dynasty, and could probably have defeated the revolutionaries. Its Commander-in-Chief, Yuan Shih-k'ai, however, hit upon a better scheme. He made peace with the revolutionaries and acknowledged the Republic, on condition that he should be the first President instead of Sun Yat Sen. Yuan Shih-k'ai was, of course, supported by the

Legations, being what is called a "strong man," i.e. a believer in blood and iron, not likely to be led astray by talk about democracy or freedom. In China, the North has always been more military and less liberal than the South, and Yuan Shih-k'ai had created out of Northern troops whatever China possessed in the way of a modern army. As he was also ambitious and treacherous, he had every quality needed for inspiring confidence in the diplomatic corps. In view of the chaos which has existed since his death, it must be admitted, however, that there was something to be said in favour of his policy and methods.

A Constituent Assembly, after enacting a provisional constitution, gave place to a duly elected Parliament, which met in April 1913 to determine the permanent constitution. Yuan soon began to quarrel with the Parliament as to the powers of the President, which the Parliament wished to restrict. The majority in Parliament was opposed to Yuan, but he had the preponderance in military strength. Under these circumstances, as was to be expected, constitutionalism was soon overthrown. Yuan made himself financially independent of Parliament (which had been duly endowed with the power of the purse) by unconstitutionally concluding a loan with the foreign banks. This led to a revolt of the South, which, however, Yuan quickly suppressed. After this, by various stages, he made himself virtually absolute ruler of China. He appointed his army lieutenants military governors of provinces, and sent Northern troops into the South. His régime might have lasted but for the fact that, in 1915, he tried to become Emperor, and was met by a successful revolt. He died in 1916—of a broken heart, it was said.

Since then there has been nothing but confusion in China. The military governors appointed by Yuan refused to submit to the Central Government when his strong hand was removed, and their troops terrorized the populations upon whom they were quartered. Ever since there has been civil war, not, as a rule, for any definite principle, but simply to determine which of various rival generals should govern various groups of provinces. There still remains the issue of North versus South, but this has lost most of its constitutional significance.

The military governors of provinces or groups of provinces, who are called Tuchuns, govern despotically in defiance of Peking, and commit depredations on the inhabitants of the districts over which they rule. They intercept the revenue, except the portions collected and administered by foreigners, such as the salt tax. They are nominally appointed by Peking, but in practice depend only upon the favour of the soldiers in their provinces. The Central Government is nearly bankrupt, and is usually unable to pay the soldiers, who live by loot and by such portions of the Tuchun's illgotten wealth as he finds it prudent to surrender to them. When any faction seemed near to complete victory, the Japanese supported its opponents, in order that civil discord might be prolonged. While I was in Peking, the three most important Tuchuns met there for a conference on the division of the spoils. They were barely civil to the President and the Prime Minister, who still officially represent China in the eyes of foreign Powers. The unfortunate nominal Government was obliged to pay to these three worthies, out of a bankrupt treasury, a sum which the newspapers stated to be nine million dollars, to secure their departure from the capital. The largest share went to Chang-tso-lin, the Viceroy of Manchuria and commonly said to be a tool of Japan. His share was paid to cover the expenses of an expedition to Mongolia, which had revolted; but no one for a moment supposed that he would undertake such an expedition, and in fact he has remained at Mukden ever since.[32] In the extreme south, however, there has been established a Government of a different sort, for which it is possible to have some respect. Canton, which has always been the centre of Chinese radicalism, succeeded, in the autumn of 1920, in throwing off the tyranny of its Northern garrison and establishing a progressive efficient Government under the Presidency of Sun Yat Sen. This Government now embraces two provinces, Kwangtung (of which Canton is the capital) and Kwangsi. For a moment it seemed likely to conquer the whole of the South, but it has been checked by the victories of the Northern General Wu-Pei-Fu in the neighbouring province of Hunan. Its enemies allege that it cherishes designs of conquest, and wishes to unite all China under its sway.[33] In all ascertainable respects it is a Government which deserves the support of all progressive people. Professor Dewey, in articles in the *New Republic*, has set forth its merits, as well as the bitter enmity which it has encountered from Hong-Kong and the British generally. This opposition is partly on general principles, because

we dislike radical reform, partly because of the Cassel agreement. This agreement—of a common type in China—would have given us a virtual monopoly of the railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. It had been concluded with the former Government, and only awaited ratification, but the change of Government has made ratification impossible. The new Government, very properly, is befriended by the Americans, and one of them, Mr. Shank, concluded an agreement with the new Government more or less similar to that which we had concluded with the old one. The American Government, however, did not support Mr. Shank, whereas the British Government did support the Cassel agreement. Meanwhile we have lost a very valuable though very iniquitous concession, merely because we, but not the Americans, prefer what is old and corrupt to what is vigorous and honest. I understand, moreover, that the Shank agreement lapsed because Mr. Shank could not raise the necessary capital.

The anarchy in China is, of course, very regrettable, and every friend of China must hope that it will be brought to an end. But it would be a mistake to exaggerate the evil, or to suppose that it is comparable in magnitude to the evils endured in Europe. China must not be compared to a single European country, but to Europe as a whole. In *The Times* of November 11, 1921, I notice a pessimistic article headed: "The Peril of China. A dozen rival Governments." But in Europe there are much more than a dozen Governments, and their enmities are much fiercer than those of China. The number of troops in Europe is enormously greater than in China, and they are infinitely better provided with weapons of destruction. The amount of fighting in Europe since the Armistice has been incomparably more than the amount in China during the same period. You may travel through China from end to end, and it is ten to one that you will see no signs of war. Chinese battles are seldom bloody, being fought by mercenary soldiers who take no interest in the cause for which they are supposed to be fighting. I am inclined to think that the inhabitants of China, at the present moment, are happier, on the average, than the inhabitants of Europe taken as a whole.

It is clear, I think, that political reform in China, when it becomes possible, will have to take the form of a federal constitution, allowing a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces. The division into provinces is very ancient, and provincial feeling is strong. After the revolution, a constitution more or less resembling our own was attempted, only with a President instead of a King. But the successful working of a non-federal constitution requires a homogeneous population without much local feeling, as may be seen from our own experience in Ireland. Most progressive Chinese, as far as I was able to judge, now favour a federal constitution, leaving to the Central Government not much except armaments, foreign affairs, and customs. But the difficulty of getting rid of the existing military anarchy is very great. The Central Government cannot disband the troops, because it cannot find the money to pay them. It would be necessary to borrow from abroad enough money to pay off the troops and establish them in new jobs. But it is doubtful whether any Power or Powers would make such a loan without exacting the sacrifice of the last remnants of Chinese independence. One must therefore hope that somehow the Chinese will find a way of escaping from their troubles without too much foreign assistance.

It is by no means impossible that one of the Tuchuns may become supreme, and may then make friends with the constitutionalists as the best way of consolidating his influence. China is a country where public opinion has great weight, and where the desire to be thought well of may quite possibly lead a successful militarist into patriotic courses. There are, at the moment, two Tuchuns who are more important than any of the others. These are Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu, both of whom have been already mentioned. Chang-tso-lin is supreme in Manchuria, and strong in Japanese support; he represents all that is most reactionary in China. Wu-Pei-Fu, on the other hand, is credited with liberal tendencies. He is an able general; not long ago, nominally at the bidding of Peking, he established his authority on the Yangtze and in Hunan, thereby dealing a blow to the hopes of Canton. It is not easy to see how he could come to terms with the Canton Government, especially since it has allied itself with Chang-tso-lin, but in the rest of China he might establish his authority and seek to make it permanent by being constitutional (see Appendix). If so, China might have a breathing-space, and a breathing-space is all that is needed.

The economic life of China, except in the Treaty Ports and in a few regions where there are

mines, is still wholly pre-industrial. Peking has nearly a million inhabitants, and covers an enormous area, owing to the fact that all the houses have only a ground floor and are built round a courtyard. Yet it has no trams or buses or local trains. So far as I could see, there are not more than two or three factory chimneys in the whole town. Apart from begging, trading, thieving and Government employment, people live by handicrafts. The products are exquisite and the work less monotonous than machine-minding, but the hours are long and the pay infinitesimal.

Seventy or eighty per cent. of the population of China are engaged in agriculture. Rice and tea are the chief products of the south, while wheat and other kinds of grain form the staple crops in the north.[34] The rainfall is very great in the south, but in the north it is only just sufficient to prevent the land from being a desert. When I arrived in China, in the autumn of 1920, a large area in the north, owing to drought, was afflicted with a terrible famine, nearly as bad, probably, as the famine in Russia in 1921. As the Bolsheviki were not concerned, foreigners had no hesitation in trying to bring relief. As for the Chinese, they regarded it passively as a stroke of fate, and even those who died of it shared this view.

Most of the land is in the hands of peasant proprietors, who divide their holdings among their sons, so that each man's share becomes barely sufficient to support himself and his family. Consequently, when the rainfall is less than usual, immense numbers perish of starvation. It would of course be possible, for a time, to prevent famines by more scientific methods of agriculture, and to prevent droughts and floods by afforestation. More railways and better roads would give a vastly improved market, and might greatly enrich the peasants for a generation. But in the long run, if the birth-rate is as great as is usually supposed, no permanent cure for their poverty is possible while their families continue to be so large. In China, Malthus's theory of population, according to many writers, finds full scope.[35] If so, the good done by any improvement of methods will lead to the survival of more children, involving a greater subdivision of the land, and in the end, a return to the same degree of poverty. Only education and a higher standard of life can remove the fundamental cause of these evils. And popular education, on a large scale, is of course impossible until there is a better Government and an adequate revenue. Apart even from these difficulties, there does not exist, as yet, a sufficient supply of competent Chinese teachers for a system of universal elementary education.

Apart from war, the impact of European civilization upon the traditional life of China takes two forms, one commercial, the other intellectual. Both depend upon the prestige of armaments; the Chinese would never have opened either their ports to our trade or their minds to our ideas if we had not defeated them in war. But the military beginning of our intercourse with the Middle Kingdom has now receded into the background; one is not conscious, in any class, of a strong hostility to foreigners as such. It would not be difficult to make out a case for the view that intercourse with the white races is proving a misfortune to China, but apparently this view is not taken by anyone in China except where unreasoning conservative prejudice outweighs all other considerations. The Chinese have a very strong instinct for trade, and a considerable intellectual curiosity, to both of which we appeal. Only a bare minimum of common decency is required to secure their friendship, whether privately or politically. And I think their thought is as capable of enriching our culture as their commerce of enriching our pockets.

In the Treaty Ports, Europeans and Americans live in their own quarters, with streets well paved and lighted, houses in European style, and shops full of American and English goods. There is generally also a Chinese part of the town, with narrow streets, gaily decorated shops, and the rich mixture of smells characteristic of China. Often one passes through a gate, suddenly, from one to the other; after the cheerful disordered beauty of the old town, Europe's ugly cleanliness and Sunday-go-to-meeting decency make a strange complex impression, half-love and half-hate. In the European town one finds safety, spaciousness and hygiene; in the Chinese town, romance, overcrowding and disease. In spite of my affection for China, these transitions always made me realize that I am a European; for me, the Chinese manner of life would not mean happiness. But after making all necessary deductions for the poverty and the disease, I am inclined to think that Chinese life brings more happiness to the Chinese than

English life does to us. At any rate this seemed to me to be true for the men; for the women I do not think it would be true.

Shanghai and Tientsin are white men's cities; the first sight of Shanghai makes one wonder what is the use of travelling, because there is so little change from what one is used to. Treaty Ports, each of which is a centre of European influence, exist practically all over China, not only on the sea coast. Hankow, a very important Treaty Port, is almost exactly in the centre of China. North and South China are divided by the Yangtze; East and West China are divided by the route from Peking to Canton. These two dividing lines meet at Hankow, which has long been an important strategical point in Chinese history. From Peking to Hankow there is a railway, formerly Franco-Belgian, now owned by the Chinese Government. From Wuchang, opposite Hankow on the southern bank of the river, there is to be a railway to Canton, but at present it only runs half-way, to Changsha, also a Treaty Port. The completion of the railway, together with improved docks, will greatly increase the importance of Canton and diminish that of Hong-Kong.

In the Treaty Ports commerce is the principal business; but in the lower Yangtze and in certain mining districts there are beginnings of industrialism. China produces large amounts of raw cotton, which are mostly manipulated by primitive methods; but there are a certain number of cotton-mills on modern lines. If low wages meant cheap labour for the employer, there would be little hope for Lancashire, because in Southern China the cotton is grown on the spot, the climate is damp, and there is an inexhaustible supply of industrious coolies ready to work very long hours for wages upon which an English working-man would find it literally impossible to keep body and soul together. Nevertheless, it is not the underpaid Chinese coolie whom Lancashire has to fear, and China will not become a formidable competitor until improvement in methods and education enables the Chinese workers to earn good wages. Meanwhile, in China, as in every other country, the beginnings of industry are sordid and cruel. The intellectuals wish to be told of some less horrible method by which their country may be industrialized, but so far none is in sight.

The intelligentsia in China has a very peculiar position, unlike that which it has in any other country. Hereditary aristocracy has been practically extinct in China for about 2,000 years, and for many centuries the country has been governed by the successful candidates in competitive examinations. This has given to the educated the kind of prestige elsewhere belonging to a governing aristocracy. Although the old traditional education is fast dying out, and higher education now teaches modern subjects, the prestige of education has survived, and public opinion is still ready to be influenced by those who have intellectual qualifications. The Tuchuns, many of whom, including Chang-tso-lin, have begun by being brigands,[36] are, of course, mostly too stupid and ignorant to share this attitude, but that in itself makes their régime weak and unstable. The influence of Young China—i.e. of those who have been educated either abroad or in modern colleges at home—is far greater than it would be in a country with less respect for learning. This is, perhaps, the most hopeful feature in the situation, because the number of modern students is rapidly increasing, and their outlook and aims are admirable. In another ten years or so they will probably be strong enough to regenerate China—if only the Powers will allow ten years to elapse without taking any drastic action.

It is important to try to understand the outlook and potentialities of Young China. Most of my time was spent among those Chinese who had had a modern education, and I should like to give some idea of their mentality. It seemed to me that one could already distinguish two generations: the older men, who had fought their way with great difficulty and almost in solitude out of the traditional Confucian prejudices; and the younger men, who had found modern schools and colleges waiting for them, containing a whole world of modern-minded people ready to give sympathy and encouragement in the inevitable fight against the family. The older men—men varying in age from 30 to 50—have gone through an inward and outward struggle resembling that of the rationalists of Darwin's and Mill's generation. They have had, painfully and with infinite difficulty, to free their minds from the beliefs instilled in youth, and to turn their thoughts to a new science and a new ethic. Imagine (say) Plotinus recalled from the shades and miraculously compelled to respect Mr. Henry Ford; this will

give you some idea of the centuries across which these men have had to travel in becoming European. Some of them are a little weary with the effort, their forces somewhat spent and their originality no longer creative. But this can astonish no one who realizes the internal revolution they have achieved in their own minds.

It must not be supposed that an able Chinaman, when he masters our culture, becomes purely imitative. This may happen among the second-rate Chinese, especially when they turn Christians, but it does not happen among the best. They remain Chinese, critical of European civilization even when they have assimilated it. They retain a certain crystal candour and a touching belief in the efficacy of moral forces; the industrial revolution has not yet affected their mental processes. When they become persuaded of the importance of some opinion, they try to spread it by setting forth the reasons in its favour; they do not hire the front pages of newspapers for advertising, or put up on hoardings along the railways "So-and-so's opinion is the best." In all this they differ greatly from more advanced nations, and particularly from America; it never occurs to them to treat opinions as if they were soaps. And they have no admiration for ruthlessness, or love of bustling activity without regard to its purpose. Having thrown over the prejudices in which they were brought up, they have not taken on a new set, but have remained genuinely free in their thoughts, able to consider any proposition honestly on its merits.

The younger men, however, have something more than the first generation of modern intellectuals. Having had less of a struggle, they have retained more energy and self-confidence. The candour and honesty of the pioneers survive, with more determination to be socially effective. This may be merely the natural character of youth, but I think it is more than that. Young men under thirty have often come in contact with Western ideas at a sufficiently early age to have assimilated them without a great struggle, so that they can acquire knowledge without being torn by spiritual conflicts. And they have been able to learn Western knowledge from Chinese teachers to begin with, which has made the process less difficult. Even the youngest students, of course, still have reactionary families, but they find less difficulty than their predecessors in resisting the claims of the family, and in realizing practically, not only theoretically, that the traditional Chinese reverence for the old may well be carried too far. In these young men I see the hope of China. When a little experience has taught them practical wisdom, I believe they will be able to lead Chinese opinion in the directions in which it ought to move.

There is one traditional Chinese belief which dies very hard, and that is the belief that correct ethical sentiments are more important than detailed scientific knowledge. This view is, of course, derived from the Confucian tradition, and is more or less true in a pre-industrial society. It would have been upheld by Rousseau or Dr. Johnson, and broadly speaking by everybody before the Benthamites. We, in the West, have now swung to the opposite extreme: we tend to think that technical efficiency is everything and moral purpose nothing. A battleship may be taken as the concrete embodiment of this view. When we read, say, of some new poison-gas by means of which one bomb from an aeroplane can exterminate a whole town, we have a thrill of what we fondly believe to be horror, but it is really delight in scientific skill. Science is our god; we say to it, "Though thou slay me, yet will I trust in thee." And so it slays us. The Chinese have not this defect, but they have the opposite one, of believing that good intentions are the only thing really necessary. I will give an illustration. Forsythe Sherfese, Forestry Adviser to the Chinese Government, gave an address at the British Legation in January 1919 on "Some National Aspects of Forestry in China." [37] In this address he proves (so far as a person ignorant of forestry can judge) that large parts of China which now lie waste are suitable for forestry, that the importation of timber (e.g. for railway sleepers) which now takes place is wholly unnecessary, and that the floods which often sweep away whole districts would be largely prevented if the slopes of the mountains from which the rivers come were reafforested. Yet it is often difficult to interest even the most reforming Chinese in afforestation, because it is not an easy subject for ethical enthusiasm. Trees are planted round graves, because Confucius said they should be; if Confucianism dies out, even these will be cut down. But public-spirited Chinese students learn political theory as it is taught in our universities, and despise such humble questions as the utility of trees. After

learning all about (say) the proper relations of the two Houses of Parliament, they go home to find that some Tschun has dismissed both Houses, and is governing in a fashion not considered in our text-books. Our theories of politics are only true in the West (if there); our theories of forestry are equally true everywhere. Yet it is our theories of politics that Chinese students are most eager to learn. Similarly the practical study of industrial processes might be very useful, but the Chinese prefer the study of our theoretical economics, which is hardly applicable except where industry is already developed. In all these respects, however, there is beginning to be a marked improvement.

It is science that makes the difference between our intellectual outlook and that of the Chinese intelligentsia. The Chinese, even the most modern, look to the white nations, especially America, for moral maxims to replace those of Confucius. They have not yet grasped that men's morals in the mass are the same everywhere: they do as much harm as they dare, and as much good as they must. In so far as there is a difference of morals between us and the Chinese, we differ for the worse, because we are more energetic, and can therefore commit more crimes per diem. What we have to teach the Chinese is not morals, or ethical maxims about government, but science and technical skill. The real problem for the Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring the mechanistic outlook. Perhaps it is not clear what I mean by "the mechanistic outlook." I mean something which exists equally in Imperialism, Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A.; something which distinguishes all these from the Chinese outlook, and which I, for my part, consider very evil. What I mean is the habit of regarding mankind as raw material, to be moulded by our scientific manipulation into whatever form may happen to suit our fancy. The essence of the matter, from the point of view of the individual who has this point of view, is the cultivation of will at the expense of perception, the fervent moral belief that it is our duty to force other people to realize our conception of the world. The Chinese intellectual is not much troubled by Imperialism as a creed, but is vigorously assailed by Bolshevism and the Y.M.C.A., to one or other of which he is too apt to fall a victim, learning a belief from the one in the class-war and the dictatorship of the communists, from the other in the mystic efficacy of cold baths and dumb-bells. Both these creeds, in their Western adepts, involve a contempt for the rest of mankind except as potential converts, and the belief that progress consists in the spread of a doctrine. They both involve a belief in government and a life against Nature. This view, though I have called it mechanistic, is as old as religion, though mechanism has given it new and more virulent forms. The first of Chinese philosophers, Lao-Tze, wrote his book to protest against it, and his disciple Chuang-Tze put his criticism into a fable[38]:—

Horses have hoofs to carry them over frost and snow; hair, to protect them from wind and cold. They eat grass and drink water, and fling up their heels over the champaign. Such is the real nature of horses. Palatial dwellings are of no use to them.

One day Po Lo appeared, saying: "I understand the management of horses."

So he branded them, and clipped them, and pared their hoofs, and put halters on them, tying them up by the head and shackling them by the feet, and disposing them in stables, with the result that two or three in every ten died. Then he kept them hungry and thirsty, trotting them and galloping them, and grooming, and trimming, with the misery of the tasselled bridle before and the fear of the knotted whip behind, until more than half of them were dead.

The potter says: "I can do what I will with clay. If I want it round, I use compasses; if rectangular, a square."

The carpenter says: "I can do what I will with wood. If I want it curved, I use an arc; if straight, a line."

But on what grounds can we think that the natures of clay and wood desire this application of compasses and square, of arc and line? Nevertheless, every age extols Po Lo for his skill in managing horses, and potters and carpenters for their skill with clay and wood. Those who govern the Empire make the same mistake.

Although Taoism, of which Lao-Tze was the founder and Chuang-Tze the chief apostle, was displaced by Confucianism, yet the spirit of this fable has penetrated deeply into Chinese life, making it more urbane and tolerant, more contemplative and observant, than the fiercer life of the West. The Chinese watch foreigners as we watch animals in the Zoo, to see whether they

"drink water and fling up their heels over the champagne," and generally to derive amusement from their curious habits. Unlike the Y.M.C.A., they have no wish to alter the habits of the foreigners, any more than we wish to put the monkeys at the Zoo into trousers and stiff shirts. And their attitude towards each other is, as a rule, equally tolerant. When they became a Republic, instead of cutting off the Emperor's head, as other nations do, they left him his title, his palace, and four million dollars a year (about £600,000), and he remains to this moment with his officials, his eunuchs and his etiquette, but without one shred of power or influence. In talking with a Chinese, you feel that he is trying to understand you, not to alter you or interfere with you. The result of his attempt may be a caricature or a panegyric, but in either case it will be full of delicate perception and subtle humour. A friend in Peking showed me a number of pictures, among which I specially remember various birds: a hawk swooping on a sparrow, an eagle clasping a big bough of a tree in his claws, water-fowl standing on one leg disconsolate in the snow. All these pictures showed that kind of sympathetic understanding which one feels also in their dealings with human beings—something which I can perhaps best describe as the antithesis of Nietzsche. This quality, unfortunately, is useless in warfare, and foreign nations are doing their best to stamp it out. But it is an infinitely valuable quality, of which our Western world has far too little. Together with their exquisite sense of beauty, it makes the Chinese nation quite extraordinarily lovable. The injury that we are doing to China is wanton and cruel, the destruction of something delicate and lovely for the sake of the gross pleasures of barbarous millionaires. One of the poems translated from the Chinese by Mr. Waley[39] is called *Business Men*, and it expresses, perhaps more accurately than I could do, the respects in which the Chinese are our superiors:—

Business men boast of their skill and cunning
But in philosophy they are like little children.
Bragging to each other of successful depredations
They neglect to consider the ultimate fate
of the body. What should they know of the Master of Dark Truth
Who saw the wide world in a jade cup,
By illumined conception got clear of heaven and earth:
On the chariot of Mutation entered the Gate of Immutability?

I wish I could hope that some respect for "the Master of Dark Truth" would enter into the hearts of our apostles of Western culture. But as that is out of the question, it is necessary to seek other ways of solving the Far Eastern question.

FOOTNOTES:

[31]

The Truth about China and Japan, Allen & Unwin, 1921, p. 14. On the other hand Sih-Gung Cheng (*Modern China*, p. 13) says that it "killed twenty million people," which is the more usual estimate, cf. *China of the Chinese* by E.T.C. Werner, p. 24. The extent to which the population was diminished is not accurately known, but I have no doubt that 20 millions is nearer the truth than 150 millions.

[32]

In January 1922, he came to Peking to establish a more subservient Government, the dismissal of which has been ordered by Wu-Pei-Fu. A clash is imminent. See Appendix.

[33]

The blame for this is put upon Sun Yat Sen, who is said to have made an alliance with Chang-tso-lin. The best element in the Canton Government was said to be represented by Sun's colleague General Cheng Chiung Ming, who is now reported to have been dismissed (*The Times*, April 24, 1922). These statements are apparently unfounded. See Appendix.

[34]

The soya bean is rapidly becoming an important product, especially in Manchuria.

[35]

There are, however, no accurate statistics as to the birth-rate or the death-rate in China, and some writers question whether the birth-rate is really very large. From a privately printed pamphlet by my friend Mr. V.K. Ting, I learn that Dr. Lennox, of the Peking Union Medical College, from a careful study of 4,000 families, found that the average number of children (dead and living) per family was 2.1, while the infant mortality was 184.1. Other investigations are quoted to show that the birth-rate near Peking is between 30 and 50. In the absence of statistics, generalizations about the population question in China must be received

with extreme caution.

[36]

I repeat what everybody, Chinese or foreign, told me. Mr. Bland, per contra, describes Chang-tso-lin as a polished Confucian. Contrast p. 104 of his *China, Japan and Korea* with pp. 143, 146 of Coleman's *The Far East Unveiled*, which gives the view of everybody except Mr. Bland. Lord Northcliffe had an interview with Chang-tso-lin reported in *The Times* recently, but he was, of course, unable to estimate Chang-tso-lin's claims to literary culture.

[37]

Printed in China in 1918, published by the Peking Leader.

[38]

Musings of a Chinese Mystic, by Lionel Giles (Murray), p. 66. For Legge's translation, see Vol. I, p. 277 of his *Texts of Taoism in Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXXIX.

[39]

Waley, *170 Chinese Poems*, p. 96. [Russ2]

1922.01.05-6 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (5)

Chapter V

Japan before the Restoration

For modern China, the most important foreign nation is Japan. In order to understand the part played by Japan, it is necessary to know something of that country, to which we must now turn our attention.

In reading the history of Japan, one of the most amazing things is the persistence of the same forces and the same beliefs throughout the centuries. Japanese history practically begins with a "Restoration" by no means unlike that of 1867-8. Buddhism was introduced into Japan from Korea in 552 A.D.[40] At the same time and from the same source Chinese civilization became much better known in Japan than it had been through the occasional intercourse of former centuries. Both novelties won favour. Two Japanese students (followed later by many others) went to China in 608 A.D., to master the civilization of that country. The Japanese are an experimental nation, and before adopting Buddhism nationally they ordered one or two prominent courtiers to adopt it, with a view to seeing whether they prospered more or less than the adherents of the traditional Shinto religion.[41] After some vicissitudes, the experiment was held to have favoured the foreign religion, which, as a Court religion, acquired more prestige than Shinto, although the latter was never ousted, and remained the chief religion of the peasantry until the thirteenth century. It is remarkable to find that, as late as the sixteenth century, Hideyoshi, who was of peasant origin, had a much higher opinion of "the way of the gods" (which is what "Shinto" means) than of Buddhism.[42] Probably the revival of Shinto in modern times was facilitated by a continuing belief in that religion on the part of the less noisy sections of the population. But so far as the people mentioned in history are concerned, Buddhism plays a very much greater part than Shinto.

The object of the Restoration in 1867-8 was, at any rate in part, to restore the constitution of 645 A.D. The object of the constitution of 645 A.D. was to restore the form of government that had prevailed in the good old days. What the object was of those who established the government of the good old days, I do not profess to know. However that may be, the country before 645 A.D. was given over to feudalism and internal strife, while the power of the Mikado had sunk to a very low ebb. The Mikado had had the civil power, but had allowed great feudatories to acquire military control, so that the civil government fell into contempt. Contact with the superior civilization of China made intelligent people think that the Chinese constitution deserved imitation, along with the Chinese morals and religion. The Chinese Emperor was the Son of Heaven, so the Mikado came to be descended from the Sun Goddess. The Chinese Emperor, whenever he happened to be a vigorous man, was genuinely supreme, so the Mikado must be made so.

The similarity of the influence of China in producing the Restoration of 645 A.D. and that of Europe in producing the Restoration of 1867-8 is set forth by Murdoch[43] as follows:— In the summer of 1863 a band of four Choshu youths were smuggled on board a British steamer by the aid of kind Scottish friends who sympathized with their endeavour to proceed to Europe for purposes of study. These, friends possibly did not know that some of the four had been protagonists in the burning down of the British Legation on Gotenyama a few months before, and they certainly could never have suspected that the real mission of the four youths was to master the secrets of Western civilization with a sole view of driving the Western barbarians from the sacred soil of Japan. Prince Ito and Marquis Inouye—for they were two of this venturesome quartette—have often told of their rapid disillusionment when they reached London, and saw these despised Western barbarians at home. On their return to Japan they at once became the apostles of a new doctrine, and their effective preaching has had much to do with the pride of place Dai Nippon now holds among the Great Powers of the world.

The two students who went to China in 608 A.D. "rendered even more illustrious service to their country perhaps than Ito and Inouye have done. For at the Revolution of 1868, the leaders of the movement harked back to the 645-650 A.D. period for a good deal of their inspiration, and the real men of political knowledge at that time were the two National Doctors."

Politically, what was done in 645 A.D. and the period immediately following was not unlike what was done in France by Louis XI and Richelieu—curbing of the great nobles and an exaltation of the sovereign, with a substitution of civil justice for military anarchy. The movement was represented by its promoters as a Restoration, probably with about the same amount of truth as in 1867. At the latter date, there was restoration so far as the power of the Mikado was concerned, but innovation as regards the introduction of Western ideas. Similarly, in 645 A.D., what was done about the Mikado was a return to the past, but what was done in the way of spreading Chinese civilization was just the opposite. There must have been, in both cases, the same curious mixture of antiquarian and reforming tendencies. Throughout subsequent Japanese history, until the Restoration, one seems to see two opposite forces struggling for mastery over people's minds, namely the ideas of government, civilization and art derived from China on the one hand, and the native tendency to feudalism, clan government, and civil war on the other. The conflict is very analogous to that which went on in mediæval Europe between the Church, which represented ideas derived from Rome, and the turbulent barons, who were struggling to preserve the way of life of the ancient Teutons. Henry IV at Canossa, Henry II doing penance for Becket, represent the triumph of civilization over rude vigour; and something similar is to be seen at intervals in Japan. After 645, the Mikado's Government had real power for some centuries, but gradually it fell more and more under the sway of the soldiers. So long as it had wealth (which lasted long after it ceased to have power) it continued to represent what was most civilized in Japan: the study of Chinese literature, the patronage of art, and the attempt to preserve respect for something other than brute force. But the Court nobles (who remained throughout quite distinct from the military feudal chiefs) were so degenerate and feeble, so stereotyped and unprogressive, that it would have been quite impossible for the country to be governed by them and the system they represented. In this respect they differed greatly from the mediæval Church, which no one could accuse of lack of vigour, although the vigour of the feudal aristocracy may have been even greater. Accordingly, while the Church in Europe usually defeated the secular princes, the exact opposite happened in Japan, where the Mikado and his Court sank into greater and greater contempt down to the time of the Restoration. The Japanese have a curious passion for separating the real and the nominal Governments, leaving the show to the latter and the substance of power to the former. First the Emperors took to resigning in favour of their infant sons, and continuing to govern in reality, often from some monastery, where they had become monks. Then the Shogun, who represented the military power, became supreme, but still governed in the name of the Emperor. The word "Shogun" merely means "General"; the full title of the people whom we call "Shogun" is "Sei-i-Tai Shogun," which means "Barbarian-subduing great General"; the barbarians in question being the Ainus, the Japanese aborigines. The first to hold this office in the form which it had at most times until the Restoration was Minamoto Yoritomo, on whom the title was conferred by the Mikado in 1192. But before long the Shogun became nearly as much of a figure-head as the Mikado. Custom confined the Shogunate to the Minamoto family, and the actual power was wielded by Regents in the name of the Shogun. This lasted until near the end of the sixteenth century, when it happened that Iyeyasu, the supreme military commander of his day, belonged to the Minamoto family, and was therefore able to assume the office of Shogun himself. He and his descendants held the office until it was abolished at the Restoration. The Restoration, however, did not put an end to the practice of a real Government behind the nominal one. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet are presented to the world as the Japanese Government, but the real Government is the Genro, or Elder Statesmen, and their successors, of whom I shall have more to say in the next chapter. What the Japanese made of Buddhism reminds one in many ways of what the Teutonic nations made of Christianity. Buddhism and Christianity, originally, were very similar in spirit. They were both religions aiming at the achievement of holiness by renunciation of the world. They both ignored politics and government and wealth, for which they substituted the future life as what was of real importance. They were both religions of peace, teaching gentleness and non-resistance. But both had to undergo great transformations in adapting themselves to the instincts of warlike barbarians. In Japan, a multitude of sects arose, teaching

doctrines which differed in many ways from Mahayana orthodoxy. Buddhism became national and militaristic; the abbots of great monasteries became important feudal chieftains, whose monks constituted an army which was ready to fight on the slightest provocation. Sieges of monasteries and battles with monks are of constant occurrence in Japanese history. The Japanese, as every one knows, decided, after about 100 years' experience of Western missionaries and merchants, to close their country completely to foreigners, with the exception of a very restricted and closely supervised commerce with the Dutch. The first arrival of the Portuguese in Japan was in or about the year 1543, and their final expulsion was in the year 1639. What happened between these two dates is instructive for the understanding of Japan. The first Portuguese brought with them Christianity and fire-arms, of which the Japanese tolerated the former for the sake of the latter. At that time there was virtually no Central Government in the country, and the various Daimyo were engaged in constant wars with each other. The south-western island, Kyushu, was even more independent of such central authority as existed than were the other parts of Japan, and it was in this island (containing the port of Nagasaki) that the Portuguese first landed and were throughout chiefly active. They traded from Macao, bringing merchandise, match-locks and Jesuits, as well as artillery on their larger vessels. It was found that they attached importance to the spread of Christianity, and some of the Daimyo, in order to get their trade and their guns, allowed themselves to be baptized by the Jesuits. The Portuguese of those days seem to have been genuinely more anxious to make converts than to extend their trade; when, later on, the Japanese began to object to missionaries while still desiring trade, neither the Portuguese nor the Spaniards could be induced to refrain from helping the Fathers. However, all might have gone well if the Portuguese had been able to retain the monopoly which had been granted to them by a Papal Bull. Their monopoly of trade was associated with a Jesuit monopoly of missionary activity. But from 1592 onward, the Spaniards from Manila competed with the Portuguese from Macao, and the Dominican and Franciscan missionaries, brought by the Spaniards, competed with the Jesuit missionaries brought by the Portuguese. They quarrelled furiously, even at times when they were suffering persecution; and the Japanese naturally believed the accusations that each side brought against the other. Moreover, when they were shown maps displaying the extent of the King of Spain's dominions, they became alarmed for their national independence. In the year 1596, a Spanish ship, the *San Felipe*, on its way from Manila to Acapulco, was becalmed off the coast of Japan. The local Daimyo insisted on sending men to tow it into his harbour, and gave them instructions to run it aground on a sandbank, which they did. He thereupon claimed the whole cargo, valued at 600,000 crowns. However, Hideyoshi, who was rapidly acquiring supreme power in Japan, thought this too large a windfall for a private citizen, and had the Spanish pilot interviewed by a man named Masuda. The pilot, after trying reason in vain, attempted intimidation. He produced a map of the world, and on it pointed out the vast extent of the dominions of Philip II. Thereupon Masuda asked him how it was so many countries had been brought to acknowledge the sway of a single man.... "Our Kings," said this outspoken seaman, "begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer religious who induce the people to embrace our religion, and when they have made considerable progress, troops are sent who combine with the new Christians, and then our Kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest." [44]

As Spain and Portugal were at this time both subject to Philip II, the Portuguese also suffered from the suspicions engendered by this speech. Moreover, the Dutch, who were at war with Spain, began to trade with Japan, and to tell all they knew against Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Papists generally. A breezy Elizabethan sea captain, Will Adams, was wrecked in Japan, and on being interrogated naturally gave a good British account of the authors of the Armada. As the Japanese had by this time mastered the use and manufacture of fire-arms, they began to think that they had nothing more to learn from Christian nations. Meanwhile, a succession of three great men—Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and Iyeyasu—had succeeded in unifying Japan, destroying the quasi-independence of the feudal nobles, and establishing that reign of internal peace which lasted until the Restoration—period of nearly two and a half centuries. It was possible, therefore, for the Central Government to enforce

whatever policy it chose to adopt with regard to the foreigners and their religion. The Jesuits and the Friars between them had made a considerable number of converts in Japan, probably about 300,000. Most of these were in the island of Kyushu, the last region to be subdued by Hideyoshi. They tended to disloyalty, not only on account of their Christianity, but also on account of their geographical position. It was in this region that the revolt against the Shogun began in 1867, and Satsuma, the chief clan in the island of Kyushu, has had great power in the Government ever since the Restoration, except during its rebellion of 1877. It is hard to disentangle what belongs to Christianity and what to mere hostility to the Central Government in the movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However that may be, Iyeyasu decided to persecute the Christians vigorously, if possible without losing the foreign trade. His successors were even more anti-Christian and less anxious for trade. After an abortive revolt in 1637, Christianity was stamped out, and foreign trade was prohibited in the most vigorous terms:—

So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that if King Philip himself, or even the very God of the Christians, or the great Shaka contravene this prohibition, they shall pay for it with their heads.[45]

The persecution of Christians, though it was ruthless and exceedingly cruel, was due, not to religious intolerance, but solely to political motives. There was reason to fear that the Christians might side with the King of Spain if he should attempt to conquer Japan; and even if no foreign power intervened, there was reason to fear rebellions of Christians against the newly established central power. Economic exploitation, in the modern sense of the word, did not yet exist apart from political domination, and the Japanese would have welcomed trade if there had been no danger of conquest. They seem to have overrated the power of Spain, which certainly could not have conquered them. Japanese armies were, in those days, far larger than the armies of Europe; the Japanese had learnt the use of fire-arms; and their knowledge of strategy was very great. Kyoto, the capital, was one of the largest cities in the world, having about a million inhabitants. The population of Japan was probably greater than that of any European State. It would therefore have been possible, without much trouble, to resist any expedition that Europe could have sent against Japan. It would even have been easy to conquer Manila, as Hideyoshi at one time thought of doing. But we can well understand how terrifying would be a map of the world showing the whole of North and South America as belonging to Philip II. Moreover the Japanese Government sent pretended converts to Europe, where they became priests, had audience of the Pope, penetrated into the inmost councils of Spain, and mastered all the meditated villainies of European Imperialism. These spies, when they came home and laid their reports before the Government, naturally increased its fears. The Japanese, therefore, decided to have no further intercourse with the white men. And whatever may be said against this policy, I cannot feel convinced that it was unwise. For over two hundred years, until the coming of Commodore Perry's squadron from the United States in 1853, Japan enjoyed complete peace and almost complete stagnation—the only period of either in Japanese history, It then became necessary to learn fresh lessons in the use of fire-arms from Western nations, and to abandon the exclusive policy until they were learnt. When they have been learnt, perhaps we shall see another period of isolation.

FOOTNOTES:

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The best book known to me on early Japan is Murdoch's *History of Japan*, The volume dealing with the earlier period is published by Kegan Paul, 1910. The chronologically later volume was published earlier; its title is: *A History of Japan during the Century of Early Foreign Intercourse (1542—1651)*, by James Murdoch M.A. in collaboration with Isoh Yamagata. Kobe, office of the *Japan Chronicle*, 1903. I shall allude to these volumes as Murdoch I and Murdoch II respectively.

[41]

Murdoch I. pp. 113 ff.

[42]

Ibid., II. pp. 375 ff.

[43]

Murdoch I. p. 147.

[44]

Murdoch, II, p. 288.

[45]

Murdoch II, p. 667.

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Chapter VI

Modern Japan

The modern Japanese nation is unique, not only in this age, but in the history of the world. It combines elements which most Europeans would have supposed totally incompatible, and it has realized an original plan to a degree hardly known in human affairs. The Japan which now exists is almost exactly that which was intended by the leaders of the Restoration in 1867. Many unforeseen events have happened in the world: America has risen and Russia has fallen, China has become a Republic and the Great War has shattered Europe. But throughout all these changes the leading statesmen of Japan have gone along the road traced out for them at the beginning of the Meiji era, and the nation has followed them with ever-increasing faithfulness. One single purpose has animated leaders and followers alike: the strengthening and extension of the Empire. To realize this purpose a new kind of policy has been created, combining the sources of strength in modern America with those in Rome at the time of the Punic Wars, uniting the material organization and scientific knowledge of pre-war Germany with the outlook on life of the Hebrews in the Book of Joshua.

The transformation of Japan since 1867 is amazing, and people have been duly amazed by it. But what is still more amazing is that such an immense change in knowledge and in way of life should have brought so little change in religion and ethics, and that such change as it has brought in these matters should have been in a direction opposite to that which would have been naturally expected. Science is supposed to tend to rationalism; yet the spread of scientific knowledge in Japan has synchronized with a great intensification of Mikado-Worship, the most anachronistic feature in the Japanese civilization. For sociology, for social psychology, and for political theory, Japan is an extraordinarily interesting country. The synthesis of East and West which has been effected is of a most peculiar kind. There is far more of the East than appears on the surface; but there is everything of the West that tends to national efficiency. How far there is a genuine fusion of Eastern and Western elements may be doubted; the nervous excitability of the people suggests something strained and artificial in their way of life, but this may possibly be a merely temporary phenomenon.

Throughout Japanese politics since the Restoration, there are two separate strands, one analogous to that of Western nations, especially pre-war Germany, the other inherited from the feudal age, which is more analogous to the politics of the Scottish Highlands down to 1745. It is no part of my purpose to give a history of modern Japan; I wish only to give an outline of the forces which control events and movements in that country, with such illustrations as are necessary. There are many good books on Japanese politics; the one that I have found most informative is McLaren's Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era 1867-1912 (Allen and Unwin, 1916). For a picture of Japan as it appeared in the early years of the Meiji era, Lafcadio Hearn is of course invaluable; his book Japan, An Interpretation shows his dawning realization of the grim sides of the Japanese character, after the cherry-blossom business has lost its novelty. I shall not have much to say about cherry-blossom; it was not flowering when I was in Japan.

Before, 1867, Japan was a feudal federation of clans, in which the Central Government was in the hands of the Shogun, who was the head of his own clan, but had by no means undisputed sway over the more powerful of the other clans. There had been various dynasties of Shoguns at various times, but since the seventeenth century the Shogunate had been in the Tokugawa clan. Throughout the Tokugawa Shogunate, except during its first few years, Japan had been closed to foreign intercourse, except for a strictly limited commerce with the Dutch. The modern era was inaugurated by two changes: first, the compulsory opening of the country to Western trade; secondly, the transference of power from the Tokugawa clan to the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, who have governed Japan ever since. It is impossible to understand Japan or its politics and possibilities without realizing the nature of the governing forces and their roots in the feudal system of the former age. I will therefore first outline these internal movements, before coming to the part which Japan has played in international affairs.

What happened, nominally, in 1867 was that the Mikado was restored to power, after having been completely eclipsed by the Shogun since the end of the twelfth century. During this long

period, the Mikado seems to have been regarded by the common people with reverence as a holy personage, but he was allowed no voice in affairs, was treated with contempt by the Shogun, was sometimes deposed if he misbehaved, and was often kept in great poverty. Of so little importance was the Imperial person in the days of early foreign intercourse that the Jesuits hardly knew of the Emperor's existence. They seem to have thought of him as a Japanese counterpart of the Pope of Rome, except that he had no aspirations for temporal power. The Dutch writers likewise were in the habit of referring to the Shogun as "His Majesty," and on their annual pilgrimage from Dashima to Yedo, Kyoto (where the Mikado lived) was the only city which they were permitted to examine freely. The privilege was probably accorded by the Tokugawa to show the foreigners how lightly the Court was regarded. Commodore Perry delivered to the Shogun in Yedo the autograph letter to the Emperor of Japan, from the President of the United States, and none of the Ambassadors of the Western Powers seem to have entertained any suspicion that in dealing with the authorities in Yedo they were not approaching the throne.

In the light of these facts, some other explanation of the relations between the Shogunate and the Imperial Court must be sought than that which depends upon the claim now made by Japanese historians of the official type, that the throne, throughout this whole period, was divinely preserved by the Heavenly Gods.[46]

What happened, in outline, seems to have been a combination of very different forces. There were antiquarians who observed that the Mikado had had real power in the tenth century, and who wished to revert to the ancient customs. There were patriots who were annoyed with the Shogun for yielding to the pressure of the white men and concluding commercial treaties with them. And there were the western clans, which had never willingly submitted to the authority of the Shogun. To quote McLaren once more (p. 33):—

The movement to restore the Emperor was coupled with a form of Chauvinism or intense nationalism which may be summed up in the expression "Exalt the Emperor! Away with the barbarians!" (Kinno! Joi!) From this it would appear that the Dutch scholars' work in enlightening the nation upon the subject of foreign scientific attainments was anathema, but a conclusion of that kind must not be hastily arrived at. The cry, "Away with the barbarians!" was directed against Perry and the envoys of other foreign Powers, but there was nothing in that slogan which indicates a general unwillingness to emulate the foreigners' achievements in armaments or military tactics. In fact, for a number of years previous to 1853, Satsuma and Choshu and other western clans had been very busily engaged in manufacturing guns and practising gunnery: to that extent, at any rate, the discoveries of the students of European sciences had been deliberately used by those men who were to be foremost in the Restoration. This passage gives the key to the spirit which has animated modern Japan down to the present day.

The Restoration was, to a greater extent than is usually realized in the West, a conservative and even reactionary movement. Professor Murdoch, in his authoritative History of Japan,[47] says:—

In the interpretation of this sudden and startling development most European writers and critics show themselves seriously at fault. Even some of the more intelligent among them find the solution of this portentous enigma in the very superficial and facile formula of "imitation." But the Japanese still retain their own unit of social organization, which is not the individual, as with us, but the family. Furthermore, the resemblance of the Japanese administrative system, both central and local, to certain European systems is not the result of imitation, or borrowing, or adaptation. Such resemblance is merely an odd and fortuitous resemblance. When the statesmen who overthrew the Tokugawa régime in 1868, and abolished the feudal system in 1871, were called upon to provide the nation with a new equipment of administrative machinery, they did not go to Europe for their models. They simply harked back for some eleven or twelve centuries in their own history and resuscitated the administrative machinery that had first been installed in Japan by the genius of Fujiwara Kamatari and his coadjutors in 645 A.D., and more fully supplemented and organized in the succeeding fifty or sixty years. The present Imperial Cabinet of ten Ministers, with their departments and departmental staff of officials, is a modified revival of the Eight Boards

adapted from China and established in the seventh century.... The present administrative system is indeed of alien provenance; but it was neither borrowed nor adapted a generation ago, nor borrowed nor adapted from Europe. It was really a system of hoary antiquity that was revived to cope with pressing modern exigencies.

The outcome was that the clans of Satsuma and Choshu acquired control of the Mikado, made his exaltation the symbol of resistance to the foreigner (with whom the Shogun had concluded unpopular treaties), and secured the support of the country by being the champions of nationalism. Under extraordinarily able leaders, a policy was adopted which has been pursued consistently ever since, and has raised Japan from being the helpless victim of Western greed to being one of the greatest Powers in the world. Feudalism was abolished, the Central Government was made omnipotent, a powerful army and navy were created, China and Russia were successively defeated, Korea was annexed and a protectorate established over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, industry and commerce were developed, universal compulsory education instituted; and worship of the Mikado firmly established by teaching in the schools and by professorial patronage of historical myths. The artificial creation of Mikado-worship is one of the most interesting features of modern Japan, and a model to all other States as regards the method of preventing the growth of rationalism. There is a very instructive little pamphlet by Professor B.H. Chamberlain, who was Professor of Japanese and philosophy at Tokyo, and had a knowledge of Japanese which few Europeans had equalled. His pamphlet is called *The Invention of a New Religion*, and is published by the Rationalist Press Association. He points out that, until recent times, the religion of Japan was Buddhism, to the practical exclusion of every other. There had been, in very ancient times, a native religion called Shinto, and it had lingered on obscurely. But it is only during the last forty years or so that Shinto has been erected into a State religion, and has been reconstructed so as to suit modern requirements.[48] It is, of course, preferable to Buddhism because it is native and national; it is a tribal religion, not one which aims at appealing to all mankind. Its whole purpose, as it has been developed by modern statesmen, is to glorify Japan and the Mikado. Professor Chamberlain points out how little reverence there was for the Mikado until some time after the Restoration:—

The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils. Emperors have been exiled; some have been murdered in exile.... For long centuries the Government was in the hands of Mayors of the Palace, who substituted one infant sovereign for another, generally forcing each to abdicate as he approached man's estate. At one period, these Mayors of the Palace left the Descendant of the Sun in such distress that His Imperial Majesty and the Imperial Princes were obliged to gain a livelihood by selling their autographs! Nor did any great party in the State protest against this condition of affairs. Even in the present reign (that of Meiji)—the most glorious in Japanese history—there have been two rebellions, during one of which a rival Emperor was set up in one part of the country, and a Republic proclaimed in another.

This last sentence, though it states sober historical fact, is scarcely credible to those who only know twentieth-century Japan. The spread of superstition has gone *pari passu* with the spread of education, and a revolt against the Mikado is now unthinkable. Time and again, in the midst of political strife, the Mikado has been induced to intervene, and instantly the hottest combatants have submitted abjectly. Although there is a Diet, the Mikado is an absolute ruler—as absolute as any sovereign ever has been.

The civilization of Japan, before the Restoration, came from China. Religion, art, writing, philosophy and ethics, everything was copied from Chinese models. Japanese history begins in the fifth century A.D., whereas Chinese history goes back to about 2,000 B.C., or at any rate to somewhere in the second millennium B.C. This was galling to Japanese pride, so an early history was invented long ago, like the theory that the Romans were descended from Æneas. To quote Professor Chamberlain again:—

The first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the fifth century after Christ, and

even the accounts of what happened in the sixth century must be received with caution. Japanese scholars know this as well as we do; it is one of the certain results of investigation. But the Japanese bureaucracy does not desire to have the light let in on this inconvenient circumstance. While granting a dispensation re the national mythology, properly so called, it exacts belief in every iota of the national historic legends. Woe to the native professor who strays from the path of orthodoxy. His wife and children (and in Japan every man, however young, has a wife and children) will starve. From the late Prince Ito's grossly misleading Commentary on the Japanese Constitution down to school compendiums, the absurd dates are everywhere insisted upon.

This question of fictitious early history might be considered unimportant, like the fact that, with us, parsons have to pretend to believe the Bible, which some people think innocuous. But it is part of the whole system, which has a political object, to which free thought and free speech are ruthlessly sacrificed. As this same pamphlet says:—

Shinto, a primitive nature cult, which had fallen into discredit, was taken out of its cupboard and dusted. The common people, it is true, continued to place their affections on Buddhism, the popular festivals were Buddhist; Buddhist also the temples where they buried their dead. The governing class determined to change all this. They insisted on the Shinto doctrine that the Mikado descends in direct succession from the native Goddess of the Sun, and that He himself is a living God on earth who justly claims the absolute fealty of his subjects. Such things as laws and constitutions are but free gifts on His part, not in any sense popular rights. Of course, the ministers and officials, high and low, who carry on His government, are to be regarded not as public servants, but rather as executants of supreme—one might say supernatural—authority. Shinto, because connected with the Imperial family, is to be alone honoured.

All this is not mere theorizing; it is the practical basis of Japanese politics. The Mikado, after having been for centuries in the keeping of the Tokugawa Shoguns, was captured by the clans of Satsuma and Choshu, and has been in their keeping ever since. They were represented politically by five men, the Genro or Elder Statesmen, who are sometimes miscalled the Privy Council. Only two still survive. The Genro have no constitutional existence; they are merely the people who have the ear of the Mikado. They can make him say whatever they wish; therefore they are omnipotent. It has happened repeatedly that they have had against them the Diet and the whole force of public opinion; nevertheless they have invariably been able to enforce their will, because they could make the Mikado speak, and no one dare oppose the Mikado. They do not themselves take office; they select the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War and Marine, and allow them to bear the blame if anything goes wrong. The Genro are the real Government of Japan, and will presumably remain so until the Mikado is captured by some other clique.

From a patriotic point of view, the Genro have shown very great wisdom in the conduct of affairs. There is reason to think that if Japan were a democracy its policy would be more Chauvinistic than it is. Apologists of Japan, such as Mr. Bland, are in the habit of telling us that there is a Liberal anti-militarist party in Japan, which is soon going to dominate foreign policy. I see no reason to believe this. Undoubtedly there is a strong movement for increasing the power of the Diet and making the Cabinet responsible to it; there is also a feeling that the Ministers of War and Marine ought to be responsible to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, not only to the Mikado directly.[49] But democracy in Japan does not mean a diminution of Chauvinism in foreign policy. There is a small Socialist party which is genuinely anti-Chauvinist and anti-militarist; this party, probably, will grow as Japanese industrialism grows. But so-called Japanese Liberals are just as Chauvinistic as the Government, and public opinion is more so. Indeed there have been occasions when the Genro, in spite of popular fury, has saved the nation from mistakes which it would certainly have committed if the Government had been democratic. One of the most interesting of these occasions was the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, after the Sino-Japanese war, which deserves to be told as illustrative of Japanese politics.[50]

In 1905, after the battles of Tsushima and Mukden, it became clear to impartial observers that Russia could accomplish nothing further at sea, and Japan could accomplish nothing further

on land. The Russian Government was anxious to continue the war, having gradually accumulated men and stores in Manchuria, and greatly improved the working of the Siberian railway. The Japanese Government, on the contrary, knew that it had already achieved all the success it could hope for, and that it would be extremely difficult to raise the loans required for a prolongation of the war. Under these circumstances, Japan appealed secretly to President Roosevelt requesting his good offices for the restoration of peace. President Roosevelt therefore issued invitations to both belligerents to a peace conference. The Russian Government, faced by a strong peace party and incipient revolution, dared not refuse the invitation, especially in view of the fact that the sympathies of neutrals were on the whole with Japan. Japan, being anxious for peace, led Russia to suppose that Japan's demands would be so excessive as to alienate the sympathy of the world and afford a complete answer to the peace party in Russia. In particular, the Japanese gave out that they would absolutely insist upon an indemnity. The Government had in fact resolved, from the first, not to insist on an indemnity, but this was known to very few people in Japan, and to no one outside Japan. The Russians, believing that the Japanese would not give way about the indemnity, showed themselves generous as regards all other Japanese demands. To their horror and consternation, when they had already packed up and were just ready to break up the conference, the Japanese announced (as they had from the first intended to do) that they accepted the Russian concessions and would waive the claim to an indemnity. Thus the Russian Government and the Japanese people were alike furious, because they had been tricked—the former in the belief that it could yield everything except the indemnity without bringing peace, the latter in the belief that the Government would never give way about the indemnity. In Russia there was revolution; in Japan there were riots, furious diatribes in the Press, and a change of Government—of the nominal Government, that is to say, for the Genro continued to be the real power throughout. In this case, there is no doubt that the decision of the Genro to make peace was the right one from every point of view; there is also very little doubt that a peace advantageous to Japan could not have been made without trickery.

Foreigners unacquainted with Japan, knowing that there is a Diet in which the Lower House is elected, imagine that Japan is at least as democratic as pre-war Germany. This is a delusion. It is true that Marquis Ito, who framed the Constitution, which was promulgated in 1889, took Germany for his model, as the Japanese have always done in all their Westernizing efforts, except as regards the Navy, in which Great Britain has been copied. But there were many points in which the Japanese Constitution differed from that of the German Empire. To begin with, the Reichstag was elected by manhood suffrage, whereas in Japan there is a property qualification which restricts the franchise to about 25 per cent of the adult males. This, however, is a small matter compared to the fact that the Mikado's power is far less limited than that of the Kaiser was. It is true that Japan does not differ from pre-war Germany in the fact that Ministers are not responsible to the Diet, but to the Emperor, and are responsible severally, not collectively. The War Minister must be a General, the Minister of Marine must be an Admiral; they take their orders, not from the Prime Minister, but from the military and naval authorities respectively, who, of course, are under the control of the Mikado. But in Germany the Reichstag had the power of the purse, whereas in Japan, if the Diet refuses to pass the Budget, the Budget of the previous year can be applied, and when the Diet is not sitting, laws can be enacted temporarily by Imperial decree—a provision which had no analogue in the German Constitution.

The Constitution having been granted by the Emperor of his free grace, it is considered impious to criticize it or to suggest any change in it, since this would imply that His Majesty's work was not wholly perfect. To understand the Constitution, it is necessary to read it in conjunction with the authoritative commentary of Marquis Ito, which was issued at the same time. Mr. Coleman very correctly summarizes the Constitution as follows[51]:—

Article I of the Japanese Constitution provides that "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal."

"By reigned over and governed," wrote Marquis Ito in his Commentaries on the Constitution of Japan, "it is meant that the Emperor on His Throne combines in Himself the Sovereignty of the State and the Government of the country and of His subjects."

Article 3 of the Constitution states that "the Emperor is sacred and inviolate." Marquis Ito's comment in explanation of this is peculiarly Japanese. He says, "The Sacred Throne was established at the time when the heavens and earth became separated. The Empire is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all His subjects. He must be revered and is inviolable. He has, indeed, to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He neither be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."

Through the Constitution of Japan the Japanese Emperor exercises the legislative power, the executive power, and the judiciary power. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, prorogues, and dissolves it. When the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances may be issued in place of laws. The Emperor has supreme control of the Army and Navy, declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties; orders amnesty, pardon and commutation of punishments.

As to the Ministers of State, the Constitution of Japan, Article 55, says: "The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it."

Ito's commentary on this article indicates his intention in framing it. "When a Minister of State errs in the discharge of his functions, the power of deciding upon his responsibilities belongs to the Sovereign of the State: he alone can dismiss a Minister who has appointed him. Who then is it, except the Sovereign, that can appoint, dismiss, and punish a Minister of State? The appointment and dismissal of them having been included by the Constitution in the sovereign power of the Emperor, it is only a legitimate consequence that the power of deciding as to the responsibility of Ministers is withheld from the Diet. But the Diet may put questions to the Ministers and demand open answers from them before the public, and it may also present addresses to the Sovereign setting forth its opinions.

"The Minister President of State is to make representations to the Emperor on matters of State, and to indicate, according to His pleasure, the general course of the policy of the State, every branch of the administration being under control of the said Minister. The compass of his duties is large, and his responsibilities cannot but be proportionately great. As to the other Ministers of State, they are severally held responsible for the matters within their respective competency; there is no joint responsibility among them in regard to such matters. For, the Minister President and the other Ministers of State, being alike personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the Emperor, and the Minister President himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. In some countries, the Cabinet is regarded as constituting a corporate body, and the Ministers are not held to take part in the conduct of the Government each one in an individual capacity, but joint responsibility is the rule. The evil of such a system is that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme power of the Sovereign. Such a state of things can never be approved of according to our Constitution."

In spite of the small powers of the Diet, it succeeded, in the first four years of its existence (1890-94), in causing some annoyance to the Government. Until 1894, the policy of Japan was largely controlled by Marquis Ito, who was opposed to militarism and Chauvinism. The statesmen of the first half of the Meiji era were concerned mainly with introducing modern education and modern social organization; they wished to preserve Japanese independence vis-à-vis the Western Powers, but did not aim, for the time being, at imperialist expansion on their own account. Ito represented this older school of Restoration statesmen. Their ideas of statecraft were in the main derived from the Germany of the 'eighties, which was kept by Bismarck from undue adventurousness. But when the Diet proved difficult to manage, they reverted to an earlier phase of Bismarck's career for an example to imitate. The Prussian Landtag (incredible as it may seem) was vigorously obstreperous at the time when Bismarck first rose to power, but he tamed it by glutting the nation with military glory in the wars against Austria and France. Similarly, in 1894, the Japanese Government embarked on war against China, and instantly secured the enthusiastic support of the hitherto rebellious Diet. From that day to this, the Japanese Government has never been vigorously opposed except for

its good deeds (such as the Treaty of Portsmouth); and it has atoned for these by abundant international crimes, which the nation has always applauded to the echo. Marquis Ito was responsible for the outbreak of war in 1894. He was afterwards again opposed to the new policy of predatory war, but was powerless to prevent it.[52] His opposition, however, was tiresome, until at last he was murdered in Korea.

Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894, Japan has pursued a consistent career of imperialism, with quite extraordinary success. The nature and fruits of that career I shall consider in the next two chapters. For the time being, it has arrested whatever tendency existed towards the development of democracy; the Diet is quite as unimportant as the English Parliament was in the time of the Tudors. Whether the present system will continue for a long time, it is impossible to guess. An unsuccessful foreign war would probably destroy not only the existing system, but the whole unity and morale of the nation; I do not believe that Japan would be as firm in defeat as Germany has proved to be. Diplomatic failure, without war, would probably produce a more Liberal regime, without revolution. There is, however, one very explosive element in Japan, and that is industrialism. It is impossible for Japan to be a Great Power without developing her industry, and in fact everything possible is done to increase Japanese manufactures. Moreover, industry is required to absorb the growing population, which cannot emigrate to English-speaking regions, and will not emigrate to the mainland of Asia because Chinese competition is too severe. Therefore the only way to support a larger population is to absorb it into industrialism, manufacturing goods for export as a means of purchasing food abroad. Industrialism in Japan requires control of China, because Japan contains hardly any of the raw materials of industry, and cannot obtain them sufficiently cheaply or securely in open competition with America and Europe. Also dependence upon imported food requires a strong navy. Thus the motives for imperialism and navalism in Japan are very similar to those that have prevailed in England. But this policy requires high taxation, while successful competition in neutral markets requires—or rather, is thought to require—starvation wages and long hours for operatives. In the cotton industry of Osaka, for example, most of the work is done by girls under fourteen, who work eleven hours a day and got, in 1916, an average daily wage of 5d.[53] Labour organization is in its infancy, and so is Socialism;[54] but both are certain to spread if the number of industrial workers increases without a very marked improvement in hours and wages. Of course the very rigidity of the Japanese policy, which has given it its strength, makes it incapable of adjusting itself to Socialism and Trade Unionism, which are vigorously persecuted by the Government. And on the other hand Socialism and Trade Unionism cannot accept Mikado-worship and the whole farrago of myth upon which the Japanese State depends.[55] There is therefore a likelihood, some twenty or thirty years hence—assuming a peaceful and prosperous development in the meantime—of a very bitter class conflict between the proletarians on the one side and the employers and bureaucrats on the other. If this should happen to synchronize with agrarian discontent, it would be impossible to foretell the issue.

The problems facing Japan are therefore very difficult. To provide for the growing population it is necessary to develop industry; to develop industry it is necessary to control Chinese raw materials; to control Chinese raw materials it is necessary to go against the economic interests of America and Europe; to do this successfully requires a large army and navy, which in turn involve great poverty for wage-earners. And expanding industry with poverty for wage-earners means growing discontent, increase of Socialism, dissolution of filial piety and Mikado-worship in the poorer classes, and therefore a continually greater and greater menace to the whole foundation on which the fabric of the State is built. From without, Japan is threatened with the risk of war against America or of a revival of China. From within, there will be, before long, the risk of proletarian revolution.

From all these dangers, there is only one escape, and that is a diminution of the birth-rate. But such an idea is not merely abhorrent to the militarists as diminishing the supply of cannon-fodder; it is fundamentally opposed to Japanese religion and morality, of which patriotism and filial piety are the basis. Therefore if Japan is to emerge successfully, a much more intense Westernizing must take place, involving not only mechanical processes and knowledge of bare facts, but ideals and religion and general outlook on life. There must be

free thought, scepticism, diminution in the intensity of herd-instinct. Without these, the population question cannot be solved; and if that remains unsolved, disaster is sooner or later inevitable.

FOOTNOTES:

[46]

McLaren, op. cit. p. 19.

[47]

Kegan Paul, 1910, vol. i. p. 20.

[48]

"What popular Shinto, as expounded by its village priests in the old time, was we simply do not know. Our carefully selected and edited official edition of Shinto is certainly not true aboriginal Shinto as practised in Yamato before the introduction of Buddhism and Chinese culture, and many plausible arguments which disregard that indubitable fact lose much of their weight." (Murdoch, I, p. 173 n.)

[49]

The strength of this movement may, however, be doubted. Murdoch (op. cit. i, p. 162) says: "At present, 1910, the War Office and Admiralty are, of all Ministries, by far the strongest in the Empire. When a party Government does by any strange hap make its appearance on the political stage, the Ministers of War and of Marine can afford to regard its advent with the utmost insouciance. For the most extreme of party politicians readily and unhesitatingly admit that the affairs of the Army and Navy do not fall within the sphere of party politics, but are the exclusive concern of the Commander-in-Chief, his Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan. On none in the public service of Japan are titles of nobility, high rank, and still more substantial emoluments showered with a more liberal hand than upon the great captains and the great sailors of the Empire. In China, on the other hand, the military man is, if not a pariah, at all events an exceptional barbarian, whom policy makes it advisable to treat with a certain amount of gracious, albeit semi-contemptuous, condescension."

[50]

The following account is taken from McLaren, op. cit. chaps. xii. and xiii.

[51]

The Far East Unveiled, pp. 252-58.

[52]

See McLaren, op. cit. pp. 227, 228, 289.

[53]

Coleman, op. cit. chap. xxxv.

[54]

See an invaluable pamphlet, "The Socialist and Labour Movements in Japan," published by the Japan Chronicle, 1921, for an account of what is happening in this direction.

[55]

The Times of February 7, 1922, contains a telegram from its correspondent in Tokyo, à propos of the funeral of Prince Yamagata, Chief of the Genro, to the following effect:—"To-day a voice was heard in the Diet in opposition to the grant of expenses for the State funeral of Prince Yamagata. The resolution, which was introduced by the member for Osaka constituency, who is regarded as the spokesman of the so-called Parliamentary Labour Party founded last year, states that the Chief of the Genro (Elder Statesmen) did not render true service to the State, and, although the recipient of the highest dignities, was an enemy of mankind and suppressor of democratic institutions. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but the fact that the introducer could obtain the necessary support to table the resolution formally was not the least interesting feature of the incident." [Russ2]

1922.01.07-8 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (7)

Chapter VII

Japan and China before 1914

Before going into the detail of Japan's policy towards China, it is necessary to put the reader on his guard against the habit of thinking of the "Yellow Races," as though China and Japan formed some kind of unity. There are, of course, reasons which, at first sight, would lead one to suppose that China and Japan could be taken in one group in comparison with the races of Europe and of Africa. To begin with, the Chinese and Japanese are both yellow, which points to ethnic affinities; but the political and cultural importance of ethnic affinities is very small. The Japanese assert that the hairy Ainu, who are low in the scale of barbarians, are a white race akin to ourselves. I never saw a hairy Ainu, and I suspect the Japanese of malice in urging us to admit the Ainu as poor relations; but even if they really are of Aryan descent, that does not prove that they have anything of the slightest importance in common with us as compared to what the Japanese and Chinese have in common with us. Similarity of culture is infinitely more important than a common racial origin.

It is true that Japanese culture, until the Restoration, was derived from China. To this day, Japanese script is practically the same as Chinese, and Buddhism, which is still the religion of the people, is of the sort derived originally from China. Loyalty and filial piety, which are the foundations of Japanese ethics, are Confucian virtues, imported along with the rest of ancient Chinese culture. But even before the irruption of European influences, China and Japan had had such different histories and national temperaments that doctrines originally similar had developed in opposite directions. China has been, since the time of the First Emperor (c. 200 B.C.), a vast unified bureaucratic land empire, having much contact with foreign nations—Annamese, Burmese, Mongols, Tibetans and even Indians. Japan, on the other hand, was an island kingdom, having practically no foreign contact except with Korea and occasionally with China, divided into clans which were constantly at war with each other, developing the virtues and vices of feudal chivalry, but totally unconcerned with economic or administrative problems on a large scale. It was not difficult to adapt the doctrines of Confucius to such a country, because in the time of Confucius China was still feudal and still divided into a number of petty kingdoms, in one of which the sage himself was a courtier, like Goethe at Weimar. But naturally his doctrines underwent a different development from that which befel them in their own country.

In old Japan, for instance, loyalty to the clan chieftain is the virtue one finds most praised; it is this same virtue, with its scope enlarged, which has now become patriotism. Loyalty is a virtue naturally praised where conflicts between roughly equal forces are frequent, as they were in feudal Japan, and are in the modern international world. In China, on the contrary, power seemed so secure, the Empire was so vast and immemorial, that the need for loyalty was not felt. Security bred a different set of virtues, such as courtesy, considerateness, and compromise. Now that security is gone, and the Chinese find themselves plunged into a world of warring bandits, they have difficulty in developing the patriotism, ruthlessness, and unscrupulousness which the situation demands. The Japanese have no such difficulty, having been schooled for just such requirements by their centuries of feudal anarchy. Accordingly we find that Western influence has only accentuated the previous differences between China and Japan: modern Chinese like our thought but dislike our mechanism, while modern Japanese like our mechanism but dislike our thought.

From some points of view, Asia, including Russia, may be regarded as a unity; but from this unity Japan must be excluded. Russia, China, and India contain vast plains given over to peasant agriculture; they are easily swayed by military empires such as that of Jenghis Khan; with modern railways, they could be dominated from a centre more securely than in former times. They could be self-subsistent economically, and invulnerable to outside attack, independent of commerce, and so strong as to be indifferent to progress. All this may come about some day, if Russia happens to develop a great conqueror supported by German organizing ability. But Japan stands outside this order of possibilities. Japan, like Great Britain, must depend upon commerce for power and prosperity. As yet, Japan has not developed the Liberal mentality appropriate to a commercial nation, and is still bent upon

Asiatic conquest and military prowess. This policy brings with it conflicts with China and Russia, which the present weakness of those Powers has enabled Japan, hitherto, to conduct successfully. But both are likely to recover their strength sooner or later, and then the essential weakness of present Japanese policy will become apparent.

It results naturally from the situation that the Japanese have two somewhat incompatible ambitions. On the one hand, they wish to pose as the champions of Asia against the oppression of the white man; on the other hand, they wish to be admitted to equality by the white Powers, and to join in the feast obtained by exploiting the nations that are inefficient in homicide. The former policy should make them friendly to China and India and hostile to the white races; the latter policy has inspired the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and its fruits in the annexation of Korea and the virtual annexation of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. As a member of the League of Nations, of the Big Five at Versailles, and of the Big Three at Washington, Japan appears as one of the ordinary Great Powers; but at other moments Japan aims at establishing a hegemony in Asia by standing for the emancipation from white tyranny of those who happen to be yellow or brown, but not black. Count Okuma, speaking in the Kobe Chamber of Commerce, said: "There are three hundred million natives in India looking to us to rescue them from the thralldom of Great Britain." [56] While in the Far East, I inquired of innumerable Englishmen what advantage our Government could suppose that we derived from the Japanese Alliance. The only answer that seemed to me to supply an intelligible motive was that the Alliance somewhat mitigates the intensity of Japanese anti-British propaganda in India. However that may be, there can be no doubt that the Japanese would like to pose before the Indians as their champions against white tyranny. Mr. Pooley [57] quotes Dr. Ichimura of the Imperial University of Kyoto as giving the following list of white men's sins:—

- (1) White men consider that they alone are human beings, and that all coloured races belong to a lower order of civilization.
- (2) They are extremely selfish, insisting on their own interests, but ignoring the interests of all whom they regard as inferiors.
- (3) They are full of racial pride and conceit. If any concession is made to them they demand and take more.
- (4) They are extreme in everything, exceeding the coloured races in greatness and wickedness.
- (5) They worship money, and believing that money is the basis of everything, will adopt any measures to gain it.

This enumeration of our vices appears to me wholly just. One might have supposed that a nation which saw us in this light would endeavour to be unlike us. That, however, is not the moral which the Japanese draw. They argue, on the contrary, that it is necessary to imitate us as closely as possible. We shall find that, in the long catalogue of crimes committed by Europeans towards China, there is hardly one which has not been equalled by the Japanese. It never occurs to a Japanese, even in his wildest dreams, to think of a Chinaman as an equal. And although he wants the white man to regard himself as an equal, he himself regards Japan as immeasurably superior to any white country. His real desire is to be above the whites, not merely equal with them. Count Okuma put the matter very simply in an address given in 1913:—

The white races regard the world as their property and all other races are greatly their inferiors. They presume to think that the rôle of the whites in the universe is to govern the world as they please. The Japanese were a people who suffered by this policy, and wrongfully, for the Japanese were not inferior to the white races, but fully their equals. The whites were defying destiny, and woe to them. [58]

It would be easy to quote statements by eminent men to the effect that Japan is the greatest of all nations. But the same could be said of the eminent men of all other nations down to Ecuador. It is the acts of the Japanese rather than their rhetoric that must concern us.

The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 concerned Korea, with whose internal affairs China and Japan had mutually agreed not to interfere without first consulting each other. The Japanese claimed that China had infringed this agreement. Neither side was in the right; it was a war

caused by a conflict of rival imperialisms. The Chinese were easily and decisively defeated, and from that day to this have not ventured to oppose any foreign Power by force of arms, except unofficially in the Boxer rebellion. The Japanese were, however, prevented from reaping the fruits of their victory by the intervention of Russia, Germany and France, England holding aloof. The Russians coveted Korea for themselves, the French came in as their allies, and the Germans presumably joined them because of William II's dread of the Yellow Peril. However that may be, this intervention made the Russo-Japanese war inevitable. It would not have mattered much to Japan if the Chinese had established themselves in Korea, but the Russians would have constituted a serious menace. The Russians did not befriend China for nothing; they acquired a lease of Port Arthur and Dalny (now called Dairen), with railway and mining rights in Manchuria. They built the Chinese Eastern Railway, running right through Manchuria, connecting Port Arthur and Peking with the Siberian Railway and Europe. Having accomplished all this, they set to work to penetrate Korea. The Russo-Japanese war would presumably not have taken place but for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, concluded in 1902. In British policy, this Alliance has always had a somewhat minor place, while it has been the corner-stone of Japanese foreign policy, except during the Great War, when the Japanese thought that Germany would win. The Alliance provided that, in the event of either Power being attacked by two Powers at once, the other should come to its assistance. It was, of course, originally inspired by fear of Russia, and was framed with a view to preventing the Russian Government, in the event of war with Japan or England, from calling upon the help of France. In 1902 we were hostile to France and Russia, and Japan remained hostile to Russia until after the Treaty of Portsmouth had been supplemented by the Convention of 1907. The Alliance served its purpose admirably for both parties during the Russo-Japanese war. It kept France from joining Russia, and thereby enabled Japan to acquire command of the sea. It enabled Japan to weaken Russia, thus curbing Russian ambitions, and making it possible for us to conclude an Entente with Russia in 1907. Without this Entente, the Entente concluded with France in 1904 would have been useless, and the alliance which defeated Germany could not have been created.

Without the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan could not have fought Russia alone, but would have had to fight France also. This was beyond her strength at that time. Thus the decisive step in Japan's rise to greatness was due to our support.

The war ended with a qualified victory for Japan. Russia renounced all interference in Korea, surrendered Port Arthur and Dalny (since called Dairen) to the Japanese, and also the railway as far north as Changchun. This part of the railway, with a few branch lines, has since then been called the South Manchurian Railway. From Dairen to Changchun is 437 miles; Changchun is 150 miles south of Harbin. The Japanese use Dairen as the commercial port for Manchuria, reserving Port Arthur for purely naval purposes. In regard to Korea, Japan has conformed strictly to Western models. During the Russo-Japanese war, the Japanese made a treaty guaranteeing the independence and integrity of Korea; in 1910 they annexed Korea; since then they have suppressed Korean nationalists with every imaginable severity. All this establishes their claim to be fully the equals of the white men.

The Japanese not merely hold the South Manchurian Railway, but have a monopoly of railway construction in South Manchuria. As this was practically the beginning of Japan's control of large regions in China by means of railways monopolies, it will be worth while to quote Mr. Pooley's account of the Fa-ku-Men Railway incident,[59] which shows how the South Manchurian monopoly was acquired:—

"In November 1907 the Chinese Government signed a contract with Messrs Pauling and Co. for an extension of the Imperial Chinese railways northwards from Hsin-min-Tung to Fa-ku-Men, the necessary capital for the work being found by the British and Chinese Corporation. Japan protested against the contract, firstly, on an alleged secret protocol annexed to the treaty of Peking, which was alleged to have said that 'the Chinese Government shall not construct any main line in the neighbourhood of or parallel to the South Manchurian Railway, nor any branch line which should be prejudicial to the interests of that railway'; and, secondly, on the Convention of 1902, between China and Russia, that no railway should be built from Hsin-min-Tung without Russian consent. As by the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan

succeeded to the Russian rights, the projected line could not be built without her consent. Her diplomatic communications were exceedingly offensive in tone, and concluded with a notification that, if she was wrong, it was obviously only Russia who could rightfully take her to task!

"The Chinese Government based its action in granting the contract on the clause of the 1898 contract for the construction of the Chung-hon-so to Hsin-min-Tung line, under which China specifically reserved the right to build the Fa-ku-Men line with the aid of the same contractors. Further, although by the Russo-British Note of 1898 British subjects were specifically excluded from participation in railway construction north of the Great Wall, by the Additional Note attached to the Russo-British Note the engagements between the Chinese Government and the British and Chinese Corporation were specifically reserved from the purview of the agreement.

"Even if Japan, as the heir of Russia's assets and liabilities in Manchuria, had been justified in her protest by the Convention of 1902 and by the Russo-British Note of 1899, she had not fulfilled her part of the bargain, namely, the Russian undertaking in the Note to abstain from seeking concession, rights and privileges in the valley of the Yangtze. Her reliance on the secret treaty carried weight with Great Britain, but with no one else, as may be gauged from the records of the State Department at Washington. A later claim advanced by Japan that her action was justified by Article VI of the Treaty of Portsmouth, which assigned to Japan all Russian rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway (South Manchurian Railway) 'with all rights and properties appertaining thereto,' was effectively answered by China's citation of Articles III and IV of the same Treaty. Under the first of these articles it is declared that 'Russia has no territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in Manchuria in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity'; whilst the second is a reciprocal engagement by Russia and Japan 'not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'

"It would be interesting to know whether a refusal to allow China to build a railway on her own territory is or is not an impairment of Chinese sovereignty and whether such a railway as that proposed was not a measure for the 'development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.'

"It is doubtful if even the Russo-Japanese war created as much feeling in China as did the Fa-ku-men incident. Japan's action was of such flagrant dishonesty and such a cynical repudiation of her promises and pledges that her credit received a blow from which it has never since recovered. The abject failure of the British Government to support its subjects' treaty rights was almost as much an eye-opener to the world as the protest from Tokio....

"The methods which had proved so successful in stopping the Fa-ku-men railway were equally successful in forcing the abandonment of other projected railways. Among these were the Chin-chou-Aigun line and the important Antung-Mukden line.[60] The same alleged secret protocol was used equally brutally and successfully for the acquisition of the Newchwang line, and participation in 1909, and eventual acquisition in 1914, of the Chan-Chun-Kirin lines. Subsequently by an agreement with Russia the sixth article of the Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1896 was construed to mean 'the absolute and exclusive rights of administration within the railway zone.'"

Japan's spheres of influence have been subsequently extended to cover the whole of Manchuria and the whole of Shantung—though the latter has been nominally renounced at Washington. By such methods as the above, or by loans to impecunious Chinese authorities, the Japanese have acquired vast railway monopolies wherever their influence has penetrated, and have used the railways as a means of acquiring all real power in the provinces through which they run.

After the Russo-Japanese war, Russia and Japan became firm friends, and agreed to bring pressure on China jointly in any matter affecting Manchuria. Their friendship lasted until the Bolshevik revolution. Russia had entered into extensive obligations to support Japan's claims at the Peace Conference, which of course the Bolsheviks repudiated. Hence the implacable hostility of Japan to Soviet Russia, leading to the support of innumerable White filibusters in

the territory of the Far Eastern Republic, and to friendship with France in all international questions. As soon as there began to be in China a revolutionary party aiming at the overthrow of the Manchus, the Japanese supported it. They have continuously supported either or both sides in Chinese dissensions, as they judged most useful for prolonging civil war and weakening China politically. Before the revolution of 1911, Sun Yat Sen was several times in Japan, and there is evidence that as early as 1900 he was obtaining financial support from some Japanese.[61] When the revolution actually broke out, Japan endeavoured to support the Manchus, but was prevented from doing so effectively by the other Legations. It seems that the policy of Japan at that time, as later, was to prevent the union of North and South, and to confine the revolution to the South. Moreover, reverence for monarchy made Japan unwilling to see the Emperor of China dispossessed and his whole country turned into a Republic, though it would have been agreeable to see him weakened by the loss of some southern provinces. Mr. Pooley gives a good account of the actions of Japan during the Chinese Revolution, of which the following quotation gives the gist[62]:—

It [the Genro] commenced with a statement from Prince Katsura on December 18th [1911], that the time for intervention had arrived, with the usual rider "for the sake of the peace of the Far East." This was followed by a private instruction to M. Ijuin, Japanese Minister in Peking, whereunder the latter on December 23rd categorically informed Yuan-shi-kai that under no circumstances would Japan recognize a republican form of government in China.... In connection with the peace conference held at Shanghai, Mr. Matsui (now Japanese Ambassador to France), a trusted Councillor of the Foreign Office, was dispatched to Peking to back M. Ijuin in the negotiations to uphold the dynasty. Simultaneously, Mr. Denison, Legal Adviser to the Japanese Foreign Office, was sent to Shanghai to negotiate with the rebel leaders. Mr. Matsui's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the Manchus against the rebels, Manchuria against the throne; Mr. Denison's mission was to bargain for Japanese support of the rebels against the throne, recognition by Peking of the Southern Republic against virtually a Japanese protectorate of that Republic and exclusive railway and mining concessions within its borders. The rebels absolutely refused Mr. Denison's offer, and sent the proposed terms to the Russian Minister at Peking, through whom they eventually saw the light of day. Needless to say the Japanese authorities strenuously denied their authenticity. The British Legation, however, supported Yuan Shi-k'ai, against both the Manchus and Sun Yat Sen; and it was the British policy which won the day. Yuan Shi-k'ai became President, and remained so until 1915. He was strongly anti-Japanese, and had, on that ground, been opposed as strongly as Japan dared. His success was therefore a blow to the influence of Japan in China. If the Western Powers had remained free to make themselves felt in the Far East, the course of events would doubtless have been much less favourable to the Japanese; but the war came, and the Japanese saw their chance. How they used it must be told in a separate chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[56]

Quoted by A.M. Pooley, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, Allen & Unwin, 1920, p. 18.

[57]

Op. cit. p. 16 n.

[58]

Pooley, op. cit. p. 17.

[59]

A.M. Pooley, *Japan's Foreign Policies*, pp. 48-51.

[60]

This line was subsequently built by the Japanese.

[61]

Pooley, op. cit., pp. 67-8.

[62]

Page 66.

Russell, Bertrand. *The Problem of China* [ID D5122]. (8)

Chapter VIII

Japan and China during the war

The most urgent problem in China's relations with foreign powers is Japanese aggression. Originally Japan was less powerful than China, but after 1868 the Japanese rapidly learnt from us whatever we had to teach in the way of skilful homicide, and in 1894 they resolved to test their new armaments upon China, just as Bismarck tested his on Denmark. The Chinese Government preserved its traditional haughtiness, and appears to have been quite unaware of the defeat in store for it. The question at issue was Korea, over which both Powers claimed suzerainty. At that time there would have been no reason for an impartial neutral to take one side rather than the other. The Japanese were quickly and completely victorious, but were obliged to fight Russia before obtaining secure possession of Korea. The war with Russia (1904-5) was fought chiefly in Manchuria, which the Russians had gained as a reward for befriending China. Port Arthur and Southern Manchuria up to Mukden were acquired by the Japanese as a result of the Russo-Japanese war; the rest of Manchuria came under Japanese control as a result of Russia's collapse after the Great War.

The nominal sovereignty in Manchuria is still Chinese; the Chinese have the civil administration, an army, and the appointment of the Viceroy. But the Japanese also have troops in Manchuria; they have the railways, the industrial enterprises, and the complete economic and military control. The Chinese Viceroy could not remain in power a week if he were displeasing to the Japanese, which, however, he takes care not to be. (See Note A.) The same situation was being brought about in Shantung.

Shantung brings us to what Japan did in the Great War. In 1914, China could easily have been induced to join the Allies and to set to work to turn the Germans out of Kiao-Chow, but this did not suit the Japanese, who undertook the work themselves and insisted upon the Chinese remaining neutral (until 1917). Having captured Tsing-tau, they presented to the Chinese the famous Twenty-One Demands, which gave the Chinese Question its modern form. These demands, as originally presented in January 1915, consisted of five groups. The first dealt with Shantung, demanding that China should agree in advance to whatever terms Japan might ultimately make with Germany as regarded this Chinese province, that the Japanese should have the right to construct certain specified railways, and that certain ports (unspecified) should be opened to trade; also that no privileges in Shantung should be granted to any Power other than Japan. The second group concerns South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, and demands what is in effect a protectorate, with control of railways, complete economic freedom for Japanese enterprise, and exclusion of all other foreign industrial enterprise. The third group gives Japan a monopoly of the mines and iron and steel works in a certain region of the Yangtze,[63] where we claim a sphere of influence. The fourth group consists of a single demand, that China shall not cede any harbour, bay or island to any Power except Japan. The fifth group, which was the most serious, demanded that Japanese political, financial, and military advisers should be employed by the Chinese Government; that the police in important places should be administered by Chinese and Japanese jointly, and should be largely Japanese in personnel; that China should purchase from Japan at least 50 per cent. of her munitions, or obtain them from a Sino-Japanese arsenal to be established in China, controlled by Japanese experts and employing Japanese material; that Japan should have the right to construct certain railways in and near the Yangtze valley; that Japan should have industrial priority in Fukien (opposite Formosa); and finally that the Japanese should have the right of missionary propaganda in China, to spread the knowledge of their admirable ethics.

These demands involved, as is obvious, a complete loss of Chinese independence, the closing of important areas to the commerce and industry of Europe and America, and a special attack upon the British position in the Yangtze. We, however, were so busy with the war that we had no time to think of keeping ourselves alive. Although the demands constituted a grave menace to our trade, although the Far East was in an uproar about them, although America took drastic diplomatic action against them, Mr. Lloyd George never heard of them until they were explained to him by the Chinese Delegation at Versailles.[64] He had no time to find out what

Japan wanted, but had time to conclude a secret agreement with Japan in February 1917, promising that whatever Japan wanted in Shantung we would support at the Peace Conference.[65] By the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Japan was bound to communicate the Twenty-one Demands to the British Government. In fact, Japan communicated the first four groups, but not the fifth and worst, thus definitely breaking the treaty;[66] but this also, one must suppose, Mr. Lloyd George only discovered by chance when he got to Versailles.

China negotiated with Japan about the Twenty-one Demands, and secured certain modifications, but was finally compelled to yield by an ultimatum. There was a modification as regards the Hanyehping mines on the Yangtze, presumably to please us; and the specially obnoxious fifth group was altered into an exchange of studiously vague Notes.[67] In this form, the demands were accepted by China on May 9, 1915. The United States immediately notified Japan that they could not recognize the agreement. At that time America was still neutral, and was therefore still able to do something to further the objects for which we were supposed to be fighting, such as protection of the weaker nations. In 1917, however, after America had entered the war for self-determination, it became necessary to placate Japan, and in November of that year the Ishii-Lansing Agreement was concluded, by which "the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly for the parts to which her possessions are contiguous." The rest of the agreement (which is long) consists of empty verbiage.[68]

I come now to the events leading up to China's entry into the war.[69] In this matter, the lead was taken by America so far as severing diplomatic relations was concerned, but passed to Japan as regards the declaration of war. It will be remembered that, when America broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, President Wilson called upon all neutrals to do likewise. Dr. Paul S. Reinsch, United States Minister in Peking, proceeded to act with vigour in accordance with this policy. He induced China first, on February 9, 1917, to send a Note of expostulation to Germany on the subject of the submarine campaign; then, on March 14th, to break off diplomatic relations. The further step of declaring war was not taken until August 14th. The intrigues connected with these events deserve some study.

In view of the fact that the Japanese were among the Allies, the Chinese had not any strong tendency to take sides against Germany. The English, French and Russians had always desired the participation of China (for reasons which I shall explain presently), and there appears to have been some suggestion, in the early days of the war, that China should participate in return for our recognizing Yuan Shi-k'ai as Emperor. These suggestions, however, fell through owing to the opposition of Japan, based partly on hostility to Yuan Shi-k'ai, partly on the fear that China would be protected by the Allies if she became a belligerent. When, in November 1915, the British, French and Russian Ambassadors in Tokyo requested Japan to join in urging China to join the Allies, Viscount Ishii said that "Japan considered developments in China as of paramount interest to her, and she must keep a firm hand there. Japan could not regard with equanimity the organization of an efficient Chinese army such as would be required for her active participation in the war, nor could Japan fail to regard with uneasiness a liberation of the economic activities of 400,000,000 people." [70] Accordingly the proposal lapsed. It must be understood that throughout the war the Japanese were in a position to blackmail the Allies, because their sympathies were with Germany, they believed Germany would win, and they filled their newspapers with scurrilous attacks on the British, accusing them of cowardice and military incompetence.[71]

But when America severed diplomatic relations with Germany, the situation for China was changed. America was not bound to subservience to Japan, as we were; America was not one of the Allies; and America had always been China's best friend. Accordingly, the Chinese were willing to take the advice of America, and proceeded to sever diplomatic relations with Germany in March 1917. Dr. Reinsch was careful to make no promises to the Chinese, but of course he held out hopes. The American Government, at that time, could honestly hold out hopes, because it was ignorant of the secret treaties and agreements by which the Allies were bound. The Allies, however, can offer no such excuse for having urged China to take the further step of declaring war. Russia, France, and Great Britain had all sold China's rights to

secure the continued support of Japan.

In May 1916, the Japanese represented to the Russians that Germany was inviting Japan to make a separate peace. In July 1916, Russia and Japan concluded a secret treaty, subsequently published by the Bolsheviks. This treaty constituted a separate alliance, binding each to come to the assistance of the other in any war, and recognizing that "the vital interests of one and the other of them require the safeguarding of China from the political domination of any third Power whatsoever, having hostile designs against Russia or Japan." The last article provided that "the present agreement must remain profoundly secret except to both of the High Contracting Parties." [72] That is to say, the treaty was not communicated to the other Allies, or even to Great Britain, in spite of Article 3 of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which provides that "The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into a separate agreement with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement," one of which objects was the preservation of equal opportunity for all Powers in China and of the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire.

On February 16, 1917, at the very time when America was urging China to sever diplomatic relations with Germany, we concluded an agreement with Japan containing the following words:—

His Britannic Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government, for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in the eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator.

The French attitude about Shantung, at the same time, is indicated by Notes which passed between France and Japan at Tokyo. [73] On February 19th, Baron Motono sent a communication to the French and Russian Ambassadors stating, among other things, that "the Imperial Japanese Government proposes to demand from Germany at the time of the peace negotiations, the surrender of the territorial rights and special interests Germany possessed before the war in Shantung and the islands belonging to her situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." The French Ambassador, on March 2nd, replied as follows:—

The Government of the French Republic is disposed to give the Japanese Government its accord in regulating at the time of the Peace Negotiations questions vital to Japan concerning Shantung and the German islands on the Pacific north of the equator. It also agrees to support the demands of the Imperial Japanese Government for the surrender of the rights Germany possessed before the war in this Chinese province and these islands.

M. Briand demands on the other hand that Japan give its support to obtain from China the breaking of its diplomatic relations with Germany, and that it give this act desirable significance. The consequences in China should be the following:

First, handing passports to the German diplomatic agents and consuls;

Second, the obligation of all under German jurisdiction to leave Chinese territory;

Third, the internment of German ships in Chinese ports and the ultimate requisition of these ships in order to place them at the disposition of the Allies, following the example of Italy and Portugal;

Fourth, requisition of German commercial houses, established in China; forfeiting the rights of Germany in the concessions she possesses in certain ports of China.

The Russian reply to Baron Motono's Note to the French and Russian Ambassadors, dated March 5, 1917, was as follows:—

In reply to the Note of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under the date of February 19th last, the Russian Embassy is charged with giving the Japanese Government the assurance that it can entirely count on the support of the Imperial Government of Russia with regard to its desiderata concerning the eventual surrender to Japan of the rights belonging to Germany in Shantung and of the German Islands, occupied by the Japanese forces, in the Pacific Ocean to the north of the Equator. [74]

It will be observed that, unlike England and France, Russia demands no quid pro quo,

doubtless owing to the secret treaty concluded in the previous year.

After these agreements, Japan saw no further objection to China's participation in the war. The chief inducement held out to China was the hope of recovering Shantung; but as there was now no danger of this hope being realized, Japan was willing that America, in more or less honest ignorance, should unofficially use this hope for the persuasion of the Chinese. It is true that Japan had reason to fear America until the last days of the Peace Conference, but this fear was considerably diminished by the conclusion of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement in November 1917.

Meanwhile Japan had discovered that the question of China's entry into the war could be used to increase internal strife in China, which has been one of the aims of Japanese policy ever since the beginning of the revolutionary movement.[75] If the Chinese had not been interfered with at this time, there was some prospect of their succeeding in establishing a stable democratic government. Yuan was dead, and his successor in the Presidency, Li Yuan Hung, was a genuine constitutionalist. He reassembled the Parliament which Yuan had dismissed, and the work of drafting a permanent constitution was resumed. The President was opposed to severing diplomatic relations, and, of course, still more to declaring war. The Prime Minister, Tuan Chih-jui, a militarist, was strongly in favour of war. He and his Cabinet persuaded a considerable majority of both Houses of the Chinese Parliament to side with them on the question of severing diplomatic relations, and the President, as in duty bound, gave way on this issue.

On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It was President Wilson's summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of national unity was more important than entry into the war, and suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never have become acute but for President's Wilson's action, had been used by the Japanese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to instigate the Chinese militarists to unconstitutional action. Sun Yat Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration of war; Sun's reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Constitution a declaration of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to compel him to dissolve Parliament unconstitutionally. The bulk of the Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of constitutional government. After these various illegalities, the military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their number, who, in July, effected a five days' restoration of the Manchu Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient unconstitutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and against militarism.

Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was duly carried out—not only public property, but private property also, so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours' notice; no degree of hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from

the merciless persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have been much greater.

The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without passion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchcock, when the war was over, after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of German-owned property here. The Treaty validates all that." [77] The European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to enter the war for righteousness.

We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration of war. What Japan gained was somewhat different.

The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, was completely dependent upon Japan, and could do nothing to resist Japanese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the war, and had sold China to Japan in return for Japanese neutrality—for Japan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were concluded between China and Japan, of which the text, never officially published, is given by Millard. [78] By these agreements the Japanese were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.

After this the Japanese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000, [79] i.e., about £25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of victory. Unfortunately for Japan, the side on which Japan was fighting in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies of Europe and America became available for holding Japan in check. For various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were compelled to support Japan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed everything to his League of Nations, which the Japanese would not have joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on this subject in Mr. Lansing's account of the negotiations is one of the most interesting in his book. [80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of Japan, all her rights, title, and privileges" in the province of Shantung. [81] Although President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China, [82] refused to sign the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.

Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public opinion on the anti-Japanese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 was in the hands of the pro-Japanese An Fu party, but they were forcibly ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu leaders took refuge in the Japanese Legation, and since then the Peking Government has ventured to be less subservient to Japan, hoping always for American support. Japan did everything possible to consolidate her position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge

that America might re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference was announced, Japan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a view to having the question settled before the opening of the Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory concessions offered by Japan, and insisted on almost unconditional evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with America. Some concessions were made to Japan, but they will not amount to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years. On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington Conference.

There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great importance in the Far East—I mean the question of Russia. It was considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence. Their existence constitutes an embarrassment to America, because in a quarrel with Japan the United States would unavoidably find themselves in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of Japan towards Russia has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after a time all withdrew except the Japanese. All Siberia east of Lake Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the Japanese have launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks—Semenov, Horvath, Ungern, etc. These have all been defeated, but the Japanese remain in military occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.

In the early days of the Bolshevik régime the Russians lost Northern Manchuria, which is now controlled by Japan. A board consisting partly of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon all Americans who have Siberian interests. If Japan were engaged in a war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia's former position in Manchuria. Already, according to The Times correspondent in Peking, Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.

The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset impartially the ambitions of Japan, Great Britain and America.[83] For America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far East, China will be Americanized, and though the shell of political freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet impossible to say.

FOOTNOTES:

[63]

On this subject George Gleason, *What Shall I Think of Japan?* pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people. The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections. The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand miners dug 690,000 tons. Japanese have estimated that the vein is capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five centuries...."

"Thus did Japan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special trade domain."

Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this matter is given by Mr. Coleman, *The Far East Unveiled*, chaps. x.-xiv. See below, pp. 232-3.

[64]

See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, October 20, 1921.

[65]

The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, *Japan's Foreign Policies*, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.

[66]

On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now Japanese Ambassador to the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can. Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably foolish" (*The Far East Unveiled*, p. 73).

[67]

The demands in their original and revised forms, with the negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.

[68]

The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung question are printed in S.G. Cheng's *Modern China*, Appendix ii, iii and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, *op. cit.* pp. 214-6.

[69]

Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and official history of this matter. They are: *An American Diplomat in China*, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; *Democracy and the Eastern Question*, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and *China, Captive or Free?* by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director of International Institute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.

[70]

Millard, p. 99.

[71]

See Pooley, *Japan's Foreign Policies*, pp. 23 ff; Coleman, *The Far East Unveiled*, chap. v., and Millard, chap. iii.

[72]

Millard, pp. 64-66.

[73]

Reid, *op. cit.* pp. 114-5; Cheng, *op. cit.*, pp. 343-6.

[74]

See Appendix III of Cheng's *Modern China*, which contains this note (p. 346) as well as the other "documents relative to the negotiations between Japan and the Allied Powers as to the

disposal of the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea Islands north of the Equator."

[75]

The story of the steps leading up to China's declaration of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.

[76]

Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.

[77]

Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, "Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything except money-grubbing.

[78]

Appendix C, pp. 421-4.

[79]

A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an article on "China's Finances in 1918" in *China in 1918*, published early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the comments appear also in Putnam Weale's *The Truth about China and Japan*.

[80]

Mr. Lansing's book, in so far as it deals with Japanese questions, is severely criticized from a Japanese point of view in Dr. Y. Soyeda's pamphlet "Shantung Question and Japanese Case," League of Nations Association of Japan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda's arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not Japanese.

[81]

See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng's *Modern China*, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.

[82]

This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau's *China Awakened* (Macmillan, 1922) chap. ix., "The Student Movement."

[83]

"Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring masses and to make demands consistent with those rights" (*Daily Herald*, December 22, 1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian labouring masses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs of the capitalists. [Russ2]

1922.01.09-10 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (9)

Chapter IX

The Washington Conference

The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at Washington, between the Chinese and Japanese, have somewhat modified the Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their effect upon the Japanese position in Siberia.

In the first place, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has apparently been brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact between America, Great Britain, France and Japan. Within this general alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of America and Great Britain against France and Japan, the former standing for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of Japan. It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of Wei-hai-wei—a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that date.

One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between America and Japan very difficult, unless we were allied with America. Without a naval base somewhere near Japan, America could hardly bring naval force to bear on the Japanese Navy. It had been the intention of the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a first-class naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve the peace with Japan.

Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the Japanese have insisted that a certain number of Japanese should be employed in the Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, though the Chinese post is excellent and the Japanese is notoriously one of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the Japanese have put their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels sent through their Post Office. The development of the Japanese importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature of their penetration of China.[84]

Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.

From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end of 1914, the Japanese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the question afresh.

At first, however, it seemed as if the Japanese would have things all their own way. The

Chinese wished to raise the question before the Conference, while the Japanese wished to settle it in direct negotiation with China. This point was important, because, ever since the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the Japanese have tried to get the Powers to recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal Japanese Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary to establish the principle that the Japanese should not be interfered with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to the Japanese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between the Japanese and Chinese. The Japanese victory on this point, however, was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no longer prepared to back up the Japanese whole-heartedly, as in the old days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly urged Japan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between China and Japan.

By this Treaty, the Chinese recover everything in Shantung, except the private property of Japanese subjects, and certain restrictions as regards the railway. The railway was the great difficulty in the negotiations, since, so long as the Japanese could control that, they would have the province at their mercy. The Chinese offered to buy back the railway at once, having raised about half the money as a result of a patriotic movement among their merchants. This, however, the Japanese refused to agree to. What was finally done was that the Chinese were compelled to borrow the money from the Japanese Government to be repaid in fifteen years, with an option of repayment in five years. The railway was valued at 53,400,000 gold marks, plus the costs involved in repairs or improvements incurred by Japan, less deterioration; and it was to be handed over to China within nine months of the signature of the treaty. Until the purchase price, borrowed from Japan, is repaid, the Japanese retain a certain degree of control over the railway: a Japanese traffic manager is to be appointed, and two accountants, one Chinese and the other Japanese, under the control of a Chinese President.

It is clear that, on paper, this gives the Chinese everything five years hence. Whether things will work out so depends upon whether, five years hence, any Power is prepared to force Japan to keep her word. As both Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour strongly urged the Chinese to agree to this compromise, it must be assumed that America and Great Britain have some responsibility for seeing that it is properly carried out. In that case, we may perhaps expect that in the end China will acquire complete control of the Shantung railway.

On the whole, it must be said that China did better at Washington than might have been expected. As regards the larger aspects of the new international situation arising out of the Conference, I shall deal with them in the next chapter. But in our present connection it is necessary to consider certain Far Eastern questions not discussed at Washington, since the mere fact that they were not discussed gave them a new form.

The question of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was not raised at Washington. It may therefore be assumed that Japan's position there is secure until such time as the Chinese, or the Russians, or both together, are strong enough to challenge it. America, at any rate, will not raise the question unless friction occurs on some other issue. (See Appendix.)

The Siberian question also was not settled. Therefore Japan's ambitions in Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces will presumably remain unchecked except in so far as the Russians unaided are able to check them. There is a chronic state of semi-war between the Japanese and the Far Eastern Republic, and there seems no reason why it should end in any near future. The Japanese from time to time announce that they have decided to withdraw, but they simultaneously send fresh troops. A conference between them and the Chita Government has been taking place at Dairen, and from time to time announcements have appeared to the effect that an agreement has been reached or was about to be reached. But on April 16th (1922) the Japanese broke up the Conference. The Times of April 27th contains both the Japanese and

the Russian official accounts of this break up. The Japanese statement is given in The Times as follows:—

The Japanese Embassy communicates the text of a statement given out on April 20th by the Japanese Foreign Office on the Dairen Conference.

It begins by recalling that in response to the repeatedly expressed desire of the Chita Government, the Japanese Government decided to enter into negotiations. The first meeting took place on August 26th last year.

The Japanese demands included the non-enforcement of communistic principles in the Republic against Japanese, the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda, the abolition of menacing military establishments, the adoption of the principle of the open door in Siberia, and the removal of industrial restrictions on foreigners. Desiring speedily to conclude an agreement, so that the withdrawal of troops might be carried out as soon as possible, Japan met the wishes of Chita as far as practicable. Though, from the outset, Chita pressed for a speedy settlement of the Nicolaievsk affair, Japan eventually agreed to take up the Nicolaievsk affair immediately after the conclusion of the basis agreement. She further assured Chita that in settling the affair Japan had no intention of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, and that the troops would be speedily withdrawn from Saghalin after the settlement of the affair, and that Chita's wishes in regard to the transfer of property now in the custody of the Japanese authorities would be met.

The 11th Division of the troops in Siberia was originally to be relieved during April, but if the Dairen Conference had progressed satisfactorily, the troops, instead of being relieved, would have been sent home. Japan therefore intimated to Chita that should the basis agreement be concluded within a reasonable period these troops would be immediately withdrawn, and proposed the signature of the agreement by the middle of April, so that the preparations for the relief of the said division might be dispensed with. Thereupon Chita not only proposed the immediate despatch of Chita troops to Vladivostok without waiting for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops, but urged that Japan should fix a time-limit for the complete withdrawal of all her troops.

Japan informed Chita that the withdrawal would be carried out within a short period after the conclusion of the detailed arrangements, giving a definite period as desired, and at the same time she proposed the signing of the agreement drawn up by Japan.

Whereas Japan thus throughout the negotiations maintained a sincere and conciliatory attitude, the Chita delegates entirely ignored the spirit in which she offered concessions and brought up one demand after another, thereby trying to gain time. Not only did they refuse to entertain the Japanese proposals, but declared that they would drop the negotiations and return to Chita immediately. The only conclusion from this attitude of the Chita Government is that they lacked a sincere effort to bring the negotiations to fruition, and the Japanese Government instructed its delegates to quit Dairen.

The Russian official account is given by The Times immediately below the above. It is as follows:—

On April 16th the Japanese broke up the Dairen Conference with the Far Eastern Republic. The Far Eastern Delegation left Dairen. Agreement was reached between the Japanese and Russian Delegations on March 30th on all points of the general treaty, but when the question of military evacuation was reached the Japanese Delegation proposed a formula permitting continued Japanese intervention.

Between March 30th and April 15th the Japanese dragged on the negotiations re military convention, reproaching the Far Eastern delegates for mistrusting the Japanese Government. The Russian Delegation declared that the general treaty would be signed only upon obtaining precise written guarantees of Japanese military evacuation.

On April 15th the Japanese Delegation presented an ultimatum demanding a reply from the Far Eastern representatives in half an hour as to whether they were willing to sign a general agreement with new Japanese conditions forbidding an increase in the Far Eastern Navy and retaining a Japanese military mission on Far Eastern territory. Re evacuation, the Japanese presented a Note promising evacuation if "not prevented by unforeseen circumstances." The Russian Delegation rejected this ultimatum. On April 16th the Japanese declared the Dairen

Conference broken up. The Japanese delegates left for Tokyo, and Japanese troops remain in the zone established by the agreement of March 29th.

Readers will believe one or other of these official statements according to their prejudices, while those who wish to think themselves impartial will assume that the truth lies somewhere between the two. For my part, I believe the Russian statement. But even from the Japanese communiqué it is evident that what wrecked the Conference was Japanese unwillingness to evacuate Vladivostok and the Maritime Province; all that they were willing to give was a vague promise to evacuate some day, which would have had no more value than Mr. Gladstone's promise to evacuate Egypt.

It will be observed that the Conference went well for Chita until the Senate had ratified the Washington treaties. After that, the Japanese felt that they had a free hand in all Far Eastern matters not dealt with at Washington. The practical effect of the Washington decisions will naturally be to make the Japanese seek compensation, at the expense of the Far Eastern Republic, for what they have had to surrender in China. This result was to be expected, and was presumably foreseen by the assembled peacemakers.[85]

It will be seen that the Japanese policy involves hostility to Russia. This is no doubt one reason for the friendship between Japan and France. Another reason is that both are the champions of nationalistic capitalism, as against the international capitalism aimed at by Messrs. Morgan and Mr. Lloyd George, because France and Japan look to their armaments as the chief source of their income, while England and America look rather to their commerce and industry. It would be interesting to compute how much coal and iron France and Japan have acquired in recent years by means of their armies. England and America already possessed coal and iron; hence their different policy. An uninvited delegation from the Far Eastern Republic at Washington produced documents tending to show that France and Japan came there as secret allies. Although the authenticity of the documents was denied, most people, apparently, believed them to be genuine. In any case, it is to be expected that France and Japan will stand together, now that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance has come to an end and the Anglo-French Entente has become anything but cordial. Thus it is to be feared that Washington and Genoa have sown the seeds of future wars—unless, by some miracle, the "civilized" nations should grow weary of suicide.

FOOTNOTES:

[84]

See e.g. chap. viii. of Millard's *Democracy and the Eastern Question*.

[85]

I ought perhaps to confess that I have a bias in favour of the Far Eastern Republic, owing to my friendship for their diplomatic mission which was in Peking while I was there. I never met a more high-minded set of men in any country. And although they were communists, and knew the views that I had expressed on Russia, they showed me great kindness. I do not think, however, that these courtesies have affected my view of the dispute between Chita and Tokyo.

Russell, Bertrand. The Problem of China [ID D5122]. (10)

Chapter X

Present forces and tendencies in the Far East

The Far Eastern situation is so complex that it is very difficult to guess what will be the ultimate outcome of the Washington Conference, and still more difficult to know what outcome we ought to desire. I will endeavour to set forth the various factors each in turn, not simplifying the issues, but rather aiming at producing a certain hesitancy which I regard as desirable in dealing with China. I shall consider successively the interests and desires of America, Japan, Russia and China, with an attempt, in each case, to gauge what parts of these various interests and desires are compatible with the welfare of mankind as a whole.[86] I begin with America, as the leading spirit in the Conference and the dominant Power in the world. American public opinion is in favour of peace, and at the same time profoundly persuaded that America is wise and virtuous while all other Powers are foolish and wicked. The pessimistic half of this opinion I do not desire to dispute, but the optimistic half is more open to question. Apart from peace, American public opinion believes in commerce and industry, Protestant morality, athletics, hygiene, and hypocrisy, which may be taken as the main ingredients of American and English Kultur. Every American I met in the Far East, with one exception, was a missionary for American Kultur, whether nominally connected with Christian Missions or not. I ought to explain that when I speak of hypocrisy I do not mean the conscious hypocrisy practised by Japanese diplomats in their dealings with Western Powers, but that deeper, unconscious kind which forms the chief strength of the Anglo-Saxons. Everybody knows Labouchere's comment on Mr. Gladstone, that like other politicians he always had a card up his sleeve, but, unlike the others, he thought the Lord had put it there. This attitude, which has been characteristic of England, has been somewhat chastened among ourselves by the satire of men like Bernard Shaw; but in America it is still just as prevalent and self-confident as it was with us fifty years ago. There is much justification for such an attitude. Gladstonian England was more of a moral force than the England of the present day; and America is more of a moral force at this moment than any other Power (except Russia). But the development from Gladstone's moral fervour to the cynical imperialism of his successors is one which we can now see to be inevitable; and a similar development is bound to take place in the United States. Therefore, when we wish to estimate the desirability of extending the influence of the United States, we have to take account of this almost certain future loss of idealism.

Nor is idealism in itself always an unmixed blessing to its victims. It is apt to be incompatible with tolerance, with the practice of live-and-let-live, which alone can make the world endurable for its less pugnacious and energetic inhabitants. It is difficult for art or the contemplative outlook to exist in an atmosphere of bustling practical philanthropy, as difficult as it would be to write a book in the middle of a spring cleaning. The ideals which inspire a spring-cleaning are useful and valuable in their place, but when they are not enriched by any others they are apt to produce a rather bleak and uncomfortable sort of world.

All this may seem, at first sight, somewhat remote from the Washington Conference, but it is essential if we are to take a just view of the friction between America and Japan. I wish to admit at once that, hitherto, America has been the best friend of China, and Japan the worst enemy. It is also true that America is doing more than any other Power to promote peace in the world, while Japan would probably favour war if there were a good prospect of victory. On these grounds, I am glad to see our Government making friends with America and abandoning the militaristic Anglo-Japanese Alliance. But I do not wish this to be done in a spirit of hostility to Japan, or in a blind reliance upon the future good intentions of America. I shall therefore try to state Japan's case, although, for the present, I think it weaker than America's.

It should be observed, in the first place, that the present American policy, both in regard to China and in regard to naval armaments, while clearly good for the world, is quite as clearly in line with American interests. To take the naval question first: America, with a navy equal to our own, will be quite strong enough to make our Admiralty understand that it is out of the question to go to war with America, so that America will have as much control of the seas as

there is any point in having.[87] The Americans are adamant about the Japanese Navy, but very pliant about French submarines, which only threaten us. Control of the seas being secured, limitation of naval armaments merely decreases the cost, and is an equal gain to all parties, involving no sacrifice of American interests. To take next the question of China: American ambitions in China are economic, and require only that the whole country should be open to the commerce and industry of the United States. The policy of spheres of influence is obviously less advantageous, to so rich and economically strong a country as America, than the policy of the universal Open Door. We cannot therefore regard America's liberal policy as regards China and naval armaments as any reason for expecting a liberal policy when it goes against self-interest.

In fact, there is evidence that when American interests or prejudices are involved liberal and humanitarian principles have no weight whatever. I will cite two instances: Panama tolls, and Russian trade. In the matter of the Panama canal, America is bound by treaty not to discriminate against our shipping; nevertheless a Bill has been passed by a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives, making a discrimination in favour of American shipping. Even if the President ultimately vetoes it, its present position shows that at least two-thirds of the House of Representatives share Bethmann-Hollweg's view of treaty obligations. And as for trade with Russia, England led the way, while American hostility to the Bolsheviks remained implacable, and to this day Gompers, in the name of American labour, thunders against "shaking hands with murder." It cannot therefore be said that America is always honourable or humanitarian or liberal. The evidence is that America adopts these virtues when they suit national or rather financial interests, but fails to perceive their applicability in other cases.

I could of course have given many other instances, but I content myself with one, because it especially concerns China. I quote from an American weekly, *The Freeman* (November 23, 1921, p. 244):—

On November 1st, the Chinese Government failed to meet an obligation of \$5,600,000, due and payable to a large banking-house in Chicago. The State Department had facilitated the negotiation of this loan in the first instance; and now, in fulfilment of the promise of Governmental support in an emergency, an official cablegram was launched upon Peking, with intimations that continued defalcation might have a most serious effect upon the financial and political rating of the Chinese Republic. In the meantime, the American bankers of the new international consortium had offered to advance to the Chinese Government an amount which would cover the loan in default, together with other obligations already in arrears, and still others which will fall due on December 1st; and this proposal had also received the full and energetic support of the Department of State. That is to say, American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having co-operated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.

It should be added that the Peking Government, after repeated negotiations, had decided not to accept loans from the consortium on the terms on which they were offered. In my opinion, there were very adequate grounds for this decision. As the same article in the *Freeman* concludes:—

If this plan is put through, it will make the bankers of the consortium the virtual owners of China; and among these bankers, those of the United States are the only ones who are prepared to take full advantage of the situation.

There is some reason to think that, at the beginning of the Washington Conference, an attempt was made by the consortium banks, with the connivance of the British but not of the American Government, to establish, by means of the Conference, some measure of international control over China. In the *Japan Weekly Chronicle* for November 17, 1921 (p. 725), in a telegram headed "International Control of China," I find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*: "We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we

thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any Conference plan to offer China international aid." He adds: "International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misinterpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing through." These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the Japan Weekly Chronicle—which, by the way, I consider the best weekly paper in the world—I find the following (p. 728):—Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: "The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Government refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it." Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying: "Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantastic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the Conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny."

Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China's best friends as "this man Simpson." I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth. But to any European radical Mr. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which is on the verge of bankruptcy, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago Bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs. Morgan are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case, thereby greatly increasing the suspicions of the Chinese.

In the New Republic for November 30, 1921, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled "A New Technique of Peace," which I fear is prophetic even if not wholly applicable at the moment when it was written. I expect to see, if the Americans are successful in the Far East, China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government which the West will consider good substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated proletariat; the spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such objets d'art as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society. All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have "good" government. The definition of the word "good" is difficult, but the definition of "good government" is as easy as A.B.C.: it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists.

The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation; all great nations need such a period, from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on "good government," but fortunately abstained. Now-a-days, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank God that they are not as this publican.

So much by way of criticism by America; we come now to the defence of Japan.

Japan's relations with the Powers are not of her own seeking; all that Japan asked of the world was to be let alone. This, however, did not suit the white nations, among whom America led the way. It was a United States squadron under Commodore Perry that first made Japan aware of Western aggressiveness. Very soon it became evident that there were only two ways of dealing with the white man, either to submit to him, or to fight him with his own weapons. Japan adopted the latter course, and developed a modern army trained by the Germans, a modern navy modelled on the British, modern machinery derived from America, and modern morals copied from the whole lot. Everybody except the British was horrified, and called the Japanese "yellow monkeys." However, they began to be respected when they defeated Russia, and after they had captured Tsing-tao and half-enslaved China they were admitted to equality with the other Great Powers at Versailles. The consideration shown to them by the West is due to their armaments alone; none of their other good qualities would have saved them from being regarded as "niggers."

People who have never been outside Europe can hardly imagine the intensity of the colour prejudice that white men develop when brought into contact with any different pigmentation. I have seen Chinese of the highest education, men as cultured as (say) Dean Inge, treated by greasy white men as if they were dirt, in a way in which, at home, no Duke would venture to treat a crossing-sweeper. The Japanese are not treated in this way, because they have a powerful army and navy. The fact that white men, as individuals, no longer dare to bully individual Japanese, is important as a beginning of better relations towards the coloured races in general. If the Japanese, by defeat in war, are prevented from retaining the status of a Great Power, the coloured races in general will suffer, and the tottering insolence of the white man will be re-established. Also the world will have lost the last chance of the survival of civilizations of a different type from that of the industrial West.

The civilization of Japan, in its material aspect, is similar to that of the West, though industrialism, as yet, is not very developed. But in its mental aspect it is utterly unlike the West, particularly the Anglo-Saxon West. Worship of the Mikado, as an actually divine being, is successfully taught in every village school, and provides the popular support for nationalism. The nationalistic aims of Japan are not merely economic; they are also dynastic and territorial in a mediæval way. The morality of the Japanese is not utilitarian, but intensely idealistic. Filial piety is the basis, and includes patriotism, because the Mikado is the father of his people. The Japanese outlook has the same kind of superstitious absence of realism that one finds in thirteenth-century theories as to the relations of the Emperor and the Pope. But in Europe the Emperor and the Pope were different people, and their quarrels promoted freedom of thought; in Japan, since 1868, they are combined in one sacred person, and there are no internal conflicts to produce doubt.

Japan, unlike China, is a religious country. The Chinese doubt a proposition until it is proved to be true; the Japanese believe it until it is proved to be false. I do not know of any evidence against the view that the Mikado is divine. Japanese religion is essentially nationalistic, like that of the Jews in the Old Testament. Shinto, the State religion, has been in the main invented since 1868,[88] and propagated by education in schools. (There was of course an old Shinto religion, but most of what constitutes modern Shintoism is new.) It is not a religion which aims at being universal, like Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam; it is a tribal religion, only intended to appeal to the Japanese. Buddhism subsists side by side with it, and is believed by the same people. It is customary to adopt Shinto rites for marriages and Buddhist rites for funerals, because Buddhism is considered more suitable for mournful occasions. Although Buddhism is a universal religion, its Japanese form is intensely national,[89] like the Church of England. Many of its priests marry, and in some temples the priesthood is hereditary. Its dignitaries remind one vividly of English Archdeacons.

The Japanese, even when they adopt industrial methods, do not lose their sense of beauty. One hears complaints that their goods are shoddy, but they have a remarkable power of adapting artistic taste to industrialism. If Japan were rich it might produce cities as beautiful as Venice, by methods as modern as those of New York. Industrialism has hitherto brought with it elsewhere a rising tide of ugliness, and any nation which can show us how to make this

tide recede deserves our gratitude.

The Japanese are earnest, passionate, strong-willed, amazingly hard working, and capable of boundless sacrifice to an ideal. Most of them have the correlative defects: lack of humour, cruelty, intolerance, and incapacity for free thought. But these defects are by no means universal; one meets among them a certain number of men and women of quite extraordinary excellence. And there is in their civilization as a whole a degree of vigour and determination which commands the highest respect.

The growth of industrialism in Japan has brought with it the growth of Socialism and the Labour movement.[90] In China, the intellectuals are often theoretical Socialists, but in the absence of Labour organizations there is as yet little room for more than theory. In Japan, Trade Unionism has made considerable advances, and every variety of socialist and anarchist opinion is vigorously represented. In time, if Japan becomes increasingly industrial, Socialism may become a political force; as yet, I do not think it is. Japanese Socialists resemble those of other countries, in that they do not share the national superstitions. They are much persecuted by the Government, but not so much as Socialists in America—so at least I am informed by an American who is in a position to judge.

The real power is still in the hands of certain aristocratic families. By the constitution, the Ministers of War and Marine are directly responsible to the Mikado, not to the Diet or the Prime Minister. They therefore can and do persist in policies which are disliked by the Foreign Office. For example, if the Foreign Office were to promise the evacuation of Vladivostok, the War Office might nevertheless decide to keep the soldiers there, and there would be no constitutional remedy. Some part, at least, of what appears as Japanese bad faith is explicable in this way. There is of course a party which wishes to establish real Parliamentary government, but it is not likely to come into power unless the existing régime suffers some severe diplomatic humiliation. If the Washington Conference had compelled the evacuation of not only Shantung but also Vladivostok by diplomatic pressure, the effect on the internal government of Japan would probably have been excellent.

The Japanese are firmly persuaded that they have no friends, and that the Americans are their implacable foes. One gathers that the Government regards war with America as unavoidable in the long run. The argument would be that the economic imperialism of the United States will not tolerate the industrial development of a formidable rival in the Pacific, and that sooner or later the Japanese will be presented with the alternative of dying by starvation or on the battlefield. Then Bushido will come into play, and will lead to choice of the battlefield in preference to starvation. Admiral Sato[91] (the Japanese Bernhardt, as he is called) maintains that absence of Bushido in the Americans will lead to their defeat, and that their money-grubbing souls will be incapable of enduring the hardships and privations of a long war. This, of course, is romantic nonsense. Bushido is no use in modern war, and the Americans are quite as courageous and obstinate as the Japanese. A war might last ten years, but it would certainly end in the defeat of Japan.

One is constantly reminded of the situation between England and Germany in the years before 1914. The Germans wanted to acquire a colonial empire by means similar to those which we had employed; so do the Japanese. We considered such methods wicked when employed by foreigners; so do the Americans. The Germans developed their industries and roused our hostility by competition; the Japanese are similarly competing with America in Far Eastern markets. The Germans felt themselves encircled by our alliances, which we regarded as purely defensive; the Japanese, similarly, found themselves isolated at Washington (except for French sympathy) since the superior diplomatic skill of the Americans has brought us over to their side. The Germans at last, impelled by terrors largely of their own creation, challenged the whole world, and fell; it is very much to be feared that Japan may do likewise. The pros and cons are so familiar in the case of Germany that I need not elaborate them further, since the whole argument can be transferred bodily to the case of Japan. There is, however, this difference, that, while Germany aimed at hegemony of the whole world, the Japanese only aim at hegemony in Eastern Asia.

The conflict between America and Japan is superficially economic, but, as often happens, the economic rivalry is really a cloak for deeper passions. Japan still believes in the divine right

of kings; America believes in the divine right of commerce. I have sometimes tried to persuade Americans that there may be nations which will not gain by an extension of their foreign commerce, but I have always found the attempt futile. The Americans believe also that their religion and morality and culture are far superior to those of the Far East. I regard this as a delusion, though one shared by almost all Europeans. The Japanese, profoundly and with all the strength of their being, long to preserve their own culture and to avoid becoming like Europeans or Americans; and in this I think we ought to sympathize with them. The colour prejudice is even more intense among Americans than among Europeans; the Japanese are determined to prove that the yellow man may be the equal of the white man. In this, also, justice and humanity are on the side of Japan. Thus on the deeper issues, which underlie the economic and diplomatic conflict, my feelings go with the Japanese rather than with the Americans.

Unfortunately, the Japanese are always putting themselves in the wrong through impatience and contempt. They ought to have claimed for China the same consideration that they have extorted towards themselves; then they could have become, what they constantly profess to be, the champions of Asia against Europe. The Chinese are prone to gratitude, and would have helped Japan loyally if Japan had been a true friend to them. But the Japanese despise the Chinese more than the Europeans do; they do not want to destroy the belief in Eastern inferiority, but only to be regarded as themselves belonging to the West. They have therefore behaved so as to cause a well-deserved hatred of them in China. And this same behaviour has made the best Americans as hostile to them as the worst. If America had had none but base reasons for hostility to them, they would have found many champions in the United States; as it is, they have practically none. It is not yet too late; it is still possible for them to win the affection of China and the respect of the best Americans. To achieve this, they would have to change their Chinese policy and adopt a more democratic constitution; but if they do not achieve it, they will fall as Germany fell. And their fall will be a great misfortune for mankind.

A war between America and Japan would be a very terrible thing in itself, and a still more terrible thing in its consequences. It would destroy Japanese civilization, ensure the subjugation of China to Western culture, and launch America upon a career of world-wide militaristic imperialism. It is therefore, at all costs, to be avoided. If it is to be avoided, Japan must become more liberal; and Japan will only become more liberal if the present régime is discredited by failure. Therefore, in the interests of Japan no less than in the interests of China, it would be well if Japan were forced, by the joint diplomatic pressure of England and America, to disgorge, not only Shantung, but also all of Manchuria except Port Arthur and its immediate neighbourhood. (I make this exception because I think nothing short of actual war would lead the Japanese to abandon Port Arthur.) Our Alliance with Japan, since the end of the Russo-Japanese war, has been an encouragement to Japan in all that she has done amiss. Not that Japan has been worse than we have, but that certain kinds of crime are only permitted to very great Powers, and have been committed by the Japanese at an earlier stage of their career than prudence would warrant. Our Alliance has been a contributory cause of Japan's mistakes, and the ending of the Alliance is a necessary condition of Japanese reform.

We come now to Russia's part in the Chinese problem. There is a tendency in Europe to regard Russia as decrepit, but this is a delusion. True, millions are starving and industry is at a standstill. But that does not mean what it would in a more highly organized country. Russia is still able to steal a march on us in Persia and Afghanistan, and on the Japanese in Outer Mongolia. Russia is still able to organize Bolshevik propaganda in every country in Asia. And a great part of the effectiveness of this propaganda lies in its promise of liberation from Europe. So far, in China proper, it has affected hardly anyone except the younger students, to whom Bolshevism appeals as a method of developing industry without passing through the stage of private capitalism. This appeal will doubtless diminish as the Bolsheviks are more and more forced to revert to capitalism. Moreover, Bolshevism, as it has developed in Russia, is quite peculiarly inapplicable to China, for the following reasons: (1) It requires a strong centralized State, whereas China has a very weak State, and is tending more and more to federalism instead of centralization; (2) Bolshevism requires a very great deal of government,

and more control of individual lives by the authorities than has ever been known before, whereas China has developed personal liberty to an extraordinary degree, and is the country of all others where the doctrines of anarchism seem to find successful practical application; (3) Bolshevism dislikes private trading, which is the breath of life to all Chinese except the literati. For these reasons, it is not likely that Bolshevism as a creed will make much progress in China proper. But Bolshevism as a political force is not the same thing as Bolshevism as a creed. The arguments which proved successful with the Ameer of Afghanistan or the nomads of Mongolia were probably different from those employed in discussion with Mr. Lansbury. The Asiatic expansion of Bolshevik influence is not a distinctively Bolshevik phenomenon, but a continuation of traditional Russian policy, carried on by men who are more energetic, more intelligent, and less corrupt than the officials of the Tsar's régime, and who moreover, like the Americans, believe themselves to be engaged in the liberation of mankind, not in mere imperialistic expansion. This belief, of course, adds enormously to the vigour and success of Bolshevik imperialism, and gives an impulse to Asiatic expansion which is not likely to be soon spent, unless there is an actual restoration of the Tsarist régime under some new Kolchak dependent upon alien arms for his throne and his life.

It is therefore not at all unlikely, if the international situation develops in certain ways, that Russia may set to work to regain Manchuria, and to recover that influence over Peking which the control of Manchuria is bound to give to any foreign Power. It would probably be useless to attempt such an enterprise while Japan remains unembarrassed, but it would at once become feasible if Japan were at war with America or with Great Britain. There is therefore nothing improbable in the supposition that Russia may, within the next ten or twenty years, recover the position which she held in relation to China before the Russo-Japanese war. It must be remembered also that the Russians have an instinct for colonization, and have been trekking eastward for centuries. This tendency has been interrupted by the disasters of the last seven years, but is likely to assert itself again before long.

The hegemony of Russia in Asia would not, to my mind, be in any way regrettable. Russia would probably not be strong enough to tyrannize as much as the English, the Americans, or the Japanese would do. Moreover, the Russians are sufficiently Asiatic in outlook and character to be able to enter into relations of equality and mutual understanding with Asiatics, in a way which seems quite impossible for the English-speaking nations. And an Asiatic block, if it could be formed, would be strong for defence and weak for attack, which would make for peace. Therefore, on the whole, such a result, if it came about, would probably be desirable in the interests of mankind as a whole.

What, meanwhile, is China's interest? What would be ideally best for China would be to recover Manchuria and Shantung, and then be let alone. The anarchy in China might take a long time to subside, but in the end some system suited to China would be established. The artificial ending of Chinese anarchy by outside interference means the establishment of some system convenient for foreign trade and industry, but probably quite unfitted to the needs of the Chinese themselves. The English in the seventeenth century, the French in the eighteenth, the Americans in the nineteenth, and the Russians in our own day, have passed through years of anarchy and civil war, which were essential to their development, and could not have been curtailed by outside interference without grave detriment to the final solution. So it is with China. Western political ideas have swept away the old imperial system, but have not yet proved strong enough to put anything stable in its place. The problem of transforming China into a modern country is a difficult one, and foreigners ought to be willing to have some patience while the Chinese attempt its solution. They understand their own country, and we do not. If they are let alone, they will, in the end, find a solution suitable to their character, which we shall certainly not do. A solution slowly reached by themselves may be stable, whereas one prematurely imposed by outside Powers will be artificial and therefore unstable. There is, however, very little hope that the decisions reached by the Washington Conference will permanently benefit China, and a considerable chance that they may do quite the reverse. In Manchuria the status quo is to be maintained, while in Shantung the Japanese have made concessions, the value of which only time can show. The Four Powers—America, Great Britain, France, and Japan—have agreed to exploit China in combination, not competitively.

There is a consortium as regards loans, which will have the power of the purse and will therefore be the real Government of China. As the Americans are the only people who have much spare capital, they will control the consortium. As they consider their civilization the finest in the world, they will set to work to turn the Chinese into muscular Christians. As the financiers are the most splendid feature of the American civilization, China must be so governed as to enrich the financiers, who will in return establish colleges and hospitals and Y.M.C.A.'s throughout the length and breadth of the land, and employ agents to buy up the artistic treasures of China for sepulture in their mansions. Chinese intellect, like that of America, will be, directly or indirectly, in the pay of the Trust magnates, and therefore no effective voice will be, raised in favour of radical reform. The inauguration of this system will be welcomed even by some Socialists in the West as a great victory for peace and freedom. But it is impossible to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, or peace and freedom out of capitalism. The fourfold agreement between England, France, America and Japan is, perhaps, a safeguard of peace, but in so far as it brings peace nearer it puts freedom further off. It is the peace obtained when competing firms join in a combine, which is by no means always advantageous to those who have profited by the previous competition. It is quite possible to dominate China without infringing the principle of the Open Door. This principle merely ensures that the domination everywhere shall be American, because America is the strongest Power financially and commercially. It is to America's interest to secure, in China, certain things consistent with Chinese interests, and certain others inconsistent with them. The Americans, for the sake of commerce and good investments, would wish to see a stable government in China, an increase in the purchasing power of the people, and an absence of territorial aggression by other Powers. But they will not wish to see the Chinese strong enough to own and work their own railways or mines, and they will resent all attempts at economic independence, particularly when (as is to be expected) they take the form of State Socialism, or what Lenin calls State Capitalism. They will keep a dossier of every student educated in colleges under American control, and will probably see to it that those who profess Socialist or Radical opinions shall get no posts. They will insist upon the standard of hypocrisy which led them to hound out Gorky when he visited the United States. They will destroy beauty and substitute tidiness. In short, they will insist upon China becoming as like as possible to "God's own country," except that it will not be allowed to keep the wealth generated by its industries. The Chinese have it in them to give to the world a new contribution to civilization as valuable as that which they gave in the past. This would be prevented by the domination of the Americans, because they believe their own civilization to be perfect.

The ideal of capitalism, if it could be achieved, would be to destroy competition among capitalists by means of Trusts, but to keep alive competition among workers. To some extent Trade Unionism has succeeded in diminishing competition among wage-earners within the advanced industrial countries; but it has only intensified the conflict between workers of different races, particularly between the white and yellow races.[92] Under the existing economic system, the competition of cheap Asiatic labour in America, Canada or Australia might well be harmful to white labour in those countries. But under Socialism an influx of industrious, skilled workers in sparsely populated countries would be an obvious gain to everybody. Under Socialism, the immigration of any person who produces more than he or she consumes will be a gain to every other individual in the community, since it increases the wealth per head. But under capitalism, owing to competition for jobs, a worker who either produces much or consumes little is the natural enemy of the others; thus the system makes for inefficient work, and creates an opposition between the general interest and the individual interest of the wage-earner. The case of yellow labour in America and the British Dominions is one of the most unfortunate instances of the artificial conflicts of interest produced by the capitalist system. This whole question of Asiatic immigration, which is liable to cause trouble for centuries to come, can only be radically solved by Socialism, since Socialism alone can bring the private interests of workers in this matter into harmony with the interests of their nation and of the world.

The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by means of it, are able to

drain all other nations of their wealth, is obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except through the complete subjection of the poorer nations. In the long run, China will see no reason to leave the profits of industry in the hands of foreigners. If, for the present, Russia is successfully starved into submission to foreign capital, Russia also will, when the time is ripe, attempt a new rebellion against the world-empire of finance. I cannot see, therefore, any establishment of a stable world-system as a result of the syndicate formed at Washington. On the contrary, we may expect that, when Asia has thoroughly assimilated our economic system, the Marxian class-war will break out in the form of a war between Asia and the West, with America as the protagonist of capitalism, and Russia as the champion of Asia and Socialism. In such a war, Asia would be fighting for freedom, but probably too late to preserve the distinctive civilizations which now make Asia valuable to the human family. Indeed, the war would probably be so devastating that no civilization of any sort would survive it.

To sum up: the real government of the world is in the hands of the big financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But not many questions rouse so much popular feeling, and among them only a few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the interests of the capitalists. Even in such a case as Asiatic immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also to nations; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the weak. Such a combination is being attempted as the outcome of Washington; but it can only diminish, in the long run, the little freedom now enjoyed by the weaker nations. The essential evil of the present system, as Socialists have pointed out over and over again, is production for profit instead of for use. A man or a company or a nation produces goods, not in order to consume them, but in order to sell them. Hence arise competition and exploitation and all the evils, both in internal labour problems and in international relations. The development of Chinese commerce by capitalistic methods means an increase, for the Chinese, in the prices of the things they export, which are also the things they chiefly consume, and the artificial stimulation of new needs for foreign goods, which places China at the mercy of those who supply these goods, destroys the existing contentment, and generates a feverish pursuit of purely material ends. In a socialistic world, production will be regulated by the same authority which represents the needs of the consumers, and the whole business of competitive buying and selling will cease. Until then, it is possible to have peace by submission to exploitation, or some degree of freedom by continual war, but it is not possible to have both peace and freedom. The success of the present American policy may, for a time, secure peace, but will certainly not secure freedom for the weaker nations, such as Chinese. Only international Socialism can secure both; and owing to the stimulation of revolt by capitalist oppression, even peace alone can never be secure until international Socialism is established throughout the world.

FOOTNOTES:

[86]

The interests of England, apart from the question of India, are roughly the same as those of America. Broadly speaking, British interests are allied with American finance, as against the pacifistic and agrarian tendencies of the Middle West.

[87]

It is interesting to observe that, since the Washington Conference, the American Administration has used the naval ratio there agreed upon to induce Congress to consent to a larger expenditure on the navy than would otherwise have been sanctioned. Expenditure on the navy is unpopular in America, but by its parade of pacifism the Government has been enabled to extract the necessary money out of the pockets of reluctant taxpayers. See The Times' New York Correspondent's telegram in The Times of April 10, 1922; also April 17

and 22.

[88]

See Chamberlain, *The Invention of a New Religion*, published by the Rationalist Press Association.

[89]

See Murdoch, *History of Japan*, I. pp. 500 ff.

[90]

An excellent account of these is given in *The Socialist and Labour Movement in Japan*, by an American Sociologist, published by the Japan Chronicle.

[91]

Author of a book called *If Japan and America Fight*.

[92]

The attitude of white labour to that of Asia is illustrated by the following telegram which appeared in *The Times* for April 5, 1922, from its Melbourne correspondent: "A deputation of shipwrights and allied trades complained to Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister, that four Commonwealth ships had been repaired at Antwerp instead of in Australia, and that two had been repaired in India by black labour receiving eight annas (8d.) a day. When the deputation reached the black labour allegation Mr. Hughes jumped from his chair and turned on his interviewers with, 'Black labour be damned. Go to blithering blazes. Don't talk to me about black labour.' Hurrying from the room, he pushed his way through the deputation...." I do not generally agree with Mr. Hughes, but on this occasion, deeply as I deplore his language, I find myself in agreement with his sentiments, assuming that the phrase "black labour be damned" is meant to confer a blessing. [Russ2]

1922.01.11-12 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (11)

Chapter XI

Chinese and Western civilization contrasted

There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress.

Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, mediæval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear we are unteachable.

I propose in this chapter to deal with the purely cultural aspects of the questions raised by the contact of China with the West. In the three following chapters, I shall deal with questions concerning the internal condition of China, returning finally, in a concluding chapter, to the hopes for the future which are permissible in the present difficult situation.

With the exception of Spain and America in the sixteenth century, I cannot think of any instance of two civilizations coming into contact after such a long period of separate development as has marked those of China and Europe. Considering this extraordinary separateness, it is surprising that mutual understanding between Europeans and Chinese is not more difficult. In order to make this point clear, it will be worth while to dwell for a moment on the historical origins of the two civilizations.

Western Europe and America have a practically homogeneous mental life, which I should trace to three sources: (1) Greek culture; (2) Jewish religion and ethics; (3) modern industrialism, which itself is an outcome of modern science. We may take Plato, the Old Testament, and Galileo as representing these three elements, which have remained singularly separable down to the present day. From the Greeks we derive literature and the arts, philosophy and pure mathematics; also the more urbane portions of our social outlook. From the Jews we derive fanatical belief, which its friends call "faith"; moral fervour, with the conception of sin; religious intolerance, and some part of our nationalism. From science, as applied in industrialism, we derive power and the sense of power, the belief that we are as gods, and may justly be, the arbiters of life and death for unscientific races. We derive also the empirical method, by which almost all real knowledge has been acquired. These three elements, I think, account for most of our mentality.

No one of these three elements has had any appreciable part in the development of China, except that Greece indirectly influenced Chinese painting, sculpture, and music.[93] China belongs, in the dawn of its history, to the great river empires, of which Egypt and Babylonia contributed to our origins, by the influence which they had upon the Greeks and Jews. Just as these civilizations were rendered possible by the rich alluvial soil of the Nile, the Euphrates, and the Tigris, so the original civilization of China was rendered possible by the Yellow River. Even in the time of Confucius, the Chinese Empire did not stretch far either to south or north of the Yellow River. But in spite of this similarity in physical and economic circumstances, there was very little in common between the mental outlook of the Chinese and that of the Egyptians and Babylonians. Lao-Tze[94] and Confucius, who both belong to the sixth century B.C., have already the characteristics which we should regard as distinctive of the modern Chinese. People who attribute everything to economic causes would be hard put to it to account for the differences between the ancient Chinese and the ancient Egyptians and Babylonians. For my part, I have no alternative theory to offer. I do not think science can, at present, account wholly for national character. Climate and economic circumstances account for part, but not the whole. Probably a great deal depends upon the character of dominant individuals who happen to emerge at a formative period, such as Moses, Mahomet, and Confucius.

The oldest known Chinese sage is Lao-Tze, the founder of Taoism. "Lao Tze" is not really a

proper name, but means merely "the old philosopher." He was (according to tradition) an older contemporary of Confucius, and his philosophy is to my mind far more interesting. He held that every person, every animal, and every thing has a certain way or manner of behaving which is natural to him, or her, or it, and that we ought to conform to this way ourselves and encourage others to conform to it. "Tao" means "way," but used in a more or less mystical sense, as in the text: "I am the Way and the Truth and the Life." I think he fancied that death was due to departing from the "way," and that if we all lived strictly according to nature we should be immortal, like the heavenly bodies. In later times Taoism degenerated into mere magic, and was largely concerned with the search for the elixir of life. But I think the hope of escaping from death was an element in Taoist philosophy from the first.

Lao-Tze's book, or rather the book attributed to him, is very short, but his ideas were developed by his disciple Chuang-Tze, who is more interesting than his master. The philosophy which both advocated was one of freedom. They thought ill of government, and of all interferences with Nature. They complained of the hurry of modern life, which they contrasted with the calm existence of those whom they called "the pure men of old." There is a flavour of mysticism in the doctrine of the Tao, because in spite of the multiplicity of living things the Tao is in some sense one, so that if all live according to it there will be no strife in the world. But both sages have already the Chinese characteristics of humour, restraint, and under-statement. Their humour is illustrated by Chuang-Tze's account of Po-Lo who "understood the management of horses," and trained them till five out of every ten died.[95] Their restraint and under-statement are evident when they are compared with Western mystics. Both characteristics belong to all Chinese literature and art, and to the conversation of cultivated Chinese in the present day. All classes in China are fond of laughter, and never miss a chance of a joke. In the educated classes, the humour is sly and delicate, so that Europeans often fail to see it, which adds to the enjoyment of the Chinese. Their habit of under-statement is remarkable. I met one day in Peking a middle-aged man who told me he was academically interested in the theory of politics; being new to the country, I took his statement at its face value, but I afterwards discovered that he had been governor of a province, and had been for many years a very prominent politician. In Chinese poetry there is an apparent absence of passion which is due to the same practice of under-statement. They consider that a wise man should always remain calm, and though they have their passionate moments (being in fact a very excitable race), they do not wish to perpetuate them in art, because they think ill of them. Our romantic movement, which led people to like vehemence, has, so far as I know, no analogue in their literature. Their old music, some of which is very beautiful, makes so little noise that one can only just hear it. In art they aim at being exquisite, and in life at being reasonable. There is no admiration for the ruthless strong man, or for the unrestrained expression of passion. After the more blatant life of the West, one misses at first all the effects at which they are aiming; but gradually the beauty and dignity of their existence become visible, so that the foreigners who have lived longest in China are those who love the Chinese best.

The Taoists, though they survive as magicians, were entirely ousted from the favour of the educated classes by Confucianism. I must confess that I am unable to appreciate the merits of Confucius. His writings are largely occupied with trivial points of etiquette, and his main concern is to teach people how to behave correctly on various occasions. When one compares him, however, with the traditional religious teachers of some other ages and races, one must admit that he has great merits, even if they are mainly negative. His system, as developed by his followers, is one of pure ethics, without religious dogma; it has not given rise to a powerful priesthood, and it has not led to persecution. It certainly has succeeded in producing a whole nation possessed of exquisite manners and perfect courtesy. Nor is Chinese courtesy merely conventional; it is quite as reliable in situations for which no precedent has been provided. And it is not confined to one class; it exists even in the humblest coolie. It is humiliating to watch the brutal insolence of white men received by the Chinese with a quiet dignity which cannot demean itself to answer rudeness with rudeness. Europeans often regard this as weakness, but it is really strength, the strength by which the Chinese have hitherto conquered all their conquerors.

There is one, and only one, important foreign element in the traditional civilization of China, and that is Buddhism. Buddhism came to China from India in the early centuries of the Christian era, and acquired a definite place in the religion of the country. We, with the intolerant outlook which we have taken over from the Jews, imagine that if a man adopts one religion he cannot adopt another. The dogmas of Christianity and Mohammedanism, in their orthodox forms, are so framed that no man can accept both. But in China this incompatibility does not exist; a man may be both a Buddhist and a Confucian, because nothing in either is incompatible with the other. In Japan, similarly, most people are both Buddhists and Shintoists. Nevertheless there is a temperamental difference between Buddhism and Confucianism, which will cause any individual to lay stress on one or other even if he accepts both. Buddhism is a religion in the sense in which we understand the word. It has mystic doctrines and a way of salvation and a future life. It has a message to the world intended to cure the despair which it regards as natural to those who have no religious faith. It assumes an instinctive pessimism only to be cured by some gospel. Confucianism has nothing of all this. It assumes people fundamentally at peace with the world, wanting only instruction as to how to live, not encouragement to live at all. And its ethical instruction is not based upon any metaphysical or religious dogma; it is purely mundane. The result of the co-existence of these two religions in China has been that the more religious and contemplative natures turned to Buddhism, while the active administrative type was content with Confucianism, which was always the official teaching, in which candidates for the civil service were examined. The result is that for many ages the Government of China has been in the hands of literary sceptics, whose administration has been lacking in those qualities of energy and destructiveness which Western nations demand of their rulers. In fact, they have conformed very closely to the maxims of Chuang-Tze. The result has been that the population has been happy except where civil war brought misery; that subject nations have been allowed autonomy; and that foreign nations have had no need to fear China, in spite of its immense population and resources.

Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science. China is practically destitute of religion, not only in the upper classes, but throughout the population. There is a very definite ethical code, but it is not fierce or persecuting, and does not contain the notion "sin." Except quite recently, through European influence, there has been no science and no industrialism.

What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization with the West? I am not thinking of the political or economic outcome, but of the effect on the Chinese mental outlook. It is difficult to dissociate the two questions altogether, because of course the cultural contact with the West must be affected by the nature of the political and economic contact. Nevertheless, I wish to consider the cultural question as far as I can in isolation.

There is, in China, a great eagerness to acquire Western learning, not simply in order to acquire national strength and be able to resist Western aggression, but because a very large number of people consider learning a good thing in itself. It is traditional in China to place a high value on knowledge, but in old days the knowledge sought was only of the classical literature. Nowadays it is generally realized that Western knowledge is more useful. Many students go every year to universities in Europe, and still more to America, to learn science or economics or law or political theory. These men, when they return to China, mostly become teachers or civil servants or journalists or politicians. They are rapidly modernizing the Chinese outlook, especially in the educated classes.

The traditional civilization of China had become unprogressive, and had ceased to produce much of value in the way of art and literature. This was not due, I think, to any decadence in the race, but merely to lack of new material. The influx of Western knowledge provides just the stimulus that was needed. Chinese students are able and extraordinarily keen. Higher education suffers from lack of funds and absence of libraries, but does not suffer from any lack of the finest human material. Although Chinese civilization has hitherto been deficient in science, it never contained anything hostile to science, and therefore the spread of scientific knowledge encounters no such obstacles as the Church put in its way in Europe. I have no

doubt that if the Chinese could get a stable government and sufficient funds, they would, within the next thirty years, begin to produce remarkable work in science. It is quite likely that they might outstrip us, because they come with fresh zest and with all the ardour of a renaissance. In fact, the enthusiasm for learning in Young China reminds one constantly of the renaissance spirit in fifteenth-century Italy.

It is very remarkable, as distinguishing the Chinese from the Japanese, that the things they wish to learn from us are not those that bring wealth or military strength, but rather those that have either an ethical and social value, or a purely intellectual interest. They are not by any means uncritical of our civilization. Some of them told me that they were less critical before 1914, but that the war made them think there must be imperfections in the Western manner of life. The habit of looking to the West for wisdom was, however, very strong, and some of the younger ones thought that Bolshevism could give what they were looking for. That hope also must be suffering disappointment, and before long they will realize that they must work out their own salvation by means of a new synthesis. The Japanese adopted our faults and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours.

The distinctive merit of our civilization, I should say, is the scientific method; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to see gradually uniting.

Lao-Tze describes the operation of Tao as "production without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination." I think one could derive from these words a conception of the ends of life as reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted that they are very different from the ends which most white men set before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly sought, both nationally and individually. They have been erected into a philosophy by Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's disciples are not confined to Germany.

But, it will be said, you have been comparing Western practice with Chinese theory; if you had compared Western theory with Chinese practice, the balance would have come out quite differently. There is, of course, a great deal of truth in this. Possession, which is one of the three things that Lao-Tze wishes us to forego, is certainly dear to the heart of the average Chinaman. As a race, they are tenacious of money—not perhaps more so than the French, but certainly more than the English or the Americans. Their politics are corrupt, and their powerful men make money in disgraceful ways. All this it is impossible to deny.

Nevertheless, as regards the other two evils, self-assertion and domination, I notice a definite superiority to ourselves in Chinese practice. There is much less desire than among the white races to tyrannize over other people. The weakness of China internationally is quite as much due to this virtue as to the vices of corruption and so on which are usually assigned as the sole reason. If any nation in the world could ever be "too proud to fight," that nation would be China. The natural Chinese attitude is one of tolerance and friendliness, showing courtesy and expecting it in return. If the Chinese chose, they could be the most powerful nation in the world. But they only desire freedom, not domination. It is not improbable that other nations may compel them to fight for their freedom, and if so, they may lose their virtues and acquire a taste for empire. But at present, though they have been an imperial race for 2,000 years, their love of empire is extraordinarily slight.

Although there have been many wars in China, the natural outlook of the Chinese is very pacifistic. I do not know of any other country where a poet would have chosen, as Po-Chui did in one of the poems translated by Mr. Waley, called by him *The Old Man with the Broken Arm*, to make a hero of a recruit who maimed himself to escape military service. Their pacifism is rooted in their contemplative outlook, and in the fact that they do not desire to change whatever they see. They take a pleasure—as their pictures show—in observing characteristic manifestations of different kinds of life, and they have no wish to reduce everything to a preconceived pattern. They have not the ideal of progress which dominates the Western nations, and affords a rationalization of our active impulses. Progress is, of course, a very modern ideal even with us; it is part of what we owe to science and industrialism. The cultivated conservative Chinese of the present day talk exactly as their earliest sages write. If

one points out to them that this shows how little progress there has been, they will say: "Why seek progress when you already enjoy what is excellent?" At first, this point of view seems to a European unduly indolent; but gradually doubts as to one's own wisdom grow up, and one begins to think that much of what we call progress is only restless change, bringing us no nearer to any desirable goal.

It is interesting to contrast what the Chinese have sought in the West with what the West has sought in China. The Chinese in the West seek knowledge, in the hope—which I fear is usually vain—that knowledge may prove a gateway to wisdom. White men have gone to China with three motives: to fight, to make money, and to convert the Chinese to our religion. The last of these motives has the merit of being idealistic, and has inspired many heroic lives. But the soldier, the merchant, and the missionary are alike concerned to stamp our civilization upon the world; they are all three, in a certain sense, pugnacious. The Chinese have no wish to convert us to Confucianism; they say "religions are many, but reason is one," and with that they are content to let us go our way. They are good merchants, but their methods are quite different from those of European merchants in China, who are perpetually seeking concessions, monopolies, railways, and mines, and endeavouring to get their claims supported by gunboats. The Chinese are not, as a rule, good soldiers, because the causes for which they are asked to fight are not worth fighting for, and they know it. But that is only a proof of their reasonableness.

I think the tolerance of the Chinese is in excess of anything that Europeans can imagine from their experience at home. We imagine ourselves tolerant, because we are more so than our ancestors. But we still practise political and social persecution, and what is more, we are firmly persuaded that our civilization and our way of life are immeasurably better than any other, so that when we come across a nation like the Chinese, we are convinced that the kindest thing we can do to them is to make them like ourselves. I believe this to be a profound mistake. It seemed to me that the average Chinaman, even if he is miserably poor, is happier than the average Englishman, and is happier because the nation is built upon a more humane and civilized outlook than our own. Restlessness and pugnacity not only cause obvious evils, but fill our lives with discontent, incapacitate us for the enjoyment of beauty, and make us almost incapable of the contemplative virtues. In this respect we have grown rapidly worse during the last hundred years. I do not deny that the Chinese go too far in the other direction; but for that very reason I think contact between East and West is likely to be fruitful to both parties. They may learn from us the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency, and we may learn from them something of that contemplative wisdom which has enabled them to persist while all the other nations of antiquity have perished.

When I went to China, I went to teach; but every day that I stayed I thought less of what I had to teach them and more of what I had to learn from them. Among Europeans who had lived a long time in China, I found this attitude not uncommon; but among those whose stay is short, or who go only to make money, it is sadly rare. It is rare because the Chinese do not excel in the things we really value—military prowess and industrial enterprise. But those who value wisdom or beauty, or even the simple enjoyment of life, will find more of these things in China than in the distracted and turbulent West, and will be happy to live where such things are valued. I wish I could hope that China, in return for our scientific knowledge, may give us something of her large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind.

FOOTNOTES:

[93]

See Cordier, *op. cit.* i. p. 368, and Giles, *op. cit.* p. 187.

[94]

With regard to Lao-Tze, the book which bears his name is of doubtful authenticity, and was probably compiled two or three centuries after his death. Cf. Giles, *op. cit.*, Lecture V.

[95]

Quoted in Chap. IV, pp. 82-3.

Russell, Bertrand. *The Problem of China* [ID D5122]. (12)

Chapter XII

The Chinese character

There is a theory among Occidentals that the Chinaman is inscrutable, full of secret thoughts, and impossible for us to understand. It may be that a greater experience of China would have brought me to share this opinion; but I could see nothing to support it during the time when I was working in that country. I talked to the Chinese as I should have talked to English people, and they answered me much as English people would have answered a Chinese whom they considered educated and not wholly unintelligent. I do not believe in the myth of the "Subtle Oriental": I am convinced that in a game of mutual deception an Englishman or American can beat a Chinese nine times out of ten. But as many comparatively poor Chinese have dealings with rich white men, the game is often played only on one side. Then, no doubt, the white man is deceived and swindled; but not more than a Chinese mandarin would be in London. One of the most remarkable things about the Chinese is their power of securing the affection of foreigners. Almost all Europeans like China, both those who come only as tourists and those who live there for many years. In spite of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, I can recall hardly a single Englishman in the Far East who liked the Japanese as well as the Chinese. Those who have lived long among them tend to acquire their outlook and their standards. New arrivals are struck by obvious evils: the beggars, the terrible poverty, the prevalence of disease, the anarchy and corruption in politics. Every energetic Westerner feels at first a strong desire to reform these evils, and of course they ought to be reformed.

But the Chinese, even those who are the victims of preventable misfortunes, show a vast passive indifference to the excitement of the foreigners; they wait for it to go off, like the effervescence of soda-water. And gradually strange hesitations creep into the mind of the bewildered traveller; after a period of indignation, he begins to doubt all the maxims he has hitherto accepted without question. Is it really wise to be always guarding against future misfortune? Is it prudent to lose all enjoyment of the present through thinking of the disasters that may come at some future date? Should our lives be passed in building a mansion that we shall never have leisure to inhabit?

The Chinese answer these questions in the negative, and therefore have to put up with poverty, disease, and anarchy. But, to compensate for these evils, they have retained, as industrial nations have not, the capacity for civilized enjoyment, for leisure and laughter, for pleasure in sunshine and philosophical discourse. The Chinese, of all classes, are more laughter-loving than any other race with which I am acquainted; they find amusement in everything, and a dispute can always be softened by a joke.

I remember one hot day when a party of us were crossing the hills in chairs—the way was rough and very steep, the work for the coolies very severe. At the highest point of our journey, we stopped for ten minutes to let the men rest. Instantly they all sat in a row, brought out their pipes, and began to laugh among themselves as if they had not a care in the world. In any country that had learned the virtue of forethought, they would have devoted the moments to complaining of the heat, in order to increase their tip. We, being Europeans, spent the time worrying whether the automobile would be waiting for us at the right place. Well-to-do Chinese would have started a discussion as to whether the universe moves in cycles or progresses by a rectilinear motion; or they might have set to work to consider whether the truly virtuous man shows complete self-abnegation, or may, on occasion, consider his own interest.

One comes across white men occasionally who suffer under the delusion that China is not a civilized country. Such men have quite forgotten what constitutes civilization. It is true that there are no trams in Peking, and that the electric light is poor. It is true that there are places full of beauty, which Europeans itch to make hideous by digging up coal. It is true that the educated Chinaman is better at writing poetry than at remembering the sort of facts which can be looked up in Whitaker's Almanac. A European, in recommending a place of residence, will tell you that it has a good train service; the best quality he can conceive in any place is that it should be easy to get away from. But a Chinaman will tell you nothing about the trains; if you ask, he will tell you wrong. What he tells you is that there is a palace built by an ancient

emperor, and a retreat in a lake for scholars weary of the world, founded by a famous poet of the Tang dynasty. It is this outlook that strikes the Westerner as barbaric.

The Chinese, from the highest to the lowest, have an imperturbable quiet dignity, which is usually not destroyed even by a European education. They are not self-assertive, either individually or nationally; their pride is too profound for self-assertion. They admit China's military weakness in comparison with foreign Powers, but they do not consider efficiency in homicide the most important quality in a man or a nation. I think that, at bottom, they almost all believe that China is the greatest nation in the world, and has the finest civilization. A Westerner cannot be expected to accept this view, because it is based on traditions utterly different from his own. But gradually one comes to feel that it is, at any rate, not an absurd view; that it is, in fact, the logical outcome of a self-consistent standard of values. The typical Westerner wishes to be the cause of as many changes as possible in his environment; the typical Chinaman wishes to enjoy as much and as delicately as possible. This difference is at the bottom of most of the contrast between China and the English-speaking world.

We in the West make a fetish of "progress," which is the ethical camouflage of the desire to be the cause of changes. If we are asked, for instance, whether machinery has really improved the world, the question strikes us as foolish: it has brought great changes and therefore great "progress." What we believe to be a love of progress is really, in nine cases out of ten, a love of power, an enjoyment of the feeling that by our fiat we can make things different. For the sake of this pleasure, a young American will work so hard that, by the time he has acquired his millions, he has become a victim of dyspepsia, compelled to live on toast and water, and to be a mere spectator of the feasts that he offers to his guests. But he consoles himself with the thought that he can control politics, and provoke or prevent wars as may suit his investments. It is this temperament that makes Western nations "progressive."

There are, of course, ambitious men in China, but they are less common than among ourselves. And their ambition takes a different form—not a better form, but one produced by the preference of enjoyment to power. It is a natural result of this preference that avarice is a widespread failing of the Chinese. Money brings the means of enjoyment, therefore money is passionately desired. With us, money is desired chiefly as a means to power; politicians, who can acquire power without much money, are often content to remain poor. In China, the tuchuns (military governors), who have the real power, almost always use it for the sole purpose of amassing a fortune. Their object is to escape to Japan at a suitable moment; with sufficient plunder to enable them to enjoy life quietly for the rest of their days. The fact that in escaping they lose power does not trouble them in the least. It is, of course, obvious that such politicians, who spread devastation only in the provinces committed to their care, are far less harmful to the world than our own, who ruin whole continents in order to win an election campaign.

The corruption and anarchy in Chinese politics do much less harm than one would be inclined to expect. But for the predatory desires of the Great Powers—especially Japan—the harm would be much less than is done by our own "efficient" Governments. Nine-tenths of the activities of a modern Government are harmful; therefore the worse they are performed, the better. In China, where the Government is lazy, corrupt, and stupid, there is a degree of individual liberty which has been wholly lost in the rest of the world.

The laws are just as bad as elsewhere; occasionally, under foreign pressure, a man is imprisoned for Bolshevik propaganda, just as he might be in England or America. But this is quite exceptional; as a rule, in practice, there is very little interference with free speech and a free Press.[96] The individual does not feel obliged to follow the herd, as he has in Europe since 1914, and in America since 1917. Men still think for themselves, and are not afraid to announce the conclusions at which they arrive. Individualism has perished in the West, but in China it survives, for good as well as for evil. Self-respect and personal dignity are possible for every coolie in China, to a degree which is, among ourselves, possible only for a few leading financiers.

The business of "saving face," which often strikes foreigners in China as ludicrous, is only the carrying-out of respect for personal dignity in the sphere of social manners. Everybody has "face," even the humblest beggar; there are humiliations that you must not inflict upon him, if

you are not to outrage the Chinese ethical code. If you speak to a Chinaman in a way that transgresses the code, he will laugh, because your words must be taken as spoken in jest if they are not to constitute an offence.

Once I thought that the students to whom I was lecturing were not as industrious as they might be, and I told them so in just the same words that I should have used to English students in the same circumstances. But I soon found I was making a mistake. They all laughed uneasily, which surprised me until I saw the reason. Chinese life, even among the most modernized, is far more polite than anything to which we are accustomed. This, of course, interferes with efficiency, and also (what is more serious) with sincerity and truth in personal relations. If I were Chinese, I should wish to see it mitigated. But to those who suffer from the brutalities of the West, Chinese urbanity is very restful. Whether on the balance it is better or worse than our frankness, I shall not venture to decide.

The Chinese remind one of the English in their love of compromise and in their habit of bowing to public opinion. Seldom is a conflict pushed to its ultimate brutal issue. The treatment of the Manchu Emperor may be taken as a case in point. When a Western country becomes a Republic, it is customary to cut off the head of the deposed monarch, or at least to cause him to fly the country. But the Chinese have left the Emperor his title, his beautiful palace, his troops of eunuchs, and an income of several million dollars a year. He is a boy of sixteen, living peaceably in the Forbidden City. Once, in the course of a civil war, he was nominally restored to power for a few days; but he was deposed again, without being in any way punished for the use to which he had been put.

Public opinion is a very real force in China, when it can be roused. It was, by all accounts, mainly responsible for the downfall of the An Fu party in the summer of 1920. This party was pro-Japanese and was accepting loans from Japan. Hatred of Japan is the strongest and most widespread of political passions in China, and it was stirred up by the students in fiery orations. The An Fu party had, at first, a great preponderance of military strength; but their soldiers melted away when they came to understand the cause for which they were expected to fight. In the end, the opponents of the An Fu party were able to enter Peking and change the Government almost without firing a shot.

The same influence of public opinion was decisive in the teachers' strike, which was on the point of being settled when I left Peking. The Government, which is always impecunious, owing to corruption, had left its teachers unpaid for many months. At last they struck to enforce payment, and went on a peaceful deputation to the Government, accompanied by many students. There was a clash with the soldiers and police, and many teachers and students were more or less severely wounded. This led to a terrific outcry, because the love of education in China is profound and widespread. The newspapers clamoured for revolution. The Government had just spent nine million dollars in corrupt payments to three Tuchuns who had descended upon the capital to extort blackmail. It could not find any colourable pretext for refusing the few hundred thousands required by the teachers, and it capitulated in panic. I do not think there is any Anglo-Saxon country where the interests of teachers would have roused the same degree of public feeling.

Nothing astonishes a European more in the Chinese than their patience. The educated Chinese are well aware of the foreign menace. They realize acutely what the Japanese have done in Manchuria and Shantung. They are aware that the English in Hong-Kong are doing their utmost to bring to naught the Canton attempt to introduce good government in the South. They know that all the Great Powers, without exception, look with greedy eyes upon the undeveloped resources of their country, especially its coal and iron. They have before them the example of Japan, which, by developing a brutal militarism, a cast-iron discipline, and a new reactionary religion, has succeeded in holding at bay the fierce lusts of "civilized" industrialists. Yet they neither copy Japan nor submit tamely to foreign domination. They think not in decades, but in centuries. They have been conquered before, first by the Tartars and then by the Manchus; but in both cases they absorbed their conquerors. Chinese civilization persisted, unchanged; and after a few generations the invaders became more Chinese than their subjects.

Manchuria is a rather empty country, with abundant room for colonization. The Japanese

assert that they need colonies for their surplus population, yet the Chinese immigrants into Manchuria exceed the Japanese a hundredfold. Whatever may be the temporary political status of Manchuria, it will remain a part of Chinese civilization, and can be recovered whenever Japan happens to be in difficulties. The Chinese derive such strength from their four hundred millions, the toughness of their national customs, their power of passive resistance, and their unrivalled national cohesiveness—in spite of the civil wars, which merely ruffle the surface—that they can afford to despise military methods, and to wait till the feverish energy of their oppressors shall have exhausted itself in internecine combats. China is much less a political entity than a civilization—the only one that has survived from ancient times. Since the days of Confucius, the Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, Macedonian, and Roman Empires have perished; but China has persisted through a continuous evolution. There have been foreign influences—first Buddhism, and now Western science. But Buddhism did not turn the Chinese into Indians, and Western science will not turn them into Europeans. I have met men in China who knew as much of Western learning as any professor among ourselves; yet they had not been thrown off their balance, or lost touch with their own people. What is bad in the West—its brutality, its restlessness, its readiness to oppress the weak, its preoccupation with purely material aims—they see to be bad, and do not wish to adopt. What is good, especially its science, they do wish to adopt.

The old indigenous culture of China has become rather dead; its art and literature are not what they were, and Confucius does not satisfy the spiritual needs of a modern man, even if he is Chinese. The Chinese who have had a European or American education realize that a new element, is needed to vitalize native traditions, and they look to our civilization to supply it. But they do not wish to construct a civilization just like ours; and it is precisely in this that the best hope lies. If they are not goaded into militarism, they may produce a genuinely new civilization, better than any that we in the West have been able to create.

So far, I have spoken chiefly of the good sides of the Chinese character; but of course China, like every other nation, has its bad sides also. It is disagreeable to me to speak of these, as I experienced so much courtesy and real kindness from the Chinese, that I should prefer to say only nice things about them. But for the sake of China, as well as for the sake of truth, it would be a mistake to conceal what is less admirable. I will only ask the reader to remember that, on the balance, I think the Chinese one of the best nations I have come across, and am prepared to draw up a graver indictment against every one of the Great Powers. Shortly before I left China, an eminent Chinese writer pressed me to say what I considered the chief defects of the Chinese. With some reluctance, I mentioned three: avarice, cowardice and callousness. Strange to say, my interlocutor, instead of getting angry, admitted the justice of my criticism, and proceeded to discuss possible remedies. This is a sample of the intellectual integrity which is one of China's greatest virtues.

The callousness of the Chinese is bound to strike every Anglo-Saxon. They have none of that humanitarian impulse which leads us to devote one per cent. of our energy to mitigating the evils wrought by the other ninety-nine per cent. For instance, we have been forbidding the Austrians to join with Germany, to emigrate, or to obtain the raw materials of industry. Therefore the Viennese have starved, except those whom it has pleased us to keep alive from philanthropy. The Chinese would not have had the energy to starve the Viennese, or the philanthropy to keep some of them alive. While I was in China, millions were dying of famine; men sold their children into slavery for a few dollars, and killed them if this sum was unobtainable. Much was done by white men to relieve the famine, but very little by the Chinese, and that little vitiated by corruption. It must be said, however, that the efforts of the white men were more effective in soothing their own consciences than in helping the Chinese. So long as the present birth-rate and the present methods of agriculture persist, famines are bound to occur periodically; and those whom philanthropy keeps alive through one famine are only too likely to perish in the next.

Famines in China can be permanently cured only by better methods of agriculture combined with emigration or birth-control on a large scale. Educated Chinese realize this, and it makes them indifferent to efforts to keep the present victims alive. A great deal of Chinese callousness has a similar explanation, and is due to perception of the vastness of the problems

involved. But there remains a residue which cannot be so explained. If a dog is run over by an automobile and seriously hurt, nine out of ten passers-by will stop to laugh at the poor brute's howls. The spectacle of suffering does not of itself rouse any sympathetic pain in the average Chinaman; in fact, he seems to find it mildly agreeable. Their history, and their penal code before the revolution of 1911, show that they are by no means destitute of the impulse of active cruelty; but of this I did not myself come across any instances. And it must be said that active cruelty is practised by all the great nations, to an extent concealed from us only by our hypocrisy.

Cowardice is *prima facie* a fault of the Chinese; but I am not sure that they are really lacking in courage. It is true that, in battles between rival tuchuns, both sides run away, and victory rests with the side that first discovers the flight of the other. But this proves only that the Chinese soldier is a rational man. No cause of any importance is involved, and the armies consist of mere mercenaries. When there is a serious issue, as, for instance, in the Tai-Ping rebellion, the Chinese are said to fight well, particularly if they have good officers. Nevertheless, I do not think that, in comparison with the Anglo-Saxons, the French, or the Germans, the Chinese can be considered a courageous people, except in the matter of passive endurance. They will endure torture, and even death, for motives which men of more pugnacious races would find insufficient—for example, to conceal the hiding-place of stolen plunder. In spite of their comparative lack of active courage, they have less fear of death than we have, as is shown by their readiness to commit suicide.

Avarice is, I should say, the gravest defect of the Chinese. Life is hard, and money is not easily obtained. For the sake of money, all except a very few foreign-educated Chinese will be guilty of corruption. For the sake of a few pence, almost any coolie will run an imminent risk of death. The difficulty of combating Japan has arisen mainly from the fact that hardly any Chinese politician can resist Japanese bribes. I think this defect is probably due to the fact that, for many ages, an honest living has been hard to get; in which case it will be lessened as economic conditions improve. I doubt if it is any worse now in China than it was in Europe in the eighteenth century. I have not heard of any Chinese general more corrupt than Marlborough, or of any politician more corrupt than Cardinal Dubois. It is, therefore, quite likely that changed industrial conditions will make the Chinese as honest as we are—which is not saying much.

I have been speaking of the Chinese as they are in ordinary life, when they appear as men of active and sceptical intelligence, but of somewhat sluggish passions. There is, however, another side to them: they are capable of wild excitement, often of a collective kind. I saw little of this myself, but there can be no doubt of the fact. The Boxer rising was a case in point, and one which particularly affected Europeans. But their history is full of more or less analogous disturbances. It is this element in their character that makes them incalculable, and makes it impossible even to guess at their future. One can imagine a section of them becoming fanatically Bolshevik, or anti-Japanese, or Christian, or devoted to some leader who would ultimately declare himself Emperor. I suppose it is this element in their character that makes them, in spite of their habitual caution, the most reckless gamblers in the world. And many emperors have lost their thrones through the force of romantic love, although romantic love is far more despised than it is in the West.

To sum up the Chinese character is not easy. Much of what strikes the foreigner is due merely to the fact that they have preserved an ancient civilization which is not industrial. All this is likely to pass away, under the pressure of the Japanese, and of European and American financiers. Their art is already perishing, and being replaced by crude imitations of second-rate European pictures. Most of the Chinese who have had a European education are quite incapable of seeing any beauty in native painting, and merely observe contemptuously that it does not obey the laws of perspective.

The obvious charm which the tourist finds in China cannot be preserved; it must perish at the touch of industrialism. But perhaps something may be preserved, something of the ethical qualities in which China is supreme, and which the modern world most desperately needs. Among these qualities I place first the pacific temper, which seeks to settle disputes on grounds of justice rather than by force. It remains to be seen whether the West will allow this

temper to persist, or will force it to give place, in self-defence, to a frantic militarism like that to which Japan has been driven.

FOOTNOTES:

[96]

This vexes the foreigners, who are attempting to establish a very severe Press censorship in Shanghai. See "The Shanghai Printed Matter Bye-Law." Hollington K. Tong, Review of the Far East, April 16, 1922. [Russ2]

1922.01.13-14 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (13)

Chapter XIII

Higher education in China

China, like Italy and Greece, is frequently misjudged by persons of culture because they regard it as a museum. The preservation of ancient beauty is very important, but no vigorous forward-looking man is content to be a mere curator. The result is that the best people in China tend to be Philistines as regards all that is pleasing to the European tourist. The European in China, quite apart from interested motives, is apt to be ultra-conservative, because he likes everything distinctive and non-European. But this is the attitude of an outsider, of one who regards China as a country to be looked at rather than lived in, as a country with a past rather than a future. Patriotic Chinese naturally do not view their country in this way; they wish their country to acquire what is best in the modern world, not merely to remain an interesting survival of a by-gone age, like Oxford or the Yellowstone Park. As the first step to this end, they do all they can to promote higher education, and to increase the number of Chinese who can use and appreciate Western knowledge without being the slaves of Western follies. What is being done in this direction is very interesting, and one of the most hopeful things happening in our not very cheerful epoch.

There is first the old traditional curriculum, the learning by rote of the classics without explanation in early youth, followed by a more intelligent study in later years. This is exactly like the traditional study of the classics in this country, as it existed, for example, in the eighteenth century. Men over thirty, even if, in the end, they have secured a thoroughly modern education, have almost all begun by learning reading and writing in old-fashioned schools. Such schools still form the majority, and give most of the elementary education that is given. Every child has to learn by heart every day some portion of the classical text, and repeat it out loud in class. As they all repeat at the same time, the din is deafening. (In Peking I lived next to one of these schools, so I can speak from experience.) The number of people who are taught to read by these methods is considerable; in the large towns one finds that even coolies can read as often as not. But writing (which is very difficult in Chinese) is a much rarer accomplishment. Probably those who can both read and write form about five per cent, of the population.

The establishment of normal schools for the training of teachers on modern lines, which grew out of the edict of 1905 abolishing the old examination system and proclaiming the need of educational reform, has done much, and will do much more, to transform and extend elementary education. The following statistics showing the increase in the number of schools, teachers, and students in China are taken from Mr. Tyau's *China Awakened*, p. 4:—

1910 1914 1917 1919

Number of Schools 42,444 59,796 128,048 134,000
 Number of Teachers 185,566 200,000 326,417 326,000
 Number of Students 1,625,534 3,849,554 4,269,197 4,500,000

Considering that the years concerned are years of revolution and civil war, it must be admitted that the progress shown by these figures is very remarkable.

There are schemes for universal elementary education, but so far, owing to the disturbed condition of the country and the lack of funds, it has been impossible to carry them out except in a few places on a small scale. They would, however, be soon carried out if there were a stable government.

The traditional classical education was, of course, not intended to be only elementary. The amount of Chinese literature is enormous, and the older texts are extremely difficult to understand. There is scope, within the tradition, for all the industry and erudition of the finest renaissance scholars. Learning of this sort has been respected in China for many ages. One meets old scholars of this type, to whose opinions, even in politics, it is customary to defer, although they have the innocence and unworldliness of the old-fashioned don. They remind one almost of the men whom Lamb describes in his essay on Oxford in the Vacation—learned, lovable, and sincere, but utterly lost in the modern world, basing their opinions of Socialism, for example, on what some eleventh-century philosopher said about it. The arguments for and against the type of higher education that they represent are exactly the same as those for and against a classical education in Europe, and one is driven to the same conclusion in both cases: that the existence of specialists having this type of knowledge is highly desirable, but that the ordinary curriculum for the average educated person should take more account of modern needs, and give more instruction in science, modern languages, and contemporary international relations. This is the view, so far as I could discover, of all reforming educationists in China.

The second kind of higher education in China is that initiated by the missionaries, and now almost entirely in the hands of the Americans. As everyone knows, America's position in Chinese education was acquired through the Boxer indemnity. Most of the Powers, at that time, if their own account is to be believed, demanded a sum representing only actual loss and damage, but the Americans, according to their critics, demanded (and obtained) a vastly larger sum, of which they generously devoted the surplus to educating Chinese students, both in China and at American universities. This course of action has abundantly justified itself, both politically and commercially; a larger and larger number of posts in China go to men who have come under American influence, and who have come to believe that America is the one true friend of China among the Great Powers.

One may take as typical of American work three institutions of which I saw a certain amount: Tsing-Hua College (about ten miles from Peking), the Peking Union Medical College (connected with the Rockefeller Hospital), and the so-called Peking University. Tsing-Hua College, delightfully situated at the foot of the Western hills, with a number of fine solid buildings,[97] in a good American style, owes its existence entirely to the Boxer indemnity money. It has an atmosphere exactly like that of a small American university, and a (Chinese) President who is an almost perfect reproduction of the American College President. The teachers are partly American, partly Chinese educated in America, and there tends to be more and more of the latter. As one enters the gates, one becomes aware of the presence of every virtue usually absent in China: cleanliness, punctuality, exactitude, efficiency. I had not much opportunity to judge of the teaching, but whatever I saw made me think that the institution was thorough and good. One great merit, which belongs to American institutions generally, is that the students are made to learn English. Chinese differs so profoundly from European languages that even with the most skilful translations a student who knows only Chinese cannot understand European ideas; therefore the learning of some European language is essential, and English is far the most familiar and useful throughout the Far East.

The students at Tsing-Hua College learn mathematics and science and philosophy, and broadly speaking, the more elementary parts of what is commonly taught in universities. Many of the best of them go afterwards to America, where they take a Doctor's degree. On returning to China they become teachers or civil servants. Undoubtedly they contribute

greatly to the improvement of their country in efficiency and honesty and technical intelligence.

The Rockefeller Hospital is a large, conspicuous building, representing an interesting attempt to combine something of Chinese beauty with European utilitarian requirements. The green roofs are quite Chinese, but the walls and windows are European. The attempt is praiseworthy, though perhaps not wholly successful. The hospital has all the most modern scientific apparatus, but, with the monopolistic tendency of the Standard Oil Company, it refuses to let its apparatus be of use to anyone not connected with the hospital. The Peking Union Medical College teaches many things besides medicine—English literature, for example—and apparently teaches them well. They are necessary in order to produce Chinese physicians and surgeons who will reach the European level, because a good knowledge of some European language is necessary for medicine as for other kinds of European learning. And a sound knowledge of scientific medicine is, of course, of immense importance to China, where there is no sort of sanitation and epidemics are frequent.

The so-called Peking University is an example of what the Chinese have to suffer on account of extra-territoriality. The Chinese Government (so at least I was told) had already established a university in Peking, fully equipped and staffed, and known as the Peking University. But the Methodist missionaries decided to give the name "Peking University" to their schools, so the already existing university had to alter its name to "Government University." The case is exactly as if a collection of old-fashioned Chinamen had established themselves in London to teach the doctrine of Confucius, and had been able to force London University to abandon its name to them. However, I do not wish to raise the question of extra-territoriality, the more so as I do not think it can be abandoned for some years to come, in spite of the abuses to which it sometimes gives rise.

Returned students (i.e. students who have been at foreign universities) form a definite set in China.[98] There is in Peking a "Returned Students' Club," a charming place. It is customary among Europeans to speak ill of returned students, but for no good reason. There are occasionally disagreements between different sections; in particular, those who have been only to Japan are not regarded quite as equals by those who have been to Europe or America. My impression was that America puts a more definite stamp upon a student than any other country; certainly those returning from England are less Anglicized than those returning from the United States are Americanized. To the Chinaman who wishes to be modern and up-to-date, skyscrapers and hustle seem romantic, because they are so unlike his home. The old traditions which conservative Europeans value are such a mushroom growth compared to those of China (where authentic descendants of Confucius abound) that it is useless to attempt that way of impressing the Chinese. One is reminded of the conversation in Eothen between the English country gentleman and the Pasha, in which the Pasha praises England to the refrain: "Buzz, buzz, all by steam; whir, whir, all on wheels," while the Englishman keeps saying: "Tell the Pasha that the British yeoman is still, thank God, the British yeoman." Although the educational work of the Americans in China is on the whole admirable, nothing directed by foreigners can adequately satisfy the needs of the country. The Chinese have a civilization and a national temperament in many ways superior to those of white men. A few Europeans ultimately discover this, but Americans never do. They remain always missionaries—not of Christianity, though they often think that is what they are preaching, but of Americanism. What is Americanism? "Clean living, clean thinking, and pep," I think an American would reply. This means, in practice, the substitution of tidiness for art, cleanliness for beauty, moralizing for philosophy, prostitutes for concubines (as being easier to conceal), and a general air of being fearfully busy for the leisurely calm of the traditional Chinese. Voltaire—that hardened old cynic—laid it down that the true ends of life are "aimer et penser." Both are common in China, but neither is compatible with "pep." The American influence, therefore, inevitably tends to eliminate both. If it prevailed it would, no doubt, by means of hygiene, save the lives of many Chinamen, but would at the same time make them not worth saving. It cannot therefore be regarded as wholly and altogether satisfactory. The best Chinese educationists are aware of this, and have established schools and universities which are modern but under Chinese direction. In these, a certain proportion of

the teachers are European or American, but the spirit of the teaching is not that of the Y.M.C.A. One can never rid oneself of the feeling that the education controlled by white men is not disinterested; it seems always designed, unconsciously in the main, to produce convenient tools for the capitalist penetration of China by the merchants and manufacturers of the nation concerned. Modern Chinese schools and universities are singularly different: they are not hotbeds of rabid nationalism as they would be in any other country, but institutions where the student is taught to think freely, and his thoughts are judged by their intelligence, not by their utility to exploiters. The outcome, among the best young men, is a really beautiful intellectual disinterestedness. The discussions which I used to have in my seminar (consisting of students belonging to the Peking Government University) could not have been surpassed anywhere for keenness, candour, and fearlessness. I had the same impression of the Science Society of Nanking, and of all similar bodies wherever I came across them. There is, among the young, a passionate desire to acquire Western knowledge, together with a vivid realization of Western vices. They wish to be scientific but not mechanical, industrial but not capitalistic. To a man they are Socialists, as are most of the best among their Chinese teachers. They respect the knowledge of Europeans, but quietly put aside their arrogance. For the present, the purely Chinese modern educational institutions, such as the Peking Government University, leave much to be desired from the point of view of instruction; there are no adequate libraries, the teaching of English is not sufficiently thorough, and there is not enough mental discipline. But these are the faults of youth, and are unimportant compared with the profoundly humanistic attitude to life which is formed in the students. Most of the faults may be traced to the lack of funds, because the Government—loved by the Powers on account of its weakness—has to part with all its funds to the military chieftains who fight each other and plunder the country, as in Europe—for China must be compared with Europe, not with any one of the petty States into which Europe is unhappily divided.

The students are not only full of public spirit themselves, but are a powerful force in arousing it throughout the nation. What they did in 1919, when Versailles awarded Shangtung to Japan, is well told by Mr. Tyau in his chapter on "The Student Movement." And what they did was not merely political. To quote Mr. Tyau (p. 146):—

Having aroused the nation, prevented the signature of the Versailles Treaty and assisted the merchants to enforce the Japanese boycott, the students then directed their energies to the enlightenment of their less educated brothers and sisters. For instance, by issuing publications, by popular lectures showing them the real situation, internally as well as externally; but especially by establishing free schools and maintaining them out of their own funds. No praise can be too high for such self-sacrifice, for the students generally also teach in these schools. The scheme is endorsed everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, and in Peking alone it is estimated that fifty thousand children are benefited by such education. One thing which came as a surprise to me was to find that, as regards modern education under Chinese control, there is complete equality between men and women. The position of women in Peking Government University is better than at Cambridge. Women are admitted to examinations and degrees, and there are women teachers in the university. The Girls' Higher Normal School in Peking, where prospective women teachers are taught, is a most excellent and progressive institution, and the spirit of free inquiry among the girls would horrify most British head mistresses.

There is a movement in favour of co-education, especially in elementary education, because, owing to the inadequate supply of schools, the girls tend to be left out altogether unless they can go to the same school as the boys. The first time I met Professor and Mrs. Dewey was at a banquet in Chang-sha, given by the Tuchun. When the time came for after-dinner speeches, Mrs. Dewey told the Tuchun that his province must adopt co-education. He made a statesmanlike reply, saying that the matter should receive his best consideration, but he feared the time was not ripe in Hunan. However, it was clear that the matter was within the sphere of practical politics. At the time, being new to China and having imagined China a somewhat backward country, I was surprised. Later on I realized that reforms which we only talk about can be actually carried out in China.

Education controlled by missionaries or conservative white men cannot give what Young

China needs. After throwing off the native superstitions of centuries, it would be a dismal fiasco to take on the European superstitions which have been discarded here by all progressive people. It is only where progressive Chinese themselves are in control that there is scope for the renaissance spirit of the younger students, and for that free spirit of sceptical inquiry by which they are seeking to build a new civilization as splendid as their old civilization in its best days.

While I was in Peking, the Government teachers struck, not for higher pay, but for pay, because their salaries had not been paid for many months. Accompanied by some of the students, they went on a deputation to the Government, but were repulsed by soldiers and policemen, who clubbed them so severely that many had to be taken to hospital. The incident produced such universal fury that there was nearly a revolution, and the Government hastened to come to terms with the teachers with all possible speed. The modern teachers have behind them all that is virile, energetic, and public-spirited in China; the gang of bandits which controls the Government has behind it Japanese money and European intrigue. America occupies an intermediate position. One may say broadly that the old traditional education, with the military governors and the British and Japanese influence, stands for Conservatism; America and its commerce and its educational institutions stand for Liberalism; while the native modern education, practically though not theoretically, stands for Socialism. Incidentally, it alone stands for intellectual freedom.

The Chinese are a great nation, incapable of permanent suppression by foreigners. They will not consent to adopt our vices in order to acquire military strength; but they are willing to adopt our virtues in order to advance in wisdom. I think they are the only people in the world who quite genuinely believe that wisdom is more precious than rubies. That is why the West regards them as uncivilized.

FOOTNOTES:

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It should be said that one sees just as fine buildings in purely Chinese institutions, such as Peking Government University and Nanking Teachers' Training College.

[98]

Mr. Tyau (op. cit. p. 27) quotes from *Who's Who of American Returned Students*, a classification of the occupations of 596 Chinese who have returned from American universities. The larger items are: In education, 38 as administrators and 197 as teachers; in Government service, 129 in executive offices (there are also three members of Parliament and four judges); 95 engineers; 35 medical practitioners (including dentists); 60 in business; and 21 social and religious workers. It is estimated that the total number of Chinese holding university degrees in America is 1,700, and in Great Britain 400 (ib.). This disproportion is due to the more liberal policy of America in the matter of the Boxer indemnity. In 1916 there were 292 Chinese university students in Great Britain, and Mr. Tyau (p. 28) gives a classification of them by their subjects. The larger groups are: Medicine, 50; law and economics, 47; engineering, 42; mining, 22; natural science (including chemistry and geology, which are classified separately), 19.

Russell, Bertrand. *The Problem of China* [ID D5122]. (14)

Chapter XIV

Industrialism in China

China is as yet only slightly industrialized, but the industrial possibilities of the country are very great, and it may be taken as nearly certain that there will be a rapid development throughout the next few decades. China's future depends as much upon the manner of this development as upon any other single factor; and China's difficulties are very largely connected with the present industrial situation. I will therefore first briefly describe this situation, and then consider the possibilities of the near future.

We may take railways and mines as the foundation of a nation's industrial life. Let us therefore consider first the railways and then the mines, before going on to other matters. When railways were new, the Manchu Government, like the universities of Oxford and Cambridge (which it resembled in many ways), objected to them, and did all it could to keep them at a distance.[99] In 1875 a short line was built by foreigners from Shanghai to Woosung, but the Central Government was so shocked that it caused it to be destroyed. In 1881 the first permanent railway was constructed, but not very much was accomplished until after the Japanese War of 1894-5. The Powers then thought that China was breaking up, and entered upon a scramble for concessions and spheres of influence. The Belgians built the important line from Peking to Hankow; the Americans obtained a concession for a Hankow-Canton railway, which, however, has only been constructed as far as Changsha. Russia built the Manchurian Railway, connecting Peking with the Siberian Railway and with Europe. Germany built the Shantung Railway, from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu. The French built a railway in the south. England sought to obtain a monopoly of the railways in the Yangtze valley. All these railways were to be owned by foreigners and managed by foreign officials of the respective countries which had obtained the concessions. The Boxer rising, however, made Europe aware that some caution was needed if the Chinese were not to be exasperated beyond endurance. After this, ownership of new railways was left to the Chinese Government, but with so much foreign control as to rob it of most of its value. By this time, Chinese public opinion had come to realize that there must be railways in China, and that the real problem was how to keep them under Chinese control. In 1908, the Tientsin-Pukow line and the Shanghai-Hangchow line were sanctioned, to be built by the help of foreign loans, but with all the administrative control in the hands of the Chinese Government. At the same time, the Peking-Hankow line was bought back by the Government, and the Peking-Kalgan line was constructed by the Chinese without foreign financial assistance. Of the big main lines of China, this left not much foreign control outside the Manchurian Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway) and the Shantung Railway. The first of these is mainly under foreign control and must now be regarded as permanently lost, until such time as China becomes strong enough to defeat Japan in war; and the whole of Manchuria has come more or less under Japanese control. But the Shantung Railway, by the agreement reached at Washington, is to be bought back by China—five years hence, if all goes well. Thus, except in regions practically lost to China, the Chinese now have control of all their more important railways, or will have before long. This is a very hopeful feature of the situation, and a distinct credit to Chinese sagacity. Putnam Weale (Mr. Lennox Simpson) strongly urges—quite rightly, as I think—the great importance of nationalizing all Chinese railways. At Washington recently, he helped to secure the Shantung Railway award, and to concentrate attention on the railway as the main issue. Writing early in 1919, he said[100]:—

The key to the proper control of China and the building-up of the new Republican State is the railway key.... The revolution of 1911, and the acceptance in principle of Western ideas of popular government, removed the danger of foreign provinces being carved out of the old Manchu Empire. There was, however, left behind a more subtle weapon. This weapon is the railway. Russia with her Manchurian Railway scheme taught Japan the new method. Japan, by the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, not only inherited the richer half of the Manchurian railways, but was able to put into practice a new technique, based on a mixture of twisted economics, police control, and military garrisons. Out of this grew the latter-day highly developed railway-zone which, to all intents and purposes, creates a new type of foreign

enclave, subversive of the Chinese State. The especial evil to-day is that Japan has transferred from Manchuria to Shantung this new technique, which ... she will eventually extend into the very heart of intramural China ... and also into extramural Chihli and Inner Mongolia (thus outflanking Peking) unless she is summarily arrested. At all costs this must be stopped. The method of doing so is easy: It is to have it laid down categorically, and accepted by all the Powers, that henceforth all railways on Chinese soil are a vital portion of Chinese sovereignty and must be controlled directly from Peking by a National Railway Board; that stationmasters, personnel and police, must be Chinese citizens, technical foreign help being limited to a set standard; and that all railway concessions are henceforth to be considered simply as building concessions which must be handed over, section by section, as they are built, to the National Railway Board.

If the Shantung Railway Agreement is loyally carried out, this reform—as to whose importance I quite agree with Putnam Weale—will have been practically completed five years hence. But we must expect Japan to adopt every possible means of avoiding the carrying out of her promises, from instigating Chinese civil war to the murdering of Japanese employees by Japanese secret agents masquerading as Chinese. Therefore, until the Chinese actually have complete control of the Shantung Railway, we cannot feel confident that they will ever get it.

It must not be supposed that the Chinese run railways badly. The Kalgan Railway, which they built, is just as well built as those constructed by foreigners; and the lines under Chinese administration are admirably managed. I quote from Mr. Tyau[101] the following statistics, which refer to the year 1919: Government railways, in operation, 6027 kilometres; under construction, 383 kilometres; private and provincial railways, 773 kilometres; concessioned railways, 3,780 kilometres. Total, 10,963 kilometres, or 6,852 miles. (The concessioned railways are mainly those in Manchuria and Shantung, of which the first must be regarded as definitely lost to China, while the second is probably recovered. The problem of concessioned railways has therefore no longer the importance that it had, though, by detaching Manchuria, the foreign railway has shown its power for evil). As regards financial results, Mr. Tyau gives the following figures for the principal State railways in 1918:—

Name of Line.	Kilometres Operated.	Year Completed.	Per cent. earned on Investment.
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Peking-Mukden 987 1897 22.7

Peking-Hankow 1306 1905 15.8

Shanghai-Nanking 327 1908 6.2

Tientsin-Pukow 1107 1912 6.2

Peking-Suiyuan 490 1915 5.6

Subsequent years, for which I have not the exact figures, have been less prosperous.

I cannot discover any evidence of incompetence in Chinese railway administration. On the contrary, much has been done to overcome the evils due to the fact that the various lines were originally constructed by different Powers, each following its own customs, so that there was no uniformity, and goods trucks could not be moved from one line on to another. There is, however, urgent need of further railways, especially to open up the west and to connect Canton with Hankow, the profit of which would probably be enormous.

Mines are perhaps as important as railways, for if a country allows foreign control of its mineral resources it cannot build up either its industries or its munitions to the point where they will be independent of foreign favour. But the situation as regards mining is at present far from satisfactory. Mr. Julean Arnold, American Commercial Attaché at Peking, writing early in 1919, made the following statement as regards China's mineral resources:—

China is favoured with a wonderful wealth in coal and in a good supply of iron ore, two essentials to modern industrial development. To indicate how little China has developed its marvellous wealth in coal, this country imported, during 1917, 14,000,000 tons. It is estimated that China produces now 20,000,000 tons annually, but it is supposed to have richer resources in coal than has the United States which, in 1918, produced 650,000,000 tons. In iron ore it has been estimated that China has 400,000,000 tons suitable for furnace reaction, and an additional 300,000,000 tons which might be worked by native methods. During 1917, it is estimated that China's production of pig iron was 500,000 tons. The developments in the iron and steel industry in China are making rapid strides, and a few years hence it is expected that the production of pig iron and of finished steel will be several millions of tons annually.... In antimony and tin China is also particularly rich, and considerable progress has taken place in the mining and smelting of these ores during the past few years. China should jealously safeguard its mineral wealth, so as to preserve it for the country's welfare.[102]

The China Year Book for 1919 gives the total Chinese production of coal for 1914 as 6,315,735 tons, and of iron ore at 468,938 tons.[103] Comparing these with Mr. Arnold's figures for 1917, namely 20,000,000 tons of coal and 500,000 tons of pig iron (not iron ore), it is evident that great progress was made during those three years, and there is every reason to think that at least the same rate of progress has been maintained. The main problem for China, however, is not rapid development, but national development. Japan is poor in minerals, and has set to work to acquire as much as possible of the mineral wealth of China. This is important to Japan, for two different reasons: first, that only industrial development can support the growing population, which cannot be induced to emigrate to Japanese possessions on the mainland; secondly, that steel is an indispensable requisite for imperialism.

The Chinese are proud of the Kiangnan dock and engineering works at Shanghai, which is a Government concern, and has proved its capacity for shipbuilding on modern lines. It built four ships of 10,000 tons each for the American Government. Mr. S.G. Cheng[104] says:— For the construction of these ships, materials were mostly supplied by China, except steel, which had to be shipped from America and Europe (the steel produced in China being so limited in quantity, that after a certain amount is exported to Japan by virtue of a previous contract, little is left for home consumption).

Considering how rich China is in iron ore, this state of affairs needs explanation. The explanation is valuable to anyone who wishes to understand modern politics.

The China Year Book for 1919[105] (a work as little concerned with politics as Whitaker's Almanack) gives a list of the five principal iron mines in China, with some information about each. The first and most important are the Tayeh mines, worked by the Hanyehping Iron and Coal Co., Ltd., which, as the reader may remember, was the subject of the third group in the Twenty-one Demands. The total amount of ore in sight is estimated by the China Year Book at 50,000,000 tons, derived chiefly from two mines, in one of which the ore yields 65 per

cent. of iron, in the other 58 to 63 per cent. The output for 1916 is given as 603,732 tons (it has been greatly increased since then). The Year Book proceeds: "Japanese capital is invested in the Company, and by the agreement between China and Japan of May 1915 [after the ultimatum which enforced the revised Twenty-one Demands], the Chinese Government undertook not to convert the Company into a State-owned concern nor to compel it to borrow money from other than Japanese sources." It should be added that there is a Japanese accountant and a Japanese technical adviser, and that pig-iron and ore, up to a specified value, must be sold to the Imperial Japanese works at much below the market price, leaving a paltry residue for sale in the open market.[106]

The second item in the China Year Book's list is the Tungkuang Shan mines. All that is said about these is as follows: "Tungling district on the Yangtze, 55 miles above Wuhu, Anhui province. A concession to work these mines, granted to the London and China Syndicate (British) in 1904, was surrendered in 1910 for the sum of £52,000, and the mines were transferred to a Chinese Company to be formed for their exploitation." These mines, therefore, are in Chinese hands. I do not know what their capacity is supposed to be, and in view of the price at which they were sold, it cannot be very great. The capital of the Hanyehping Co. is \$20,000,000, which is considerably more than £52,000. This was the only one of the five iron mines mentioned in the Year Book which was not in Japanese hands at the time when the Year Book was published.

Next comes the Taochung Iron Mine, Anhui province. "The concession which was granted to the Sino-Japanese Industrial Development Co. will be worked by the Orient Steel Manufacturing Co. The mine is said to contain 60,000,000 tons of ore, containing 65 per cent. of pure iron. The plan of operations provides for the production of pig iron at the rate of 170,000 tons a year, a steel mill with a capacity of 100,000 tons of steel ingots a year, and a casting and forging mill to produce 75,000 tons a year."

The fourth mine is at Chinlingchen, in Shantung, "worked in conjunction with the Hengshan Colliery by the railway." I presume it is to be sold back to China along with the railway. The fifth and last mine mentioned is the Penhsihu Mine, "one of the most promising mines in the nine mining areas in South Manchuria, where the Japanese are permitted by an exchange of Notes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments (May 25, 1915) to prospect for and operate mines. The seam of this mine extends from near Liaoyang to the neighbourhood of Penhsihu, and in size is pronounced equal to the Tayeh mine." It will be observed that this mine, also, was acquired by the Japanese as a result of the ultimatum enforcing the Twenty-one Demands. The Year Book adds: "The Japanese Navy is purchasing some of the Penhsihu output. Osaka ironworks placed an order for 15,000 tons in 1915 and the arsenal at Osaka in the same year accepted a tender for Penhsihu iron."

It will be seen from these facts that, as regards iron, the Chinese have allowed the Japanese to acquire a position of vantage from which they can only be ousted with great difficulty. Nevertheless, it is absolutely imperative that the Chinese should develop an iron and steel industry of their own on a large scale. If they do not, they cannot preserve their national independence, their own civilization, or any of the things that make them potentially of value to the world. It should be observed that the chief reason for which the Japanese desire Chinese iron is in order to be able to exploit and tyrannize over China. Confucius, I understand, says nothing about iron mines;[107] therefore the old-fashioned Chinese did not realize the importance of preserving them. Now that they are awake to the situation, it is almost too late. I shall come back later to the question of what can be done. For the present, let us continue our survey of facts.

It may be presumed that the population of China will always be mainly agricultural. Tea, silk, raw cotton, grain, the soya bean, etc., are crops in which China excels. In production of raw cotton, China is the third country in the world, India being the first and the United States the second. There is, of course, room for great progress in agriculture, but industry is vital if China is to preserve her national independence, and it is industry that is our present topic. To quote Mr. Tyau: "At the end of 1916 the number of factory hands was officially estimated at 560,000 and that of mine workers 406,000. Since then no official returns for the whole country have been published ... but perhaps a million each would be an approximate figure for

the present number of factory operatives and mine workers." [108] Of course, the hours are very long and the wages very low; Mr. Tyau mentions as specially modern and praiseworthy certain textile factories where the wages range from 15 to 45 cents a day. [109] (The cent varies in value, but is always somewhere between a farthing and a halfpenny.) No doubt as industry develops Socialism and labour unrest will also develop. If Mr. Tyau is to be taken as a sample of the modern Chinese governing classes, the policy of the Government towards Labour will be very illiberal. Mr. Tyau's outlook is that of an American capitalist, and shows the extent to which he has come under American influence, as well as that of conservative England (he is an LL.D. of London). Most of the Young Chinese I came across, however, were Socialists, and it may be hoped that the traditional Chinese dislike of uncompromising fierceness will make the Government less savage against Labour than the Governments of America and Japan.

There is room for the development of a great textile industry in China. There are a certain number of modern mills, and nothing but enterprise is needed to make the industry as great as that of Lancashire.

Shipbuilding has made a good beginning in Shanghai, and would probably develop rapidly if China had a flourishing iron and steel industry in native hands.

The total exports of native produce in 1919 were just under £200,000,000 (630,000,000 taels), and the total imports slightly larger. It is better, however, to consider such statistics in taels, because currency fluctuations make the results deceptive when reckoned in sterling. The tael is not a coin, but a certain weight of silver, and therefore its value fluctuates with the value of silver. The China Year Book gives imports and exports of Chinese produce for 1902 as 325 million taels and 214 million taels respectively; for 1911, as 482 and 377; for 1917, as 577 and 462; for 1920, as 762 and 541. (The corresponding figures in pounds sterling for 1911 are 64 millions and 50 millions; for 1917, 124 millions and 99,900,000.) It will thus be seen that, although the foreign trade of China is still small in proportion to population, it is increasing very fast. To a European it is always surprising to find how little the economic life of China is affected by such incidents as revolutions and civil wars.

Certain principles seem to emerge from a study of the Chinese railways and mines as needing to be adopted by the Chinese Government if national independence is to be preserved. As regards railways, nationalization is obviously desirable, even if it somewhat retards the building of new lines. Railways not in the hands of the Government will be controlled, in the end if not in the beginning, by foreigners, who will thus acquire a power over China which will be fatal to freedom. I think we may hope that the Chinese authorities now realize this, and will henceforth act upon it.

In regard to mines, development by the Chinese themselves is urgent, since undeveloped resources tempt the greed of the Great Powers, and development by foreigners makes it possible to keep China enslaved. It should therefore be enacted that, in future, no sale of mines or of any interest in mines to foreigners, and no loan from foreigners on the security of mines, will be recognized as legally valid. In view of extra-territoriality, it will be difficult to induce foreigners to accept such legislation, and Consular Courts will not readily admit its validity. But, as the example of extra-territoriality in Japan shows, such matters depend upon the national strength; if the Powers fear China, they will recognize the validity of Chinese legislation, but if not, not. In view of the need of rapid development of mining by Chinese, it would probably be unwise to nationalize all mines here and now. It would be better to provide every possible encouragement to genuinely Chinese private enterprise, and to offer the assistance of geological and mining experts, etc. The Government should, however, retain the right (a) to buy out any mining concern at a fair valuation; (b) to work minerals itself in cases where the private owners fail to do so, in spite of expert opinion in favour of their being worked. These powers should be widely exercised, and as soon as mining has reached the point compatible with national security, the mines should be all nationalized, except where, as at Tayeh, diplomatic agreements stand in the way. It is clear that the Tayeh mines must be recovered by China as soon as opportunity offers, but when or how that will be it is as yet impossible to say. Of course I have been assuming an orderly government established in China, but without that nothing vigorous can be done to repel foreign aggression. This is a

point to which, along with other general questions connected with the industrializing of China, I shall return in my last chapter.

It is said by Europeans who have business experience in China that the Chinese are not good at managing large joint-stock companies, such as modern industry requires. As everyone knows, they are proverbially honest in business, in spite of the corruption of their politics. But their successful businesses—so one gathers—do not usually extend beyond a single family; and even they are apt to come to grief sooner or later through nepotism. This is what Europeans say; I cannot speak from my own knowledge. But I am convinced that modern education is very quickly changing this state of affairs, which was connected with Confucianism and the family ethic. Many Chinese have been trained in business methods in America; there are Colleges of Commerce at Woosung and other places; and the patriotism of Young China has led men of the highest education to devote themselves to industrial development. The Chinese are no doubt, by temperament and tradition, more suited to commerce than to industry, but contact with the West is rapidly introducing new aptitudes and a new mentality. There is, therefore, every reason to expect, if political conditions are not too adverse, that the industrial development of China will proceed rapidly throughout the next few decades. It is of vital importance that that development should be controlled by the Chinese rather than by foreign nations. But that is part of the larger problem of the recovery of Chinese independence, with which I shall deal in my last chapter.

FOOTNOTES:

[99]

For the history of Chinese railways, see Tyau, *op. cit.* pp. 183 ff.

[100]

China in 1918. Published by the Peking Leader, pp. 45-6.

[101]

Op. cit. chap. xi.

[102]

China in 1918, p. 26. There is perhaps some mistake in the figures given for iron ore, as the Tayeh mines alone are estimated by some to contain 700,000,000 tons of iron ore. Coleman, *op. cit.* p. 51.

[103]

Page 63. The 1922 Year Book gives 19,500,000 tons of coal production.

[104]

Modern China, p, 265.

[105]

Pages 74-5.

[106]

Coleman, *op. cit.* chap. xiv.

[107]

It seems it would be inaccurate to maintain that there is nothing on the subject in the Gospels. An eminent American divine pointed out in print, as regards the advice against laying up treasure where moth and rust doth corrupt, that "moth and rust do not get at Mr. Rockefeller's oil wells, and thieves do not often break through and steal a railway. What Jesus condemned was hoarding wealth." See Upton Sinclair, *The Profits of Religion*, 1918, p. 175.

[108]

Page 237.

[109]

Page 218. [Russ2]

1922.01.15 Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. (15)

Chapter XV

The outlook for China

In this chapter I propose to take, as far as I am able, the standpoint of a progressive and public-spirited Chinese, and consider what reforms, in what order, I should advocate in that case.

To begin with, it is clear that China must be saved by her own efforts, and cannot rely upon outside help. In the international situation, China has had both good and bad fortune. The Great War was unfortunate, because it gave Japan temporarily a free hand; the collapse of Tsarist Russia was fortunate, because it put an end to the secret alliance of Russians and Japanese; the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was unfortunate, because it compelled us to abet Japanese aggression even against our own economic interests; the friction between Japan and America was fortunate; but the agreement arrived at by the Washington Conference, though momentarily advantageous as regards Shantung, is likely, in the long run, to prove unfortunate, since it will make America less willing to oppose Japan. For reasons which I set forth in Chap. X., unless China becomes strong, either the collapse of Japan or her unquestioned ascendancy in the Far East is almost certain to prove disastrous to China; and one or other of these is very likely to come about. All the Great Powers, without exception, have interests which are incompatible, in the long run, with China's welfare and with the best development of Chinese civilization. Therefore the Chinese must seek salvation in their own energy, not in the benevolence of any outside Power.

The problem is not merely one of political independence; a certain cultural independence is at least as important. I have tried to show in this book that the Chinese are, in certain ways, superior to us, and it would not be good either for them or for us if, in these ways, they had to descend to our level in order to preserve their existence as a nation. In this matter, however, a compromise is necessary. Unless they adopt some of our vices to some extent, we shall not respect them, and they will be increasingly oppressed by foreign nations. The object must be to keep this process within the narrowest limits compatible with safety.

First of all, a patriotic spirit is necessary—not, of course, the bigoted anti-foreign spirit of the Boxers, but the enlightened attitude which is willing to learn from other nations while not willing to allow them to dominate. This attitude has been generated among educated Chinese, and to a great extent in the merchant class, by the brutal tuition of Japan. The danger of patriotism is that, as soon as it has proved strong enough for successful defence, it is apt to turn to foreign aggression. China, by her resources and her population, is capable of being the greatest Power in the world after the United States. It is much to be feared that, in the process of becoming strong enough to preserve their independence, the Chinese may become strong enough to embark upon a career of imperialism. It cannot be too strongly urged that patriotism should be only defensive, not aggressive. But with this proviso, I think a spirit of patriotism is absolutely necessary to the regeneration of China. Independence is to be sought, not as an end in itself, but as a means towards a new blend of Western skill with the traditional Chinese virtues. If this end is not achieved, political independence will have little value.

The three chief requisites, I should say, are: (1) The establishment of an orderly Government; (2) industrial development under Chinese control; (3) The spread of education. All these aims will have to be pursued concurrently, but on the whole their urgency seems to me to come in the above order. We have already seen how large a part the State will have to take in building up industry, and how impossible this is while the political anarchy continues. Funds for education on a large scale are also unobtainable until there is good government. Therefore good government is the prerequisite of all other reforms. Industrialism and education are closely connected, and it would be difficult to decide the priority between them; but I have put industrialism first, because, unless it is developed very soon by the Chinese, foreigners will have acquired such a strong hold that it will be very difficult indeed to oust them. These reasons have decided me that our three problems ought to be taken in the above order.

1. The establishment of an orderly government.—At the moment of writing, the condition of China is as anarchic as it has ever been. A battle between Chang-tso-lin and Wu-Pei-Fu is

imminent; the former is usually considered, though falsely according to some good authorities, the most reactionary force in China; Wu-Pei-Fu, though *The Times* calls him "the Liberal leader," may well prove no more satisfactory than "Liberal" leaders nearer home. It is of course possible that, if he wins, he may be true to his promises and convoke a Parliament for all China; but it is at least equally possible that he may not. In any case, to depend upon the favour of a successful general is as precarious as to depend upon the benevolence of a foreign Power. If the progressive elements are to win, they must become a strong organized force.

So far as I can discover, Chinese Constitutionalists are doing the best thing that is possible at the moment, namely, concerting a joint programme, involving the convoking of a Parliament and the cessation of military usurpation. Union is essential, even if it involves sacrifice of cherished beliefs on the part of some. Given a programme upon which all the Constitutionalists are united, they will acquire great weight in public opinion, which is very powerful in China. They may then be able, sooner or later, to offer a high constitutional position to some powerful general, on condition of his ceasing to depend upon mere military force. By this means they may be able to turn the scales in favour of the man they select, as the student agitation turned the scales in July 1920 in favour of Wu-Pei-Fu against the An Fu party. Such a policy can only be successful if it is combined with vigorous propaganda, both among the civilian population and among the soldiers, and if, as soon as peace is restored, work is found for disbanded soldiers and pay for those who are not disbanded. This raises the financial problem, which is very difficult, because foreign Powers will not lend except in return for some further sacrifice of the remnants of Chinese independence. (For reasons explained in Chap. X., I do not accept the statement by the American consortium bankers that a loan from them would not involve control over China's internal affairs. They may not mean control to be involved, but I am convinced that in fact it would be.) The only way out of this difficulty that I can see is to raise an internal loan by appealing to the patriotism of Chinese merchants. There is plenty of money in China, but, very naturally, rich Chinese will not lend to any of the brigands who now control the Government.

When the time comes to draft a permanent Constitution, I have no doubt that it will have to be federal, allowing a very large measure of autonomy to the provinces, and reserving for the Central Government few things except customs, army and navy, foreign relations and railways. Provincial feeling is strong, and it is now, I think, generally recognized that a mistake was made in 1912 in not allowing it more scope.

While a Constitution is being drafted, and even after it has been agreed upon, it will not be possible to rely upon the inherent prestige of Constitutionalism, or to leave public opinion without guidance. It will be necessary for the genuinely progressive people throughout the country to unite in a strongly disciplined society, arriving at collective decisions and enforcing support of those decisions upon all its members. This society will have to win the confidence of public opinion by a very rigid avoidance of corruption and political profiteering; the slightest failure of a member in this respect must be visited by expulsion. The society must make itself obviously the champion of the national interests as against all self-seekers, speculators and toadies to foreign Powers. It will thus become able authoritatively to commend or condemn politicians and to wield great influence over opinion, even in the army. There exists in Young China enough energy, patriotism and honesty to create such a society and to make it strong through the respect which it will command. But unless enlightened patriotism is organized in some such way, its power will not be equal to the political problems with which China is faced.

Sooner or later, the encroachments of foreign Powers upon the sovereign rights of China must be swept away. The Chinese must recover the Treaty Ports, control of the tariff, and so on; they must also free themselves from extra-territoriality. But all this can probably be done, as it was in Japan, without offending foreign Powers (except perhaps the Japanese). It would be a mistake to complicate the early stages of Chinese recovery by measures which would antagonize foreign Powers in general. Russia was in a stronger position for defence than China, yet Russia has suffered terribly from the universal hostility provoked by the Bolsheviki. Given good government and a development of China's resources, it will be

possible to obtain most of the needed concessions by purely diplomatic means; the rest can wait for a suitable opportunity.

2. Industrial development.—On this subject I have already written in Chap. XIV.; it is certain general aspects of the subject that I wish to consider now. For reasons already given, I hold that all railways ought to be in the hands of the State, and that all successful mines ought to be purchased by the State at a fair valuation, even if they are not State-owned from the first. Contracts with foreigners for loans ought to be carefully drawn so as to leave the control to China. There would not be much difficulty about this if China had a stable and orderly government; in that case, many foreign capitalists would be willing to lend on good security, without exacting any part in the management. Every possible diplomatic method should be employed to break down such a monopoly as the consortium seeks to acquire in the matter of loans.

Given good government, a large amount of State enterprise would be desirable in Chinese industry. There are many arguments for State Socialism, or rather what Lenin calls State Capitalism, in any country which is economically but not culturally backward. In the first place, it is easier for the State to borrow than for a private person; in the second place, it is easier for the State to engage and employ the foreign experts who are likely to be needed for some time to come; in the third place, it is easier for the State to make sure that vital industries do not come under the control of foreign Powers. What is perhaps more important than any of these considerations is that, by undertaking industrial enterprise from the first, the State can prevent the growth of many of the evils of private capitalism. If China can acquire a vigorous and honest State, it will be possible to develop Chinese industry without, at the same time, developing the overweening power of private capitalists by which the Western nations are now both oppressed and misled.

But if this is to be done successfully, it will require a great change in Chinese morals, a development of public spirit in place of the family ethic, a transference to the public service of that honesty which already exists in private business, and a degree of energy which is at present rare. I believe that Young China is capable of fulfilling these requisites, spurred on by patriotism; but it is important to realize that they are requisites, and that, without them, any system of State Socialism must fail.

For industrial development, it is important that the Chinese should learn to become technical experts and also to become skilled workers. I think more has been done towards the former of these needs than towards the latter. For the latter purpose, it would probably be wise to import skilled workmen—say from Germany—and cause them to give instruction to Chinese workmen in any new branch of industrial work that it might be desired to develop.

3. Education.—If China is to become a democracy, as most progressive Chinese hope, universal education is imperative. Where the bulk of the population cannot read, true democracy is impossible. Education is a good in itself, but is also essential for developing political consciousness, of which at present there is almost none in rural China. The Chinese themselves are well aware of this, but in the present state of the finances it is impossible to establish universal elementary education. Until it has been established for some time, China must be, in fact, if not in form, an oligarchy, because the uneducated masses cannot have any effective political opinion. Even given good government, it is doubtful whether the immense expense of educating such a vast population could be borne by the nation without a considerable industrial development. Such industrial development as already exists is mainly in the hands of foreigners, and its profits provide warships for the Japanese, or mansions and dinners for British and American millionaires. If its profits are to provide the funds for Chinese education, industry must be in Chinese hands. This is another reason why industrial development must probably precede any complete scheme of education.

For the present, even if the funds existed, there would not be sufficient teachers to provide a schoolmaster in every village. There is, however, such an enthusiasm for education in China that teachers are being trained as fast as is possible with such limited resources; indeed a great deal of devotion and public spirit is being shown by Chinese educators, whose salaries are usually many months in arrears.

Chinese control is, to my mind, as important in the matter of education as in the matter of

industry. For the present, it is still necessary to have foreign instructors in some subjects, though this necessity will soon cease. Foreign instructors, however, provided they are not too numerous, do no harm, any more than foreign experts in railways and mines. What does harm is foreign management. Chinese educated in mission schools, or in lay establishments controlled by foreigners, tend to become de-nationalized, and to have a slavish attitude towards Western civilization. This unfits them for taking a useful part in the national life, and tends to undermine their morals. Also, oddly enough, it makes them more conservative in purely Chinese matters than the young men and women who have had a modern education under Chinese auspices. Europeans in general are more conservative about China than the modern Chinese are, and they tend to convey their conservatism to their pupils. And of course their whole influence, unavoidably if involuntarily, militates against national self-respect in those whom they teach.

Those who desire to do research in some academic subject will, for some time to come, need a period of residence in some European or American university. But for the great majority of university students it is far better, if possible, to acquire their education in China. Returned students have, to a remarkable extent, the stamp of the country from which they have returned, particularly when that country is America. A society such as was foreshadowed earlier in this chapter, in which all really progressive Chinese should combine, would encounter difficulties, as things stand, from the divergencies in national bias between students returned from (say) Japan, America and Germany. Given time, this difficulty can be overcome by the increase in purely Chinese university education, but at present the difficulty would be serious.

To overcome this difficulty, two things are needed: inspiring leadership, and a clear conception of the kind of civilization to be aimed at. Leadership will have to be both intellectual and practical. As regards intellectual leadership, China is a country where writers have enormous influence, and a vigorous reformer possessed of literary skill could carry with him the great majority of Young China. Men with the requisite gifts exist in China; I might mention, as an example personally known to me, Dr. Hu Suh.[110] He has great learning, wide culture, remarkable energy, and a fearless passion for reform; his writings in the vernacular inspire enthusiasm among progressive Chinese. He is in favour of assimilating all that is good in Western culture, but by no means a slavish admirer of our ways.

The practical political leadership of such a society as I conceive to be needed would probably demand different gifts from those required in an intellectual leader. It is therefore likely that the two could not be combined in one man, but would need men as different as Lenin and Karl Marx.

The aim to be pursued is of importance, not only to China, but to the world. Out of the renaissance spirit now existing in China, it is possible, if foreign nations can be prevented from working havoc, to develop a new civilization better than any that the world has yet known. This is the aim which Young China should set before itself: the preservation of the urbanity and courtesy, the candour and the pacific temper, which are characteristic of the Chinese nation, together with a knowledge of Western science and an application of it to the practical problems of China. Of such practical problems there are two kinds: one due to the internal condition of China, and the other to its international situation. In the former class come education, democracy, the diminution of poverty, hygiene and sanitation, and the prevention of famines. In the latter class come the establishment of a strong government, the development of industrialism, the revision of treaties and the recovery of the Treaty Ports (as to which Japan may serve as a model), and finally, the creation of an army sufficiently strong to defend the country against Japan. Both classes of problems demand Western science. But they do not demand the adoption of the Western philosophy of life.

If the Chinese were to adopt the Western philosophy of life, they would, as soon as they had made themselves safe against foreign aggression, embark upon aggression on their own account. They would repeat the campaigns of the Han and Tang dynasties in Central Asia, and perhaps emulate Kublai by the invasion of Japan. They would exploit their material resources with a view to producing a few bloated plutocrats at home and millions dying of hunger abroad. Such are the results which the West achieves by the application of science. If

China were led astray by the lure of brutal power, she might repel her enemies outwardly, but would have yielded to them inwardly. It is not unlikely that the great military nations of the modern world will bring about their own destruction by their inability to abstain from war, which will become, with every year that passes, more scientific and more devastating. If China joins in this madness, China will perish like the rest. But if Chinese reformers can have the moderation to stop when they have made China capable of self-defence, and to abstain from the further step of foreign conquest; if, when they have become safe at home, they can turn aside from the materialistic activities imposed by the Powers, and devote their freedom to science and art and the inauguration of a better economic system—then China will have played the part in the world for which she is fitted, and will have given to mankind as a whole new hope in the moment of greatest need. It is this hope that I wish to see inspiring Young China. This hope is realizable; and because it is realizable, China deserves a foremost place in the esteem of every lover of mankind.

FOOTNOTES:

[110]

An account of a portion of his work will be found in Tyau, *op. cit.* pp. 40 ff.

Appendix

While the above pages were going through the Press, some important developments have taken place in China. Wu-Pei-Fu has defeated Chang-tso-lin and made himself master of Peking. Chang has retreated towards Manchuria with a broken army, and proclaimed the independence of Manchuria. This might suit the Japanese very well, but it is hardly to be supposed that the other Powers would acquiesce. It is, therefore, not unlikely that Chang may lose Manchuria also, and cease to be a factor in Chinese politics.

For the moment, Wu-Pei-Fu controls the greater part of China, and his intentions become important. The British in China have, for some years, befriended him, and this fact colours all Press telegrams appearing in our newspapers. According to *The Times*, he has pronounced in favour of the reassembling of the old all-China Parliament, with a view to the restoration of constitutional government. This is a measure in which the South could concur, and if he really adheres to this intention he has it in his power to put an end to Chinese anarchy. The *Times* Peking correspondent, telegraphing on May 30, reports that "Wu-Pei-Fu declares that if the old Parliament will reassemble and work in national interests he will support it up to the limit, and fight any obstructionists."

On May 18, the same correspondent telegraphed that "Wu-Pei-Fu is lending his support to the unification movements, and has found common ground for action with Chen Chiung Ming," who is Sun's colleague at Canton and is engaged in civil war with Sun, who is imperialistic and wants to conquer all China for his government, said to be alone constitutional. The programme agreed upon between Wu and Chen Chiung Ming is given in the same telegram as follows:

Local self-government shall be established and magistrates shall be elected by the people; District police shall be created under District Boards subject to Central Provincial Boards; Civil governors shall be responsible to the Central Government, not to the Tuchuns; a national army shall be created, controlled and paid by the Central Government; Provincial police and gendarmerie, not the Tuchuns or the army, shall be responsible for peace and order in the provinces; the whole nation shall agree to recall the old Parliament and the restoration of the Provisional Constitution of the first year of the Republic; Taxes shall be collected by the Central Government, and only a stipulated sum shall be granted to each province for expenses, the balance to be forwarded to the Central Government as under the Ching dynasty; Afforestation shall be undertaken, industries established, highways built, and other measures taken to keep the people on the land.

This is an admirable programme, but it is impossible to know how much of it will ever be carried out.

Meanwhile, Sun Yat Sen is still at war with Wu-Pei-Fu. It has been stated in the British Press that there was an alliance between Sun and Chang, but it seems there was little more than a common hostility to Wu. Sun's friends maintain that he is a genuine Constitutionalist, and that Wu is not to be trusted, but Chen Chiung Ming has a better reputation than Sun among reformers. The British in China all praise Wu and hate Sun; the Americans all praise Sun and decry Wu. Sun undoubtedly has a past record of genuine patriotism, and there can be no doubt that the Canton Government has been the best in China. What appears in our newspapers on the subject is certainly designed to give a falsely unfavourable impression of Canton. For example, in *The Times* of May 15, a telegram appeared from Hong-Kong to the following effect:

I learn that the troops of Sun Yat Sen, President of South China, which are stated to be marching north from Canton, are a rabble. Many are without weapons and a large percentage of the uniforms are merely rags. There is no discipline, and gambling and opium-smoking are rife.

Nevertheless, on May 30, *The Times* had to confess that this army had won a brilliant victory, capturing "the most important stronghold in Kiangsi," together with 40 field guns and large quantities of munitions.

The situation must remain obscure until more detailed news has arrived by mail. It is to be hoped that the Canton Government, through the victory of Chen Chiung Ming, will come to terms with Wu-Pei-Fu, and will be strong enough to compel him to adhere to the terms. It is

to be hoped also that Chang's proclamation of the independence of Manchuria will not be seized upon by Japan as an excuse for a more complete absorption of that country. If Wu-Pei-Fu adheres to the declaration quoted above, there can be no patriotic reason why Canton should not co-operate with him; on the other hand, the military strength of Canton makes it more likely that Wu will find it prudent to adhere to his declaration. There is certainly a better chance than there was before the defeat of Chang for the unification of China and the ending of the Tutchuns' tyranny. But it is as yet no more than a chance, and the future is still problematical.

June 21, 1922.

Russell, Bertrand. The problem of China : **Sekundärliteratur**
1994

George C.H. Sun : Russell's book on China has a unique charm of its own which is presented in his characteristically lucid, brief and witty style and is highly suggestive, full of insight. Even when reread today, more than seventy years after its first appearance, it remains a rare classic, unsurpassed, in the field of China studies. 'The problem of China' is a book written with an unusual perspicuity, profound sympathy and a long range perspective into the cultural heritage of Chinese civilization, its future and that of the entire world. Much of what is said therein remains unchallenged, especially the non-topical parts. Many of the insightful prophecies made about the destiny of China have turned out to be true. His pessimistic view of the two alternatives China would be forced to take : militarism and/or communism, if the Western powers were not to relieve their pressure.

2007

Ding Zijiang : Russell advocated that China should (1) develop industry to halt the extreme poverty ; (2) to establish an efficient and constitutional parliamentary government, with the support of a patriotic and world-minded populace, stop military usurpation and foreign control, and avoid excessive bureaucratic dictatorship ; (3) build a new economic system which can be called 'State Socialism', or what Lenin called 'State Capitalism', because it is unsuitable to establish a pure or complete socialism in an undeveloped country such as China ; (4) apply the Russian type of communism to China's present stage of economic development since its urgent problem was to increase production with rapid speed (although it could not prevail in Western Europe and was not an ideal system for world peace) ; and (5) follow the pacific and non-violent approaches in its reform.

The reconstruction of Chinese education should follow Russell's model : (1) education could help China avoid poverty and backwardness ; (2) Chinese education should teach more science and technical skills, but not morals or ethical maxims about government derived from Western culture ; (3) Chinese education should develop political consciousness among the people and avoid the foreign control that made Chinese students slavish toward Western civilization. The reconstruction of Chinese thought should follow Russell's philosophical approaches. Russell suggested : (1) new Chinese philosophy should be based on modern sciences, not on mysticism ; (2) Chinese intellectuals should apply the methods of philosophical analysis and mathematical logic, instead of romantic synthesis ; (3) China should give up the traditional Confucian and Daoist passive agricultural and family ethics and should instead develop public spirit, patriotism, or Western nationalism ; and (4) China should have an antireligious movement, including Marxism as a form of religion, in addition to Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam.

Russell emphasized that Westerners should learn from the Chinese 'a just conception of ends of life'. He believed that the Chinese could not learn morals or ethical maxims about government from Western culture. For him, contact between East and West was likely to be fruitful to both parties. China could learn from the West the indispensable minimum of practical efficiency, and the West could learn from China the contemplative wisdom that has enabled it to persist.

In China, unlike the Western militant and aggressive attitude. Russell found a tranquil, pacific, humane, and tolerant attitude among the average people, in particular among those in the countryside. Moreover, most Chinese ethics and political philosophy preached an ideal life along these lines. He felt that the Chinese Daoist philosophy of Laozi and Zhuangzi was most compelling. Russell's advocacy for industrialization without losing the passive and pacific characters of the Chinese and their ethics developed in an agricultural society raised the question whether it was too difficult to realize. Whether the Daoist philosophy to 'reject knowledge' and 'return to follow nature' was compatible with the modern scientific attempt to seek knowledge endlessly and conquer nature was also an open question. [Russ41,Russ43,Russ2]

- 1922.01.31 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Ottoline Morrell. 31 Sydney Street, 31 Jan. 1922.
Dearest O. ... The other day Dora and I went to a Chinese feast given by the Chinese Students here. They made speeches full of delicate wit, in the style of 18th century France, with a mastery of English that quite amazed me. The Chinese Chargé d'Affaires said he had been asked to speak on Chinese Politics – he said the urgent questions were the General Election, economy and limitation of armaments – he spoke quite a long time, saying only things that might have been said in a political speech about England, and which yet were quite all right for China – when he sat down he had not committed himself to anything at all, but had suggested (without ever saying) that China's problems were worse than ours. The Chinese constantly remind me of Oscar Wilde in his first trial when he thought wit would pull one through anything, and found himself in the grip of a great machine that cared nothing for human values. I read of a Chinese General the other day, whose troops had ventured to resist a Japanese attack, so the Japanese insisted that he should apologize to their Consul. He replied that he had no uniform grand enough for such an august occasion, and therefore to his profound sorrow he must forego the pleasure of visiting a man for whom he had so high an esteem. When they nevertheless insisted, he called the same day on all the other Consuls, so that it appeared as if he were paying a mere visit of ceremony. Then all Japan raised a howl that he had insulted the Japanese nation. I would do anything in the world to help the Chinese, but it is difficult. They are like a nation of artists, with all their good and bad points. Imagine Gertler and [Augustus] John and Lytton set to govern the British Empire, and you will have some idea how China has been governed for 2000 years. Lytton is very like an old fashioned Chinaman, not at all like the modern westernized type.
I must stop. All my love. Your B. [Russ36]
- 1922.03.02 Letter from Xu Zhimo to Bertrand Russell. 2.3.1922.
Xu Zhimo decided to divorce his first wife and to marry Lin Huiyin. He must have been desirous of seeking advice from the Russells before he contacted his wife in Berlin.
"I wonder if I may have the happiness and privilege to book you to lunch or tea with me at the above address [55 Victoria Road, Cambridge] when you come to town this weekend [sic]. I do hope it will not be inconvenient for you to arrange. I can hardly express the anxiety with which I have been looking forward to meeting you again : I do miss you heartily.
I think I can get Mr. [G. Lowes] Dickinson to be with us if you like. But I must confess my desire to monopolize your attention even for a rare short occasion and on that account should not regret omitting Mr. Dickinson's company, charming as it is. Selfishness, perhaps. But you will smile and forgive. I am confident."
Xu did not manage to see Russell again before 1925. [Russ45]

1922.03.08 Russell, Bertrand. *As a European radical sees it*. In : *The Freeman* ; vol. 4 (8. März 1922). [Betr. China].

Many Americans not unnaturally think that the good record of America hitherto is a reason for expecting a good record in the future. I think those who take this point of view do not quite understand the new temptations to which America will henceforth be exposed. I know there is in America a great deal of what is called 'idealism'. But what are its manifestations ? Prohibition certainly is due to 'idealism'. Now there are many good arguments in favour of prohibition, and I am not myself prepared to oppose it, but no student of modern psychology will suppose that these arguments were what persuaded the nation. Apart from the interests of those who make non-alcoholic drinks, and the hopes of employers that their men would work harder, it must have been the case that there were more people who found pleasure in preventing others from drinking than people who found pleasure in drinking themselves. Take another exhibition of 'idealism': the treatment of Maxim Gorky in the United States. I know there were journalistic reasons for inflaming opinion against him, but these could not have operated unless opinion were ready to be inflamed. In America divorce is easy ; in Tsarist Russia it was almost impossible. Consequently the law had not sanctioned a union far more stable than many American marriages; therefore Gorky was 'immoral' and must be hounded out of the country. Again : the Bible says 'Thou shalt not steal', but Socialists believe that civilization can only be preserved by confiscation of private property. Therefore they are immoral men, who must not be allowed to sit in a Legislature to which they have been duly elected, and whose heads may be bashed in by loyal mobs who invade their houses. Sacco and Vanzetti are accused of a murder, and there is no conclusive evidence that they committed it ; but their political opinions are undesirable, so that no one is interested in the mere question of fact: Did they, or did they not, commit the murder? The moral repro-bation of these men on account of their opinions is, no doubt, another case of 'idealism'. So far, 'idealism' may be identified with love of persecution. If I were concerned to analyse its unconscious psychological sources, I should say that this form of it results from a conflict between the Christian duty of loving one's neighbour and the natural man's impulse to torture him. A reconciliation is effected by the theory that one's neighbour is a 'sinner', who must be punished in order to be purified. People cling to the con-ception of 'sin', because otherwise they would have no moral justification for inflicting pain. 'Idealism', in this form, is moral reprobation as a pretext for torture.

I do not suggest that America is the only country where there is 'idealism'. All the belligerents were full of it during the war, and is still rampant everywhere. But it is only in America, and to a lesser extent in England, that it still deceives the people who are trying to think out the prob-lem of creating a happier world. Is it not clear that a happier world will not be generated by hatred, even if the objects of hatred are 'sinners' ? Do any Christians, I wonder, ever read the Gospels ?

'Idealism' has, however, a wider scope than persecution. It may be defined generically as the practice of proclaiming moral motives for our actions. After America's entry into the war, President Wilson became idealistic in our former sense; before that, when he was 'too proud to fight', he was idealistic in a wider sense. The objection to proclaiming moral motives for one's actions is twofold: first, that no one else believes what one says; and secondly, that one does believe it oneself. I have no doubt that many Americans believe in the unselfishness of America's motives, first for neutrality and then for belligerency. People who are not Americans, however, cannot be persuaded to adopt this view. They think that America intervened at the exact moment most favourable for Ameri-can interests, and that America would not have become either so rich or so powerful as she is if she had intervened sooner or had remained neutral to the end. They do not blame America for this, but they are somewhat irritated when they find that Americans will not admit it, but claim to be made of nobler stuff than the rest of humanity.

I suppose few things have done more to disgust Americans with the Old World than the secret treaties. I am not, of course, a defender of the secret treaties, but I think it is worth while to understand how a man like Lord Grey came to agree to them. I took and still take the view that the issues in the war were unimportant, that it did not matter which side won (though a

draw would have been best), and that the most important thing was that the war should end quickly. This was not the view of the belligerents. The British Government took the view—to which America was converted in the end—that the defeat of Germany was vital. We could not defeat Germany without the help of nations having no direct interest in the struggle, and we could not get their help without buying it. By the time America came in, we had built up such a strong alliance that America's strength turned the scale ; but it must be admitted that America profited by our sins. Our people did not know of the secret treaties ; the sins were only those of the Government. And when President Wilson declared in the Senate that he did not know of the secret treaties, the American Govern-ment showed that it shared the guilt. I come now to China. It is in China that American policy has been seen at its best. America alone has not sought concessions, has returned the balance of the Boxer indemnity, has stood for the Open Door, and has championed the independence and integrity of China. All these things are admirable, but they show wisdom rather than unselfishness ; they are all strictly consonant with American interests. The Washington Conference has provided a good deal of rather painful evidence that the interests of China receive little consideration when they are opposed to those of America. Up to the present (January 26), it is doubtful whether anything effective is going to be done about Shantung, but that may be excused on the ground of Japanese obduracy. The more serious matter is the Ameri-can attempt to secure international control of China by means of the Consortium. China is in financial difficulties, partly owing to the anarchy which has been carefully fomented by Japan, partly owing to the withhold-ing of the Customs Revenue by the British Inspector-General of Customs. The London 'Times' of 14 January says :

It is curious to reflect that this country [China] could be ren-dered completely solvent and the Government provided with a substantial income almost by a stroke of the foreigner's pen, while without that stroke there must be bankruptcy pure and simple. Despite constant civil war and political chaos, the Customs Rev-ue consistently grows, and last year exceeded all records by £1,000,000. The increased duties sanctioned by the Washington Conference will provide sufficient revenue to liquidate the whole foreign and domestic floating debt in a very few years, leaving the splendid salt surplus unencumbered for the Government. The difficulty is not to provide money, but to find a Government to which to entrust it. Yet the 'Times' foams at the mouth when the Chinese say they would like to recover control of their own customs. As a consequence of foreign control the Chinese Government has failed to meet an obligation of \$5,500,000 due to a Chicago bank. The resulting action of America is set forth in 'The Freeman' for November 25 (p. 244), as follows : American financiers and politicians were at one and the same time the heroes and villains of the piece; having cooperated in the creation of a dangerous situation, they came forward handsomely in the hour of trial with an offer to save China from themselves as it were, if the Chinese Government would only enter into relations with the Consortium, and thus prepare the way for the eventual establishment of an American financial protectorate.

In the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle' for November 17 (p. 725), in a telegram headed 'International Control of China', I find it reported that America is thought to be seeking to establish international control, and that Mr. Wellington Koo told the Philadelphia 'Public Ledger': 'We suspect the motives which led to the suggestion and we thoroughly doubt its feasibility. China will bitterly oppose any conference-plan to offer China inter-national aid.' He adds : 'International control will not do. China must be given time and opportunity to find herself. The world should not misin-terpret or exaggerate the meaning of the convulsion which China is now passing through.' These are wise words, with which every true friend of China must agree. In the same issue of the 'Japan Weekly Chronicle'— which, by the way, I consider one of the best weekly papers in the world— I find the following (p. 728) :

Mr. Lennox Simpson [Putnam Weale] is quoted as saying: 'The international bankers have a scheme for the international control of China. Mr. Lamont, representing the consortium, offered a sixteen-million-dollar loan to China, which the Chinese Govern-ment refused to accept because Mr. Lamont insisted that the Hukuang bonds, German issue, which had been acquired by the Morgan Company, should be paid out of it.' Mr. Lamont, on hearing this charge, made an emphatic denial, saying : 'Simpson's statement is unqualifiedly false. When

this man Simpson talks about resisting the control of the international banks he is fantas-tic. We don't want control. We are anxious that the conference result in such a solution as will furnish full opportunity to China to fulfil her own destiny.'

Sagacious people will be inclined to conclude that so much anger must be due to being touched on the raw, and that Mr. Lamont, if he had had nothing to conceal, would not have spoken of a distinguished writer and one of China's best friends as 'this man Simpson'.

I do not pretend that the evidence against the consortium is conclusive, and I have not space here to set it all forth, but to any European radical Air. Lamont's statement that the consortium does not want control reads like a contradiction in terms. Those who wish to lend to a Government which, if it is let alone, will go bankrupt, must aim at control, for, even if there were not the incident of the Chicago bank, it would be impossible to believe that Messrs.

Morgan and Company are so purely philanthropic as not to care whether they get any interest on their money or not, although emissaries of the consortium in China have spoken as though this were the case.

While I was in China recently, the consortium, which is theoretically international but practically American, offered a loan to China on condition that China made certain internal reforms. China rejected the offer, rightly as I thought, since it involved international control. Shortly before my departure from Peking, Mr. Crane, who had just ceased to be American Minister to China, was reported in the 'Peking Leader' (a paper owned by Chinese but edited by an American) to have stated in an interview that he was in favour of international control of China. I mentioned this interview in a farewell address. To my amazement, there was an uproar among the very Americans who had advocated the Consortium. The editor of the 'Peking Leader', in whose paper the interview had appeared, seemed astonished that I could have believed it to be genuine, and made difficulties about permitting my address to be reprinted. I left China immediately afterwards, and do not know what subsequently occurred, except that the Peking Leader published an editorial criticizing my work as a professor. All this shows the curious confusion of mind which enables people to advocate a loan on condition of internal changes, and yet to imagine themselves opposed to international control.

In the 'New Republic' for November 30, there is an article by Mr. Brailsford entitled 'A New Technique of Peace', which sets forth an analysis with which I find myself in complete agreement. If the Conference is successful, I expect to see China compelled to be orderly so as to afford a field for foreign commerce and industry; a government such as the West will consider good substituted for the present go-as-you-please anarchy; a gradually increasing flow of wealth from China to the investing countries, the chief of which is America; the development of a sweated Chinese proletariat; the spread of Christianity; the substitution of the American civilization for the Chinese; the destruction of traditional beauty, except for such objets d'art as millionaires may think it worth while to buy; the gradual awakening of China to her exploitation by the foreigner; and one day, fifty or a hundred years hence, the massacre of every white man throughout the Celestial Empire at a signal from some vast secret society.

All this is probably inevitable, human nature being what it is. It will be done in order that rich men may grow richer, but we shall be told that it is done in order that China may have 'good' government. The definition of the word 'good' is difficult, but the definition of 'good government' is as easy as A.B.C. : it is government that yields fat dividends to capitalists. The Chinese are gentle, urbane, seeking only justice and freedom. They have a civilization superior to ours in all that makes for human happiness. They have a vigorous movement of young reformers, who, if they are allowed a little time, will revivify China and produce something immeasurably better than the worn-out grinding mechanism that we call civilization. When Young China has done its work, Americans will be able to make money by trading with China, without destroying the soul of the country. China needs a period of anarchy in order to work out her salvation; all great nations need such a period from time to time. When America went through such a period, in 1861-5, England thought of intervening to insist on 'good government', but fortunately abstained. Nowadays, in China, all the Powers want to intervene. Americans recognize this in the case of the wicked Old World, but many of

them are smitten with blindness when it comes to their own consortium. All I ask of them is that they should admit that they are as other men, and cease to thank God that they are not as this publican.

I hope no reader will think that my outlook is that of a cynic. Whoever will read the third Book of Spinoza's Ethics will find there a view of human nature identical with my own ; whoever will read the fourth and fifth Books will see how little cynicism this view implies. The two qualities which I consider superlatively important are love of truth and love of our neighbour. I find love of truth obscured in America by commercialism, of which pragmatism is the philosophical expression ; and love of our neighbor kept in fetters by Puritan morality. Faults at least as bad as those of America exist in all countries ; but America seems as yet somewhat more lacking than some other countries as regards a self-critical minority. This minority exists ; and there is notable proof that it is not silent. I fear that some of the things I have said may cause irritation, but that is not their purpose ; I wish only to promote mutual understanding. I wish also, if I can, to do something to save China from a slavery more complete than any that Japan could impose. [Russ6]

- 1922.03.09 Russell, Bertrand. *China's entanglements*. In : Foreign affairs ; vol. 3, no 9 (March 1922). Review of Reid, Gilbert. *China, captive or free ?* (London : G. Allen & Unwin, 1922). Among all the many recent books on the Far East there are extraordinarily few that are tolerably free from national bias. The British bias is familiar to readers of Mr. J.O.R Bland and The Times. In Chinese internal affairs it is reactionary, sneering at Young China, exalting the virtues of the old-fashioned mandarins, and desiring to uphold the traditional family ethics. At bottom, this attitude is usually, though not always, inspired by the fear of seeing China become strong enough to stand alone. It goes with an admiration for Japan, which takes the form of assurances that Japan's misdeeds have been due to a small military clique and will soon be ended by the victory of some imaginary Liberal Party in Japanese politics. There is, of course, a Liberal Party as regards home affairs, but in foreign affairs all Japanese are united except the small band of Socialists and Labour leaders. The American bias is different from the British, and politically less noxious. Almost all Americans are friendly to Young China and inclined to side with Canton as against Peking. They have no doubt that it would be for China's good to be developed commercially and industrially, and they do not wish to see this done by Japan alone. So far I think we ought to agree with them. But their dislike of Japan makes them hardly just to that country, and their fanatical belief in capitalistic enterprise makes them perhaps blind to the dangers of international exploitation. Dr. Reid is that rare exception, a truly just man. The faults of Japan are told, but not exaggerated ; the faults of America are not passed over. One of the most interesting portions of his book deals with the injury done to China by the Allied and Associated Powers when they induced China to participate in the war. In inducing a severance of diplomatic relations, America took the lead; in inducing the declaration of war, Japan was foremost. The intrigues and faction fights required to bring about the result caused the failure of parliamentary government and of the all-but successful attempts to unite North and South. No one supposed that the participation of China would help to win the war ; the sole object of the European Allies, especially Great Britain, was to capture German trade and German property, both public and private. This laudable object was achieved. After the armistice, the Germans in China were sent home at twenty-four hours' notice, in crowded ships through the tropics, with confiscation of everything belonging to them except their clothes. This policy was mainly British. The British were inexorable, even in the case of delicate women holding medical certificates to the effect that they would probably die on the voyage; but the Chinese often managed to hide away their German friends until passions had cooled. I know of nothing in the whole war so sordidly and inhumanly money-grubbing as our behaviour in China in 1918. Although Dr. Reid is a Doctor of Divinity, his book compels the conclusion that Christian nations are more degradedly cruel than the heathen Chinese. From the opium war onward, our record is one of shame and infamy. [Russ6]

- 1922.03.19-22[Russell, Bertrand. *Sketches of modern China*]. Chi Fu yi. [ID D28291].
Chi Fu added his own reflection at the end of his translation :
Now western culture comes to China everyday. We have invited many famous people to lecture in China. Even if [foreigners] have ideas about reforming China, these are just ideas. They cannot carry out reform for us. One who is not familiar with the history, customs, and human relationships [of China] may not have ideas that are feasible. Mr. Russell understands that, and that is why he does not approve of foreigners trying to reform China. [Russ44]
- 1922.10.16 Bertrand Russell speaks on "Young China" to the Political Union of the University College Cardiff. [Russ6]
- 1922.11.11 [Russell, Bertrand. *Zhongguo wen ti.*]. Ed. by Sun Fuyuan. [ID D28292].
Sun Fuyuan added a commentary in Chen bao fu juan ; 11. Nov. (1922) : The national characters of various peoples naturally have merits and defects at the same time. But Russell, using the opportunity of praising the Chinese, criticized the British severely. Nowadays most Chinese are mentally unstable, ecstatic when praised and enraged at criticism. Such a temperament is preserved from children and barbarians, because the [Chinese] national character has not had the opportunity to develop and grow, due to thousands of years of political turmoil. Russell's attitude of being 'heavy in criticizing oneself and light in criticizing others', therefore, is exactly the medicine we need. At another, and most important level, it is not that we have not seen a few Westerners praising China, such as [John O.P.] Bland and his like. But they only praise China's old personalities and old systems. Just as Russell says, their praise hides a malicious motive, which is to make us sacrifice modern life and preserve the bizarre and the ancient for them to amuse themselves and play with. That is why they like us to have an emperor, like us to wear the queue, like us to have bound feet, like us to be confined in the cage of the old moral system to suffer, while they stand outside the cage and shout bravo. While Russell praises a few of the merits of our inherent national character, most of which I think are gone, he pays special attention to our new movement. Whether the Chinese nation has hope for rejuvenation depends on whether the new movement succeeds. [Russ44]

- 1922.12.03 Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu yü Zhongguo* [ID D28381]. [Bertrand Russell and China].
 Gaylord Kai Loh Leung : Referring to Russell's book *The problem of China* Xu Zhimo declared in his essay that 'Russell had sincere feelings for, deep understanding of and absolute sympathy for us', and 'This book by Russell marks a milestone in the course of cultural exchange between East and West. Russell is a man who truly understands and values Chinese culture ; what he says are correct views originating from sympathy '. Xu admired Russell's condemnation of Japan and other western powers whose encroachment on China, driven by rapacity and stupidity, might have disastrous effects on one of the world's best cultures. But Xu had some mild criticism of Russell but he was generous in his praise of Russell. It is just natural that Xu Zhimo, a starry-eyed idealist, should feel inspired when reveling in the realm of Bertrand Russell's social and political ideals. The English philosopher's attack on hypocrisy ; on capitalism and commercialism ; his promotion of an international government for the maintenance of world peace ; his defence of creative impulse ; his love for mankind and for civilization ; and his integrity, bravery and candour, would have appealed powerfully to Xu who was by nature inclined to emotionalism, freedom and justice. The imprisonment [1918] of Russell by the British government would only have excited his admiration for the dauntless fighter of independent thought.
 Bertrand Russell sent Xu Zhimo his publication *The problem of China* and asked him to propagate in China the ideas expounded in the book.
 Xu Zhimo :
 "Russell, however, does not fully understand the evolution of the Chinese culture and life to its present form. In the first place, he fails to gauge the influence of Confucius. He frankly admits in his book that he is not well-disposed towards Confucius who insisted on excessive formalities. In the second place, he presumes that the strength of China has much to do with Lao Tzu and Chuang tzu.
 Russell is the highest crystallization of reason in modern age. His logic and mathematics apart, there is a burning passion in him. Coupled with his bravery in his fearless fight against convention, he is truly a great personality to be emulated, a unique figure of all times." [Russ45]
- 1922.12.03 Xu, Zhimo. [Review of Bertrand Russell's "*The problem of China*"]. [ID D28402].
 This book by Russell has really established a milestone in the course of Chinese-Western cultural exchange and convergence. He is a man who truly understands and loves Chinese culture... Some people here may say that [Russell] is reacting to European civilization and his admiration of China is emotional, exaggerating everything beyond facts ; that he cannot understand China since he stayed here for such a short period of time. Yes, he is reacting ; but what he is disgusted with is not all things European, which would be captious, but the evils produced by industrial civilization and the capitalist system. His admiration of China is not due to China's being the opposite of Europe, but is a real faith resulting from a combination of penetrating reason, sincere feelings, and awareness and recognition of the life itself behind all civilizations and cultures. I dare to say this because I myself have been there. I too used to wonder whether he was reacting emotionally, using the East to let out his own frustration [with the West]. But in contrast to the life of the Indians and the Chinese that I have seen during and after my return journey this time, I see the hypocrisy, the indecency, and the precariousness of life in Europe and America, and I cannot but believe the sincerity of Russell's feelings. We must never think we naturally have the correct view of China simply because we were born and are living in China.
 Xu Zhimo remarked that Russell's concern about China's possible tendency towards militarism was unfounded and that Russell did not fully grasp Chinese culture and Chinese life, for he mistakenly attributed China's virtues to Daoism, while the peaceful, easy-going temperament of the Chinese actually came from Confucianism. In spite of himself, therefor, Xu was showing that after all he knew China better than Russell did. [Russ4]
- 1922.12.20 Bertrand Russell attends a meeting of Chinese students at Connaught Rooms in London. [Russ6]

1923

Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu you lai shuo hua le* [Artikel über *Leisure and mechanism* von Bertrand Russell]. [ID D28403].

Bertrand Russell himself also said that his ideas were not novelties. But however commonplace a principle may be, if the society as a whole could recognize its importance and seriously put it into practice, then astonishing effect could be achieved.

In the final analysis, the current industrialism, mechanism, system of competition and the mentality associated with superstition engendered by those phenomena are enemy of our ideal society and obstacles to a national life. Now as far as China is concerned, the only hope is an early awakening by her leaders who could, by virtue of their positions, set example to resist the temptations from without and reverse the suicidal trend. Otherwise, the future will be bleak and full of traps.

Every time I read Russell's writings or recollect his voice and facial expressions, I think of New York City, especially the fifty-eight-storied Woolworth Building. Russell's thought and views resemble the summer evening on the sea – there are flashes of lightning like golden snakes, sharply and coldly streaking amidst the dark purple clouds. They appear and disappear before your eyes and above your head.

Isn't a skyscraper dangerous ? Just half a thunderbolt is enough to pulverize the entire building ; it could shake and terrify the woods and lawns along the Hudson river ! But no ! Despite the flash of lightning, the thunderbolt never comes. The building still towers high in the clouds. The golden lightning only illuminates its loftiness and adds to its lustre. [Russ45]

1924

Russell, Bertrand. *Memorandum on the Boxer indemnity*. (1924).

The Boxer Indemnity Bill, now in Committee, provides that what remains unpaid of the Boxer Indemnity shall be spent on purposes to the mutual advantage of Great Britain & China. It does not state that these purposes are to be educational. In the opinion of all who know China (except solely as a field for capitalist exploitation), it is of the utmost importance that an Amendment should be adopted specifying Chinese education as the sole purpose to which the money should be devoted. The following are the chief ground in favour of such an Amendment :

1. That this would be the expenditure most useful to China.
2. That no other course would produce a good effect on influential Chinese opinion.
3. That the interests of Great Britain, which are to be considered, can only be secured by winning the good will of the Chinese.
4. That any other course would contrast altogether too unfavourably with the action of America, which long ago devoted all that remained of the American share of the Boxer indemnity to Chinese education.
5. That the arguments alleged in favour of other courses all have a corrupt motive, i.e. are designed for the purpose of securing private profit through Government action.

For these reasons, it is profoundly desirable that Labour Members of Parliament should take action to secure the necessary Amendment before it is too late.

The China Indemnity Bill, in its present form, provides that the remainder of the Boxer Indemnity shall be applied to 'purposes, educational or other', which are mutually beneficial to Great Britain and China.

Sir Walter de Frece proposed in Committee that the words 'connected with education' should be substituted for 'educational or other'.

It is much to be hoped that the House of Commons will carry this Amendment on the Report stage. Certain interests are opposed to the Amendment for reasons with which Labour can have no sympathy. The Government thinks it necessary to placate these interests, but maintains that the Committee to be appointed will be free to decide in favour of education only. The Committee, however, is appointed by Parliament, and one third of its members are to retire every two years ; there is therefore no guarantee against its domination by private interests in the future.

The Bill in its present form opens the door to corruption, is not calculated to please Chinese public opinion, displays Great Britain as less enlightened than American and Japan, and therefore fails altogether to achieve its nominal objects. The Labour Party ought to make at least an attempt to prevent the possibility of the misapplication of public money to purposes of private enrichment. This will be secured by the Insertion of the words 'connected with education' in Clause 1, after the word 'purposes'. [Russ9]

1925.06.19 Russell, Bertrand. *The Chinese Amritsar : extracting wealth from blood and tears* [ID D28422].

The first necessity in this Chinese crisis is to be clear about the facts, which have, as usual, been distorted by the Press, the telegraph agencies, and the Government. The Professor of the National University of Peking have issued a statement in which they have endeavoured to counteract these distortions ; so has the Chinese Information Bureau ; so have various American missionaries. These accounts are universally believed, and have the effect of rousing humanitarian sentiment against Great Britain. But in England almost the whole Press boycotts the truth.

The trouble began with a strike in a Japanese mill in Shanghai. One of the strikers was shot by the Japanese. [The fuller information given in our leader of last week (i.e., 2 killed, 13 wounded) is, we believe, correct. Ed. New Leader]. Some Chinese students paraded the streets as a protest against this unjustifiable homicide. The students were, as the Professor state, 'armed with nothing more than pamphlets and handbills'. Many of them were arrested by the British police, whereupon the remainder marched to the police station to demand the release of their comrades. Terrified by this unarmed mob of boys and girls, the British authorities ordered the police to fire upon them, killing six and seriously wounding over forty. As the students continued to demonstrate, the police continued to kill them for six days, until 70 were killed and 300 wounded. To justify their action, the British asserted that the mob was armed and advanced with cries of 'kill the foreigner'. If such cries were uttered, it must have been by 'agents provocateur'.

The students who demonstrated were the kind of young men and young women of whom I saw a great deal when in China – eager, enthusiastic, idealistic, unable to believe that justice, however clear, is powerless against brute force. Chinese students are like the best of our sons and daughters, but slightly more naïve as regards the wickedness of the world. Confucius taught that human nature is naturally good, and one of the difficulties of our missionaries has been that they cannot get the Chinese to accept the doctrine of original sin. In this task they are receiving valuable assistance from the British police.

The rest of the Chinese population of Shanghai has resented this massacre, and has been engaged in a gradually growing strike. There is also a beginning of a boycott of British and Japanese goods throughout China. There have been simultaneous disturbances in other places in China. The navies of the world have assembled in Shanghai harbor so as to be ready to shoot more boys and girls.

To understand the situation it is necessary to say a word about the government of Shanghai. Shanghai is a city comparable in size to London, divided into three parts : the Chinese City, the French concession, and the International concession. The last, where the trouble has occurred, is governed by the capitalists exclusively : there is not the faintest hint of democracy. The capitalists are mainly British and Japanese, with a fair sprinkling of Americans. The British police are Sikhs (except the officers), who play the same part as the Cossacks played in Tsarist Russia. Whenever the capitalists of Shanghai get into trouble, warships of all 'civilised' countries hasten to their assistance, as in the present instance.

Where Young Life is Cheap

The right of the foreigners in Shanghai is the right of conquest – the same right that the Germans had in Belgium from 1914 to 1918. They arrived there in the first instance as a result of the Opium War of 1842. There is no justification whatever for their presence, except that the Chinese are not a match for the foreigners in military and naval power.

Shanghai is an important industrial centre, and the labour conditions are quite as bad as they were in England 100 years ago. Young children work twelve hours a day for seven days in the week ; sometimes they fall asleep at their work, and roll into the unfenced machinery and are killed. Other children are employed in making matches. They get phosphorous poisoning, and most of them die young. There was a proposal before the Shanghai Municipal Council to introduce some slight regulation of child labour (at present there is none). This came forward during the first days of the present trouble, but fell through because there was no quorum – fortunately, according to the 'Times', as it might have encouraged the strikers. The conditions of adult workers are such as these facts would lead us to expect. They work from 12 to 13 ½

hours a day, and their wages vary from 16s. to 30s. a month. It is to prevent any improvement in these conditions that we are shooting unarmed boys and girls – usually in the back.

The Capitalist Mind

The issue which has been raised has two aspects ; one industrial, the other national, though it is impossible to keep the two quite separate. As regards the industrial aspect, we have the singular fact that in the Treaty Ports the workers have no voice in the government, which is an undisguised tyranny of the rich. Naturally, they use their power as they always do when they have it : to extort wealth out of the blood and tears of their victims. I do not pretend that Chinese capitalists would be more humane than those who are Christians or Japanese ; a capitalist, of whatever country, will be as cruel as is compatible with saving his skin, often more so. But Chinese capitalists would not long be able to call overwhelming military and naval force to their assistance. Left to themselves, the Chinese would develop industrialism very slowly, and would learn to control it by democracy to the extent that it is controlled in the West.

If we do not desire an irresistible growth of anti-foreign feeling in China, we must radically alter our ways. It would be a good thing if the authorities were to discourage white men from beating coolies whenever they are out of temper. They never beat Japanese coolies, however angry they may be ; the sole reason is that Japan has a powerful army and navy.

It would be a good thing to introduce factory legislation on Western lines. It would be a good thing if white men were to practice ordinary courtesy towards the Chinese. But none of these things will be done so long as the foreigners living in the Treaty Ports have the government exclusively in their own hands. We shall not, of course, evacuate the Treaty Ports except as the result of superior force, which the Chinese are likely to display within the next twenty years. But if we wish to delay the militarisation of China as long as possible, we shall be wise to control the foreign residents in Treaty Ports, and compel them to conform to those laws of elementary humanity which have been forced upon capitalists at home. This would, of course, be in the interests of British workers, who suffer by the competition of ill-paid labour. It would not be in the interests of British capitalists, who mean to invest their money abroad, starve out the British workers, and convert England into a country of parks and pheasant preserves.

Assuming that foreigners do not radically alter their policy towards China, it is easy to predict what must happen. Nationalist feeling will grow more and more inflamed, Feng or some other will put himself at the head of it, and with the help of the Soviet Union every Englishman, Frenchman and American in China will be driven into the sea.

Administering 'Justice'

At present, the movements which are taking place are not properly described as 'anti-foreign'. There are Labour movements, aiming at less intolerable conditions. There is the Young China movement, which wants to recover some degree of national independence. But these movements are not inspired by any hatred of individual foreigners. We are told that whatever crimes our countrymen may have committed in Shanghai, we must support them for fear they should be murdered. This is as yet a groundless fear. No policeman employed by Europeans, and only one European has been killed. But if the Europeans persist in claiming the right to shoot innocent Chinese whenever they feel so disposed, they must expect that, sooner or later, the Chinese will begin to think of retaliation. All the British in China who have not actively protested against recent occurrences are morally guilty of murder. They cannot be hanged, because the administration of 'justice' is in their hands. But if, ultimately, they provoke reprisals, which I profoundly hope will not be the case, they cannot be regarded as innocent victims. They have forced themselves, at the point of the bayonet, upon a country which did not want them, and they have used their military strength solely to grow rich by incredibly cruel exploitation.

There has been, ever since the November Revolution in Russia, a curious intertwining of the struggle between Capital and Labour on the one hand, and the struggle between West and East on the other. Russia was formerly dominated by foreign capitalists, and reed herself by an incredibly painful process. India and China are still where Russia was formerly. Western Labour cannot obtain full emancipation while it remains an accomplice in the profitable

exploitation of the East by those who are its enemies at home. To talk of Bolshevik propaganda is nonsense : it is Western Governments and capitalists who have done the propaganda for the Bolsheviks. It is they who have persuaded young China that no spark of justice or humanity is to be expected from Western nations. Unless our democracies take hold of the Asiatic question, and insist upon seeing it handled according to Socialist principles, not according to the maxims of a ruthless capitalist imperialism, there is no hope for the white man in Asia, and no way of avoiding a clash which will be more terrible than any that mankind has yet known. [Russ297]

1925.07.10 Russell, Bertrand. *Deliver China from her bondage : peace or shame for Britain ?* [ID D28425].

What has been happening recently in China appears to have taken our governing classes by surprise. 'The Times' on July 3 began a leading article with the words : 'something quite new is happening in China'. Those who have taken the trouble to study modern China are not in any degree surprised by recent events.

The British in China are broadly of three classes, traders, officials and missionaries. Of these the traders are the worst and most ignorant, the missionaries the most humane and the best informed. But all three classes, for varying reasons, have a conservative bias. Traders and officials regret the Manchu Empire, because it was weak externally, but strong enough internally to enforce obedience to concessions made to foreigners. Missionaries cannot be expected to like the fact that Young China, largely from patriotic motives, is becoming more and more anti-Christian. Nevertheless, the missionaries have shown themselves far more liberal in the present crisis, than the traders and officials. This is largely because they have a real contact with the Chinese, and because their activities consist in persuading, not in coercing. The contempt for Young China among the other sections of Anglo-Chinese is astonishing.

Recent events are a continuation of the movement which had a spectacular beginning with the Revolution of 1911, and has since had several notable effects on Chinese politics. It was Young China which caused the Chinese Government not to sign the Versailles Treaty, because that Treaty handed Shantung to Japan, as a reward to the Chinese for their participation in the war. It was Young China which caused the overthrow of the An-Fu (Pro-Japanese) Party in 1920, the method being propaganda by students among the soldiers. It was Young China which stirred up the movement which ended with the restoration of Shantung to China.

Nevertheless, the British in China have continued to speak of Young China with contempt, and to treat with disdain every Chinese who has received an education on Western lines. If our officials could have spared a little time from polo and bridge, they would have discovered the un-wisdom of this attitude. But the upper-class Briton is encased in idleness and superciliousness. With a little sympathy and a little industry we could avoid disaster in Asia ; but there seems no hope that either will be forthcoming so long as we continue to believe that our public schools produce heaven-sent rulers, who must be allowed to rule 'inferior' races. Mixed with a wholly groundless contempt, both in India and China, is an ever-present fear, which must always exist where a small governing aristocracy oppresses a large population, and especially where the aristocracy is of an alien race. The shooting in Shanghai was obviously unwise from the standpoint of British imperialism ; so was the shooting in Canton. In both cases, terror caused the officials in charge to lose their heads. When they had killed so many Chinese as to rouse resentment throughout the country, they set up the plea of 'British women and children in danger'. On this plea it is urged that we must go on with the bad work. Any suggestion that the Chinese have a point of view is treated as treachery. The Archdeacon of Hong Kong was rated by Sir John Jordan as if he had been a naughty boy, because he was reported (apparently inaccurately) to have said that the Chinese students had a serious grievance. Very instructive is the letter sent by the British Consul-General to the Government of Canton the day before the shooting at Shameen (the European quarter of Canton). I quote from the 'Times' of June 25 :

I learn from sources which I have every reason to believe trustworthy that in the course of a patriotic demonstration, arranged for to-morrow, the student element intend to make martyrs of themselves by attacking the bridges leading to Shameen... Any attempt to penetrate into the British Concession of Shameen will be resisted by force of arms... I write in this serious strain so that it may not be said hereafter that brutal Imperialist rifles wantonly massacred unoffending Chinese youth.

Nevertheless the Europeans were accused of firing first, not by the Chinese merely, but by the Canton Christian College. In this country we have not been allowed to see their statement, although it has apparently been published in America. So at least one gathers from the 'Times' of June 27, whose Hong Kong correspondent says that the Vice-President subsequently

withdrew his signature.

This shows that the truth is doubtful, but British readers are not allowed to know the evidence on the side of the Chinese.

Evidently the British Government, from the standpoint of British interests, is behaving with the utmost unwisdom both in India and in China. Neither the officials on the spot nor the Cabinet at home seem able to adapt themselves to the post-war situation in Asia. In the Near East, the Treaty of Sèvres and the opposition to Turkish nationalism was a costly blunder, now universally admitted. In Persia, everything we thought we had gained by the war has been lost to America or Russia. Japan has been alienated by our policy since the Washington Conference, and especially by the Singapore base. In India and China, the war was regarded as proving the moral bankruptcy of European civilization, and the prestige of the white man was destroyed. Amritsar, and its counterparts in China, have failed to restore belief in our moral superiority.

If we are to avoid a conflict, almost sure to end in defeat, there is nothing for it but to abate our Imperial pride and treat with Indians and Chinese on equal terms. The late Mr. Das made a conciliatory overture, to which we have made no response, and it seems that we shall persist in this ungraciousness. This is madness. The methods of Clive and Warren Hastings are not suited to our age, but our Conservatives have learned nothing during the last one hundred and fifty years. Race pride and caste pride are greater obstacles to friendly relations with Asian than are the economic motives of exploitation. Very soon we shall have no chance to exploit either India or China, unless we learn to treat both countries with less haughtiness.

It is remarkable, and very serious from a British point of view, that the present agitation in China is directed especially against the British. Although the trouble began in a Japanese mill, the Governmental action that has been taken has been mainly British ; the Japanese, since the Washington Conference, have been becoming increasingly liberal, and have not shown themselves anxious to take stringent action in China. With Japan neutral and Russia hostile, the British have no chance of succeeding in a high-handed policy towards China. After giving an example of brutality, they will have to retire covered with shame – unless, at this late date, wiser counsels should prevail.

So much for the folly of our Government's policy. But even if this policy could be successful, it would still deserve the severest condemnation. Take first the industrial issue. It is pretended by official apologists that the British mills are better than others, and that British employers are longing to introduce humane Factory Acts, but cannot get the Chinese to agree. But, as Mr. C.R. Buxton points out in the 'Times' (July 3), the very largest number of children under twelve employed in any one mill in Shanghai are employed in a British mill. The produce of the Shanghai mills competes with Lancashire, and the bad industrial conditions are diametrically opposed to the interests of British Labour.

A have been taken to task for stating that young China regards the industrial issue as important. I repeat, with the utmost emphasis, that it is regarded as of the utmost importance. The great majority of Chinese students are Socialists, and are keenly alive to the evils of capitalism. They do not talk freely to those whom they regard as representatives or agents of foreign Capitalism, and these men often remain ignorant of the real views of their pupils. But in China opposition to Capitalism is naturally bound up with opposition to foreign domination, since it is the foreigner who is forcing capitalist exploitation upon the Chinese. To treat Chinese nationalism as a crime is both ridiculous and short-sighted. For the last hundred years China has been weak, and white men have profited by her weakness to inflict intolerable humiliations. But China's weakness was merely governmental : the people are vigorous, industrious, patient and more numerous than those of any other country ; moreover, they possess abundance of raw materials. They have therefore every non-political element of strength. The one thing hitherto lacking si being supplied by foreign oppression.

China is demanding only what every independent country possesses already ; the Japanese at one time suffered the same disabilities, but secured their rights by creating a strong army and navy. Is this the only argument to which our Government will listen ? If so, it is likely before long to be forthcoming. Russia has freed herself from economic bondage to the West ; China inevitably will do, and will at the same time acquire full political liberty. With Russia and

China pointing the way, India will find a method of emancipation from British rule. It is just that these things should happen, and it is the interests of mankind ; moreover, whether we oppose them or not, they will happen. Would it not be better to help them to take place peacefully, rather than to offer a resistance which must be costly, shameful, and in the end futile ? [Russ300]

1925.07.18

Russell, Bertrand. *Fair play for the Chinese* [ID D28421].

[This very distinguished man of science spent some time in China ; he writes about it not only with special sympathy, but with special knowledge].

I hope your readers are not yet tired of the Chinese question. As I have often pointed out before, the truth about any Chinese occurrence cannot be ascertained until the mail arrives ; telegraphic news is always propaganda. Who could have guessed, from what was telegraphed about the Shanghai shooting, that 30 British missionaries had published a protest, saying among other things : - 'We desire to express our intense regret that these incidents should have occurred. We should go further. We recognize that the serious situation evoked is largely due to underlying racial animosities. We, as Britons. Admit that we have a large share of blame in the matter'.

To issue this statement must have required great courage – more than can be realized by anyone who has never lived in a small British community among oppressed population.

The Chinese Information Bureau has issued valuable corrections of British misstatements ; but even when its facts are drawn from the China Year Book (a British enterprise) they are regarded as biased ex parte pleading. For instance, attempts are made to give the impression that the International Settlement in Shanghai is mainly inhabited by non-Chinese. The facts are that the foreign population of the Settlement is 23,307 and the Chinese population 763,401. (The total population of Shanghai is close on two millions).

The foreigners alone have a vote for the Shanghai Municipal Council, which behaves as if it were a sovereign State, and has recently refused to acknowledge even the authority of the Diplomatic Body. It has nine members – six British, two Americans, and one Japanese. This explains why the Chinese hold the British specially responsible in Shanghai.

The American Government is anxious to use the Conference which was promised at Washington in 1921 for the purpose of seeking remedies for this state of affairs. The British Government wants to get the Conference indefinitely postponed, or, if America insists upon its being held, to have it confined to the one question of tariff revision.

Two Demands :

Two quite practicable demands should be made by our Government :

(1) The holding of an impartial judicial inquiry into the Shanghai shooting.

On this matter the British action is condemned, not only by the unanimous opinion of China, but by many British missionaries, practically all foreign missionaries, the diplomatic body, and the unanimous verdict of the non-British world. Our Government should undertake that, if an impartial tribunal condemns the action of any Shanghai officials, he shall be punished.

(2) The holding of the Conference demanded by America, with the right to investigate the whole question of the position of foreigners in China.

Generally we ought to give it to be understood that we shall adapt our Chinese policy to that of America, which has been far more liberal than ours. This would also have the effect of improving our relations with America. Our heaven-sent diplomats are too ignorant to know how serious is the bad effect which such incidents have upon the attitude of Americans towards us.

India is the key to most of our crimes in China. We wish to keep up the white man's prestige, and imagine that that can best be done by wanton homicide. But modern China is not that of the Manchu Emperors, and our methods are out of date. [Russ296]

1925.07.18 Russell, Bertrand. *British policy in China* [ID D28328].

The Chinese situation becomes, from the British point of view, more grave every day. In the present article, I shall deal only with immediate issues and immediate palliatives ; ultimate solutions are impossible in the present atmosphere.

The gravity of the situation is made evident by a long leader in the 'Times' of July 11th, apparently expressing the views of the Foreign Office. We are told in this article that we must not mind dissociating ourselves from the other Powers concerned by adopting a more vigorous policy, and that 'there is nothing in international affairs so immediately important as this menace in China'. Also that 'it has become obviously necessary to assure our naval strength in the Pacific, since the Chinese crisis is only a prelude to further complications in which British interests in the Pacific are vitally concerned. The present state of affairs in The Far East has an intimate connection with the discussion of the cruiser programme'. These words must be taken to mean that our Government contemplates fighting China and Russia simultaneously without securing any allies. I wish to suggest certain reasons for regarding this as an undesirable policy, from the standpoint of British interests ; also to point out the measures we must adopt if we wish to preserve our China trade.

First : any action in China which is to have any prospect of success must be international : the Consortium Powers, Great Britain, France, America, and Japan, must be united. If we take isolated action at the present moment, America and France will stand aloof, as their official acts already prove. Japan is likely to be actively hostile, since any increase in the influence of a white Power in China is against Japan's vital interests. Before the Washington Conference, we might have appealed to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance ; since that date, we have attempted to replace it by an Anglo-American Entente. To secure this end, we funded the debt to American and created the Irish Free State. Our Government seems, however, to have failed to realize that a non-imperialist policy in China was another requisite of American friendship. An Japanese friendship has, of course, been rendered impossible by Singapore. Indeed, since the evacuation of Vladivostock, the Japanese have shown an increasing tendency to co-operation with the Soviet Government in Chinese affairs. Considering that the present trouble arose from our attempt to protect Japanese employers from the just fury of their employees, Japan's recent aloofness has been remarkable.

The Soviet Government, meanwhile, is prepared to support Chinese resistance with all its strength. In these circumstances, any action we may take in China must fail. Chinese anarchy is an asset to China, since the occupation of Peking would not compel the Chinese to negotiate, and any treaty concluded by the Peking Government might be repudiated in the Province. We cannot conquer China, and we cannot compel the Chinese to trade with us. Force, therefore, offers no solution of our difficulties.

But if we are not to use force, we must try to understand the issues, and to see them as they appear both to the Chinese and to other white Power. Here there are two questions which must be kept separate : first, the narrow and definite question of the Shanghai shooting ; secondly, the general question of what the Chinese regard as their grievances under the Treaties.

With regard to the Shanghai shooting, some of the facts are still in debate, others are now generally admitted. The following facts are not in dispute : the crowd outside the police station was unarmed ; no notice was given of the intention to fire upon them ; the order to fire was given in English, and therefore not understood by most of the crowd ; the firing began ten seconds after the order was given ; many of those who were hit were shot in the back, showing that they were trying to disperse, but were not given time to do so. Other crowds were fired upon during the next six days. Altogether about seventy people were killed, with a proportionate number of wounded. Every non-British person, and almost every British missionary, who has spoken about the affair has pronounced that the British authorities were not justified in their action. For example, Dr. J.W. Cline, formerly head of the missionary college at Soochow, who saw the whole thing, says : 'I was not expecting to see the police fire, was shocked when they did fire, and have been sorry about it ever since'. According to the French and Japanese newspapers, the commission of the diplomatic body which inquired into the matter recommended that the American Chairman of the Shanghai Municipal Council

should be dismissed ('Times', July 11th). The incident aroused unprecedented indignation throughout China, and united all parties in that usually disunited country – not only the partisans of the Bolsheviks, but even the most conservative sections. The strength of popular feeling is shown by the fact that Chang Tso-lin dare not act, though his rival Feng is profiting by the situation.

It seems obvious that, if we are to recover any reputation for just dealing, not only with the Chinese, but with the rest of the world, we must agree to have this whole incident investigated by an impartial judicial tribunal, and to act upon its findings. A mistake was committed by an official in a state of nerves – at least this is the view of everybody except the British. If this view proves on investigation to be correct, the official in question ought not to be supported by the Government if it is not to become an accomplice. This is so evident that I cannot understand why British public opinion has not forced our Government to act in the only reasonable way.

The cry of Bolshevism has been very much overdone. Such influence as the Bolsheviks possess in China is not due to their communism, for very few Chinese are communists in the economic sense, and the country is obviously unsuited for such a régime. The influence of the Bolsheviks throughout Asia is due to the fact that they appear (rightly or wrongly) as champions against Western oppression. The Chinese indignation at the Shanghai shooting was natural and spontaneous, and had nothing to do with Bolshevism.

But, we say, why is the indignation directed specially against us ? Are not other Powers also responsible ! The answer is that the International Settlement in Shanghai is, in fact, governed by the British. The governing body is the Municipal Council, elected by the foreign ratepayers. (The Chinese are allowed to pay rates, but do not thereby acquire a vote). The Municipal Council consists of six British, two Americans, and one Japanese ; the Secretary, who has the executive power, is also British. Thus the responsibility for what happens in the International Settlement rests with the British.

Those who wish to see how the matter appears to eminent Chinese intellectuals who are by no means Bolsheviks should obtain a little pamphlet called 'China's case', published by the Union of Chinese Associations in Great Britain, and written by four of the leading men in the Chinese academic world – men as learned, as widely travelled, as worthy of scientific respect, as any to be found in England. (I speak from personal knowledge). To attribute what they say to Bolshevik influence is as absurd as it would be to attribute Mr. Keynes's 'Economic Consequences of the Peace' to that cause.

On the wider issues, such as extra-territoriality, it is not necessary to come to any precipitate decision. At the Washington Conference it was arranged there should be a Conference to consider tariff revision, &c. ; the American Government is urging that this Conference must be no longer delayed, and many people have suggested that its scope should be widened. To both these proposals our Government ought to agree. And, speaking broadly, it ought to adapt its Chinese policy to that of America, and to state with emphasis that it means to do so. The policy of America in China has always been more liberal than that of the European Powers. If we are to retain any position in China, it has become necessary for us to adopt the principles which have guided the American Government. And this course would also greatly improve our relations with America.

Finally, I wish to say a word about the extreme gravity of the issue. A war with Russia about China, which is apparently in contemplation, would be strongly opposed by organized Labour in this country, and would almost infallibly lead to defeat. In our difficulties Indian nationalism would see its opportunity. The Empire would collapse in disgrace, and a large part of our population would die of hunger, probably after making an attempt at revolution. The present Government fails to realize that our position in the world is not what it was before the war. Being no longer so strong as we were, it has become important for us to avoid such injustice and tyranny as will rouse the disgust of the civilized world. These are motives of self-interest. Of the further motives which must appeal to every person possessed of the faintest feeling of honour or humanity I say nothing. [Russ303]

1925.08.28 Russell, Bertrand. *China asserts herself : Imperialism in a quandary* [ID D28424].
 The Canton Government's embargo upon British and Japanese shipping has come as a surprise, and neither the friends nor the enemies of China in this country seem to know what line to take. The friends of China are disposed to think that the Cantonese have made a mistake, but this view is hardly borne out by the perplexities of China's enemies, as illustrated by the comments of the Conservative Press and the inaction of the British Government. It is evident that the Canton Government thinks the moment propitious for bringing to an end a long series of affronts inflicted by Hong-Kong. But in order to understand the situation, it is necessary to bear in mind a few historical facts, which are not widely known in this country. Hong-Kong was acquired by the British in 1841 as a result of the Opium War of 1840. It was at the time a barren island, but we made of it a great city, with dockyards, naval arsenal, and the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank. For some reason which I have never understood, we think the Chinese ought to be grateful to us on this account. The population of Hong-Kong is over 600,000, and its trade, before the recent troubles, was about £200 millions per annum. There is a Government opium monopoly. Child-slavers in the colony was abolished in 1922, as a result of an agitation ; a British naval officer was recalled because his wife took part in the protest.

Corruption Frustrated.

Some distance up the river from Hong-Kong stands Canton ; their geographical relations are like those of London and the Isle of Sheppey. The population of Canton (which is the capital of the province of Kwangtung) is about 1,300,000. There is a small foreign concession, called Shameen ; the remainder of the city is purely Chinese. There is a railway from Canton to Kowloon (on the mainland close to Hong-Kong), but there is no railway from Canton into the interior, although one has long been projected.

The prosperity of Hong-Kong has always depended upon failure to develop Canton. If Canton had docks suitable for large ocean-going vessels, commerce would have no need to use Hong-Kong. This would be still more the case if railway communications were developed. It has, therefore, naturally been our policy to embarrass Canton, and to hamper its development unless under British auspices. For a moment, complete success seemed within our grasp. Immediately after the war, we negotiated with the corrupt militarists who then controlled Canton, a concession known as the Cassel Agreement, which would have given us a virtual monopoly of the railways and mines in the province of Kwangtung. But in 1920, before this Agreement could be ratified, Sun Yat-Sen acquired control of Canton, and very properly refused to ratify. This was the initial cause of our hostility to him.

Sun Yat-Sen's Government, and the present Government, which is its legitimate successor, have never been recognized by the Powers. On this ground, the present action of Canton is regarded as piracy, not war, so that anybody supporting it can be hanged as a common criminal. Non-recognition is very serious for any Chinese Government, because the foreigners collect the customs and the salt tax, which form the bulk of the normal revenue, and the proceeds are not handed over to a Government which the Powers dislike. Ever since Sun Yat-Sen's acquisition of power in Canton, the proceeds of these taxes in the South have been kept on deposit in the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank, to be handed over as soon as there is a government bad enough to win our approval.

Official apologists, of course, pretend that they are guided solely by legal considerations in giving or withholding recognition from various Chinese Governments, but this is quite untrue. Mr. Henry K. Norton, formerly a Professor at Tsing-hua College, as the result of a prolonged and careful study, came to the conclusion that the Canton Government was the only one in China that could validly claim to be legal.

Rival Governments

The Revolution of 1911, led by Sun Yat-Sen, led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the election of a Parliament. The majority in the Parliament belonged to the progressive Kuo-min-tang Party, and opposed Yuan Shi-kai's attempts to make himself autocrat. He, therefore, illegally dissolved the Parliament. He was greatly admired by the British, and his autocracy was unquestioningly recognized as the legal government of China. It is from his usurpation that subsequent Peking governments have derived their claim to legality. But

Parliament refused to regard itself as dissolved, and the partisans of the Kuo-min-tang refuge at Canton. After various vicissitudes they established themselves under the leadership of Sun Yat-Sen in 1920. Their claim to legality is therefore at least as good as that of Peking. The Canton government has been liberal and mildly socialistic ; force of circumstances has driven it to seek the alliance of the Bolsheviki. Among these circumstances, not the least effectual has been the hostility of Hong-Kong. A Fascist militia was organized at Canton among the conservative plutocracy, with the help of a Chinese employed by the Hong-Kong and Shanghai Bank ; its purpose was to overthrow Sun Yat-Sen. A European ship full of arms arrived at Canton, with its cargo consigned to these Fascisti ; we were furious when the Canton Government prevented the arms from being delivered.

Checkmate

We might have succeeded in establishing a Government of corrupt reactionary militarists at Canton, but for two circumstances. The first of these was the attitude of America. Decent Americans who know China hate us for our brutality. Other Americans hate us as trade rivals. Both combine in wishing to develop Canton at the expense of Hong-Kong. While I was in China, Messrs. Morgan, the bankers, sent a representative to China on behalf of the Consortium, and he spent a considerable part of his time in Canton. What he did there I do not know, but perhaps readers can guess. The other circumstance which stood in our way was the sudden defection of Feng, the Christian General, who turned Bolshevik and carried the Peking Government with him, thus removing the ground of quarrel between North and South. At this juncture, when everything was going against British imperialist designs, the British in control of the Municipal Council in Shanghai shot down a number of unarmed students without warning. The Municipal Council claimed to be an independent Power, and refused to submit to the report of the inquiry instituted by the Diplomatic Body ; their independence, however did not go so far as to abstain from demanding to be protected by all the navies of the world. From Shameen, the European quarter of Canton, a large number of Chinese were shot down, in self-defence, so we say ; but the American missionaries on the spot reported otherwise. The strike in Hong-Kong connected with these incidents has been so complete as to paralyse trade entirely ; it is estimated that our traders in Hong-Kong are losing £400,000 a day.

Our Government and our reactionaries are completely nonplussed. If we fight China, we must also fight Russia ; our Tories would like nothing better, but they know that Labour would not tolerate such a thing, and that therefore they must be defeated, as they were when they supported Denikin and Wrangel. Moreover, they are not, as then, supported by the other Powers. The French have no interest in the quarrel ; the Americans are definitely hostile to us, both for idealistic reasons and for reasons of self-interest. The Japanese, at first sight, seem to be involved on our side, but there are reasons why they should act independently. Since we terminated the Alliance and started to make a great naval base at Singapore, they have no reason to love us. They naturally dislike our position in Hong-Kong, and they are rivals for the China trade. Moreover, since the Washington Conference, they have been driven by fear of isolation into a more friendly policy towards Russia and China. We cannot therefore count upon them to help us in our dirty work. No wonder our Government is puzzled ; no wonder our reactionary Press screams in impotent fury.

A Simple Remedy

There is one line of action which has not occurred to any of them, although it would put an end to the whole trouble in a week. The line of action I mean is the adoption of friendliness, common justice, and common honesty. Let us accept the report of the diplomatic inquiry into the Shanghai shooting, and act upon it ; let us cease to foment civil war at Canton, and loyally accept the existing Canton Government as at least the de facto authority, to which its quota of the Customs revenue should be given ; let us concert with America proposals for the gradual abolition of extra-territoriality, say by subjecting Europeans, for a time, to European judges appointed by and responsible to the Chinese Government. Let us not leave our policy to be decided by Admirals on the spot, as we are doing at present. At least so it appears from the sinister statement. ('Times', Aug. 20) that Vice-Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair 'would take such steps as he thought fit for the protection of British shipping without first

consulting the Government'.

We must instruct correspondents of important newspapers not to write, as the 'Times' Peking correspondent did in the issue of August 20, 'extremists are endeavouring by misrepresentation to establish the view in Europe and America that the Treaties operate only to the advantage of foreigners and are oppressive to China. So it might be said of all the nursery rules imposed upon children by their elders'. The Chinese are not children, and it is not the practice in nurseries to shoot children in the back with rifle bullets. Our rich men must learn to treat the Chinese justly and as equals, or must put up with losing their money. I fear they will find the second alternative the less painful of the two. [Russ299]

- 1926 Xu, Zhimo. *Wu suo zhi dao de kang qiao*. [My impressions of Cambridge]. [ID D28287]. I went to England with a view to studying under Bertrand Russell. I paid my steamer ticket to cross the Atlantic, setting my mind on doing some serious study under 'the Voltaire of the 20th-century'. To my surprise, things had changed upon my arrival : he had been dismissed from Cambridge partly because of his pacifism during the War and partly because of his divorce. He was originally a fellow of Trinity College, but then this fellowship was also stripped. After his return to England from China, he and his wife settled down in London, earning their living by writing. As a result, my original intention of studying under him fell through. [Russ45]
- 1926 Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu yu you zhi jiao yu*. [Artikel über *On education* von Bertrand Russell.] [ID D28405].
It was the first time John saw the sea. He was scared and cried when he was told to enter the water. This angered our philosopher. 'What ! Russell's son afraid of something ?! Russell's son scared of seeing something ?! Impossible !' The Russell couple simply ignored the screaming of their child, who was still under three years of age, and dumped him into the water. They did it once and again, despite the child's crying. Well, after a few days, the child would insist on playing in the water without your telling him... The parents in the East certainly will not do that, will they ? I know that. But the spirit of courage, valour and fearlessness is the root of all virtues and foundation of character. We have to be very strict about it. We can tolerate many things, but not cowardice and fear. If you didn't help a child to overcome this obstacle early, you may ruin the rest of his life. Whenever Russell mentioned the word 'courage', his voice became exceptionally grave ; his eyes sparkled with an extraordinary light. Courage seemed to be the first tenet of his religion, the only credential of a human being.
'On education' is an extremely brilliant book for character training. After reading it the sensible parents will be more interested in educating their children and the knowledge-hungry parents will be greatly benefited. Believe me, this book is an inextinguishable light. The family that has obtained it will be free from the misery of darkness.
Reply from Xu Zhimo to Ou-yang Lan's *Luosu yu you zhi jiao yu zhi yi yu da wen*. [In : *Chen bao fu kan* ; 19. Mai (1926)].
Xu's story provoked some protest from a couple of Chinese education specialists and in defending Russell presented the following opinion :
I cannot guarantee that we all sympathize with Russell's passion to uphold courage and denounce cowardice, but truly, if you consider other aspects of character as secondary and your greatest expectation of your child is his being good-tempered, being able to produce sweet smiles and to greet others politely, you differ widely from Russell. Concerning this, I must admit that my obsession is pretty deep. I prefer not having a child if I should have a cowardly one. There is nothing more shameful in the world than being cowardly. [Russ45]

1926.03

Russell, Bertrand. *What is happening in China ?* [ID D28427].

"In many ways the Chinese are the most civilised nation in the world, and it is infinitely shameful that we should make it our business to teach them lessons in barbarity." This is how Bertrand Russell sums up his conclusions on the present situation in China. He suggests a policy for the Labour Party which might bring great benefits both to China and this country. - To understand what has been happening in China is difficult for the ordinary man, and impossible for officials who have had long experience of that country as it used to be. Probably no country except Russia has changed so much during the present century. The changes have been visible for a number of years to those who had a sympathetic knowledge of young China, but have only recently become obvious to men who, like almost all British officials and merchants, regarded young China with contempt. A few words of history are necessary to explain the situation.

The Powers take sides.

The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Manchu Dynasty and established, nominally, a democratic Republic. This was mainly the work of Sun Yat-sen. But Yuan She-kai, the 'strong man' favoured by the British, controlled the Northern troops, and only agreed to support the Republicans on condition of being made the first President. He governed unconstitutionally, and tried, without success, to make himself Emperor. When he died, there was no longer any legal Government, and his Generals quarrelled, as they have continued to do down to the present day. Naturally the great Powers took sides (some—what surreptitiously) in these disputes. Wu Pei-fu (at present more or less in eclipse) was the British favourite ; Chang Tso-lin, in Manchuria, is the henchman of Japan ; Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General, is the favourite of the Soviet Government and the military champion of Chinese nationalism. Of course, the actions of the Powers have made the ending of Chinese anarchy more difficult. In Canton, which was controlled by Sun Yat-sen from 1920 till his death, there is a more Radical Government than in the North. This Government has been increasingly hated by Hongkong, partly because of its Labour sympathies, partly because the development of Canton as a port is capable of ruining Hongkong. At present the relations between Hongkong and Canton are only just short of war. The massacre last June at Shameen (the foreign quarter of Canton) was even more brutal and destructive than the Shanghai massacre, but obtained less publicity, because British propa—ganda had a firmer hold over the sources of information. It has come as a surprise to the British in China to find that it is more difficult than it used to be to suppress the demand for justice towards China. The Japanese appear to have been quicker to learn this lesson. During the war they were the worst oppressors of China, but since the Washington Confer—ence they have shown themselves much more conciliatory. Although the trouble in Shanghai started with a labour dispute in a Japanese mill, during which a Chinese working man was brutally murdered, the work of suppression was mainly under—taken by the British, who have come in for the largest share of odium in consequence. The American Government, in all its dealings with China, has behaved with enlightened self-interest and was the best friend of China until the rise of the Soviet Republic. Now Russia is the main external supporter of Chinese nationalism, in spite of the fact that this movement is genuinely nationalistic, not Bolshevik.

An Educational Awakening.

The causes of the increased resistance of China to foreign oppression are several, of which three are specially important. I put first the spread of modern education. For 2,000 years the Chinese have been governed by their most highly educated men ; now these men have imbibed Western knowledge without acquiring a respect for Western practice. The injustice of the old treaties (especially that of 1842, following the Opium War) is now obvious to every educated Chinese. Under these treaties, foreigners are not subject to Chinese laws or Chinese justice ; the Treaty Ports are practically sovereign States, where foreign merchants control almost all the external commerce of China, and allow the Chinese no voice in the Government; the Customs Tariff is fixed by treaty and the Customs Revenue is collected by foreigners, as is also the Salt Tax ; foreign war—ships assemble at Shanghai, and foreign gun-boats anchor hundreds of miles up the Yangze, in the very heart of the country. No foreign loan can be concluded except through the Consortium, a group of privileged banks,

British, French, American and Japanese. These conditions make the nominal independence of China a mockery, and naturally men who understand the sources of power and the way in which power is used for economic exploitation resent the enslavement of their country to foreign nations which they see no reason to respect.

The leaders in the nationalist movement of the past months have been the professors of the National University of Peking, where the education is modern, but where there is no European control. Students have had a profound influence by propaganda among merchants, wage-earners, and even soldiers ; their influence has exceeded anything that Europeans could have foreseen, because, in China, learning is respected.

The second cause of the revolt of China against foreign domination was the war and the Treaty of Versailles. The Japanese conquered from the Germans the province of Shantung, which contains about thirty million inhabitants, and the birth-place of Confucius. When, in 1917, the Allies were engaged in inducing China to join in the war, the Americans held out hopes that Shantung would be restored to China at the Peace, while England, France and Tsarist Russia concluded secret treaties with Japan, promising that Shantung should remain Japanese. When this came out, and was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles, because President Wilson considered Shantung less important than Fiume, it did not increase the respect of China for the morality of Europe. And the mere fact of the war made the Chinese feel that Western civilisation was not such a fine thing as its missionaries pretended.

The third cause of the new attitude in China is the ferment produced by the spectacle of Russia—not so much by Bolshevik propaganda as by the knowledge that Russia had succeeded in throwing off the financial dominion of the West and was prepared to help other Asiatic nations to do likewise. This is a fact of immense importance throughout Asia, against which the British Foreign Office is powerless. It is not for their Communism, but for their championship of economic independence, that the Bolsheviks are admired in China. And for this they deserve the admiration they receive.

The amount of Communism in China is infinitesimal, if Communism means the adoption of a certain economic doctrine. China is a country of peasants, handicraftsmen and merchants ; a country accustomed to an extraordinarily small amount of central government. In such a country Communism is technically and psychologically quite impossible. But the influence of the Bolsheviks throughout Asia is in no way due to their Communist doctrine. It is due to the fact that they have taken the side of Asia as against Europe and that they have succeeded, at the cost of terrible suffering, in emancipating themselves from the financial domination of the West. The prestige of white men in Asia depended upon their acting in unison against men with any different pigmentation. The war and the Bolshevik revolution put an end to this co-operation which cannot possibly be revived until the relations between Russia and the West are radically changed. But although differences of economic doctrine underlie the conflict between Russia and the West, it is agreement in politics, not in economics, that leads to friendship between Russia and China. The hostility of the Soviet Government to Chang Tso-lin is really an example of this friendship, since Chang Tso-lin is a tool of the foreign oppressors of China.

The Weapon of the Boycott.

As a result of these causes, the educated minority in China, to whom the nation is accustomed to look for leadership, have adopted an attitude which is new in the history of the country.

They are not anti-foreign, like the Boxers ; they recognise that China, like Japan, must learn from the West. But they desire that degree of national independence which is possessed by European nations. They see that, by different roads, Japan, Russia, and Turkey have emancipated themselves, and they wish China to do likewise. The method of resistance by force of arms is not feasible, partly because of the anarchy, partly because the Chinese are not a warlike people. This may change in time, but for the present the method of the boycott is the natural one to adopt. As against Hongkong, this method has been practised with extraordinary success ; the British in that city would have starved but for a loan of millions from the home Government. Canton has been entirely justified from the point of view of self-defence.

Hongkong stirred up Fascist rebellions in Canton, an employee of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank being prominent among the Fascisti. The Europeans in Shameen, led by the

British, brutally massacred a large number of Chinese engaged in a peaceful demonstration outside the limits of the Foreign Concession. Of what has been done in the way of secret intrigue, it is difficult to get reliable evidence ; but of the stream of propaganda against Canton, all the telegrams from Hongkong in our newspapers are indubitable proof. The Chinese are now demanding tariff autonomy (virtually conceded), abolition of extra-territoriality, and a drastic modification of the régime in the Treaty Ports. Germans, Austrians, and Russians have lost their extra-territorial rights as a consequence of the war ; thus in effect the nations concerned are Great Britain, America, France, and Japan. The interests of France are less than those of the other three. America has always taken up a liberal attitude towards China, and Japan has thought it prudent to do so since her set-back at the Washington Conference in 1921. Consequently the odium of defending the old injustices has fallen mainly upon the British Government. The matter has been most grossly mishandled from the point of view of British interests. The massacres at Shanghai and Shameen were bound to rouse fury throughout China, but if our Government had promptly and publicly acceded to the demand for punishment of the culprits, the indignation could not have extended to the British nation in general. As it is, our China trade (particularly in the South) has suffered because we preferred massacre to money. We brought on the boycott because we were not willing to forego the pleasure of firing upon unarmed crowds.

The Danger to Peace.

It is too late now for mild palliative measures. The Chinese are roused, and are quite capable of securing their objects by passive resistance, even supposing the anarchy continues. The situation is, of course, very dangerous from the standpoint of world peace. The recent dispute between the Soviet Government and Chang Tso-lin about the Chinese Eastern Railway might have led to a clash between Russia and Japan if either Power had failed to show moderation. The Governor of Hongkong has stated that his Government is prepared to take drastic steps to put an end to the Canton boycott of Hongkong. This, if it means anything, means action which must be resented by the Soviet Government. If the British Government were not afraid of effective resistance on the part of British labour, we should before now have found ourselves involved in a war in China against the Chinese and Russians combined ; in such a conflict not a shred of right would have been on our side.

It is true, of course, that much of the European oppression in China is justified by treaties. These treaties, however, were concluded as the result of aggressive wars, and the Manchu Government, which signed them, was wholly ignorant of the modern world. To attempt to hold modern China to these old treaties is like demanding of a grown-up man that he shall be crippled for life by a contract made with a moneylender while he was a minor. In this case the Courts recognise the invalidity of the contract; but in international affairs there is no analogous mechanism. Nevertheless, China is now in a position to demand radical changes in the old treaties. The only question is whether we are to resist up to the last moment, and yield to nothing- but the threat of ruin, or whether we are to concede willingly and cheerfully what is obviously just. If we do the latter, the new regime can begin with friendly feeling on the part of China ; if the former, every other nation will be preferred to us. It is obvious to every sane man that justice and self- interest are on the same side ; but this is not the opinion of anybody in the Government or the Foreign Office.

A Policy for Labour.

The policy of the Labour Party should be clear in these circumstances. Tariff autonomy, demanded by the Chinese at the Tariff Conference now sitting, seems likely to be carried ; this is an important step. But this is a very different thing from autonomy in the collection of the customs. At present the Inspector-General of Customs (who has to be British) is appointed by the Chinese Government, and himself appoints all the other Customs officials and controls the funds. This system cannot easily be altered, as the Customs revenue is largely pledged to pay the interest on various loans. A closely similar situation exists as regards the Salt Tax. Again, there are difficulties as regards the Treaty Ports. Shanghai, in particular, is a European city of fabulous wealth, not in any degree subject to Chinese control ; it may be doubted whether there would be anything like so much wealth if autonomy were abrogated. So long as China has no stable Government, such arguments must be allowed a certain weight. It will

therefore be necessary, for a time, to adopt measures designed to ease the transition, and such measures will have to be adopted by agreement among the Powers concerned. Take the case of the International Settlement in Shanghai, where the difficulties have been most acute. To begin with, the immense majority of its inhabitants are Chinese, but no Chinese has a vote for the Municipal Council. This is an injustice which should be remedied immediately. In the second place, all legal disputes, whether civil or criminal, between Chinese and foreigners are tried by foreigners, naturally with results which bear little relation to justice. If, here and now, it were decided that they should all be tried by Chinese, there would be equally little justice. The proper course would be to have both Chinese and foreign judges in all cases where both Chinese and foreigners are involved, until such time as the Chinese have a sufficient body of trained jurists to be able to do the work efficiently themselves. Another matter which might be conceded at once is respect for Chinese territorial waters : no war-ships of foreign navies should approach the coasts of China, still less sail up the rivers, except at the invitation of the Chinese Government. At present foreigners can (and do) massacre Chinese with impunity, but if one foreigner is killed, the Chinese are made to pay an exorbitant indemnity and very likely forced to yield economic or political concessions. Another point should be concerned with loans; the Governments of the Powers should agree that henceforth they will not act as debt-collectors for their nationals. At present, the British taxpayer has to pay for the expense of enforcing payment due to such wealthy corporations as the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank this is absurd as well as unjust. There is thus a great deal which could be done at once, and the British Government ought to take the lead in urging that it should be done ; the other Powers would almost certainly concur.

There are larger matters, however, which cannot be done in a day, though they will have to be done at the earliest possible moment. The chief are the abolition of extra-territoriality and the retrocession of the Treaty Ports. It is nearly certain that the Chinese will soon be in a position to exhort these concessions by force, and it would be obviously wiser to initiate negotiations with a view to making them voluntarily. It is naked capitalism that stands in the way, and there can be no ultimate and complete cure except a socialistic control over economic adventure in distant countries. It is to be hoped that, when we next have a Labour Government in this country, it will take steps to ascertain what is happening in distant parts of the world. Of course, merchants and officials hang together, and so long as a Labour Government is content to rely upon official sources of information it will never know anything except what capitalists wish it to know. The late Government made the mistake of assuming intelligent loyalty in public servants towards policies which they neither liked nor understood. Those who take Socialism seriously will not expect to see it established by the work of its enemies.

Conclusion.

To sum up : China is at the moment still in the state of anarchy into which it fell after the death of Yuan Shi-kai, but there are signs that this anarchy will be ended as a result of the Nationalist movement, since soldiers are increasingly unwilling to fight for unpatriotic Generals. The potential strength of China is so great that a very small amount of enthusiasm and organisation would suffice to drive the foreigners into the sea. The amount of good done by foreigners in China is infinitesimal in comparison with the amount of harm, and so long as their special privileges are preserved, this will continue to be the case. The Chinese realise this, and are determined to extort justice. In their demand for justice they are vigorously supported by the Soviet Government, which has played so far an almost wholly beneficent part in China. Other foreign Governments would be acting both justly and wisely if they were to show the utmost readiness to make concessions. At the same time, the financial interests which have grown up under our protection and with the guarantee of our support, are so vast that, in a capitalist world, the British Government can hardly be expected to abandon them suddenly. We could do certain things at once : concede an equal voice in the Government of the Treaty Ports to the Chinese living in them ; abandon the practice of introducing warships into Chinese territorial waters without the consent of the Chinese Government ; recognise the Government of Canton and cease to intrigue against it or prevent it from acquiring its share of the Customs revenue ; grant tariff autonomy ; and associate Chinese with foreign jurists in all litigation between Chinese and foreigners. We ought also to

express our willingness to cede the Treaty Ports and abandon extra-territoriality at an early date, by methods to be agreed upon between China and the Powers. And, above all, we ought to give up the practice of making Governments the debt-collectors for their nationals. China is undergoing a most remarkable intellectual renaissance, which is disliked and despised by almost all the British in China. The result is already beginning to appear in the political sphere, and will become increasingly evident in the near future. In many ways the Chinese are the most civilised nation in the world, and it is infinitely shameful that we should make it our business to teach them lessons in barbarism. [Russ302]

1926.04.07 Russell, Bertrand. The foreign wolf in the Chinese sheepfold : what will happen to him when the sheep learn their lesson ? Review of Gilbert, Rodney. What's wrong with China. London : J. Murray, 1926. [Extract].

The present reviewer can perhaps hardly be expected to be quite impartial towards Mr. Rodney Gilbert's book, in view of the author's attitude to those who are friendly to China, as exemplified in the statement :

'China's future has been much more seriously prejudiced by the ideas imported and peddled by such persons as Bertrand Russell, John Dewey, Tagore and Karakhan, than by all opium, morphia, heroin, cocaine and hashish imported or produced in China during the past three centuries'.

Would anyone suppose from this passage that Tagore could scarcely get a hearing in China because his meetings were systematically interrupted by Karakhan's political allies ? The Communists stand for the Westernising of China, Tagore stand for the preservation of the traditional Orient ; either is an intelligible policy, but obviously they have nothing in common.

Not The Last Word

Even their resistance to the West is of two quite different kinds – in the one case cultural, in the other economic and military. Is the belief that Western Capitalism does not represent the last word in wisdom and virtue.

The author, though an American, disapproves violently of what he regards as the milksop sentimentalism of his country's policy in China, and wants the white nations (except Russia) for join in a military conquest, to be followed by 'good government' – i.e., encouragement of exploitation. He endeavours to prove by history that the Chinese have never prospered except under a foreign despotism. If he were Chinese, he could prove the same thesis about England...

Those Fatal Fogs

... So Mr. Gilbert might have written if he had been Chinese – not more inaccurately than he has in fact written. He is an outcome of the 'Nordic' propaganda in the United States, which has dominated recent immigration policy in that country. He holds that everything good is Teutonic, and everything Asiatic (including Christianity) is bad.

At the same time, he hates most in China the Chinese who have become Europeanised, and prefers those who are totally destitute of Western knowledge – presumably because they are easier to exploit. He makes no secret of his Nietzschean morality : -

"In China we are regarded with much the same feelings as a group of polite and sociable wolves would be in a flock of sheep. The sheep have no natural inclination to bite one another, so they can hard together in perfect confidence, but the wolf on his good behavior is always restraining his natural inclination to snap at a fellow or eat a lamb ; so, however well the wolves behave, the sheep are never at their ease when exchanging compliments with them."

Are we content to remain wolves ? Mr. Gilbert says yes : 'Because of our ancestry and our instincts we should be more inclined to admire the well-behaved wolf than the browsing sheep'. The thesis of his book is that the wolf should cease to be 'well-behaved'. At the present moment, the West, under British leadership, is taking his advice, and America, alarmed by the Bolshevik bogy, is more inclined than ever before to fall into line with European imperialism. The Chinese nationalists are being defeated by our henchman, Wu Pei-fu.

But the sheep are learning to imitate the wolves, and when they have driven Mr. Gilbert and his friends into the sea, they will presumably have earned his respect. [Russ301]

- 1926.05.10 Xu, Zhimo. *Luosu yu you zhi jiao yu*. [Russell and child education]. [ID D28404].
Xu Zhimo visited Bertrand Russell during his tour of Europe and stayed in Carn Vole, Porthcurno, Penzance, Cornwall for two days in July 1925.
Russell's house, a light grey square structure of three stories, is surrounded by a low wall. There is a verandah jutting out from the back of the house ; its two pillars are yellow in colour, serving in a way as a remembrance of China... They were going to set up a small structure which would resemble a Chinese pavilion. At the time, I wrote for them a Chinese inscription bearing – I can't remember with certainty – either the characters 'Listening to wind' or 'Facing the wind'. When Russell drove an old car to Penzance station to meet me that day, I almost couldn't recognize him. Every inch a countryman ! His straw hat had holes, and his jacket was torn. If he did wear a necktie that day, it would be like a straw dangling in front of his chest. His shoes, needless to say, were twins with Charley Chaplin's. He held a smoking pipe whose dark brown colour blended well with his skin. But how sharp, how intense and how bright his eyes were. The exterior of a rustic could not conceal the intelligence of a philosopher !
It was Sunday that day... He started with an epigram thus, 'Sunday is the only common tenet shared by both Christians and the trade unionists...' I asked why he and his wife had come to the tip of the south for a recluse's life. Russell said first he wanted to concentrate on writing and second, more importantly, he had to look after the moral education of their kids.
I spent two days there. Listening to Russell is like watching German firecrackers – all sorts of dazzling wonders cracking in the sky in a most amazing way, one group after another and clusters after clusters. You cannot help being amazed, astounded and delighted. But I am not going to recall his talks. The difficulty would be something like wishing to depict the silvery sparks in the sky. [Russ45]

1926.09.17 Russell, Bertrand. *The white peril in China : business as usual* [ID D28423].

Never since 1900 has the position of foreigners in China been so critical as at the present moment. But in recalling the Boxer movement I am not suggesting a parallel ; quite the contrary. What is important for Europeans to realize is the profound gulf which separates the Chinese nationalists of the present day from the misguided reactionaries of twenty-six years ago. The Boxers represented the least civilized and least enlightened elements in their country ; they stood solely for the preservation of ancient tradition. On the other hand, the Kuo Min Tang, the modern nationalist party, consists of the most modern and Westernised people in China – people who have assimilated, not the slave morality which Europeans have tried to inculcate in the East, but the doctrines of freedom and self-respect which they have tried to keep for home consumption. No unprejudiced person can doubt that the Kuo Min Tang represents all that is best in China, both morally and intellectually ; that is why our Foreign Office is itching to destroy it.

One word about the situation. In Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin is seizing the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was built by Chinese labour and Tsarist capital, and is therefore claimed by the Soviet Government. Not very far to the north of Peking is the intact army of Feng, the northern champion of Chinese nationalism, who was driven from Peking by the combined forces of Chang Tso-lin, the protégé of Japan, and Wu Pei-fu, the champion of British interests in the Yangtze. On the Yangtze, at its most crucial point, the Cantonese nationalist army, marching from the south, has occupied the twin cities of Hankow and Hanyang – including Wu's great arsenal in the latter, but not the foreign concession in the former. Farther up the Yangtze, one of Wu's lieutenants has turned against us, seized some British ships and come into collision with British gunboats. In the neighbourhood of Hankow, the nationalists are said to be firing upon all foreign ships indiscriminately, including those of America ; whether this is fact or propaganda it is not yet possible to know. Wu Pei-fu, for the moment at least, is impotent ; Chang Tso-lin is held in check, both by Russia to the north and by Feng in the south. In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether Chinese armies can be found to fight our battles for us.

There is at this moment a serious possibility that China may be united under the joint leadership of Feng and the Cantonese. Public opinion enthusiastically supports them – not only that of the students, as our newspapers pretend, but also that of the 'solid middle class'. It is true that the 'students' . i.e., the men and women who have had a modern education, both old and young – are the most active and energetic of the champions of Chinese freedom, but they have won over almost all who are politically conscious among the Chinese. They even influence the soldiers in the mercenary armies, and make it difficult for Generals who are tools of the foreigner to rely upon their troops. That is in part the explanation of the successes of the Cantonese armies.

Hankow and Hanyang are practically one city, about the size of Glasgow, on the northern bank of the Yangtze. Together with Wuchang, opposite them on the southern bank, they constitute the centre of China, where the river, running from west to east, crosses the north-and-south route from Peking to Canton. This is the key position, industrially, commercially, and strategically. Hence our dismay at the success of the Cantonese.

The Cantonese are called 'Reds' in our propaganda Press. They are less 'Red' than Mr. MacDonald ; perhaps about as 'Red' as Mr. Lloyd George. But they are willing to accept help from Red Russia in the 'sort of war' that we have been waging against them from Hongkong, just as Chang Tso-lin, whom we regard as a pattern of virtue, has always accepted help from White Russia. The Cantonese wish to establish an orderly democratic government in China, and to restore Chinese independence, which we destroyed by the Opium War and its successors.

The extent to which China has been deprived of independence is not always realized. Let us illustrate it by an analogy. Suppose the Germans had won the war, and had compelled us to sign a treaty giving them the City of London, control of the railway from London to Harwich, the right to garrisons at Reading and Oxford as 'Treaty Ports', the exclusive admiration of the business quarters in Glasgow, Liverpool, Southampton, with a score of other ports, and the right to determine import duties, collect the customs, and hand over the proceeds only to such

Governments as they approved of, and to decide all disputes between Germans and British by German Courts. This would represent fairly accurately the state of affairs which Europe and Japan have created in China. I think that even the present Cabinet and Foreign Office would be found among the patriots if that were the condition of England.

But sauce for the goose is not sauce for the gander. The Chinese are 'wicked' when they demand the abrogation of the unequal treaties. For a long time, in fact, ever since the present British Government came into power, our Foreign Office has wished to intervene in China, but has been restrained by fear of America. It is hoped, however, that America will be brought to consent to intervention by means of the propaganda which represents Chinese nationalists as Bolsheviks. In many respects Americans are liberal, but where the Reds are concerned they see red. It is therefore possible that they may be induced at least to tolerate our intervention. This will, of course, further embitter our relations with Russia, leading, not improbably, to open war with the Soviet Government.

Whatever may be the immediate outcome, it may be taken as certain that we shall be defeated in the end, with the loss of the whole of our political and commercial advantages in China. From the standpoint of British interests, opposition to Chinese nationalism is madness. It has already ruined Hongkong and seriously damaged our China trade elsewhere. And the more we persist, the more we shall lose.

If we were fighting for a great cause, the prospect of loss might be faced with heroism. But the exact opposite is the case : we are fighting against everything progressive, upright, and intelligent in China, in favour of everything ignorant, reactionary and corrupt. We are fighting to keep civilization under in a great nation, in order that it may be the easier to exploit. We are fighting for the right to shoot down young unarmed students when they protest against the killing of Chinese workers by Japanese capitalists in labour disputes. We are fighting to prolong anarchy and civil war among self-seeking militarists dependent upon foreign support. We are fighting to preserve everything that is bad and to prevent the growth of everything that is good. This, alas, is our position throughout Asia. This is the sacred cause which we pursue with a pig-headed obstinacy that must, before long, bring ruin and national disaster upon us. Both as a patriot and as an internationalist, I view the situation with feelings little short of despair.

What can be done about it ? The Labour Party might make an emphatic gesture to dissociate itself from reckless imperialism. It is painful to have to acknowledge that during the Labour Government the Colonial Office and the India Office were little better than at other times, though the Foreign Office was distinctly better until the permanent officials broke loose. The Labour Party ought to declare emphatically that, in the present disturbed state of affairs, no British naval vessels should navigate the Yangtze or take part in hostile acts against Canton. It should declare that the time has come to revise the unequal treaties. It should emphatically express sympathy with the Kuo Min Tang, which is fighting the battle of Labour in China. And, last but not least, it should make it clear that it will not be a party to any hostilities against the U.S.S.R. which may grow out of the Chinese tangle.

Looking further ahead, the Labour Party should resolve that, when next Labour is in office, it shall not depend upon officials and capitalists for its information about such countries as Mexico and China.

So long as it remains in this dependence all its information will be biased, and it will be led to pursue a policy diametrically opposed to its professed objects. The attitude of the Labour Government towards Mexico (where Labour is in power) was such as to serve the oil interests, but was quite against the interests of humanity. So it will be again if we continue to depend upon reactionaries for our information.

The continuity of foreign policy, which, I regret to say, has received some support from nominal adherents of the Labour Party, is a Satanic principle, which no humane person can tolerate for a moment. Our foreign policy, from the days of Henry VIII to the present moment, has been abominable : it has had one uniform principle, that of causing dissensions among others, in order that they might weaken each other for our benefit. This is called the Balance of Power.

The Labour Party has, on paper, the most admirable principles in international affairs, but it

allows itself to be deceived by not realizing the cunning and wickedness of the forces opposed to it, more particularly of those whose opposition is concealed and surreptitious. If our international ideals are to be effective, we shall have to be less gentle and trustful towards those whose ideals are different. I do not mean that we should persecute them ; I mean only that we should not leave them in key positions of influence and power. If I were Prime Minister, I should give a long holiday on full pay to many of our diplomatic service and of the higher permanent officials in the Foreign Office and the India Office. Until we do this, everything that we attempt will be sabotaged.

Meanwhile we have to face the cry of 'British lives in danger'. Will our mandarins never understand the cry of 'Chinese lives in danger' which went up after the Shanghai massacre, committed at a time when no British lives were in danger ? If the British in China are in danger, let us announce that we are prepared to withdraw them, and the danger will cease. So long as the British arrogate to themselves the right to shoot Chinese at sight they cannot expect that the Chinese will respect their right to life. 'This animal is wicked ; it defends itself when attacked'. [Russ298]

1927 Lu Xun schreibt : "L'Anglais Bertrand Russell et le Français Romain Rolland s'opposaient à la guerre et tout le monde les a admirés, mais en fait c'est une chance que leurs paroles n'aient pas été suivies d'effet, car l'Allemagne aurait conquis l'Angleterre et la France. En fait, à moins de réaliser dans le même temps le pacifisme en Allemagne aussi, c'était chose nulle et non avenue. C'est pour la même raison qu'on n'a pu mettre en acte la théorie de non-résistance de Tolstoï. Comme il était opposé à ce qu'on rendît le mal pour le mal, il proposait de ne pas suivre les ordres du tsar : s'il enrôlait des conscrits, qu'on refusât de partir soldat et de faire la guerre, s'il ordonnait aux policiers de faire des arrestations, que les policiers refusent d'arrêter, s'il ordonnait au bourreau de faire des exécutions, que les bourreaux refusent d'exécuter, que tous en comme cessent d'obéir aux ordres du tsar et lui-même finirait par perdre le goût d'en donner, il perdrait toute ambition et le monde connaîtrait une grande paix. Mais il suffisait qu'une petite partie de ces gens lui obéissent pour que ce beau mécanisme ne fonctionne plus." [Rol5]

1927 Russell, Bertrand. *Preface*. In : T'ang, Leang-li [Tang, Liangli]. *China in revolt* [ID D28456]. Recent events in China have shown the extraordinary extent to which our Foreign Office has been misled as to the present state of public opinion in that country. Relying upon information from Anglo-Chinese, who associate almost exclusively with Europeans, and are completely ignorant of the change that has come over China in recent years, our Government has refused, until too late, to make concessions in response to the just indignation of the Chinese in the matter of the Shanghai massacre, or to abate in any degree the unscrupulous hostility displayed by Hongkong towards Canton. The immediate result has been an immense injury to British trade in China ; the ultimate result is likely unless there is a complete change in our official attitude, to be a complete collapse of British interests in China. Those who wish to understand the point of view of the modern Chinese – who are coming, more and more, to control the policy of their country – cannot do better than read Mr. T'ang's book. They will find an indictment of Western policy, and more particularly of the policy of Great Britain, which is as painful as it is irrefutable. Hitherto we have treated China with the injustice and brutality which invariably fall to the lot of the weak among nations ; but the indignation aroused is at length putting an end to weakness, and enabling China to insist upon being treated as an equal. The sooner this is realized, the less disastrous it will be for ourselves. Mr. T'ang is therefore doing a service to Great Britain as well as to his own country in endeavouring to bring the facts to the notice of those who are not totally blind to the significance of contemporary movements. [TangL1]

1927.02.05 Russell, Bertrand ; Russell, Dora. *Force in China : letter to the editor* [ID D28420].

Sir, It becomes increasingly difficult to read with patience your commentaries and warnings on the present situation in China. Is it not time that all people of humane ideals and aims were frankly told that the dispatch of the large forces that have gone to China is not only likely but probably intended, to provoke a war between us and the Chinese, in which there would not be a shadow of right or justification on our side, nor any possible final issue but shameful and deserved defeat, involving the almost complete loss of our already fast diminishing trade with the Chinese. In these circumstances all those who do not demand the immediate recall of all British forces from China, and the recognition of Cantonese rights in all provinces where the Cantonese Government has jurisdiction, are doing a grave disservice, not only to the English people, but also even to the misguided British merchants out in China, who still hope to extend their trade at the bayonet point as they did at the time of the opium wars.

Not long since you were urging the Government to explain the Wanhsien incident. No English explanation has been given ; and now you speak of the necessity of large forces in order to avoid a 'repetition of the Wanhsien fiasco'. In what did the fiasco consist – in the fact that not more than one thousand Chinese were killed, and not more than one thousand Chinese houses destroyed ? Surely Mr. Chen's 'rodomontade' on Imperialism has a considerable 'bearing on the existing situation', when he is faced by the dispatch of more troops by a Power which has not hesitated to bombard without compensation or apology an open unfortified town. This act is against the laws of warfare, even where we at war with the Chinese.

The lives and persons of British nationals are in no danger. Persons of other nationality are walking about and doing business freely. It must be admitted, of course, that they have not seen fit to take part in the recent shooting of Chinese as we have done. But it is time that the six thousand odd British in Shanghai faced the situation like the British gentlemen they claim to be. They are free to return to England, or to move northward if they do not like the Cantonese regime.

The Cantonese are the accepted and functioning Government now of nine provinces, practically all the South and West of China. The treaty rights, about which we generously offer to 'negotiate', were force on China by war. No self-respecting Chinese Government could continue to accept them, and our trade and prestige in China stand to gain by their immediate abandonment. There is nothing outrageous or 'impossible' in the whole of the Cantonese demands. They are modern people, ready for peace and trade. They have not taken, nor will they take, unless bitterly provoked, the life of any foreigner not engaged in war with them. In fact they are a model of sweet reasonableness, in comparison with what the English would be like, had Chinese gunboats sailed up the Thames for a lark and bombarded Reading and Oxford.

Unless this Government is severely handled, telegraph agencies will soon be busy manufacturing 'riots in Shanghai', and the British troops privily engaged in the Chinese civil war, on the side of the North against Canton.

[Mr. and Mrs. Russell appear to have written their letter before Sir Austen Chamberlain spoke at Birmingham last Saturday. After reading his speech, would they still suggest that the Shanghai Defence Force is 'probably intended to provoke a war between us and the Chinese' ? Ed., Nation]. [Russ295]

1927.02.08 Russell, Bertrand. *British folly in China* [ID D28383].
London, February 8 (1927).

In all the long history of British blunders it would be difficult to parallel the present governmental policy in regard to China for immoral ineptitude. I say governmental policy, for the nation is emphatically not behind the Government as yet. One supposes that it will in time be influenced by means of a suitable diet of atrocities. It will be taught to believe that the Chinese eat corpses and mutilate children, and those who ask for evidence of these practices will be put in jail. As yet, however, feeling against China is confined to the Die-Hard section of the Conservative Party, and the Conservative Party, though a majority of Parliament, was a minority in the nation even in the 'Red Letter' election.

Labor, with the exception of a few leaders who have been hobbled, is vigorously and determinedly opposed to the policy of sending troops, and is demanding their recall in spite of discouragement from their own headquarters. Labor quite understands that what our Government dislikes about the Chinese Nationalists is their policy of favoring trade unionism and aiming at an increase in wages. Enormous and enthusiastic meetings are being held in every part of the country demanding the recall of the expeditionary force. Even the Liberals, taking their cue from Lloyd George, are exceedingly critical of the Government's action. From the mere standpoint of British interests what has been done is so foolish that nothing but a lust for blood could have made anyone suppose it wise. The concessions which our foreign Office has offered to the Nationalist Government go beyond anything that would have been required to secure agreement if no forces had been dispatched. But because these forces are on their way, Mr. Chen rightly refuses to negotiate until this threat is withdrawn. The forces are being sent nominally to protect the International Settlement, but the Japanese, whose diplomacy is never caught napping, have intimated that they will not permit the troops to land in a region, where their rights are the same as ours, and where their citizens are not finding the need of armed protection. If the troops land on pure Chinese territory, this of course will be in itself an act of war, and will give legal validity to the protest of Dr. Wellington Koo on behalf of the Peking Government, which relies upon the Nine-Power Treaty and the Covenant of the League of Nations.

This protest and the dismissal of Sir Francis Aglen as Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Admiralty are the first signs of the one good result to be expected of British folly, namely, the reunion of North and South in resistance to foreign aggression. It is to be expected that the reactionary generals, whom in spite of their illegalities and extortions the British Government is attempting to keep in power, will be abandoned by their own troops unless they make peace with the Nationalists. The British in China, absorbed as they are in ridge and polo, have not noticed that China has become a political nation, and have not stopped to reflect upon the asset which their policy affords to the Kuomintang in its party strife with Chinese conservatism. They have a curious inability to understand what sort of conduct people like and what sort they dislike. I listened the other night to an hour's address given to the Society for the Study of International Affairs, by a British diplomat lately returned from China, in the course of which he professed to explain why the British are not popular in China. He never even mentioned the massacres of Shanghai, Shameen, and Wanhsien, and when afterwards I asked him the reason for his omission he said that he did not consider they had been an important factor. The British in China are apparently unable to realize that Chinese civilians take no pleasure in being shot down treacherously without warning. Psychology is not taught at our English public schools or at Oxford.

The situation is of course one of the utmost gravity, for if once the troops land at Shanghai it is difficult to see how war can be avoided, unless by American or Japanese intervention, either of which our Government would presumably regard as an unfriendly act, though it would be welcomed by every sane man in Great Britain. If war breaks out it will entail the complete militarization of China and a prolonged struggle leading to the immediate cessation of the British-China trade, and an ultimate humiliation, even in a military sense, for though it may be easy to defeat Chinese armies it will be absolutely impossible to maintain control of China or any portion of it not within reach of naval guns.

The men to whom our Government is listening recall with pride our exploits in the Opium

War, and point to the trade advantages thereby secured. They do not seem to realize that the republic of 1927 is different from the tottering Manchu empire of 1840. I could hardly have believed in the existence of such anachronistic ideas among persons with large interests in China had I not myself heard them expressed by such persons in debate.

Nor is the issue confined to China. Our Government contemplates breaking off diplomatic relations with Russia, and there is reason to think that the Poles are being incited to repeat their war of 1920. Our attempt to suppress China will of course have repercussions in India, and will increase the unrest in that country. In Great Britain itself a large proportion of those who fought in the Great War are determined never to fight again, whatever the issue. China is distant, and cannot be made to seem truly menacing.

The nation will not therefore throw itself into a struggle in the Far East with the wholeheartedness which it showed during the Great War. Unless our Government quickly comes to its senses, I foresee the loss of our Indian Empire and the accession to power in this country of a Labor Party with a very different temper from that of our Government of 1924. For the world at large the insanity of our present Government is likely to be a boon, but for England it is a disaster of the first magnitude. [Russ257]

1927.02.13 Russell, Bertrand. *Where is China going ?* [ID D28382].

Immediate future of China is very doubtful, though it is certain that in the long run the nationalists will achieve complete independence for their country.

To an Occidental reader, misled by the propaganda which is being telegraphed from China, it may well seem as if that country were in a state of mere chaotic turmoil. That, however, is not the case, any more than it was in America in the years 1861-65 when the fate of slavery was being decided by force. But in order to understand the situation a few facts about Chinese history are necessary.

The Manchus, a warlike northern tribe of foreign conquerors, acquired Peking and the empire in 1644, but during the 15th century they fell gradually in disrepute, partly because they could not oppose a successful resistance to the foreigners (especially English and French), partly because of their extreme difficulty in coping with the Taiping rebellion, which cost as many lives as the Great War cost to all the belligerents together. The Boxer rising of 1900 was a blind outburst of anti-foreign conservatism, in which the most ignorant elements made a last frantic attempt to preserve the old order. The Empress Dowager, having finally sided with the Boxers, shared the disgrace of their fall.

The next move came from the South, which has long been the most progressive part of China. Under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, a new movement grew up, patriotic but progressive, anti-Manchu but not anti-foreign, and aiming at the regeneration of China by the adoption of Western ideas and institutions. In the Revolution of 1911, this party triumphed, the Manchu fell and China became (at least nominally) a democratic parliamentary republic, with Sun Yat-sen as first President.

Unfortunately, the price of victory was the placating of Yuan Shi-kai, Commander-in-Chief of the northern armies, who demanded and obtained the retirement of Sun Yat-sen in his favor. He soon quarreled with the Parliament and took to governing by military force. After his death in 1916, his lieutenants quarreled with each other and started the confused personal struggles between militarists which have continued ever since. In these struggles the military leaders have been guilty of every kind of deprecation and violence ; moreover they have shown themselves willing to sacrifice the interests of their country in order to obtain assistance from foreigners. Foreigners (other than Americans) have continued in public to bewail the anarchy in China, while nevertheless some among them have kept it alive by timely surreptitious assistance to this or that Chinese general.

Meanwhile in the South the progressive democratic movement continued. After various vicissitudes, Sun Yat-sen was in 1920, declared President of the Republic of Canton, though at first the authority of his government extended no further than the one province of Kwantung. The British from the first bitterly opposed him, both because the development of Canton might injure the shipping interests of Honkong, and because in that part labor troubles developed as a result of the ferment produced by the pro-labor attitude of the Canton government.

After years of struggle, during which Honkong was nearly ruined by the Chinese boycott, the British had to give way so far as the relations of Honkong and Canton were concerned. But this experience made the British authorities more than ever desirous of preventing any increase in the area controlled by the Canton government, and thus led them into a general opposition to all that is liberal and progressive in China – an opposition as short-sighted as it is wicked.

Since the Washington Conference, only one Power has shown any sympathy with the best elements in China, or any understanding of China's needs. That one Power is Soviet Russia. America, from fear of Bolshevism, has hesitated to support the South, and while refraining from doing harm, has not taken any initiative in doing good. The restoration of Shantung to China as a result of the Washington Conference was a service of great importance for which the Chinese have to thank America ; but since that event active assistance has been left to the Russians.

Organization and propaganda have been largely directed by Borodin, a man who has had an adventurous career in many countries. From Spain he went to Mexico where he helped to bring about the present admirable regime. From Mexico, as a Mexican, he entered the United

States ; thence he went to Glasgow, where he called himself Mr. Brown and took part in all the most advanced labor movements. The British Parliament deported him to Russia, and the Russian government sent him to help the Cantonese. No doubt his energy and skill in propaganda have contributed to their spectacular success in acquiring control of nearly all China south of the Yangtze, together with the great city of Hankow on its northern bank. It must not be supposed that the contest is really one between North and South, though that is its genealogical form. In the North, as in the South, public opinion is on the side of the Cantonese ; no one is on the side of the northern generals except themselves and the foreigners. Propaganda has repeatedly succeeded in winning their troops to the side of the South and this, more than military prowess, has been the cause of the southern victories. It follows that if the Cantonese can win they can establish a stable popular government and unify China.

The Cantonese are not anti-foreign, in the sense in which the Boxers were. They are on the best possible terms with the Russians and are willing to be friends with any foreigners who will respect China's claims to independence. They are not communists and there is no chance to China becoming communistic : The alliance with Russia is only political. But their outlook on all domestic questions is completely enlightened. They do everything in their power to improve the status and remuneration of labor. They favor education on western lines. There is nothing in the programme that can be objected to by any decent person or approved by the present British government.

From the British imperialist point of view the struggle in China is part of the secular struggle between England and Russia for control of Asia. For ten years, from 1907 to 1917, this struggle was suspended to deal with the Germans ; but at the Bolshevik Revolution it broke out again, without waiting for the end of the war. Although the catchwords are new, the contest is essentially the old context between two imperialisms ; and it is noteworthy that, in spite of losses in the West, the Russian Empire is larger now than before the war. But whereas, before the war Russia stood for reaction, now throughout Asia, Russia stands for progress and for everything that enlightened Asiatics desire. Consequently England has been led by imperialistic motives into support of everything old, reactionary and corrupt, and into opposition to everything that represents new growth.

In the long run there can be no doubt whatever that the Chinese Nationalists will win and will achieve for their country the same independence of the West as is enjoyed by Japan. But it is impossible to foretell the immediate future. As I write, the British government is sending powerful naval forces to China, presumably for the protection of Shanghai. British interests in Shanghai are so important that they will certainly not be surrendered without a first-class struggle. And Shanghai, unlike Hankow, can easily be held from the sea.

Whether it is possible to compel the Chinese to trade with us by shouting down a sufficient number of them, remains to be seen ; so far, the results of this policy have not been encouraging from a business point of view.

The Labor Party is doing its utmost to rouse public opinion against the government policy and it is still possible that it will succeed in preventing a war which would be as disastrous as it would be immoral. But the present British Government – which, I am happy to say, represents a minority of the votes cast at the last election – appears to be as blind to the true national interest as it is to considerations of decency and humanity. Fortunately, it has lost whatever popularity it once possessed and is likely to be swept away next year in a wave of indignation. Will that be too late to redress the evil that will have been wrought in China ? No man can say. [Russ256]

1928

Xu Zhimo saw Russell again in September 1928.

Brief von Xu Zhimo an Elmhirst. Sept. 1928.

I have found the Philosopher [Bertrand Russell] as pungently witty and relentlessly [sic] humorous as ever. They are out here, once again, looking after the moral welfare of their two kids. We have had a jolly good time together since last evening. Since I was only to stay overnight we were very jealous of the little while we had with each other, so we sat up chatting last evening till, before we were aware, it was almost 2 a.m. [Russ45]

- 1931 Zhang, Shenfu. *Guanyu Luosu*. [Bertrand Russell]. [ID D28406].
I have been wanting to write something about Bertrand Russell for a long time. He will be 60 years old next May. I very much wanted to write a big, thick book about his thought by way of congratulation. What I have here instead, is sort of a foreword to that project. It is only an expression of my personal interest in Russell. But actually if you stop to think about, what other criteria is there for truth but that of interest, or rather beauty. What is life for, if not for the expression, the fulfillment of interest ? But whether my interests will find an echo among readers is beyond my ability to predict.
When asked what do you like best and would have liked to be Russell answered : 'I would have liked to know physics best and be a physicist'. 'What are you most afraid of ?' 'I fear most becoming a boring companion to my friends'. 'When was the happiest and the most unhappy time in your life ?' 'The unhappiest was the time of my birth. The happiest will probably be when I die'. 'What do you like most and least about yourself ?' 'What I like the most about myself is that many people like me. What I dislike is that I hate myself'. [Russ8]
- 1931 Death of Xu Zhimo.
Bertrand Russell was classifying his manuscripts and correspondence in the fifties or sixties. He attached the following note to Xu Zhimo's letters :
Mr. Hsü [Xu] was a highly cultivated Chinese undergraduate, a poet both in English and Chinese. He was taught Chinese classical literature by a man who had never been washed, even at birth. When this man died, Mr. Hsu, who was the local landowner, was asked whether the body should be washed. 'No', he replied, 'bury him whole'.
Unfortunately, Mr. Hsü [Xu] was killed on his way home to China. [Russ45]

1935

Lin, Yutang. *On Bertrand Russell's divorce* [ID D28025].

Bertrand Russell's divorce is none of my business. On the other hand, my thoughts on Bertrand Russell's divorce are none of his business. The short item of news that appeared in The China Press about two months ago made me think a great deal. In fact, it made me think furiously. To those acquainted with the liberal views of marriage taken both by Bertrand and Dora Russell, which to my mind, would make marriage considerably easier, the news must have come as a surprise. In fact, the situation is a little invested with humour, as the personal distresses of all great men are invested with humour. This sort of humour is of the best, for it comes from the Defeat of Theories. The cosmic engine grinds on, taking its toll from prince and pauper, and from the shop-keeper to the modern sage, and shows us up as a couple of human mortals that must eternally flounder along. For life is victorious over human philosophy.

Perhaps, if the news is true, the divorce mustn't be taken as a defeat of Bertrand Russell, but only as a defeat of marriage. Perhaps Bertrand Russell is greater than the institution of marriage. For if Russell's marriage was a failure, he was, and is, in good company. All great men's marriage are failures. You say, what about Tolstoy and Goethe ? That is very well ; but I was thinking of the great sages of the past – Buddha, Confucius, Jesus and Mohammed. Jesus never married, so that proves nothing, unless it be taken as a practical comment on marriage on his part. Buddha, as we are told in *The light of Asia*, literally walked over the graceful sleeping body of his beautiful wife and became the first monk. It makes me wonder what he must have gone through. It seems to me that all these great men and sages are half crazy people : the common feelings of pain and suffering, of pity for the beggar, of the little annoyances in marriage and the great 'ennui' of life, which to the common man are no sooner felt than forgotten, must have struck their more highly sensitized souls with the power of an exaggerated illusion. From this exaggerated illusion, usually a religion was created. In fact, all founders of a special favorite theory, like Freud, Karl Marx and D.H. Lawrence, must have suffered from a type of mental myopia or astigmatism, which enables them to 'carry it through to its logical conclusion' and beyond all limits of reasonableness. To come back – Confucius and Mencius divorced their wives, and Mohammed took to concubines. All their marriages were failures. Only Socrates, that old Greek with a large measure of common sense, stood his marriage as well as any middle-class John Smith. We are told that, after being scolded by his wife and when he was leaving his house, his wife poured a pail of cold water over his head, he merely muttered, 'After the storm, the rain !' In other words, he had very robust, healthy nerves ; he stood marriage with the same physical courage as he stood cold, hardship and physical fatigue, for which he had extraordinary powers, and he faced his wife with the same moral courage with which he faced the cup of hemlock at the end of his seventy years. Socrates had that secret of happiness which is the essences of Chinese culture: Endure and conquer.

Why didn't Russell do it, and why didn't Confucius do it ? Confucius had the same humour and the same common sense as Socrates. But we have no sufficient evidence to determine whether Confucius divorced his wife or his wife divorced him. My conviction is that his wife merely ran away. Turn up Chapter Ten of The Analects, and you will understand why it must be so. Any woman who could stand Confucius as husband could stand the Spanish Inquisitions. 'He did not talk at dinner table, and did not talk in bed'. Many wives who face the back of their husband's morning paper every breakfast must know what that first part means ; for the second part, they can only imagine. Then he was extremely fastidious about the matching of colours in his dress. 'A fur gown of black sheep should be matched with a black material, a fur gown of white deer should be matched with a black material, a fur gown of white deer should be matched with white material, and a fur gown of fox should be matched with chocolate material'. Like all great men, he had original personal habits. 'He must have the right sleeve of his working gown made shorter' than the left sleeve, and he 'insisted on changing into a sleeping gown, which was longer by half than his body'. All these were practical hygienic innovations, but to the wife of Confucius, who was just a conventional woman, they might have just seemed like sheer nonsense. Equally fastidious was he with his food. 'Rice could never be too white, and mince meat could never be too fine', and who bore

the burden except the wife in the kitchen ? The ten conditions under which Confucius refused to eat must have hanged over the mind of his wife at the kitchen like the sword of Damocles, and eventually caused her to make up her mind one fine morning. It was quite within reason, for instance, that 'when fish was not fresh, and meat was bad-smelling, he would not eat ; when the colour was bad, he would not eat ; when the flavor was bad, he would not eat'. But when 'he would not eat because a dish was overdone or underdone', was the wife of Confucius to stand over the boiling pot like a guard over a nationally well-known gangster, at the risk of seeing her man starve for another fine half day ? The article that he would not eat 'when a thing was not in season' meant extra time and caution at buying in the market. But when 'he would not eat, when the meat was not cut into perfect squares, and he would not eat, when it was not served with its proper sauce', the idea of running away must have already dawned in her mind. The worm was turning. And when, for one reason or another, she could not get up a proper meal, but could ask her son, Li, to run across and get some bacon and some wine to humour him and be through with the darned meal, she might still consent to stay. As it happened, she learned that 'he would not take wine that was not home-brewed or pickled meat that was bought from the streets', so what could the wife do except pack up and go away ? That last scene with Confucius, in which she delivered her mind of Confucius, is waiting for some great playwright to write up as the climax of a modern feminist drama. Greater, infinitely greater, than Dora's speech in leaving the Doll's House.

This instance of Confucius is given to illustrate the kind of problems that lie back of marriage and its failures. Two beings, biologically dissimilar, and actually leading two lives, are constrained to lead one. The response to surroundings must necessarily be dissimilar, and only an old couple, with a fundamental respect and liking for each other, and willing to give and take, can, with the exercise of vigilant common sense, toleration and subtle understanding, ever make a go of it. When this condition fails, the marriage breaks, and for it there is no remedy. The East, which regard the family as a social affair and the basis of society, take to concubinage, keeping the family as a social unit intact, while the West, which regard marriage as an individual, sentimental and romantic affair (sic !) go for divorce. Now the East are copying the West, but whoever believes that divorce is a true solution ? It is merely as we say in Chinese, 'a solution of no solution', like concubinage itself. There is no such thing as fairness or equality, for it is invariably the woman who suffers. The question is under which system she suffers more. Under the old system, when the man gets tired of his wife and takes his favorite home as concubine, the wife still retains her high position in the family, surrounded by her children, and holding at least a theoretic supremacy over the concubine. Above all, her personal position in the family is kept, and her home is not broken up. In the West, the woman sues for divorce, gets her alimony and goes away to live alone, or re-marry, or become a social lioness. In China, where women have not the spirit of independence of their western sisters, the situation is quite different. It has sometimes seemed to me that the old wife who is cast away to live a solitary life, with her home broken and her position as matriarch lost, is an infinitely pathetic spectacle. In olden days, when a maiden was, by the force of circumstances, involved with a married man, she was, if she was really in love with him, willing to go to his home as his concubine and serve the wife with respect and honour. Now driving one another out in the name of monogamy seems to be the modern fashionable way. It is the so-called emancipated, civilized way. In this battle against their own sex, the young must win out against the old. But if the women prefer it that way, let them have it, since it is they who are primarily affected by it. In any case, there is a happy and an unhappy woman in it. The problem is so new and yet so old. There is no such thing as fairness and equality. I hear Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks are estranged. I am interested not in what Doug thinks, but in what Mary thinks about this internecine war of the fair sex. If Mary were a good Chinese girl, she would let Doug take his concubine, watch how his passion cools after a time, and retain her lordship over Doug. Doug would then have plenty of time to learn what is love and some day come to his senses. Again, this is their own business, but again my thoughts are my own. [Russ1]

- 1935.06.23 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Reginald Bridgeman. 23 Juni 1935.
Dear Bridgeman, Thank you for your letter of June 20. I feel strongly that there ought to be in England such a society as 'les Amis du peuple Chinois', and think you should, if possible, have, as that society has, a committee with no definite political bias. I cannot, however, sign the draft letter you enclosed, unless certain alterations are made in it... I cannot understand your policy, if you keep clause 6. The Chinese cannot resist Japan without foreign help, and any foreign help must take the form of 'interference in the internal struggle of the Chinese people'. And how can you, at one and the same time, blame Nanking for giving way to Japan, and tell Nanking that, however they may resist Japan, we won't raise a finger to help them ? I suppose your view is that, if none of the Western Powers interfere, Russia will be able to keep the Chinese Communists from being defeated by Nanking ; that is to say, you want Russia alone to 'interfere in the internal struggle of the Chinese people'. This is a natural view for a Communist, but not for any one else.
For my part, I lost the desire to befriend the Chinese Government in 1927 ; it then became apparent that internal dissensions would continue to make China powerless, and the brutalities of the suppression of the Communists disgusted me. Now, however, Japan is so dangerous that I wish something could be done. Nothing can be done without American readiness to fight, and America is not at present prepared for war. When America is seriously willing to fight, perhaps something may be achieved without fighting ; till then, Japan can't be stopped unless as part of a world war in which Japan would be allied with Germany.
Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]
- 1938 Lu, Xun. *Lu Xun quan ji* (1938).
But there are two more types. One, those who regard the Chinese as an inferior race deserving to remain so, and therefore deliberately praise the old things of China. Two, those who want peoples to be different so as to increase their interest in travel, seeing the queue in China, wooden sandals in Japan, bamboo hats in Korea ; if clothes were the same, it would be no fun, and therefore oppose the Europeanization of Asia. Both the types are despicable. As for Bertrand Russell, who praised the Chinese because he saw sedan-chair carriers smiling around the West Lake, perhaps he meant something else. But if the sedan-chair carriers were able not to smile at their passengers, China would have long ago ceased to be what it is today. [Russ44]
- 1942 Zhang, Shenfu. *Luosu : xian dai sheng cun zui wei da de zhe xue jia*. [Bertrand Russell, the greatest philosopher alive in the Modern age]. [ID D28407].
Russell, the great scholar of enlightenment realism is the most well-known modern thinker in the world of Western philosophy. Russell's works have been translated into more foreign languages than that of any philosopher alive today. Russell's philosophy is complex and cannot be explained in a few simple terms. The source of his original contribution must be traced to his masterwork, the Principia mathematica, which opened up a new page in both mathematical logic and philosophy. Russell has often said, and I always agreed with him : 'No problem in philosophy can be truly solved unless there is a breakthrough in mathematical logic'. Currently Russell is working on an autobiography that is eagerly awaited by readers all over the world. His thought, like his personal demeanour, is thoroughly revolutionary. He is capable of evoking intense admiration. This can be seen in the powerful loyalties he has generated among the women who have shared his life. Since Russell is a powerful and attractive personality, he has been, naturally, envied, and even hated by some people. His commitment to science and democracy have not always received a supportive response. Some people hate him, just because others love him too much, especially women. [Russ6]

- 1942 Zhang, Shenfu. *Zhu Luosu qi shi*. [Bertrand Russell zum 70. Geb.]. [ID D28408].
Bertrand Russell is the greatest philosopher of mathematical logic. He is a veteran soldier of the new enlightenment trad that has brought science to the study of human nature. Every new philosophy has its own methodology. Russell's pathbreaking method is that of logical analysis. If you want to truly understand Russell's philosophy, you have to understand the tradition of British empiricism out of which Russell emerges. His goal was to set mathematics on a firm foundation of logical proof. In this he succeeded admirably. [Russ6]
- 1942 Russell, Bertrand. *A fresh look at empiricism, 1927-42*.). In : Russell, Bertrand. Basic writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959. (New York, N.Y. : Simon and Schuster, 1961).
Dr. [John] Dewey and I were once in the town of Changsha during an exlipse of the moon : following immemorial custom, blind men were beating gons to fritter the heavenly dog, whose attempt to swallow the moon is the cause of eclipses. Throughout thousands of years, this practice of beating gons has never failed to be successful ; every eclipse has come to an end after a sufficient prolongation of the din. This illustration shows that our generalization must not use merely the method of agreement, but also the method of difference. [Russ80]
- 1942-1943 Jiang, Menglin. *Xi chao*. [Über Bertrand Russell]. [ID D28409].
It was due to Bertrand Russell that young minds began to get interested in principles of social reconstruction, which roused them against both religion and imperialism, is highly inaccurate. First, the exploration of the question of social reconstruction was the major theme of the May Fourth Period, and Russell was invited to China in part because his social philosophy responded to the questions the Chinese were already asking. Second, Chinese antipathy toward religion long antedated Russell's visit. (The Boxer Rebellion in 1900 was in part an anti-Christian movement; and anti-Confucianism, to the extent that Confucianism may be called a religion, was part of the fabric of the May Fourth Movement.) And third, hostility toward imperialism was as old as nineteenth-century gun-boat diplomacy and was exacerbated further by events of the early twentieth century, including particularly the results of the Versailles Peace Settlement of 1919. The Chinese did not need Russell to stimulate their ire against imperialism. [Russ10]
- 1944 Russell, Bertrand. *My mental development*. (1944). In : The philosophy of Bertrand Russell. Ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp. (Evanstone : Northwestern University, 1944). (The library of living philosophers ; 5). In : Russell, Bertrand. Basic writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959. (New York, N.Y. : Simon and Schuster, 1961).
China did one thing for me that the East is apt to do for Europeans who study it with sensitive sympathy : it taught me to think in long stretches of time, and not to be reduced to despair by the badness of the present. Throughout the increasing gloom of the past twenty years, this habit has helped to make the world less unendurable than it would otherwise have been. There was much that I found admirable in the Chinese tradition, but it was obvious that none of this could survive the onslaughts by Western and Japanese rapacity. I fully expect to see China transformed into a modern industrial state as fierce and militaristic as the powers that it was compelled to resist. I expected that in due course there would be in the world only three first class powers – America, Russia and China – and that the new China would possess none of the merits of the old. These expectations (in 1920) are now being fulfilled. [Russ41,Russ80]
- 1948 Feng, Yu-lan [Feng, Youlan]. *A short history of Chinese philosophy* [ID D10068].
Feng Youlan pointed out that what John Dewey and Bertrand Russell mainly lectured about in China was their own philosophy : “This gave their hearers the impression that the traditional philosophical systems had all been superseded and discarded. With little knowledge of the history of Western philosophy, the great majority of audiences failed to see the significance of their theories. One cannot understand a philosophy unless at the same time he understands the earlier traditions that it either approves or refutes. So these two philosophers, though well received by many, were understood by few. Their visit to China, nevertheless, opened new intellectual horizons for most of the students at that time. In this respect, their stay had great cultural and educational value. [Russ43]

- 1951 Bertrand Russell : "I love the Chinese but it is obvious that the resistance to hostile militarism must destroy much of what is best in their civilization. They seem to have no alternative except to be conquered or to adopt many of the vices of their enemies." [Russ41]
- 1953 Russell, Bertrand. *What is an agnostic ?* In : Look magazine (1953). In : Russell, Bertrand. Basic writings of Bertrand Russell, 1903-1959. (New York, N.Y. : Simon and Schuster, 1961).
The oldest known Chinese sage is Laotzu, the founder of Taoism... Laotzu describes the operation of Tao as 'creation without possession, action without self-assertion, development without domination'. I think one could derive from these words a conception of the ends of life as the reflective Chinese see them, and it must be admitted that they are very different from the ends which the white men have set before themselves. Possession, self-assertion, domination, are eagerly sought, both nationally and individually... Comparing the civilization of China with that of Europe, one finds in China most of what was to be found in Greece, but nothing of the other two elements of our civilization, namely Judaism and science... What will be the outcome of the contact of this ancient civilization with the West ?
The Japanese adopted our faults and kept their own, but it is possible to hope that the Chinese will make the opposite selection, keeping their own merits and adopting ours... The distinctive merit of our civilization. I should say, is the scientific method ; the distinctive merit of the Chinese is a just conception of the ends of life. It is these two that one must hope to gradually uniting. [Russ80,Russ41]
- 1956-1957 Mou, Zongsan. *Ren shi xin zhi pi pan* [ID D17143].
Mou geht von Immanuel Kants Analyse des Verstandesvermögens aus und verbindet diese unter anderem mit Bertrand Russells und Ludwig Wittgensteins Theorien der Mathematik und Logik. Im Vorwort der Neuauflage von 1988 schreibt er : Der grösste Fehler besteht darin, dass ich damals nur den logischen Charakter des Verstandes zu verstehen vermochte, nicht hingegen Kants System des 'ontologischen Charakters des Verstandes'. [Kant3]
- 1962 *Pacifism of Bertrand Russell and A.J. Muste* :
<http://www.san.beck.org/GPJ24-Russell,Muste.html>.
In November 1962 Russell was similarly involved in mediating the border dispute between China and India in Kashmir. In numerous telegrams to Nehru and Zhou Enlai, Russell urged a cease-fire and withdrawal so that negotiation and arbitration could settle the conflict. He also urged President Sukarno of Indonesia and U Thant to help mediate. In this situation India, which as a neutral nation, had so often pleaded for peaceful relations, seemed to be overcome by war hysteria, and thus Russell found that the nation for which he had the most sympathy again was being the most unreasonable. This time Zhou Enlai exercised wisdom and thanked Russell for his peacemaking efforts.
- 1962.09.17 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhang Shenfu. 17. Sept. 1962
It was very rewarding for me to receive your thoughtful and kind letter. I am enclosing to you a copy of a programme given to me on the occasion of my ninetieth birthday, which I value and should wish you to have. I am also sending you a copy of my History of the world in epitome which I hope you will like. I should very much like to see you again to discuss all that has happened in the years since we last met. Naturally, those who write about one have their own particular Veltanschauung [sic], which affects their vision of oneself. I am not publishing my autobiography until after my death, because there is so much that affects contemporary events, and because there is much that I am hoping to add to it. The danger of nuclear war is overwhelming and terrifying, and I feel that I must do anything I am able to prevent it. I hope that you will write again, because it was a source of pleasure for me to hear from you. [Russ8]

- 1962.11.09 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Jawaharlal Nehru. Plas Penrhyn, 9. Nov. 1962.
Dear Mr. Nehru, Our recent correspondence concerning our mutual hopes for peace in this dangerous world makes me conscious that in this time of trial for India you will wish for her friends to be visible and outspoken. A count myself as a life-time friend of India and an admirer of your own efforts for peace. It is out of such feelings that I write to you now. The tragic deterioration of relations between India and China holds the most grave forebodings as I am sure you are deeply aware. I feel a sense of urgency because the general outbreak of fullscale war between India and China can not but lead to a world conflagration. I know and painfully understand the difficult choices you face. Events, however, should they advance further in this direction, will permit no return. Should this occur India's vital interests will not be served but irrevocably harmed. Should China be expansionist to the point of wishing such a conflict, every step should be taken to make such policy difficult to sustain. Should she be uncertain as to whether her claims ought to be pressed at such cost and danger, every possibility of permitting this consciousness to reach the level of policy should be pursued. I feel that the offer of Chou En-Lai for cease-fire, even if at terms which entail sacrifice, should be accepted if only to enable talks to begin and fighting to cease... Should Chou En-Lai become so unreasoning as to discard any willingness to end fighting what can be in store other than great war between one-third of the world's people ? We know that general nuclear war will be soon upon us if this takes place... [Russ36]
- 1962.11.16 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 16.11.1962. [Extract].
The Chinese attacks on the border with India were in self-defence and that it is hoped that Bertrand Russell can use his influence to promote a peaceful settlement.
Zhou Enlai appeals for Russell to use his influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.
Zhou Enlai comments that so long as there is a ray of hope China will continue to work towards a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute. He also urges Russell to use his 'distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question.
Zhou Enlai tells Russell that the Chinese government will continue to strive 'for a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question'. He hopes Russell will use his distinguished influence to promote a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question. [MML]
- 1962.11.24 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 24.11.1962. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai states that the Chinese government hopes that the Indian government will be willing to change its past attitude and sincerely settle the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations.
Zhou Enlai hopes that Russell will continue to use his distinguished influence to urge the Indian Government to respond positively to the Chinese governments.
Zhou Enlai welcomes Russell's support of the Chinese cease-fire proposal. He notes that the Indian government has repeatedly rejected any Chinese proposals, and hopes that the Indian government will be willing to change its past attitude and sincerely settle the Sino-Indian boundary question through friendly negotiations. [MML]

- 1962.12.28 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Jawaharlal Nehru. Plas Penrhyn, 28. Dez. 1962.
Private & Confidential
Dear Mr. Nehru, Thank you for your letter of December 20. I find it extremely painful to be in any degree of disagreement with you. As for the material which caused my doubts, I had long interviews in London with your Deputy High Commissioner and, also, with the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires. It was quite impossible for me to know which of them, if either, was giving an accurate account of the matter. The only conclusions to which I was able to come from my talks with them supplemented by all the information that I could get hold of from the documents they each gave me as well as from other sources was that each side had a case and that it should be left to expert impartial examination to decide as to the justice of the rival claims.
Apart from the rights and wrongs of the original dispute, the Chinese unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal seemed to me a generous action showing a real desire for Peace. I thought that India should have given a more welcoming response to their gesture. I think, further, that the questions of who was the first aggressor and of which of two provisional lines should be adopted during negotiations, are less important than the grave dangers involved in a long war, and both India and China will be gravely to blame if they insist upon this or that provisional line as a condition for negotiations.
I have been alarmed by your public mention of a 'long war'. Such a war would be infinitely dangerous and can only be justified by considerations of 'honour' and 'prestige'. Whipping up of nationalist war-like feeling by professed disciples of Gandhi inevitably throws doubt upon the sincerity of Indian professions in past years.
It is very kind of you to offer to send me the correspondence between your Government and that of China, and, if you do so, I shall read it with the utmost care.
Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]
- 1963 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 30.5.1963. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai expresses China's view on the border dispute with India. China wants an amicable settlement of its boundary questions through peaceful negotiations on the basis of equality. [MML]

1963.03.19 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 19. März 1963.

Dear Mr. Chou En-Lai, I have read with interest your statements concerning the Colombo proposals and I am heartened that your Government accepts them in principle. I am anxious, however, about the difference in interpretation placed upon the proposals by Mr. Nehru and yourself.

I believe that the unilateral cease-fire of your Government and the withdrawal of your forces indicates clearly the sincerity of your desire for an understanding with the Indian Government on the border question. The fact that your forces are now substantially behind the positions of September 8th, 1962, which Mr. Nehru has said earlier were the circumstances necessary for his willingness to enter talks, speaks again of Chinese sincerity.

You will appreciate, therefore, that in writing to you now I do so with awareness of your efforts to solve this dispute and with sympathy for them. I believe that the issue separating your Government and that of Mr. Nehru from beginning bilateral negotiations consists of the disposition of Indian troops in the Eastern sector and of Indian civil check-points in the Western sector. I understand that China feels that the withdrawal of her troops to twenty kilometres behind the McMahon Line should not herald the advance of Indian forces into the vacated area. I also understand that China objects to Indian civil check-points in the Western sector from which Chinese troops have withdrawn.

Would it not be possible to have the consistent principle apply wherein the civil authorities of both China and India could set up check-points in the vacated areas of all sectors without regard to the final determination of any part of the boundary ? Final determination would wait upon bilateral negotiations between India and China.

Would it not further be possible for Madame Bandaranaike to appeal for talks to begin immediately on the ground that the differences now separating China and India, as regards the conditions for talks, are so slight as hardly to justify continued dispute ? You will understand how anxious I am that talks begin as soon as possible and in the best possible spirit and it may be that a suggestion from Madame Bandaranaike would facilitate the immediate commencement of them. I assure you I have sympathy for your efforts to settle this dispute amicably and that I shall continue to seek to facilitate this to whatever extent I am able.

There is a particular point about which I should wish to seek your advice. I should be happy and anxious to have a first hand account of the Chinese feelings and Chinese advances. If it would be possible for you to invite two of my representatives to come to China, so that I might have this opportunity. I should be in your great debt. I should dearly wish to come myself, but age prevents this. I hope you will not mind my asking this of you.

With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]

- 1963.05.22 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Plas Penrhyn, 22. Mai 1963.
Dear Madame Bandaranaike,
I am very grateful for your kind letter with which I am in complete agreement. I appreciate very much your unrelenting efforts to bring about a settlement between India and China and feel honoured that I should be able to assist.
I was interested to learn that Mr. Chou En-Lai has indicated that he is ready to start talks either in Peking or in New Delhi at any time. I realized that China had been calling for negotiations, but not the extent to which the position they maintained conformed to the entirety of the Colombo proposals.
I am most anxious to pursue your suggestion of a further appeal to Mr. Nehru. May I ask if it would be possible for you to receive two personal representatives from me for the purpose of discussing with them how most effectively to conduct this appeal and to further the work for a settlement in the Sino-Indian dispute. It is my hope that after their discussion with you they could proceed on my behalf to New Delhi to meet with Mr. Nehru and to convey to him the appeal from me that you mention. I feel that it is in Mr. Nehru's hands to permit peace between India and China or to create, at best, a Cold War as between those two countries, the onset of a disastrous arms race, the involvement of South East Asia in the military consequences of such a contest, the intrusion of the Cold War Powers, and an end to Asian neutralism...
With my warm good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]
- 1963.06.05 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Zusammenfassung].
Zhou Enlai makes reference to the fact that China has successively taken a series of important measures on its own initiative in order to promote Sino-Indian negotiations.
Zhou Enlai would warmly welcome Russell's personal visit to China, if health condition permits it. He comments that he would welcome the visit by Russell's representatives, and gives an outline of the steps China has taken towards securing a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute. He also points out to Russell that facts about Tibet contained in unarmed victory are inconsistent with the historical facts.
He said he had been reading a summary of 'Unarmed Victory' in Chinese. (This was presumably prepared specially for him : no Chinese translation was ever published). He seemed quite pleased with the book, which at the time was one of the few Western documents which attempted to put China's case sympathetically, though Russell made no bones about his detestation of Chinese communism or his immense respect for Nehru and the Indian policy of non-alignment. Zhou thought, that Russell had made mistakes about Tibet, the McMahon Line, and China's foreign policy. (He sent the Chinese Chargé d'Affaires to Wales to put him right). He also dismissed the differences between India and China over the Colombo proposals as unimportant matters could be resolved in negotiations. [Russ36,MML]

1963.06.14 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 14. Juni 1963.

Dear Premier Chou En-lai,

I am grateful to you for your instructive and generous letter to me, and I value the opportunity to send my personal associates to China. I have been deeply impressed by the initiatives that your Government has taken with a view to bringing about a settlement of the dispute between China and India, and by the fact that you have done more than has been asked of your Government by the Colombo Powers with respect, to the withdrawal of your troops in the Central and Eastern Sectors, although you were not obliged to do so by the recommendations of the Colombo Powers. I further understand that China has, in addition to releasing all military personnel, returned all captured military equipment to the Government of India. These steps, and the repeated guarantee on the part of China that negotiations between the two countries may be conducted without any assumptions as to where boundary lines and troop positions are to be placed, have impressed me with the entire sincerity of your Government in its desire to settle this dispute.

I agree with you when you say that the Indian Government has failed to provide one initiative or conciliatory gesture such as might allow a friendly atmosphere and the onset of serious negotiations. I recognize, also that there is every reason to suspect the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate. I suggest, however, that, assuming all this to be the case, it would be in China's interests to accept the Indian interpretation of the proposals. There would be two advantages in this course : first, that it would probe the sincerity of India's professed willingness to negotiate ; and second, that, if India proved insincere and refused to negotiate, even the habitual practice of misrepresentation by the West would not be able to conceal from world opinion that China is eager for peace, and India is not. I suggest that these considerations should outweigh your justifiable objection to Indian civilian officials in Aksai Chin. It seems to me that it would not be 'appeasement' or 'weakness' should China say that, unreasonable as it is for India to presume to suggest that there could be pre-conditions for negotiations, , China is prepared to allow these civilian posts so that India will have no further stated grounds to use as pretexts for failing to begin negotiations.

I have persistently urged India to begin negotiations, first on the basis of your proposals of October 24th, then on the basis of your interpretation of the Colombo proposals. I have written to Prime Ministers Nehru and Bandaranaike and to U Thant in this sense. I have appealed to all those Indians with whom I have had association during many years. You will understand, therefore, that I have not sought to persuade only China to make concessions or have at any point envisaged impairing the position of your Government or your people. Should China state that she considers India's demands to be unreasonable in the extreme but, nonetheless, as a test of India's sincerity, will permit a certain number of Indian civilian posts in the area north of the line from which Chinese troops have withdrawn 20 kilometres in the Western Sector, there would be nothing India could do except agree to negotiate or accept exposure before the world.

I am well aware of the difficulties which were imposed upon the conflict between China and India through the intrusion of the United States and Britain. It is clear to me that they are encouraging India to arm to the teeth and to harbor long-term hostilities toward China. It is largely because of this that I urge you to remove the last obstacle to negotiations. This, to my mind, is the course of strength and is not appeasement or unlimited concession. It seems to me that, should China remove every vestige of nominal Indian objections to beginning negotiations, China would both force India to come to the Conference table and release many forces within India which could then agitate for peace and understanding and agreement. Although the Colombo proposals as interpreted are weighted to India's advantage, they are, as all the participating members have pointed out, recommendations, and have only the force of suggested arrangements such as to facilitate negotiations. You yourself have pointed this out to me. It seems to me, therefore, that it would be possible for China to accede to such interpretations as India unreasonably insists upon, so that the danger of provocations or of foreign intervention or of a deteriorating situation may be avoided.

I am grateful for your frankness in putting to me your view in China and Tibet, and I am taking care to study them and also your Government's position on the overall question of

peace and war.

With good wishes and high regard, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell [Russ36]

- 1963.07.21 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 5.6.1963. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai states that the Chinese and Indian armed forces have disengaged and the border situation has eased. [MML]
- 1963.07.29 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Zhou Enlai. Plas Penrhyn, 29. Juli 1963.
Dear Premier Chou,
My representatives have given to me a full account of their discussions with Prime Minister Nehru, Prime Minister Bandaranaike and yourself. I have been deeply interested in their reports and find myself fully informed of the discussions which occurred. They have also given to me a detailed description of their impressions of the development and advance in China since 1949.
I consider the new posture of Mr. Nehru, advanced in his talks with my associates, to be very important. It is my hope that he will, as you request, confirm in writing that which he said to my associates and which he asked them to convey to you.
I entirely endorse the suggestion they made to Mr. Nehru which prompted his response. I consider all those initiatives undertaken by you previously to be admirable, particularly as they occurred without such assurances in advance as are now obtainable from Mr. Nehru with respect to the hoped-for negotiations. I also have place hope in your earlier statements concerning your determination to remove any obstacles in the way of genuine negotiations. As I explained in the letter carried by my colleagues, concessions designed to probe finally the sincerity of Indian willingness to settle the dispute seemed to me to be desirable for the sake of normal relations and an end to the threat of conflict. All the more reason why the 'no man's land' formula gains in importance for the guarantee of negotiations which consider the overall issue. I remain hopeful that Mr. Nehru's response will be communicated to you and that you will, accordingly, find a way to remove such obstacles as may remain in the way of negotiations.
Your representative's words to me in London that China, for her part, was prepared to forego her right to civilian posts in the area east of the line of actual control in Aksai Chin vacated by Chinese forces were important. He had further said that for China the important issue in this connection was that it was not allowable for Indian civil posts to enter the area. Consequently, the 'no man's land' connection seemed entirely reasonable and, in fact, implied by China's own weighting of the issue : namely, that while the self-denial concerning her own civil posts was conceivable, the advent of those of India was not.
I approve of all that my representatives said on my behalf and consider them to have reflected my own feelings accurately and well. It is a disappointment to me that there should have been certain disagreements over minor matters with them. This is particularly so because during the past year my access to facts which made more clear and correct the attitude of your government with respect to the border conflict was made possible because of their efforts on my behalf. I need not tell you of the difficulty to form an accurate picture about China when restricted to information available in the West. I wish you to know that our concern for fair play with respect to China was greatly aided by the efforts of all my colleagues and I certainly endorse their endeavor on this occasion of their mission on my behalf.
I should regret that the important matter of settlement between China and India were clouded by any irrelevant issue and, therefore, desire not to express myself on other and smaller matters. I hope you will accept my sincere appreciation for your kind gifts and the opportunity given Mr. Schoenman and Mr. Pottle to see China and to act on my behalf.
With my good wishes and respect, Yours sincerely, Bertrand Russell. [Russ36]

- 1964.11.27 Letter from Bertrand Russell to Lyndon Johnson. Plas Penrhyn, 27. Nov. 1964.
Dear Mr. President,
The Vietnam crisis is one which concerns not only the citizens of the United States and of Vietnam but all human beings, since the lives of all are at stake. The American Government is hesitating (so it appears) as to whether the war should be extended to North Vietnam and to China. The war against China, if it is not nuclear, is likely to drag on inconclusively for years. It is likely that the Russians will patch up their differences with China and come to its assistance. Indeed, they have already said that they will come to the assistance of North Vietnam. It will soon become evident, in that case, that neither side can defeat the other except by employing nuclear weapons. In the heat of battle, each side will consider such employment essential. The result will be the extermination of the human race... [Russ36]
- 1965.10.22 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 22.20.1965. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai agrees with Russell's condemnation of U.S. imperialism for its criminal aggression in Vietnam.
Zhou Enlai agrees with Russell that the chief threat to world peace is U.S. imperialism. He also comments that the struggle against U.S. imperialism is at present the key to the cause of the people of the world defending peace. [MML]
- 1966 Letter from Zhou Enlai to Bertrand Russell. 4.1.1966. [Extract].
Zhou Enlai thanks for the confidence and support Russell have shown in the Chinese government and people.
Zhou Enlai praises Russell's noble efforts in opposing U.S. imperialist policies of aggression. [MML]

1979

Interview : Zhang Shenfu and Vera Schwarcz about Bertrand Russell.

Zhang Shenfu : I believe I understand Russell. Maybe I am the only one in China who really does. Russell himself did not understand Confucius. But, in fact his thought is very close to Confucius. I see this similarity even if nobody else does. Even if Russell were to deny it. My philosophy brings them together. I am like a bridge (qiao liang), you might say. Among all philosophers I have read, and there have been so many, those two are the ones I respect and admire the most.

I did not invite Russell to China – Liang Qichao did. I did not translate his public lectures. Zhao Yuanren, an American-educated young man, did. I did not even translate Russell's lecture notes. A member of the New Tide Society, Sun Fuyuan did. I was not even involved in the founding of the Chinese 'Russell Society' in 1921. I had already gone to France. Your friend does not tell my story but that of others who stayed on in China after I left. I did something else, something maybe more important. I translated Russell's philosophy. I introduced him to Chinese readers as an important modern thinker. I think I set the stage for informed appreciation.

I was the first to translate most of Russell's key texts into Chinese. Others followed with longer books, more technical works. But I introduced all the key phrases, all the key themes. I was the first to notice and to emphasize what was new in Russell's thought. For example, I was the first to emphasize the concept of philosophy as 'the science of the possible' – though I am not sure where this concept appears in Russell's works. I was also the first to translate and interpret the logical concept of 'gui lun' – from the English 'falsification' – which is fundamental for all of logical analysis. I also translated the concept of 'analysis' very differently from all others. I used the Chinese term 'jie xi' instead of the more commonly used 'fen xi'. Why, you wonder ? Because I believe 'jie xi' is more logical. It also sounds more new somehow. 'Fen xi' suggests something being cut up. Scattered, severed – as if by one blow. 'Jie xi', by contrast is not so simple. How is it more complex, you ask ? I feel that there are many more steps involved in 'jie xi'. When something is subjected to logical analysis, it is a slow, systematic operation. 'Fen xi' was widely accepted as a synonym for 'analysis' when I began my work on Russell. But I did not think it conveys the full implications of Russell's thought. It was too simple. So I made an innovation through translation. Maybe this is my most important contribution to clarifying Russell's work in twentieth-century China.

But Russell, you see, ended up so one-sided in his philosophical outlook. His philosophy is useful in seeing only discrete parts of a problem. I wanted to think about the whole. In many ways Russell was biased. He opposed materialism. But materialism and idealism are just two sides of the same coin. Materialism does not see the heart (or 'mind', xin) while idealism fails to appreciate outward realities. My own philosophy seeks for a more comprehensive view of experience, for a more thorough realism, for an expansive objectivity. So I went back to certain ideas in Chinese philosophy – especially to the Confucian notions of 'ren' (tolerance, humanism) and 'zhong' (the unprejudiced golden mean). [Russ8]

1980

Du, Renzhi. *Bodeyang Luosu* [Bertrand Russell]. [ID D28415].

Du Renzhi's extensive review of Bertrand Russell's career in philosophy, his political activities, and his ideas about society fails to mention that Russell ever went to China in 1920-1921. Russell's book 'Bolshevism' is dismissed as 'reactionary', and although it is recognized that he also criticized the capitalist system, he is still considered a supporter of it, a philosopher who was never able to rise above his class background (except on the issue of individual freedom). Philosophically, Russell is termed a 'subjective idealist' (as opposed to 'materialist'), and on social questions he is called a 'capitalist class libertarian'. [Russ10]

- 1983 Zhang Shenfu about *The problems of philosophy* by Bertrand Russell.
 In this book Mr. Russell uses the example of the painter to talk about how an artist becomes interested in the appearance of things. By contrast, the practical person wants to know what things are really like. The philosopher, in turn, is moved by an even more profound desire to know the inner quality (ben ti) of things. According to Russell, philosophy is not the process through which one finds concrete, definite answers to this or that question. Unlike the physicist, the philosopher studies the questions themselves. Philosophical questions broaden our conception of reality. They enrich our inner feelings and imagination and diminish arbitrary self-righteousness. Arbitrary self-righteousness, Russell wrote, is difficult to undo. More difficult than acquiring Reason. Still, this is the most important object of philosophy. It is concerned with nothing less than the universe as a whole. The subject is so great that it must, by necessity, stretch our minds as well. To put it simply, it is possible for us to strive to obtain truth – a truth that is part of the great objective truth of the universe. [Russ8]
- 1983 Zhang, Shenfu. *Wo dui Luosu de zan pei yu liao jie* [ID D28256]. [My admiration for and understanding of Russell]. [Geschrieben 1983].
 To be a great philosopher, a person must be creative. He must have something original to say about the human condition and have a noble purpose in philosophizing. Russell did not fail to meet all of these criteria. Tu sum op Russell's live : he was not only a great philosopher, but also a theorist of education. He also fought for justice and peace. He was tireless in his appeal to critical reason and in the fight against Fascism. His great achievements in mathematical logic have transformed the entire philosophical world. Thus I write this article to show my admiration and respect for Russell.
 1914, when I entered Beida's undergraduate school, the library finally opened a reading room. Books in Western languages were placed on bookshelves along the walls. But the shelves were locked up most of the time. Still, I came often. Because of my frequent appearances, I became very familiar and friendly with the librarian. So, I was allowed to read whatever I wanted from the locked shelves. There were very few books in the reading room at the time. Other than a few texts on engineering, there was almost nothing that I did not read. One day, I found a very interesting book, published in the US in 1914. The title was 'Our knowledge of the external world' written by Bertrand Russell. From the first time I read it, I sensed that it was full of new meaning for me. Then, I read it two more times growing more interested in its author, Bertrand Russell.
 Russell's speeches were easy to understand, fluent, humorous and inspiring. When analyzing a problem, Russell explained the problem in simple terms. His reasoning powers were penetrating, but not without irony. But it was not a hurting sort of irony. To me, his voice sounded like spring water from a sacred mountain. It cools and clams. It also leaves one with a chilly, alert, pleasant sensation. [Russ8]

1993

Coates, Ken. *Foreword*. In : Russell, Bertrand. *The problem of China* [ID D5122]. [Enthält Text von Mao Zedong über Russell].

I

Bertrand Russell decided to reprint this book unaltered in 1966, even though, as he said at the time, hardly anything else had 'remained unchanged during the intervening forty-three years' since it was first published in 1922. The present edition is very slightly different from that of 1966, in that it includes a postscript, originally published in an earlier reissue of the book in 1926. Then, 800 unsold copies from 1922 had their appendix removed and index reset, with the postscript substituted in the space that was created by these changes.

The postscript is notable for Russell's acid summary of British policy :

"The British view is still that China needs a central Government strong enough to suppress internal anarchy, but weak enough to be always obliged to yield to foreign pressure."

In those far off days, Britain was still a major world power, and the centre of a huge empire.

This was the context in which Russell could write that

"The concentration of the world's capital in a few nations, which, by means of it, are able to drain all other nations of their wealth, is obviously not a system by which permanent peace can be secured except through the complete subjection of the poorer nations... The real government of the world is in the hands of the big financiers, except on questions which rouse passionate public interest. No doubt the exclusion of Asiatics from America and the Dominions is due to popular pressure, and is against the interests of big finance. But not many questions rouse do much popular feeling, and among them only a few are sufficiently simple to be incapable of misrepresentation in the interests of the capitalist. Even in such a case as Asiatic immigration, it is the capitalist system which causes the anti-social interests of wage-earners and makes them illiberal. The existing system makes each man's individual interest opposed, in some vital point, to the interest of the whole. And what applies to individuals applies also to nations ; under the existing economic system, a nation's interest is seldom the same as that of the world at large, and then only by accident. International peace might conceivably be secured under the present system, but only by a combination of the strong to exploit the weak."

II

These conclusions were born in upon Russell during his extended visit to China, when he lectured at the University of Peking. There he debated with Chen Tu-Tsu, the founder of the Chinese Communist Party. Among his audience was Mao Tse-Tung, then a young student. Here is what Mao wrote about the event ;

"In his lecture at Changsha, Russell... took a position in favour of communism but against the dictatorship of the workers and peasants. He said that one should employ the method of education to change the consciousness of the propertied classes, and that in this way it would not be necessary to limit freedom or to have recourse to war and bloody revolution... My objections to Russell's viewpoint can be stated in a few words : 'This is all very well as a theory, but it is unfeasible in practice'. Education requires (1) money, (2) people, and (3) instruments. In today's world, money is entirely in the hands of the capitalists or slaves of capitalists. In today's world, the schools and the press, the two most important instruments of education, are entirely under capitalist control. In short, education in today's world is capitalist education. If we teach capitalism to children, these children, when they grow up, will in turn teach capitalism to a second generation of children. Education thus remains in the hands of the capitalists. Then the capitalists have 'parliaments' to pass laws protecting the capitalists and handicapping the proletariat ; they have governments to apply these laws and to enforce the advantages and the prohibitions that they contain ; they have 'armies' and 'police' to defend the well-being of the capitalists and to repress the demands of the proletariat ; they have 'banks' to serve as repositories in the circulation of their wealth ; they have 'factories', which are the instruments by which they monopolize the production of goods. Thus, if the communists do not seize political power, they will not be able to find any refuge in this world ; how, under such circumstances, could they take charge of education ? Thus, the capitalists will continue to control education and to praise their capitalism to the skies, so that the number of converts to the proletariat's communist propaganda will diminish from day to day.

Consequently, I believe that the method of education is unfeasible... What I have just said constitutes the first argument. The second argument is that, based on the principle of mental habits and on my observation of human history, I am of the opinion that one absolutely cannot expect the capitalists to become converted to communism... If one wishes to use the power of education to transform them, then since one cannot obtain control of the whole or even an important part of the two instruments of education — schools and the press — even if one has a mouth and a tongue and one or two schools and newspapers as means of propaganda... this is really not enough to change the mentality of the adherents of capitalism even slightly ; how then can one hope that the latter will repent and turn toward the good ? So much from a psychological standpoint. From a historical standpoint... one observes that no despot imperialist and militarist throughout history has ever been known to leave the stage of history of his own free will without being overthrown by the people. Napoleon I proclaimed himself emperor and failed ; then there was Napoleon III. Yuan Shih-K'ai failed ; then, alas, there was Tuan Ch'i-jui... From what I have just said based on both psychological and a historical standpoint, it can be seen that capitalism cannot be overthrown by the force of a few feeble efforts in the domain of education. This is the second argument. There is yet a third argument, most assuredly a very important argument, even more important in reality. If we use peaceful means to attain the goal of communism, when will we finally achieve it ? Let us assume that a century will be required, a century marked by the unceasing groans of the proletariat. What position shall we adopt in the face of this situation ? The proletariat is many times more numerous than the bourgeoisie ; if we assume that the proletariat constitutes two-thirds of humanity, then one billion of the earth's one billion five hundred million inhabitants are proletarians (I fear that the figure is even higher) who during this century will be cruelly exploited by the remaining third of capitalists. How can we bear this ? Furthermore, since the proletariat has already become conscious of the fact that it, too, should possess wealth, and of the fact that its sufferings are unnecessary, the proletarians are discontented, and a demand for communism has arisen and has already become a fact. This fact confronts us, we cannot make it disappear, when we become conscious of it we wish to act. This is why, in my opinion, the Russian revolution, as well as the radical communists in every country, will daily grow more powerful and numerous and more tightly organized. This is the natural result. This is the third argument...

There is a further point pertaining to my doubts about anarchism. My argument pertains not merely to the impossibility of a society without power or organization. I should like to mention only the difficulties in the way of the establishment of such form of society and of its final attainment... For all the reasons just stated, my present viewpoint on absolute liberalism, anarchism, and even democracy is that these things are fine in theory, but not feasible in practice..."

III

Mao's letters never came to Russell's attention. I found them shortly after he died, in a collection which had been published by Stuart Schram. I was thus able to draw attention to them in a memorial collection which honoured the Russell Centenary, two years later. At that time, Mao was still wielding almost absolute power in the People's Republic of China, which he and his Party had created, unifying the country and subjecting it to powerful central control. No doubt, had he been reminded of these earlier judgements on Russell, he would have thought that they were self-evidently justified. Had he not, in 1949, brought the Communist Party into power ? Had not that victory been a feat of arms, by the Red Army moulded in the shape of his own doctrines ? Had he not then called up, in 1966, a further insurgency to prevent any thought of restoration, and oppose bureaucracy ? And had not the Great Cultural Revolution registered an apparently complete success in its struggle against 'capitalist roaders', and indeed all others who took a different view of Chinese development ? And yet, within months of Mao's death, his Cultural Revolution was repudiated, and some of its more eminent proponents in the 'Gang of Four' were on trial. The principal capitalist roader, Deng Xiaoping, was soon to become paramount leader, and China was to embark on a feverish programme of foreign investment. Multinational corporations were to become welcome. Hong Kong and Taiwanese developers built massive and luxurious hotels all over

the country from which oases great entrepreneurs could journey forth, foraging for profit. For one night's stay in these palaces, they might pay the equivalent of a peasant's annual income. Not only was all the hated apparatus feared by Mao soon to be introduced, but much of it was to be celebrated by baroque embellishment and exaggeration. Western newspapers no longer reported on youthful insurgents waving little red books, but instead described the dreadful scenes at the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, when people were crushed underfoot in the rush to subscribe to new issues.

In 1993, Chinese capitalism is developing with enormous verve and dynamism, under the benign encouragement of the Chinese Communist Party, which maintains a political regime of stringent authoritarianism. A Chinese trade union leader in Tientsin assured me that Western apprehensions concerning his members were entirely false : "They think our workers will soon demand much higher wages and better conditions", he said. "But they do not understand that labour will remain cheap in China for very many generations, because we have hundreds of millions of rural people who will accept work in the towns for very modest rewards." Modest though they may be, such rewards are still much greater than the customary earnings of poor peasants, so that the new policy is not unpopular. Indeed, the Politbureau may draw some relief from this result of controlled capitalism, with which it seems able to co-exist in comfort. For its part, Capital does not seem incommoded by the undoubted cruelties which maintain autocratic rule in China. After all, order rules. The framework of commerce is stable. One's money does not evaporate in inflation or turmoil. Everyone knows his or her place, even if he or she might wish it to be different.

Russian capitalism is an altogether feebler growth, but the Communist Party in its old form has ceased to exist there. Thus the world resumes something closer to the condition that was familiar to Bertrand Russell at the beginning of this convulsive century, against which Mao launched his ragged and heroic legions.

Russell would have drawn small comfort from this, since he was no admirer of the power structure against which both he and Mao Tse-Tung were, each in his own way, in rebellion. Neither brute force, nor sophisticated pleading, have produced the results which optimists awaited.

Yet the conflicts between rich and poor, the polarities between capitalist power centres and peripheral zones of famine, all endure. It is still too soon to put these ghostly voices behind us, if we seek a more human outcome from the world's traumas. [Russ2]

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